The effects of changes in family policy on gender differences in employment: a quantitative comparative investigation of 20 OECD countries over the years 1985-2010 by Clarke, Christopher
1 
 
 
The effects of changes in family policy on gender 
differences in employment: a quantitative comparative 
investigation of 20 OECD countries over the years 1985-
2010 
 
 
 
 
Christopher Clarke 
 
 
 
 
PhD 
University of York 
Social Policy and Social Work 
January 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis provides a quantitative comparative investigation into the effects of changes in 
family policy on gender differences in employment outcomes. Existing comparative 
research offers a sophisticated account of the influence of family policy on gender equality 
in employment – certain leave and childcare policies are found to promote female 
economic activity, especially amongst less educated women, but may at the same time also 
damage women’s occupational attainment with harmful effects that appear particularly 
severe for women with high levels of education. Yet, this existing literature does suffer 
limitations, particularly in the extent to which many studies rely on cross-sectional data 
only. The contribution of this thesis is to test whether established associations hold when 
looking at changes within countries over time. It examines how changes in family policies 
affect measures of gender differences in economic activity and occupational attainment, 
both at the overall level and when data are broken down by levels of education.  
 
Data are measured at the country-level and take time-series cross-section form, with a 
sample that stretches across 20 OECD countries and the years 1985-2010. Analysis is 
conducted primarily through fixed effects multiple linear regression. Results suggest that 
increases in certain leave and childcare policies may help close gender gaps in labour force 
participation rates, particularly but not exclusively amongst men and women with low 
education. Simultaneously, increases in leave entitlements for mothers may moderate 
gains in women’s relative access to managerial positions and top quintile wages. Notably, 
though, the damaging effects of changes in leave do not appear to apply to highly educated 
women. Thus, results are consistent with the broader argument that family policies may 
have contradictory effects on gender differences in employment, but provide less support 
for the more recent suggestion that any such ‘policy paradox’ operates neatly along class 
lines.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................... 3 
List of tables ............................................................................................................. 6 
List of figures ......................................................................................................... 11 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ 13 
Author’s declaration .............................................................................................. 14 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 15 
 
Chapter 2. Literature review and theoretical and empirical background .................. 23 
2.1. A brief overview of comparative research on the state, public policy and gender         
differences in employment ..................................................................................................... 29 
2.2. The theoretical effects of family policies on gender differences in  
employment ............................................................................................................................ 39 
2.3. Comparative empirical evidence on family policy and gender differences in  
employment ............................................................................................................................ 61 
2.4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 71 
 
Chapter 3. Methods and research strategy ............................................................. 73 
3.1. Size, scope and sample .................................................................................................... 74 
3.2. Measuring family policies ................................................................................................ 79 
3.3. Measuring gender differences in employment outcomes ............................................... 93 
3.4. Methods of analysis ....................................................................................................... 104 
3.5. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 118 
 
Chapter 4. Changes and developments in family policy, 1985-2010 ........................121 
4.1. Data and methods .......................................................................................................... 123 
4.2. Between-country differences in family policy ............................................................... 124 
4.3. Dual earner-carer leave policy ....................................................................................... 130 
4.4. Dual earner childcare policy ........................................................................................... 134 
4.5. General family support policy ........................................................................................ 138 
4.6. Overview and discussion ................................................................................................ 144 
 
Chapter 5. Do changes in family policy influence gender differences in  
economic activity? ................................................................................................151 
5.1. Data and methods .......................................................................................................... 153 
5.2. Cross-sectional associations ........................................................................................... 155 
5.3. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate ......................................................... 160 
5.4. Gender gap in usual weekly working hours ................................................................... 174 
5.5. Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 184 
 
Chapter 6. Do changes in family policy influence women’s relative position  
within the labour market? .....................................................................................191 
6.1. Data and methods .......................................................................................................... 194 
6.2. Cross-sectional associations ........................................................................................... 196 
6.3. Gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations .................. 202 
6.4. The female share of managerial employment ............................................................... 211 
5 
 
6.5. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings ...........219 
6.6. Discussion .......................................................................................................................230 
 
Chapter 7. Do the effects of changes in family policy differ by levels of  
education? ........................................................................................................... 235 
7.1. Data and methods ..........................................................................................................237 
7.2. Cross-sectional associations ...........................................................................................239 
7.3. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate, by education level ..........................248 
7.4. The female share of managerial employment, by education level ................................262 
7.5. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings, by 
education level ......................................................................................................................271 
7.6. Discussion .......................................................................................................................280 
 
Chapter 8. Discussion and conclusion .................................................................... 287 
8.1. Summary of the thesis: what was done and why ...........................................................287 
8.2. Limitations of the study ..................................................................................................291 
8.3. Synthesis of findings .......................................................................................................295 
8.4. Lessons and implications ................................................................................................298 
8.5. Final reflections and conclusion .....................................................................................308 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A. Summary of methodological and empirical aspects of twenty key  
comparative family policy studies .........................................................................................313 
Appendix B. Methodological appendix to chapter 3 ............................................................317 
Appendix C. First statistical appendix to chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7: full results for each  
indicator of family policy and gender equality in employment, by country and year ..........341 
Appendix D. Second statistical appendix to chapters 5, 6 and 7: additional regression  
models ...................................................................................................................................377 
Appendix E. Third statistical appendix to chapters 5, 6 and 7: outliers and influential  
points .....................................................................................................................................391 
Appendix F. Fourth statistical appendix to chapter 5, 6 and 7: checks and tests for the 
influence of missing data imputed using ‘last value carried forward’ or ‘next value carried 
back’ .......................................................................................................................................411 
 
References ........................................................................................................... 447 
Data sources ..........................................................................................................................467 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
List of tables 
 
Chapter 2 
Table 2.1. Leitner’s (2003) two-dimensional gender regime classification ............................ 33 
Table 2.2. Country classifications in different gender policy typologies ................................ 35 
 
Chapter 3 
Table 3.1. Countries used in twenty key comparative family policy studies and their 
frequency of inclusion ............................................................................................................. 76 
Table 3.2. Country sample for the thesis with countries sorted according to general         
family policy country groups ................................................................................................... 77 
Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics for the indicators of family policy ........................................ 80 
Table 3.4. Descriptive statistics for the indicators of gender equality in employment .......... 96 
Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics for the seven control variables used in linear               
regression models ................................................................................................................. 113 
 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.1. General family policy typology ............................................................................. 124 
Table 4.2. Summary of change in dual earner-carer leave policy ........................................ 131 
Table 4.3. Summary of change in dual earner childcare policy ............................................ 136 
Table 4.4. Summary of change in general family support policy .......................................... 140 
Table 4.5. Summary of change on the three family policy indices ....................................... 145 
 
Chapter 5 
Table 5.1. Correlations between measures of family policy and indicators of gender     
equality in labour market activity, 1998 ............................................................................... 157 
Table 5.2. Summary of change in the gender gap in the labour force participation               
rate (25-54 year olds), 1985-2010 ......................................................................................... 163 
Table 5.3. Two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the labour force       
participation rate (25-54 year olds)  ..................................................................................... 167 
Table 5.4. Alternative two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the                   
labour force participation rate (25-54 year olds) .................................................................. 170 
Table 5.5. Two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the labour force       
participation rate (25-34 year olds) ...................................................................................... 172 
Table 5.6. Summary of change in the gender gap in usual weekly working hours                   
(25-54 year olds), 1985-2010 ................................................................................................ 176 
Table 5.7. Two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in usual weekly                    
working hours (25-54 year olds)  .......................................................................................... 181 
Table 5.8. Alternative two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in usual               
weekly working hours (25-54 year olds) ............................................................................... 183 
 
Chapter 6 
Table 6.1. Correlations between measures of family policy and indicators of gender            
job segregation and equality in occupational attainment, 1998 .......................................... 198 
Table 6.2. Summary of change in the gender gap in the proportion of employees in        
‘female-type’ occupations, 1992-2010 ................................................................................. 205 
Table 6.3. Two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the proportion of       
employees in ‘female-type’ occupations .............................................................................. 207 
Table 6.4. Alternative two-way fixed effects models of the gender gap in the           
proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations ....................................................... 209 
7 
 
Table 6.5. Summary of change in the  female share of employment as managers,         
legislators and senior officials (%), 1992-2010 ......................................................................214 
Table 6.6. Two-way fixed effects models for the female share of managerial           
employment ..........................................................................................................................217 
Table 6.7. Summary of change in the gender gap in the proportion of employees                
with top quintile annual earnings, 1985-1989 to 2010 .........................................................222 
Table 6.8. Two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the proportion of        
employees with top quintile earnings ...................................................................................224 
Table 6.9. Alternative two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the             
proportion of employees with top quintile earnings ............................................................227 
 
Chapter 7 
Table 7.1. Correlations between measures of family policy and the gender gap in the      
labour force participation rate (25-49 year olds), by education level, 1997 .........................241 
Table 7.2. Correlations between measures of family policy and indicators of gender      
equality in occupational attainment, by education level, 1997 ............................................245 
Table 7.3. Summary of change in the gender gap in the labour force participation               
rate (25-49 year olds), 1992-2010ᵃ, by education level ........................................................251 
Table 7.4. Two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the labour force      
participation rate (25-49 year olds), by education level .......................................................254 
Table 7.5. Two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the labour force      
participation rate (25-29 year olds), by education level .......................................................258 
Table 7.6. Two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the labour force      
participation rate (30-34 year olds), by education level .......................................................259 
Table 7.7. Summary of change in the female share of managerial employment              
amongst managers with equivalent education, 1992-2010 ..................................................264 
Table 7.8. Two-way fixed effects models for the female share of managerial            
employment amongst managers with equivalent education. ..............................................267 
Table 7.9. Summary of change in the gender gap in top quintile earnings,                              
1985-1989 to 2010, by education level .................................................................................274 
Table 7.10. Two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in top quintile earnings,            
by education level ..................................................................................................................276 
 
Appendix A 
Table A.1. Summary of methodological and empirical aspects of twenty key               
comparative family policy studies .........................................................................................314 
 
Appendix B 
Table B.1. Tests for non-spherical errors in the regression models presented in             
chapters 5, 6 and 7 ................................................................................................................331 
Table B.2. Tests for non-stationarity and unit roots in the dependent variables                     
used in chapters 5, 6 and 7 ....................................................................................................334 
Table B.3. Tests for endogeneity in the models presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7 ...............339 
 
Appendix C 
Table C.1. Mother-specific earnings-related job protected leave, in effective weeks,                
by country ..............................................................................................................................342 
Table C.2. Father-specific job protected leave, in effective weeks, by country....................343 
Table C.3. Gender-neutral earnings-related job protected parental leave,                                  
in effective weeks, by country ...............................................................................................344 
 
8 
 
 
Table C.4. Proportion of children under three years of age in public or publicly                  
supported childcare, by country ........................................................................................... 345 
Table C.5. Proportion of children between three and six years of age in publicly run              
pre-primary education or in primary school, by country ...................................................... 346 
Table C.6. Public expenditure on childcare services per child aged under six                           
(US$ 1000s, 2005 prices 2005 PPPs), by country .................................................................. 347 
Table C.7. Child benefit per month for two children, as a proportion of an average 
production worker’s gross monthly earnings, by country .................................................... 348 
Table C.8. Tax subsidies for the family, by country .............................................................. 349 
Table C.9. Flat-rate job protected parental leave and childcare leave available                          
to mothers, in effective weeks, by country .......................................................................... 350 
Table C.10. Total effective maternity and parental leave available to mothers,                         
in weeks, by country ............................................................................................................. 351 
Table C.11. Effective childcare leave, in weeks, by country ................................................. 352 
Table C.12. Scores on the dual earner-carer leave policy index, by country ........................ 353 
Table C.13. Scores on the dual earner childcare policy index, by country ........................... 354 
Table C.14. Scores on the general family support policy index, by country ......................... 355 
Table C.15. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-54 year olds),                     
by country ............................................................................................................................. 356 
Table C.16. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-34 year olds),                     
by country ............................................................................................................................. 357 
Table C.17. Gender gap in usual weekly working hours (25-54 year olds),                                
by country ............................................................................................................................. 358 
Table C.18. Gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations              
(all ages), by country ............................................................................................................. 359 
Table C.19. Female share of employment as mangers, legislators and senior officials              
(all ages), by country ............................................................................................................. 360 
Table C.20. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual             
earnings (25-54 year olds), by country ................................................................................. 361 
Table C.21. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate for individuals with                   
low education (ISCED levels 0-2) (25-49 year olds), by country ........................................... 362 
Table C.22. Gender gap in the  labour force participation rate for individuals with                      
low education (ISCED levels 0-2) (25-29 year olds), by country ........................................... 363 
Table C.23. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate for individuals with                    
low education (ISCED levels 0-2) (30-34 year olds), by country ........................................... 364 
Table C.24. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate for individuals with            
medium education (ISCED levels 3-4) (25-49 year olds), by country .................................... 365 
Table C.25. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate for individuals with            
medium education (ISCED levels 3-4) (25-29 year olds), by country .................................... 366 
Table C.26. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate for individuals with           
medium education (ISCED levels 3-4) (30-34 year olds), by country .................................... 367 
Table C.27. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate for individuals with                 
high education (ISCED levels 5-6) (25-49 year olds), by country .......................................... 368 
Table C.28. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate for individuals with                  
high education (ISCED levels 5-6) (25-29 year olds), by country .......................................... 369 
Table C.29. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate for individuals with                  
high education (ISCED levels 5-6) (30-34 year olds), by country .......................................... 370 
Table C.30. Female share of employment as managers amongst managers with                      
low education (ISCED 0-2) (all ages), by country .................................................................. 371 
Table C.31. Female share of employment as managers amongst managers with             
medium education (ISCED 3-4) (all ages), by country ........................................................... 372 
Table C.32. Female share of employment as managers amongst managers with                     
high education (ISCED 5-6) (all ages), by country ................................................................. 373 
9 
 
Table C.33. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual            
earnings for employees with low education (ISCED levels 0-2) (25-54 year olds),                    
by country ..............................................................................................................................374 
Table C.34. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual             
earnings for employees with medium education (ISCED levels 3-4) (25-54 year olds),               
by country ..............................................................................................................................375 
Table C.35. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual            
earnings for employees with high education (ISCED levels 5-6) (25-54 year olds,),                    
by country ..............................................................................................................................376 
 
Appendix D 
Table D.1. Additional two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the labour           
force participation rate (25-54 years old), using the normal OLS standard errors ...............378 
Table D.2. Additional two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in usual weekly 
working hours, using  normal OLS standard errors ...............................................................379 
Table D.3. Additional two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the               
proportion of employees with top quintile earnings, using CRSEs .......................................380 
Table D.4. Additional two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the                     
labour force participation rate (25-49 year olds), by education level, with interaction            
term between the dual earner policy indicators and a ‘Scandinavia’ dummy ......................381 
Table D.5. Full results from two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the           
labour force participation rate (25-49 year olds), by education level ...................................382 
Table D.6. Full results from two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the          
labour force participation rate (25-29 year olds), by education level ...................................383 
Table D.7. Full results from two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in the          
labour force participation rate (30-34 year olds), by education level ...................................384 
Table D.8. Full results from alternative two-way fixed effects models for the gender            
gap in the labour force participation rate (25-49 year olds), by education level ..................385 
Table D.9. Full results from alternative two-way fixed effects models for the gender           
gap in the labour force participation rate (25-29 year olds), by education level ..................386 
Table D.10. Full results from alternative two-way fixed effects models for the gender         
gap in the labour force participation rate (30-34 year olds), by education level ..................387 
Table D.11. Full results from two-way fixed effects models for the gender gap in                  
top quintile earnings, by education level ..............................................................................388 
Table D.12. Full results from alternative two-way fixed effects models for the gender        
gap in top quintile earnings, by education level....................................................................389 
 
Appendix E 
Table E.1. Summary of Cook’s D statistics for regression models presented in                
chapter 5 ................................................................................................................................394 
Table E.2. Summary of Cook’s D statistics for regression models presented in  
chapter 6 ................................................................................................................................396 
Table E.3. Additional two-way fixed effects regression models for the gender gap                  
in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations, and for the female                
share of managers, with possible influential cases removed ................................................398 
Table E.4. Alternative two-way fixed effects regression models for the gender gap                 
in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings, with possible          
influential cases removed ......................................................................................................400 
Table E.5. Summary of Cook’s D statistics for regression models presented in                  
chapters 7 ..............................................................................................................................402 
 
 
10 
 
 
Table E.6. Additional two-way fixed effects regression models for the gender gap                  
in the labour force participation rate for individuals with low and high education,                 
and for the female share of managers with low education, with possible influential            
cases removed....................................................................................................................... 405 
Table E.7. Additional two-way fixed effects regression models for the gender gap in              
the proportion of employees with top quintile earnings, for employees with low and 
medium education, with possible influential cases removed............................................... 407 
Table E.8. Alternative two-way fixed effects regression models for the gender gap in             
the proportion of employees with top quintile earnings, for employees with high      
education, with possible influential cases removed ............................................................. 410 
 
Appendix F 
Table F.1. Additional models of the gender gap in labour force participation rates (25-54 
year olds) with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed ............................................. 414 
Table F.2. Additional models of the gender gap in labour force participation rates (25-54 
year olds) with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed ............................................. 415 
Table F.3. Additional models of the gender gap in labour force participation rates (25-34 
year olds) with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed ............................................. 418 
Table F.4. Additional models of the gender gap in usual weekly working hours with any data 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed ..................................................................................... 421 
Table F.5. Additional models of the gender gap in usual weekly working hours with any data 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed ..................................................................................... 422 
Table F.6. Additional models of the gender gap in the proportion of employees in 'female-
type' occupations with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed ................................ 424 
Table F.7. Additional models of the female share of managers with any data imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB removed ............................................................................................................. 426 
Table F.8. Additional models of the gender gap in top quintile earnings with any data 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed ..................................................................................... 428 
Table F.9. Additional models of the gender gap in labour force participation rates (25-54 
year olds) by level of education with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed .......... 430 
Table F.10. Additional models of the gender gap in labour force participation rates (25-54 
year olds) by level of education with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed .......... 431 
Table F.11. Additional models of the gender gap in labour force participation rates (25-29 
year olds) by level of education with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed .......... 433 
Table F.12. Additional models of the gender gap in labour force participation rates (25-29 
year olds) by level of education with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed .......... 434 
Table F.13. Additional models of the gender gap in labour force participation rates (30-34 
year olds) by level of education with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed .......... 436 
Table F.14. Additional models of the gender gap in labour force participation rates (30-34 
year olds) by level of education with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed .......... 437 
Table F.15. Additional models of the female share of managers by level of education with 
any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed ...................................................................... 440 
Table F.16. Additional models of the female share of managers by level of education with 
any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed ...................................................................... 441 
Table F.17. Additional models of the gender gap in top quintile earnings by level of 
education with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed............................................. 444 
Table F.19. Additional models of the gender gap in top quintile earnings by level of 
education with any data imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed............................................. 445 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
List of figures 
 
Chapter 2 
Figure 2.1. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-54 year olds), 1985  
and 2010 ..................................................................................................................................25 
Figure 2.2. Female share of employment as managers, legislators and senior officials,  
1985 and 2010 .........................................................................................................................26 
 
Chapter 4 
Figure 4.1. Country family policy configurations, mean average 1985-2010  ......................125 
Figure 4.2. Country family policy configurations, 1985 and 2010  ........................................128 
Figure 4.3. Cross-country unweighted average score on the dual earner-carer leave  
policy index, 1985-2010 .........................................................................................................130 
Figure 4.4. Cross-country unweighted average score on the dual earner childcare  
policy index, 1985-2010  ........................................................................................................135 
Figure 4.5. Cross-country unweighted average score on the general family support  
policy index, 1985-2010 .........................................................................................................139 
Figure 4.6. Scores on the general family support policy index in 1985 and change in  
scores between 1985 and 2010  ............................................................................................141 
Figure 4.7. Change in scores on the general family support index between 1985 and  
1998 and between 1998 and 2010 ........................................................................................143 
Figure 4.8. Scores for Norway on the three family policy indices, 1985-2010 .....................146 
Figure 4.9. Scores for Germany on the three family policy indices, 1991-2010 ...................147 
 
Chapter 5 
Figure 5.1. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-54 year olds), 1998 ........155 
Figure 5.2. Gender gap in usual weekly working hours (25-54 year olds), 1998 ..................158 
Figure 5.3. The general family support policy index and the gender gap in usual  
weekly working hours ............................................................................................................159 
Figure 5.4. Cross-country unweighted average gender gap in the labour force          
participation rate (25-54 year olds), 1985-2010 ...................................................................161 
Figure 5.5. Change in the dual earner childcare policy index and change in the gender        
gap in the labour force participation rate, 1985-2010 ..........................................................165 
Figure 5.6. Cross-country unweighted average gender gap in usual weekly working          
hours (25-54 year olds), 1985-2010  .....................................................................................175 
Figure 5.7. Change in male and female usual weekly working hours between 1985  
and 2010 ................................................................................................................................177 
Figure 5.8. Change in the female employment rate and change in female involuntary       
part-time employment, 1985-2010 .......................................................................................179 
 
Chapter 6 
Figure 6.1. Gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations,       
1998 .......................................................................................................................................197 
Figure 6.2. Female share of employment as managers, legislators and senior officials,       
1998 .......................................................................................................................................199 
Figure 6.3. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile earnings,           
1995-1999 ..............................................................................................................................201 
Figure 6.4. Cross-country unweighted average gender gap in employment in               
‘female-type’ occupations, 1992-2010 ..................................................................................203 
Figure 6.5. Cross-country unweighted average female share of managerial             
12 
 
 
employment, 1992-2010 ....................................................................................................... 212 
Figure 6.6. Cross-country unweighted average gender gap in top quintile earnings,            
1985-2010 ............................................................................................................................. 220 
 
Chapter 7 
Figure 7.1. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-49 year olds), by   
education level, 1997 ............................................................................................................ 240 
Figure 7.2. The dual earner childcare policy index and the gender gap in the labour           
force participation rate for men and women with low and high education ........................ 242 
Figure 7.3. Female share of managerial employment amongst managers with          
equivalent education level, 1997 .......................................................................................... 243 
Figure 7.4. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile earnings by 
education level, 1995-1999  .................................................................................................. 246 
Figure 7.5. Cross-country unweighted average gender gap in the labour force      
participation rate (25-49 year olds), by education level, 1992-2010 .................................... 249 
Figure 7.6. Change in the dual earner childcare policy index and change in the               
gender gap in participation rates amongst men and women with low and high        
education, 1992 to 2010 ....................................................................................................... 253 
Figure 7.7. Cross-country unweighted average female share of managerial              
employment amongst managers of equivalent education level, 1992-2010 ....................... 263 
Figure 7.8. Estimated effects of changes in total effective weeks of maternity and         
parental leave available to mothers on the female share of managerial employment,            
by education level ................................................................................................................. 269 
Figure 7.9. Cross-country unweighted average gender gap in the proportion of        
employees with top quintile earnings by education level, 1985-2010 ................................. 272 
Figure 7.10. Estimated effects of changes in total effective weeks of maternity and  
parental leave available to mothers on the gender gap in top quintile earnings,  
by education level ................................................................................................................. 279 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost, I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to Naomi and Stefan. I am 
fortunate to have been placed with two such dedicated and supportive supervisors, and I 
have learned so much from them both. Without their wisdom, advice and endless patience 
I would never have got this far.  
 
I would like to thank the ERSC for financial support, and all at SPSW for providing me with 
the opportunity to study in the Department. Special thanks are due to Antonios, Chris, Caz, 
Dan, John, Mary, Richard and Stuart for all they have taught me, and also to Ange, Jane, 
Sam and Sharon for always being so helpful throughout the process. Huge thanks also to 
Dom for his advice and guidance over the past couple of years. 
 
A debt of gratitude is owed to friends and family. Thanks to my fellow students – Abby, 
Adam, Amy, Charlotte, Gill, Hannah, Harriet, Katie, Sarah B-W and Sarah C – particularly 
for their tolerance of my periodic work-related crises. Special thanks also to Alex, Annika, 
Drew, Ed, Fripps, Joe, Jonnie, Lewis, Si, Tommy and Will, all of whom are owed several 
pints each. Needless to say, endless thanks are due to Mum and Dad for everything they 
have ever done for me.  
 
Finally, to Ruth, I’m not sure there is much I could say that would do justice to all your love 
and support over the past few years. Thank you for always being there, and for never 
losing your sense of humour despite all the self-sacrifice. You have made our time in York 
special and I owe you everything.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
Author’s declaration 
 
The work presented in this thesis is my own and has not been submitted for any other 
award at the University of York or any other institution. All sources are acknowledged as 
references. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
The role played by family policies in reducing or reinforcing gendered labour market 
outcomes has attracted much attention over the past two decades or so. Although the term 
‘family policy’ is slightly fuzzy and not firmly defined (Thévenon, 2011: 60), research 
proceeds under the premise that state legislated policies – including but not limited to 
parental leave entitlements, public childcare provisions and family-related tax and 
transfer policies – can and do influence gender differences in employment in various ways. 
Particularly important here has been research that adopts a comparative perspective on 
links between family policy and gender equality in employment. These studies, which take 
advantage of cross-national or temporal variations in both policy provision and 
employment outcomes, have generated numerous insights into how family policy may 
impact on gender differences in employment outcomes. 
 
First off, a substantial body of comparative research finds that family policies influence 
gender differences in economic activity and market participation (e.g. Winegarden and 
Bracy, 1995; Gornick et al, 1998; Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006; 
Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012; Korpi et al, 2013; Thévenon, 2013). Family policies that are 
aimed at encouraging female employment and ‘dual earning’ within couples – such as 
public childcare provisions and certain parental leave entitlements – are generally found 
to promote equal market participation (Pettit and Hook, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 
2006; Misra et al, 2011; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). 
Conversely, policies that are more supportive of the traditional nuclear family unit – such 
as family-related tax and transfer policies – are often found to constrain female 
employment and inflate gender differences in economic activity (Korpi, 2000; Jaumotte, 
2003; Thévenon, 2013; Korpi et al, 2013). Notably, more recent comparative research 
suggests that the impact of policy is likely to differ across socio-economic groups – for 
example, ‘dual earner’ family policies appear particularly effective at promoting activity 
amongst women with lower levels of education (Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2009; 
Korpi et al, 2013). Nonetheless, associations remain apparent at the aggregate or overall 
level.  
 
Family policies may also however affect employment in ways that stretch beyond labour 
market activity. In particular, several authors argue that certain family policies play at 
least some role in the reinforcement of gender job segregation and ‘glass ceilings’ on 
women’s careers (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Misra et al, 
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2008; Mandel, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). Most important here are maternal 
leave programmes, which may inadvertently inflate gender differences in earnings and 
harden obstacles to top positions for women by weakening female skills and experience 
and by encouraging employer discrimination (Ruhm, 1998; Blau et al, 2001; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006). Importantly, the severity of these adverse ‘trade off’ effects is also likely 
to vary across groups – in this case, though, it is the careers of highly educated women that 
appear most at risk from any damaging effects attached to family policies (Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). Taken together, the broad 
suggestion from much of the comparative literature is that family policy – in a general 
sense – produces some form of ‘policy paradox’ that operates mostly to the benefit of less 
educated women at the expense of the careers of their highly educated counterparts 
(Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). 
 
This broad argument is compelling and carries considerable implications for policy 
provision – in effect, it suggests that governments need to balance the competing interests 
of different groups of women against one another. However, the empirical evidence upon 
which it and much of the wider comparative family policy literature is based does suffer 
from limitations. In particular, much of the empirical literature is cross-sectional in design 
with associations based entirely on differences between countries in family policy 
provision and gendered labour market outcomes. This is problematic because cross-
sectional associations are particularly vulnerable to bias from any ‘third’ factors omitted 
from the analysis, and because the static relations produced may say little about the 
impact of a within-country change in policy on employment outcomes (Frees, 2004; 
Dougherty, 2006; Wilson and Butler, 2007; Bartels, 2008; Fairbrother, 2014). Thus, there 
is a danger that studies based on cross-sectional data alone may produce inferences that 
are misleading or of limited practical use. 
 
One possible solution to these problems is to stretch comparative data across time, adding 
a time-series dimension to the existing cross-sectional data. This helps reduce the risk of 
omitted variable bias, as repeatedly observing the same set of countries over time enables 
analyses to control for country ‘individualness’ (Hsiao, 2003; Frees, 2004; Dougherty, 
2006), and allows for the examination of how changes in policy impact on gender 
differences in employment (Dougherty, 2006; Wooldridge, 2010). A limited number of 
comparative family policy studies have begun to do just this (Winegarden and Bracy, 
1995; Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; 
Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012; Thévenon, 2013; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013; Nieuwenhuis, 
2014). However, this emerging ‘over time’ literature concentrates almost entirely on the 
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impact of changes in policy on gender gaps in general labour market activity. Only a few 
studies cover links between family policy and women’s careers and occupational 
attainment over time (Ruhm, 1998; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 
2013), while the impact of changes in policy on outcomes across levels of education is 
severely under-researched. As a result, much of the evidence base for any ‘family policy 
paradox’ and, more so, any inter-class policy trade off continues to rely mostly on cross-
sectional data and between-country associations only. 
 
Aims and objectives of the thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide an empirical investigation into relations between 
changes over time in family policy provision and developments in various areas of gender 
equality in employment. First, it looks to examine links between changes in family policy 
and gender differences in employment outcomes at the aggregate or overall level. This 
includes relations between policy change and gender differences in the depth and extent 
of economic activity – termed here as gender equality in labour market activity – and links 
with changes in both women’s relative career attainment and the extent to which men and 
women work in different areas of the labour market – termed throughout the thesis as 
gender job segregation and equality in occupational attainment. Second, it looks to explore 
whether these relations vary across individuals with differing levels of education. These 
research aims can be summarised by the following three research questions:  
 
Q1. How do within-country changes in family policy relate to within-country changes in 
gender equality in labour market activity? 
 
Q2. How do within-country changes in family policy relate to within-country changes in 
gender job segregation and gender equality in occupational attainment? 
 
Q3. Do relations between within-country changes in family policy and within-country 
changes in the various areas of gender equality in employment differ with levels of 
education? 
 
As noted above, a limited number of comparative studies already cover relations between 
changes over time in family policy and gender equality in economic activity. Thus, to some 
degree, providing answers to the first research question represents some form of 
replication study. However, as it turns out many of these existing ‘over time’ studies may 
suffer from statistical issues – such as a lack of correction for serially correlated regression 
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errors – that are known to increase the likelihood of overly optimistic or misleading 
results. It is then worthwhile re-examining links between changes in family policy and 
gender differences in economic activity with slightly different measures and a method that 
provides a somewhat ‘harder’ test of relations.  
 
The second and third research questions address clearer gaps in the empirical literature. 
Answering the former means building and expanding upon the few comparative studies 
that briefly touch on links between policy change and women’s occupational outcomes. 
Providing answers to the latter, meanwhile, means going at least some way towards 
tackling the almost complete absence of comparative ‘over time’ research that examines 
the differential effects of changes in family policy on employment outcomes across levels 
of education.  
 
In all three cases the broader intention is to contribute to knowledge on how changes in 
family policy provision shape developments in men and women’s differential experiences 
of the labour market. This is important in any case – given the numerous social and 
economic costs associated with gender differences in employment outcomes (Fraser, 
1994; Young et al, 1994; Lister, 1997; Blau et al, 2001; Rubery et al, 2003; OECD, 2007), 
knowing whether and in what way state legislated policies affect gender equality in 
employment may be central to isolating the best route towards a fairer and more efficient 
labour market. However, the need to understand the effects of changes in family policy 
becomes particularly pressing in the context of a possible ‘policy paradox’, and in 
particular some form of inter-class policy trade off. If, as cross-sectional research suggests, 
introducing or extending certain family policies actively damages the careers of women 
who otherwise stand to gain little from the provision, decisions around which tools are 
most appropriate for a government seeking to influence gendered labour market 
outcomes become increasingly complicated, both politically (Shalev, 2008) and morally.  
 
General approach and research strategy 
 
The approach of the empirical investigation is quantitative and large-N comparative, with 
associations between changes in family policy and employment outcomes examined 
primarily through statistical analysis. The study is conducted at the country level, and is 
based on a set of secondary macro-level policy and employment data that stretch across a 
sample of twenty OECD countries and the years 1985-2010. Observing multiple countries 
at multiple points in time in this manner produces what is often called a pooled time-
series cross-section dataset, and means that the analysis can make use of variations across 
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the sample countries in within-country changes in both family policy provision and 
employment outcomes. In other words, the thesis draws on the differential experience of 
the twenty sample countries over the years between 1985 and 2010 as a means of 
understanding how changes in family policy impact on gendered labour market outcomes.  
 
The thesis uses Korpi’s (2000) conception of family policy types as its broad theoretical 
framework, although contributions and insights from number of authors – especially 
Hadas Mandel and colleagues – are also taken into account. It measures family policies 
through several quantitative indicators organised loosely around Korpi’s (2000) policy 
types – that is, around 'dual earner’ and ‘general family support’ types of family policy – 
and employment outcomes through a number of quantitative country-level indicators that 
reflect the different aspects of equality covered by the thesis’ three research questions. 
Data on family policies are drawn from numerous sources, including cross-national 
databases such as Gauthier’s Comparative Family Policy Database (2011a), MISSOC 
(2013), and the OECD Family Database (2013c), plus country-specific sources and journal 
articles. Data on employment outcomes come mostly from Eurostat Labour Market 
Statistics (2013), the ILO LABORSTA Database (2014), the Luxembourg Income Study 
Database (2014) and the OECD Employment Database (2013a). 
 
The primary method of analysis used throughout the thesis is fixed effects multiple linear 
regression, a form of regression analysis that produces estimates based on within-country 
variation – that is, changes within each country – in the included variables only. This 
technique is common in the existing ‘over time’ comparative family policy literature, but 
does suffer from drawbacks (see Shalev, 2007a). To overcome at least some of the 
limitations attached to multiple linear regression, the thesis complements its regression 
analyses with thorough descriptions of trends, changes and developments in the measures 
of both family policy and employment outcomes. Together, these dual analyses produce a 
detailed account of how changes in family policy are associated with movements in gender 
differences in labour market outcomes.   
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is structured in a relatively standard ‘IMRAD’1 format. It consists of a literature 
review, a dedicated methods chapter, four empirical chapters, and a concluding chapter 
                                                        
1 A mnemonic for ‘Introduction, Methods, Results and Discussion’, a common format for academic 
research articles with the first sections or chapters reviewing the literature and covering the 
methods used, with subsequent sections or chapters detailing the results of the research or 
analysis, and with the final setions or chapters providing a discussion and conclusion to the article.  
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that draws together and discusses findings and results.  
 
The thesis proper starts in chapter 2 with a review of comparative family policy research. 
The primary aim of the chapter is to provide a theoretical and empirical foundation for the 
thesis, as well as to clarify the rationale for the subsequent empirical investigation. 
Accordingly, the chapter starts fairly broad with an overview of wider comparative 
research on links between the state, public policy and gender differences in employment, 
before narrowing in on the comparative family policy literature specifically. It covers both 
theoretical and empirical aspects of comparative family policy research in some depth, 
adds detail to the earlier critique of existing empirical research, and emphasises the need 
for further investigation into relations between changes in family policy and gender 
differences in labour market outcomes. 
 
Chapter 3 concentrates on the data, methods and techniques used throughout the thesis. It 
outlines the size and scope of the study in terms of sample years and countries, details and 
justifies the data and indicators used to capture both family policy and gender equality in 
employment, and describes the methods and techniques used to examine links between 
changes in policy and gender differences in outcomes. This chapter is fairly lengthy as 
methods chapters go. In large part, this is because the methods used are relatively 
common across the thesis so are outlined in bulk in chapter 3 at the outset.  
 
Chapter 4 opens the empirical investigation with an examination of changes and 
developments in family policy across the twenty sample countries and years 1985-2010. It 
uses fairly simple methods – mainly table and charts – to detail and describe patterns of 
change both within and across countries, and to highlight any broader developments such 
as any convergence or divergence in provision. This exercise holds its own value – only a 
few existing studies examine changes in family policy from a broader, large-N comparative 
perspective. It also serves a more practical function, however, in that it helps set the policy 
context for the following analyses of links between changes in policy and gendered labour 
market outcomes.  
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 form the core of the thesis. Each uses both descriptive and regression 
methods to examine relations between changes in family policy and gender differences in 
employment outcomes, with the area of equality covered in each of the three chapters 
corresponding to the thesis’ three research questions. Chapter 5 considers how changes in 
policy impact on gender equality in labour market activity, and thus looks to provide 
answers to the thesis’ first research question. Chapter 6 concentrates on the second 
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research question by examining links between changes in family policy and measures of 
gender job segregation and equality in occupational attainment. Lastly, chapter 7 focuses 
on relations between policy change and gender differences in both labour market activity 
and occupational attainment across levels of education. In the process, it looks to answer 
the thesis’ third and final research question – that is, whether relations between changes 
in policy and gender equality in employment differ with levels of education.    
 
Finally, chapter 8 discusses findings and offers a conclusion to the thesis. It reviews the 
empirical investigation, highlights any limitations, and synthesises results from across the 
four empirical chapters. It also outlines any implications emerging from findings for 
knowledge and understandings of the effects of family policy on gender differences in 
employment, and looks to tease out any lessons from the thesis for future comparative 
family policy research.  
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Chapter 2. Literature review and theoretical and empirical background 
 
 
Despite decades of effort from women’s movements and notwithstanding substantial 
changes to gender differences in employment outcomes, large disparities persist between 
male and female experiences of the labour market. Across OECD countries, women are less 
likely to be employed, are likely to earn less, and are more likely to be found in insecure, 
low status and reduced hours employment than their male counterparts (Daly, 2000; 
Gornick and Meyers, 2003; Pettit and Hook, 2009). Even in the most egalitarian labour 
markets – typically, in the Scandinavian countries – the economic position of women 
continues to compare unfavourably to that of their male equivalents on a number of 
measures (Plantenga, 1995; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; 
Scott et al, 2008).  
 
From an economic perspective, low female market activity comes with substantial costs in 
terms of economic performance and the sustainability of social protection programmes 
(Klasen, 1999; OECD, 2007; Thévenon et al, 2012). Most immediately, assuming no 
systematic differences in preferences and abilities, the under-utilisation of female human 
capital represents a misallocation of productive resources and thus prevents the most 
productive economic outcomes (Dijkstra, 2000; Smith and Bettio, 2008). This is 
particularly true in many economically advanced nations, where vast expenditures have 
seen levels of female education equal or surpass that of their male counterparts – among 
younger cohorts at least (Barro and Lee, 2010) – and where skills ‘bottlenecks’ could be 
eased by highly qualified female labour (Smith and Bettio, 2008: 10). Raising female 
participation may also stimulate economic demand through increases in household 
purchasing power (Smith and Bettio, 2008: 10), and provide a boost to fiscal contributions 
that, according to Rubery et al (2003), would more than outweigh costs to the taxpayer of 
facilitating female labour supply. The latter point is particular relevant, of course, in light 
of population ageing and the escalating dependency ratios seen throughout OECD 
countries. 
 
Once inside the labour market, gender job segregation and ‘glass ceilings’ on women’s 
careers also represent a misallocation of resources (Anker, 2001; 129), again assuming no 
gender differences in preferences and abilities. Abolishing discrimination- or culture-
based gender job segregation and allocating roles according to abilities is likely to produce 
a substantial one-off gain in gross domestic product (GDP) (Tzannatos, 1999), leading to 
increases in both female and male wages (Elson, 1999). Greater diversity within the 
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workplace may also produce further long-run efficiency gains. Several studies (Carter et al, 
2007; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Dezso and Ross 2008) argue that women’s 
presence on boards or in senior management positions promotes financial performance – 
possibly because increasing the variety of viewpoints and experience on boards leads to 
better decisions, and perhaps also because opening positions to women increases the 
available talent pool for appointments (Marinova et al, 2010) – while others suggest 
increasing diversity in the workforce more generally could boost firm performance, 
particularly for companies in the service sector and especially where the prevailing level 
of diversity in the company is either very low or very high (see McMahon (2010) for a 
review). 
 
From an equity perspective, meanwhile, labour market disparities between men and 
women are not only harmful in themselves (Lister, 1997: 126), but also act to structure 
and reinforce inequality in wider society. Of course, gender equality is a vast and complex 
concept (see Fraser, 1994). However, achieving gender parity in the labour market is often 
considered key to attaining equality in other interrelated aspects of social life (Young et al, 
1994). Differences in occupational attainment play a decisive role in structuring social 
relationships, with access to resources and relative incomes in large part determining 
power and social status and consequently shaping decision-making authority (Huber and 
Spitze, 1981; Anker, 2001: 130; Blau et al, 2001: 20; Saul, 2003: 15). Okin (1989), for 
example, suggests that intra-household earnings inequalities between partners are central 
in shaping power relations, while Warren (2007: 320) states that an independent female 
wage is crucial for at least equal control over household resources. Financial dependence 
on a partner, meanwhile, decreases economic security and increases the risk of poverty – 
particularly ‘hidden poverty’, whereby economic resources are distributed unequally 
between partners so as to place one into hardship (Fraser, 1994: 598; Lister, 1997: 136; 
Pettit and Hook, 2009: 19) – while also leading to exclusion from social rights as modern 
citizenship is so deeply linked to paid employment (Sainsbury, 1996; Lister, 1997; Orloff, 
2002). And unpaid work too, is shaped by workplace inequality, with activity in the paid 
labour market playing a significant role in the determination of divisions of household 
labour (Bianchi et al, 2000; Parkman, 2004; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard, 2010). 
 
None of this is to say that women should seek to directly replicate male patterns of 
economic activity. Without going into the equality-versus-difference debate (Bock and 
James, 1992), many authors have argued that economic participation is but one of several 
differing strategies for achieving gender equity objectives (Wetterberg and Melby, 2008). 
Rather, what matters from a gender equity perspective is equality in employment – which 
25 
 
also includes changes to male employment patterns – as part of a wider shift towards 
establishing a dual earner–dual carer model as the universal norm (Fraser, 1994: 608-
609). The above is also not to say that gender inequality in the labour market is exogenous 
to wider inequalities, or that it is possible to achieve equality in the workplace without 
seeking equality elsewhere (Loufti, 2001: 5). Equality in employment and equality in other 
aspects of society are intertwined and interlinked (Young et al, 1994: 60). Nonetheless, it 
is apparent that attainment of gender equality in the economic sphere is a principle, 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for attaining equality between men and women in 
wider society (Date-Bah, 1997; Loufti, 2001: 5). 
 
Importantly, though, observed labour market inequalities are not homogenous across 
countries or over time (Daly, 2000; Van Dijk, 2001; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002; 
Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). Figure 2.1, for example, shows the male-to-female gender 
gap in the labour force participation rate for 20 OECD countries in 1985 and 2010. At both 
time points, the gap varies considerably between countries. This is particularly so in 1985 
– where gender differences range from over 50 percentage points in Greece, Luxembourg 
and Spain to just under 10 points in Denmark, Finland and Sweden – but is also true in 
2010. However, the gap also varies across time, with almost all of the countries shown 
seeing at least some decrease in the gender gap between 1985 and 2010. Clearly, gender 
differences in economic activity can and do vary, not just between countries but also 
within countries over time.   
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Figure 2.1. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-54 year 
olds), 1985 and 2010 
1985 2010
Source: OECD (2013a) 
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Similarly, differences in the position of men and women inside the labour market also vary 
both across countries and over time (Plantenga and Tijdens, 1995; Nermo, 2000; 
Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012). Figure 2.2, for instance, shows the female share of 
managerial employment across 19 OECD countries in 1992 and 2010, or the nearest years 
available. Like the gender gap in labour participation, women’s representation amongst 
managers differs substantially in the cross-section. In New Zealand in 2008, for example, 
close to 40% of managers are female, while the equivalent figure in Denmark in 2010 is 
less than 25%. Also like the gap in participation though, levels of equality are not fixed 
across time. In all but one of the 19 countries the female share increases between 1992 
and 2010, with Ireland seeing a change as large as 15 percentage points.  
 
 
These heterogeneous patterns of gender equality in employment are not trivial. Most 
immediately, they stress the need for a broader perspective on gender equality that 
stretches beyond the here and now, and that recognises that gender differences in 
employment are a non-fixed and variable phenomena that can be and have been modified. 
Through comparative logic, they also suggest that the determinants of gender differences 
must vary across time and space. Thus, these variations provide an opportunity to use 
comparison and comparative techniques to understand at least some of the drivers behind 
gender equalities and inequalities in the labour market.  
 
There are, of course, a number of factors that contribute to variations in gender 
differences in labour market outcomes. Within a given labour market, gendered 
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Figure 2.2. Female share of employment as managers, legislators and senior 
officials, 1985 and 2010 
1992 2010
Source: Eurostat (2013), ILO (2014).  
Notes: Data for Australia are for 1997 and 2008, for Austria are 1995 and 2010, for Belgium 1993 and 2010, for Canada  
1992 and 2008, for Finland 1997 and 2010, for Luxembourg 1993 and 2010, for New Zealand 1992 and for 2008, for 
Norway 1996 and 2010, and for Sweden 1997 and 2010.  
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employment outcomes are at least partly determined by individual or micro-level factors 
(Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002). These include gender differences in education and 
skills (e.g. Schultz, 1960; Mincer, 1962; Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Polachek, 1981; 
Becker, 1993; Polachek, 1995; Lips, 2013), individual perceptions of appropriate gender 
roles and household divisions of labour (e.g. West and Zimmerman, 1987; Coltrane, 2000; 
Cunningham, 2007; Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard, 2010), and employer discrimination 
(e.g. Joshi and Newell, 1987; England et al, 1988; Wright and Ermisch, 1991; Blau et al, 
2001: 213; Reskin and Bielby, 2005). In certain cases, variations in aggregations of these 
micro factors may also help explain differences in levels of equality across labour markets 
– for example, movements towards gender equality in education can explain at least part 
of the evolution of gender differences in market participation (Pampel and Tanaka, 1986; 
Goldin, 1994) and also in the gender pay gap (Blau and Kahn, 1997; Polachek, 2004). 
However, from a comparative perspective micro arguments are rarely entirely 
satisfactory. Variations in aggregations of individual-level factors often struggle to explain 
a sufficient proportion of variations in gender equality across counties (Nermo, 2000: 297; 
Pettit and Hook, 2005: 782), and in some circumstances the effects of micro determinants 
actually differ across countries2 and over time (Charles et al, 2001). 
 
Here, comparative studies often turn to macro- or societal-level factors as possible 
determinants of variations in gendered labour market outcomes. The broad argument is 
that individual employment decisions are always nested within and influenced by a 
‘societal context’, and that variation in at least some of the macro factors that contribute to 
such a context may produce systematic variation in male and female employment 
outcomes across macro units (Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002). Again, there are a 
number of possible determinants. Societal level norms and culture are likely to hold an 
influence, as, for instance, Pfau-Effinger (1998; 2004) shows in an examination of the 
manner and extent to which cultural traditions shape female labour participation (see also 
Fortin, 2005). Variations in economic structures play a role too (Pampel and Tanaka, 
1986), either directly by shaping employment opportunities and conditions, or indirectly 
by altering incentives for labour supply. For example, several studies point to the level of 
economic competition and the length of the overall wage structure as determinants of 
cross-national variation in the gender pay gap (Blau et al, 2001: 409; Blau and Kahn, 2003; 
Zweimüller et al, 2007). The proportional size of the service sector is also found to both 
promote female employment through increased labour demand, and to intensify 
                                                        
2 For instance, the response of female labour supply to male partners’ labour market assets differs 
between Germany – where a male partner’s income, education and occupational status are found to 
constrain female employment – and Denmark and Sweden – where a highly educated male partner 
increases women’s economic activity (Drobnic and Blossfeld, 2001: 378). 
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segregation of male and female labour across occupational roles (Goldin, 1990; Charles, 
1992; Esping-Andersen, 2002; Pettit and Hook, 2005; Thévenon, 2013). However, perhaps 
the most influential – or at least the most keenly studied – macro level factor is the state, 
or more specifically cross-national and temporal variations in public policies and national 
levels institutions (Daly, 2000; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002). 
 
It is here, within the comparative public policy-gender equality in employment research 
field, that this thesis is placed. This chapter reviews the comparative policy literature, with 
a view to providing a theoretical and empirical foundation for the thesis. It starts fairly 
broad in section 2.1 with a brief history and overview of comparative research on links 
between the state, public policy and gender differences in employment outcomes. The 
section touches on differing approaches to comparative policy investigation – paying 
particular attention to the contribution and limitations of the influential gender regime 
literature – before highlighting the value and worth of comparative family policy research.  
 
The remainder of the review covers the comparative family policy literature specifically 
and in some detail. As a means of organisation, it is split into two parts with the theoretical 
and empirical sides of the comparative family policy literature covered separately. It is 
worth noting that this distinction is to some extent artificial, since many of those studies 
that develop and advance theories on the effects of family policy also test and examine 
these theories using empirical evidence. However, the two sides are separated here for 
clarity and to help highlight gaps and issues in existing comparative family policy 
research. 
 
Section 2.2 covers the theoretical side of the literature. It outlines the thesis’ broad 
theoretical framework – Korpi’s (2000) conception of family policy types – and draws 
together insights from a number of authors to produce a fairly detailed theoretical account 
on the expected influence of family policy on gender differences in employment. The 
section is fairly lengthy, in large part because it provides the theoretical foundation for the 
entirety of the thesis.  
 
Section 2.3 reviews the empirical side of comparative family policy research. It covers the 
contribution of the existing empirical literature and assesses the extent to which it 
provides support for theorised relations. In doing so, it also adds detail to the critique of 
existing research first outlined in the introduction to the thesis – specifically, that much of 
the literature continues to rely on problematic cross-sectional associations only – and 
emphasises the need for further ‘over time’ investigation.     
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Finally, section 2.4 offers a conclusion to the chapter, summarises discussions from the 
preceding sections and underlines how this thesis looks to contribute to knowledge on 
relations between family policy and gender differences in employment.  
 
2.1. A brief overview of comparative research on the state, public policy and gender 
differences in employment 
 
At its most basic, the core argument behind research into the state and gender differences 
in employment is that public policies and state structures can influence employment 
outcomes, at times directly but more so by altering the context within which individual 
decisions regarding employment are made (Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002). Much of 
this influence may be gender-neutral, but in a number of cases public policies and 
institutions can produce effects that – sometimes intentionally, sometimes inadvertently – 
impact differentially on men and women. As a result, the state has the ability to moderate, 
reduce or reinforce pre-existing gender differences in employment outcomes (Daly, 2000; 
Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002).  
 
Notably, much of the early literature on the relation between gender and the state is highly 
critical, and for the most part argues that the state acts only to constrain female outcomes 
and to produce and reproduce gender inequalities (O’Connor, 1996; Orloff, 1996; 
Marinetto, 2007: 83). Perhaps the most acute examples come from radical feminism – 
which sees the state as a system purposefully designed to expand male privilege and to 
sustain female oppression by adding legitimacy to gender practices through public policy 
and institutions (Hartmann, 1976; MacKinnon, 1989) – or from socialist-feminist writers 
who view the patriarchal welfare state as a part of wider exploitation, with gender joining 
class as an axis of manipulation by the capitalist class (MacIntosh, 1976; Wilson, 1977). 
Feminist perspectives on social citizenship also emphasise the role played by public policy 
in reinforcing hierarchical gender relations. In particular, much attention has been paid to 
the manner in which modern citizenship and social rights are attached to wage-earning 
and employment status, which has obvious implications for the exclusion of women from 
rights and social provisions for as long as historical gender divisions of labour continue to 
hold (Fraser, 1987; Nelson, 1990; Fraser, 1994; Lister, 1997). 
 
These various early critical perspectives are highly influential (Orloff, 1996) and provide a 
strong point of reference from which further research into the influence of the state on 
gender equality departs. However, in themselves they have attracted criticism based on 
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the tendency to assume uniformity in the patriarchal state (Walby, 1990; Sainsbury, 1999; 
Marinetto, 2007: 83), and to ignore or brush over both historical and cross-national 
variation in the structure and organisation of welfare states (O’Connor, 1996; Orloff, 1996; 
Sainsbury, 1999). This ‘monolithic’ patriarchal state is not only empirically false, but is 
also problematic for the current discussion in that it restricts the ability to apply feminist 
welfare state insights to explorations of variations in labour market equality. 
 
Importantly, though, later feminist state research – starting perhaps around 1990 – re-
examined gender state insights from a comparative perspective (Orloff, 1993; Sainsbury, 
1999). Driven to some extent by the shortcomings of early feminist state research and in 
part by a lack of recognition for gender in mainstream comparative welfare state analyses, 
this ‘comparative turn’ allowed feminist research to explore cross-national variation in 
gendered aspects of states and welfare state forms. The impact on the direction and 
development of gender and state research has been substantial. Most immediately, the 
adoption of a comparative perspective prompted an acknowledgement that certain state 
forms could promote and support women’s interests (O’Connor, 1996: 7) – early studies 
with a focus on Scandinavian in particular were influential in highlighting the idea of a 
‘female-friendly’ welfare state (Hernes, 1987; Leira, 1992; Orloff, 1996: 63). Just as 
important here, though, the use of comparative methods and the recognition of variation 
allowed for insights into gender and the welfare state to be applied to analyses of 
variations in gendered labour market outcomes. In other words, by acknowledging 
variation, the state and public policy could enter explorations of cross-national or 
temporal variation in gender equality in employment as a macro level factor. 
 
A variety of state policies may contribute to variations in gendered labour market 
outcomes, particularly when comparing over time as well as across countries. These 
stretch from gender-relevant ‘freedom from’ anti-discrimination policies to wider and 
broader state employment policies (Korpi et al, 2013: 8). Indeed, as recent research into 
the global financial crisis and its fallout shows, even general macroeconomic policies may 
have gendered implications (Karamessini and Rubery, 2013). However, within the 
comparative gender equality literature – and especially the quantitative comparative 
literature – much of the focus has been on gender- or family-specific claim rights or 
‘freedom to’ policies such as parental leaves, public childcare provision and family-related 
tax and transfer policies, most of which come under the umbrella term ‘family policy’ (Van 
der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002; Korpi et al, 2013: 8).  
 
In recent years the comparative literature has come to be dominated by studies that, like 
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this thesis, focus on family policies specifically and in and of themselves. However, earlier 
research – most notably gender regime studies, which take a broader view of variations in 
policy provision – continues to provide insight. Indeed, gender regime studies are not only 
valuable in themselves, but are also important because they provide much of the 
theoretical and empirical basis for comparative family policy studies with the two 
literatures remaining closely linked (Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002). Before moving on 
to explore the comparative family policy literature then, it is important to touch on the 
contribution of gender regime research, as well as its limits. 
 
Gender regime studies 
 
Regime analysis as a general method developed as a means to capture neatly and 
succinctly variety in state forms and welfare state structures. In broad terms, the 
technique looks to capture qualitative variation in state structures through the 
identification of common patterns of policy provision and shared institutional 
characteristics that develop within and differ between groups or ‘clusters’ of nations 
(Myles and Quadagno, 2002: 39). From these clusters emerge classifications of ‘regime 
types’, where the general and overall approach to a given policy area or areas is relatively 
homogeneous internally but qualitatively distinct externally from other regime types. The 
end result is a categorical variable that, ideally, neatly reflects differing approaches to the 
policy area across nations. Of course, values on this categorical variable are unlikely to 
exactly describe the approach of the state in any given country, and a certain level of 
simplification remains necessary in order to provide systematic comparison (Perrons, 
1995). Nonetheless, the technique provides a useful vehicle for illustrating variations in 
state policies and institutions. 
 
Gender or gender-relevant regime typologies themselves emerged out of dissatisfaction 
with mainstream, androcentric welfare regime analyses (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
O’Connor 1993) and from a desire to examine systematically how states differentially 
affect the position of women through the provision of family policies and other gender 
relevant policies and institutions (Sainsbury, 1999; Hobson, 2005). There are a number of 
gender-relevant regime analyses available (e.g. Lewis, 1992; Siaroff, 1994; Sainsbury, 
1996; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Leitner, 2003; see Saxonberg, 2013), but all share a concern 
with producing a typological categorisation of state approaches to gender, employment 
and the family.  
 
Several early feminist regime analyses base their typologies around the concept of the 
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male-breadwinner model, that is, around the institutionalisation of the ideal of a complete 
and gendered division of labour between partners (Lewis, 1992; Ostner and Lewis, 1995; 
Sainsbury, 1996). Lewis (1992) and Ostner and Lewis (1995), for instance, ground their 
influential typologies in the extent to which social policies support female exclusion from 
the labour market and encourage women to remain full-time caregivers. 'Strong male 
breadwinner' states seek to maintain female economic subordination and provide few 
policies that facilitate female employment. In contrast, the ‘weak male breadwinner’ 
welfare state is less faithful to the status quo and provides more support for a dual earner 
society through female-friendly tax, leave and child care policies (Lewis, 1992:159). The 
authors apply their measure to welfare states in France, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. Sweden emerges as a weak breadwinner state and France moderate, 
while policy formulations in Germany, Ireland and the UK are all found to be strongly 
committed to maintaining the male breadwinner ideal, albeit through differing 
mechanisms. 
 
Many other gender-relevant regime typologies are based around some variant of the term 
‘defamilialisation’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Leitner, 2003; Hantrais, 2004). The concept is 
slightly contested (see Bambra, 2004; Bambra, 2007; Saxonberg, 2013), but is normally 
taken to mean either the extent to which an individual can maintain an acceptable 
standard of living independent of the family (Lister, 1997) or, more commonly in the 
regime context, the extent to which domestic care services are ‘provided outside of the 
family, either by the state or the market’ (Orloff, 2002:12). In the latter sense, the term 
recognises that the responsibility for care often rests on the mother and that, in the 
absence of a sufficient market, state provision of ‘defamilialising’ care services – such as 
public childcare services – may be necessary for full female labour participation. 
Alternatively, the state may also provide ‘familialising’ policies – such as family-related tax 
subsidies and cash transfers, for example – which given prevailing gender divisions of 
labour are likely only to solidify women’s roles as caregivers in a manner similar to Lewis’ 
‘strong male breadwinner’ state. 
 
One of the most influential typologies to use the concept of ‘defamilialisation’ comes from 
Esping-Andersen (1999), who notably had earlier authored a seminal regime analysis on 
variations in welfare state approaches to class and class relations (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). Interestingly, Esping-Andersen (1999) produces a tripartite classification of gender 
regime types with country clusters that – with just a couple of exceptions – are remarkably 
consistent with his original typology (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 94; see table 2.2 (pg. 35)). 
The ‘social democratic’ cluster draws together states that are characterised by extensive 
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public provision of defamilialising care policies and a policy environment that is generally 
favourable to and encouraging of female employment (1999: 78, 86). This regime type 
covers the Scandinavian nations, with Sweden often seen as the typical social democratic-
type state. The ‘liberal’ regime – most often found in the English speaking countries, with 
the United States as the archetype – covers states that provide little in the way of either 
explicit public familialising or defamilialising policy, and instead tend to rely mostly on the 
market for the provision of care services and on private judgment for decisions around 
labour participation (1999:86). Lastly, the ‘conservative’ cluster captures states that are 
generally reluctant to provide public defamilialising policy, and on the contrary actively 
reinforce the role played by the family in providing care through the provision of 
extensive familialising policy – in other words, the conservative regime pulls together 
states that are generally hostile to full female employment (1999: 66, 86). This regime 
type includes most of the continental European countries. However, slightly problematic 
here – as Esping-Andersen acknowledges – are France and Belgium, who diverge slightly 
from other conservative-type states by the extent to which they offer relatively generous 
public childcare services (Moller and Misra, 2005; Misra et al, 2006).  
 
Alternative regime analyses look to overcome this latter issue by allowing countries to 
exhibit a contradictory or pluralistic approach towards women, care and employment 
(Leitner, 2003; Misra et al, 2006). Leitner (2003), for example, constructs a typology built 
loosely around Esping-Andersen (1999) but with degrees of familialism and defamilialism 
captured concurrently. This lets Leitner construct a multidimensional typology that allows 
for combinations of strong or weak familialising and defamilialising policy, resulting in 
four possible regime types (shown in table 2.1). Most important here is the ‘optional 
familialism’ type, which combines high levels of family support through familialising 
policy with generous defamilialising policy – in other words, the state provides support 
both for women who wish to participate in the labour market and also for those who wish 
to remain home to care (Leitner, 2003: 359). 
 
 
Leitner applies this conception to the EU15. Results are broadly similar to Esping-
Familialisation
Strong Weak
Strong Optional Familialism Explicit familialism
Weak De-familialism Implicit familialism
Source: Leitner (2003)
Defamilialisation
Table 2.1. Leitner's (2003) two-dimensional gender regime classification
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Andersen (1999), but with certain notable differences (2003: 361; see table 2.2 (pg. 35)). 
The ‘conservative’ regime type is mostly split between ‘implicit familialism’ in the 
southern European countries – where little effort is made to break down the familialist 
status quo (2003: 359) – and ‘explicit familialism’ in most other continental European 
countries (2003: 35). Ireland and the United Kingdom are – a little surprisingly – classified 
together as ‘defamilialist’, due mostly to Leitner measuring both public and private 
provisions of childcare together as one (Moller and Misra, 2005: 8). The Scandinavian 
countries, meanwhile, are classified as contradictory or ’optional familialist’ countries on 
account of generous parental leave schemes and childcare provisions which produce high 
scores on Leitner’s measures of familialism and defamilialism, respectively. Importantly, 
they are also joined here in the ’optional familialist’ set by France and Belgium, thus 
providing a neat solution to the uncomfortable placement of the latter two within Esping-
Andersen’s conservative regime type. 
 
These various gender typologies each produce their own insights and all hold their own 
value. However, they are not completely incompatible with one another (Orloff, 2002: 13-
14). Table 2.2 synthesises the various typologies outlined above. There are of course 
inconsistencies and disagreements between conceptions, but a broad reading of this 
categorisation represents some form of general agreement as to how states cluster and 
vary with regard to public policy, gender and employment. Simplifying somewhat, the 
‘social-democratic’ countries in the top cluster are generally the most extensive providers 
of public policies that encourage female employment, while the ‘conservative’ continental 
European countries in the second group are – to varying extents and with the partial 
exception of Belgium and France – generally less supportive of female market 
participation and more likely to provide policies that reinforce women’s position within 
the home. The ‘southern European’ and ‘liberal’ countries in the bottom two groups, 
meanwhile, generally provide little in the way of explicit family policy, and instead tend to 
rely more on the family or on the market and private decision-making, respectively. 
 
Empirical studies largely confirm the expected association between these country clusters 
and variations in gender differences in economic activity (O’Connor, 1996; Gornick, 
1999a; Daly, 2000; Korpi, 2000; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002). Countries within the 
social democratic regime type tend to have the highest rates of female employment and 
the greatest level of gender equality in labour participation, suggesting that a country 
characterised by the presence of strong defamilialising policy can indeed encourage 
female labour supply. Liberal-type states tend to perform moderately – implying the 
market can provide defamilialising services for at least some women – while conservative- 
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type states and in particular southern European countries generally exhibit the lowest 
levels of female market participation (O’Connor, 1996; Gornick, 1999a; Van der Lippe and 
Van Dijk, 2002:230). There is, of course, some variation within each cluster (Gornick, 
1999a; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002:230) and there are anomalous cases, such as  
 
Norway and, in particular, Portugal, where female employment rates are far higher than 
other nations usually grouped within the conservative/southern European regime type 
(Gornick, 1999a; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002). Broadly, though, the relation between 
gender regime types and female economic activity appears reasonably robust and in-line 
with the theoretical expectations of the regime literature. 
 
Notably though, more recent empirical research suggests that the Scandinavian countries 
may not be leaders in all aspects of labour market equality – indeed, in certain areas 
gender equality may be markedly lower in the social democratic states than elsewhere 
(Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Pettit and Hook, 2009). 
Country Esping-Andersen's (1999) typology Lewis' (1992) typology Leitner's (2003) typology
Denmark Social democratic  - Optional familialism
Finland Social democratic  - Optional familialism
Norway Social democratic  -  -
Sweden Social democratic Weak breadwinner Optional familialism
Belgium Conservative  - Optional familialism
France Conservative Modified breadwinner Optional familialism
Austria Conservative  - Explicit famililialism
Germany Conservative Strong breadwinner Explicit famililialism
Luxembourg  -  - Explicit famililialism
Netherlands Conservative  - Explicit famililialism
Italy Conservative / Southern Europe  - Explicit famililialism
Greece  -  - Implicit familialism
Portugal Conservative / Southern Europe  - Implicit familialism
Spain Conservative / Southern Europe  - Implicit familialism
Ireland Liberal Strong breadwinner De-familialism
United Kingdom Liberal Strong breadwinner De-familialism
Australia Liberal  -  -
Canada Liberal  -  -
United States Liberal  -  -
New Zealand  -  -  -
Table 2.2. Country classifications in different gender policy typologies
Source: Adapted from Orloff (2002:13,14); Esping-Andersen (1999: 62-63, 71-72); Leitner (2003: 361). See also Sainsbury (1996), 
Bambra (2004), Hantrais (2004), Misra et al (2006), Bambra (2007) and Saxonberg (2013) for alternative typologies.  
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Gender job segregation, for instance, appears higher in the Scandinavian countries than in 
other European states (Den Dulk et al, 1996). Likewise, women’s access to high status 
managerial positions is generally lower in the social democratic countries than in those 
from the liberal regime type in particular (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). 
 
These contradictory patters of equality have lead several authors to develop the idea of a 
welfare state ‘paradox’ (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; 
Mandel, 2009; Pettit and Hook, 2009). The exact mechanisms behind these proposed 
trade-offs are examined in detail later in section 2.2.3, but the general idea is that the very 
policies and institutions that promote female employment act at the same time to 
encourage segregation between men and women and to reinforce ‘glass ceilings’ on 
women’s careers (Pettit and Hook, 2009:8; Mandel, 2009:700). Some authors have 
contested the validity of such a trade-off – arguing instead that these apparent 
contradictions are little more than statistical artefacts (Korpi et al, 2013; see section 2.3.1) 
– but the important point to take away here is that a social democratic style state is not 
necessarily a panacea for broader gender equality in employment.  
 
The limitations of gender regime studies 
 
Broadly, then, the gender regime literature produces valuable insights into how variations 
in public policy may shape and structure cross-national differences in various areas of 
gender equality in employment. However, there are limits to how far these empirical 
insights can go, as several features inherent to policy regime analysis restrict the ability of 
and detail with which gender policy typologies can explain variations in gender 
differences in employment (Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002: 227; Korpi et al, 2013: 8).  
 
Most immediately, the categorical variable produced by regime typologies is likely to paint 
a far simpler picture of policy provision than exists in reality or, to put it in more technical 
terms, is likely to sharply reduce variation in measures of gender relevant public policies. 
The reduction in variation may not be too severe if all countries in a given cluster conform 
consistently and near-perfectly to a certain set of policies, that is, if policies are consistent 
and close to homogenous within each regime type. However, such homogeneity is both 
theoretically and empirically unlikely. Most immediately, despite the best efforts of gender 
regime theorists it remains possible to find rather sharp differences in gender relevant 
policy within the usual country clusters. More worryingly perhaps, it is also possible to 
find inconsistencies in policy provision within a given country, in that in several countries 
it is not always easy to isolate one single coherent approach to gender. Thus, the 
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categorical variable produced by regime typologies may not only reduce variation in 
policy between countries but also within countries themselves (Kasza, 2002). 
 
These intra-cluster and intra-country inconsistencies are problematic for the theoretical 
robustness of gender regime types. More relevant here though, because such variations 
are not picked up by the categorical regime variable they are also likely to reduce the 
ability of and accuracy with which the categorical variable can explain variations in 
gendered labour market outcomes. In certain circumstances the reduction in variation 
may even obscure or disguise some ‘true’ relation between the policies underlying regime 
types and equality outcomes, leading to incorrect inferences regarding the influence of 
public policy (Park, 2008: 875). 
 
Reducing policy data into a single categorical variable also makes it difficult to delineate 
which specific policies or institutions, if any, actually influence variation in equality 
outcomes (Park, 2008: 876; Misra et al, 2011: 143). This is particularly true where there is 
diversity within regimes – it is not helpful to argue that, say, a conservative approach to 
gender constrains female employment if it is not clear what policies are intrinsic to a 
conservative-type gender regime – but is also the case even if policy is relatively 
homogenous within clusters. For example, the findings reviewed above suggest a social 
democratic approach to gender promotes female economic activity, but it is not clear 
whether this is due to the presence of generous leave entitlements or childcare provision, 
due to female-friendly tax and transfer systems, or perhaps a combination of all the above. 
This of course sharply reduces the usefulness of results for policy makers.  
 
Finally, the fact that a country can take on only one of perhaps three or four possible states 
– coupled with the historical and institutional basis of regime types – means that country 
membership of a particular regime type rarely changes and indeed almost always remains 
fixed. As a result, regime indicators are unlikely to capture policy development and 
variation over time (Moller and Misra, 2005), particularly when policies change only 
incrementally or when individual policies within a given country develop at different 
paces and perhaps in different directions. Thus, while regime analyses may help explain 
the influence of policy on cross-national variation in gender equality in employment, the 
technique is poorly suited to examining variations and developments in gender 
differences in employment over time. 
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Comparative family policy studies 
 
Comparative family policy research is closely related to the gender regime literature – 
indeed, in large part it examines the effects of the very same policies that underlie and 
define gender regime types. However and importantly, rather than using these policies as 
the basis for a general classification of a state’s overall approach to gender, family policy 
studies generally focus on the specific and individual policies in themselves. In other 
words, whereas regime analyses take regime types and country clusters as the units of 
analysis, in comparative family policy studies it is the specific policies that form the focus 
of inquiry. For a couple of reasons, this helps comparative family policy research 
overcome at least some of the limitations of, and build on many of the findings from, 
gender regime analyses.  
 
First, from a theoretical perspective, focusing on individual policies helps avoid many of 
the complications involved with properly capturing gender regime types (Korpi et al, 
2013: 8). Comparative family policies studies need not be so concerned with summarising 
neatly and in one go a state’s general and overall approach to gender and the family, or 
with forcing and fitting complex patterns of policy provision into a categorical typology 
variable. Instead, to some extent at least, they can simply allow measures of policy to paint 
whatever picture they need, including any intra-cluster or even intra-country 
contradictions and inconsistencies.    
 
Second, from a methodological point of view, family policies themselves offer analytical 
units that are generally far more flexible than regime types. For instance, family policy 
studies have the option of using rich data on policy provision as measures in their own 
right – as opposed to inputs that are used only to produce a single categorical typology 
variable – and as a result can produce detailed individual indicators that in many cases can 
be measured on a continuous or at least ordinal scale. This means that the effects of 
different policies can be examined separately and simultaneously, and allows for the 
construction of a more detailed overview of policy provision both across and within 
countries. Moreover, since measures can be more sensitive to variation, indicators of 
individual family policies are better able to capture developments over time and therefore 
are far better suited to examining relations between changes in policy and employment 
outcomes (Korpi et al, 2013: 8). 
 
These advantages allow the comparative family policy literature to extend and expand 
upon the basic associations uncovered by gender regime studies and to advance 
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understandings of how policy, as a macro factor, impacts on male and female employment 
outcomes. In recent years a large number of insightful studies have examined the 
influence of family policy, producing what is in many cases a fairly detailed and 
sophisticated account of links between variations in policy and variations in employment 
outcomes. As touched on in the introduction to the thesis, these studies indicate that 
specific family policies may have some direct influence on both gender differences in 
economic activity and on occupational segregation and women’s careers (Gornick et al, 
1998; Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Ferrarini, 2006; Mandel 
and Semyonov, 2006; Misra et al, 2008; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Nieuwenhuis et al, 
2012; Thévenon, 2013), with effects that in both cases may vary across socio-economic 
class (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012; Korpi et al, 
2013). However, as also mentioned in the introduction, this existing comparative family 
policy literature has its limits, particularly in the extent to which much of it remains based 
on between-country differences in policies and outcomes only.  
 
The remaining two sections of this chapter review this comparative family policy 
literature in some depth, starting first with the theoretical side of the literature. This 
theoretical review is structured loosely around Korpi’s (2000) theory of family policy 
types, although by itself Korpi’s conception is not broad enough to cover all considerations 
relevant to the three research questions stated in the introduction. Thus, the section also 
brings together insights from a number of other authors to produce a reasonably detailed 
description of the expected effects of family policy on various aspects of gender equality in 
employment.  
 
2.2. The theoretical effects of family policies on gender differences in employment  
 
The comparative family policy literature provides a number general theories on the 
influence of family policy on gender differences in employment (e.g. Gornick et al, 1997; 
Korpi, 2000; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Pettit and Hook, 
2009; Misra et al, 2011), many of which emerge from work on gender and the welfare 
state as outlined in the previous section. To be sure, not all research on links between 
family policies and employment outcomes operates within an explicit overarching 
theoretical framework. Rather, several studies (e.g. Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Tranby, 
2010; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Nieuwenhuis, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013; 
Thévenon and Solaz, 2013) simply take each individual family policy on its own terms, 
with each holding its own theoretical influence over gendered labour market outcomes. 
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However, use of the right overarching theory can aid coherence and organisation, and 
helps ensure ‘family policy’ in general terms is covered comprehensively. 
 
The preferred theoretical framework for much of this thesis is Korpi’s (2000) theoretical 
distinction between ‘dual earner’, ‘general family support’ and ‘market oriented’ family 
policy types3. Dual earner policies, Korpi suggests, are those with a focus on encouraging 
full and equal access to the labour market. They look to promote female economic activity 
by reducing care burdens through service provision and by increasing the compatibility of 
paid and unpaid responsibilities (2000:11). General family support policies, on the other 
hand, look to provide financial or ‘time’ support for the family unit in general (Korpi et al, 
2013: 14). Since these latter policies tend to be premised on the traditional family model – 
with the father as a single earner and the mother as the specialised household labourer – 
they are more likely to reinforce gender divisions of labour than to promote female 
employment (Korpi, 2000:11). An absence of both, meanwhile, generally indicates a 
‘market oriented’ approach to family policy with a reliance on the market and private 
decision-making (Korpi, 2011: 11).  
 
Korpi’s (2000) theoretical conception is popular – it has been used in the family policy-
gender equality in employment literature by Ferrarini (2006), Mischke (2011) and Korpi 
et al (2013), and by several others in the wider family policy literature4 – and carries 
advantages. In particular, the explicit recognition that different types of family policy 
operate with different and at times opposing objectives encourages and to some degree 
even forces analyses to consider the possibility of contradictory configurations of policy 
(Mischke, 2011: 445). This is important, of course, because it is known from the gender 
regime literature that certain welfare states provide policies that produce conflicting 
incentives for families and for mothers in particular (Leitner, 2003; Misra et al, 2006). By 
putting policy contradictions at the centre of the theory, Korpi’s conception ensures that 
analyses explore the full picture and examine the effects of family policies that look to 
promote equality in employment having controlled for the influence of others that may 
reinforce women’s position within the home (Ferrarini, 2006: 105). 
 
This is not to say that Korpi’s theory is without its faults. For example and as discussed a 
                                                        
3 It is worth noting that Korpi (2000) initially developed this distinction to provide the theoretical 
underpinnings of a gender regime typology that avoids the complications of familialising / 
defamilialising policy, but later works (Ferrarini, 2006; Mischke, 2011; Korpi et al, 2013) use the 
dimensions as the basis for measures of family policy in their own right, rather than collapsing the 
data into a categorical typology 
4 Examples include Bäckman and Ferrarini’s (2010) study of relations between family policy and 
child poverty, and Engster and Olofsdotter Stensöta’s (2011) research on child well-being. 
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little later on, it says little about the possible adverse ‘trade off’ effects attached to certain 
policies. Nonetheless, Korpi’s theory continues provides a useful organising framework. As 
the loose foundation for the thesis, it is important to outline the various policy types and 
what they do and do not cover in a little more detail.  
 
2.2.1. Korpi’s theoretical conception of family policy types   
 
Dual earner policy 
 
Korpi’s dual earner type policies are those family policies that look to encourage full and 
continuous female employment and promote equality in labour market outcomes (Korpi, 
2000: 11, 13). These policies generally aim to reduce the costs and barriers to female 
employment by shifting the responsibility for care away from mothers, by increasing 
returns to maternal employment, and by easing the compatibility of work and family roles 
(2000: 13). In more recent work, Korpi (2010; Korpi et al; 2013) compliments the dual 
earner policy type with a closely related ‘dual carer’ policy category. These policies are 
aimed at encouraging male participation in household labour (2013: 14), which is 
desirable in itself but also helps facilitate female labour supply through a reduction in 
female domestic responsibilities. Importantly, though, Korpi et al (2013) find that dual 
earner and dual carer policies ‘work in synergy’ and correlate closely (2013: 14). As a 
result, they find it beneficial to treat the two types as one single dual earner-carer policy 
category (2013: 14). This is also the approach taken here.  
 
For the most part dual earner-carer family policies can be split into two main policy sub-
types – state legislated job-protected leaves of absence, and public childcare provision or 
subsidisation (Korpi, 2000: 13)5. The two are referred to throughout this thesis as ‘dual 
earner-carer leave policy’ and ‘dual earner childcare policy’, respectively. It may also be 
possible to consider some forms of flexible working legislation and also certain financial 
incentives for employment – especially employment-conditioned or ‘in-work’ benefits – as 
‘dual earner’ type policies. The former – which are most commonly found in European 
countries in the form of an individual right to, or at least the ‘right to request’, flexible 
hours (Plantenga and Remery, 2005; Lewis, 2009) – may be considered dual earner to the 
extent to which they help parents reconcile work and family responsibilities and thus 
                                                        
5 This distinction is not strictly part of Korpi’s (2000) conceptualisation, but draws inspiration from 
the distinction made by both Pettit and Hook (2009) and Misra et al (2011) between ‘work-
facilitating’ family policies that free parents from care constraints – mostly childcare policies – and 
‘work-reducing’ family policies – mostly leave policies - that temporarily lessen labour market 
responsibilities in the short-term with a view to promoting medium- to long-term labour market 
attachment. 
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allow mothers the opportunity to enter the market. The latter, meanwhile, rarely have an 
explicit dual earner intention – rather, the they tend to be aimed at incentivising 
employment and ‘making work pay’ more generally (OECD, 2005: 126) – but may 
encourage dual earning in as much as it is women and particularly mothers who tend to be 
out of work or on low pay in the first place. Unfortunately though, concerns around data 
and operationalisation prevent either from full inclusion in this thesis. Comparable 
information on ‘in-work’ benefits is fairly scarce, while several studies note that the actual 
practice of flexible working at company-level seldom corresponds to national-level 
legislation, both within and across countries6 (Plantenga and Remery, 2005; Riedmann et 
al, 2006; Chung and Tijdens, 2013). Indeed, both types of policy are rarely covered in the 
comparative family policy-gender equality literature and are not mentioned in Korpi’s 
works, perhaps for these very reasons. 
 
Dual earner-carer leave policies are those child-related leaves of absence that are 
constructed so as to support female economic activity and, perhaps to a lesser extent, 
promote male caregiving and participation in household labour (Korpi, 2000: 13; Korpi, 
2010: S22). Importantly, this does not include all leave entitlements, as the effects of leave 
as a general policy type on female employment are theoretically ambiguous. On the one 
hand, allowing women to temporarily leave employment with the guarantee of a job on 
return is likely to promote labour market attachment amongst women who would 
otherwise have had to exit the market completely upon childbirth. On the other, 
encouraging mothers to leave employment in order to fulfil caring responsibilities may 
reinforce gender norms and gendered divisions of labour. This is particularly likely to be 
the case where leaves are long7 – so, therefore, the mothers is outside of the market for 
longer than might be the case without any leave entitlement – and are structured so as to 
encourage take-up by the mother only. Accordingly, only those policies that are designed 
to promote dual earning – on balance at least – are considered ‘dual earner’ by Korpi.  
 
The idiosyncratic nature of leave policies means that it is at times difficult to differentiate 
between dual earner and non-dual earner leaves. However, the distinctions made by Korpi 
(2010) and others (Ferrarini, 2006; Mischke, 2011; Korpi et al, 2013) when 
operationalising leave policies are fairly clear. Paid maternity leaves are generally 
                                                        
6 At least in part, this may be because of the tradition in many countries for negotiation and 
collective agreements regarding employment conditions at the level of the firm (Riedmann et al, 
2006; Chung and Tijdens, 2013).   
7 The exact length at which leave becomes detrimental to mother’s labour market attachment is not 
theorised within Korpi’s framework. However, empirical evidence suggests that the marginal effect 
of weeks of total leave on female employment becomes negative at around two years (Misra et al, 
2011; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). See section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for more detail.  
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considered ‘dual earner’ (Korpi, 2000; Ferrarini, 2006; Korpi, 2010; Mischke, 2011; Korpi 
et al, 2013). Although specific to mothers, these leaves are generally fairly short and are 
almost always paid through an earnings-related benefit that reflects labour market 
achievement prior to childbirth. As a result, they produce incentives for women to ‘start 
and maintain an occupational career’ (Korpi, 2000: 13), as well as encouraging female 
employment continuity through a relatively brief period of job-protected period leave.  
 
Likewise, paid paternity leaves and other entitlements specific to fathers are generally 
classified as ‘dual earner-carer’ (Korpi, 2000; Ferrarini, 2006; Korpi, 2010; Mischke, 2011; 
Korpi et al, 2013). These leaves aim to encourage a more gender egalitarian division of 
unpaid labour and may, as a result, promote equality in economic activity. This is most 
likely to work through indirect channels if they encourage men to take more responbility 
for care and domestic labour and, subsequently, allow women to expand their supply of 
market labour. But father-specific leaves may also have more immediate and direct effects 
on gender differences in economic activity if they encourage men to cut back on their own 
time spent in paid work. Either way, they form an important part of dual earner-carer 
policy as they represent one of the few legislated methods through which states attempt to 
change care burdens and divisions of unpaid labour (Korpi, 2000: 13).  
 
Lastly, certain gender-neutral or sharable parental leaves are also considered ‘dual 
earner’. Important here is the distinction made by Korpi between parental leaves paid 
through an earnings-related benefit and those that use a flat-rate payment (Korpi, 2000: 
13). The latter flat-rate type tend to be long and contain strong disincentives for take-up 
by fathers – since, on average, men typically earn the higher wage within a couple, the 
opportunity cost of taking a leave paid through a flat-rate payment is often far larger for 
the father (Ferrarini, 2006: 94; Korpi et al, 2010: 16; Bäckman and Ferrarini, 2010: 281). 
As a result, these lengthy flat-rate parental leaves are particularly likely to remove 
mothers from the labour market for an extended period and to reinforce their position 
within the home8.  
 
Parental leaves paid through an earnings-related benefit, on the other hand, provide at 
least some incentive for male take-up as the payment reflects prior earnings and therefore 
                                                        
8 Empirically, the payment rates on flat-rate parental leaves also tend to be relatively low. Low 
payment rates are likely only to reinforce discincentives for male take-up, although to some degree 
they may also discourage take up – or at least shorten the preferred length of leave – among women 
too. Thus, when payment rates are low, it is possible that at least some of the damaging effects of 
long flat-rate leaves may be offset by the discentives produced for lengthy use.  
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goes some way towards correcting for differential incomes within the household9. 
Additionally, earnings-related schemes provide greater incentives for female career 
progression prior to childbirth – as any wage gains will be reflected in the benefit paid 
(Bäckman and Ferrarini, 2010: 280) – and, empirically, tend to be shorter than parental 
leaves paid through flat-rate benefits. Accordingly, these parental leaves are more likely to 
promote male caregiving and, even if take-up remains dominated by the mothers, are less 
likely to reinforce women’s roles as domestic workers. It is on this basis that Korpi and 
others consider only earnings-related job-protected parental leave schemes as ‘dual 
earner-carer’. Parental leave schemes paid through a flat rate benefit, meanwhile, tend to 
be considered ‘general family support’ (Korpi, 2000: Ferrarini, 2006; Korpi, 2010; 
Bäckman and Ferrarini, 2010; Mischke, 2011; Korpi et al., 2013; see later in this section). 
 
Dual earner childcare policies are a little easier to classify. Broadly, childcare policies can 
be classified as ‘dual earner’ as long as they reallocate the responsibility for child care 
away from the mother, and therefore facilitate full and continuous female market 
participation. Korpi is interested mostly in the ‘extent to which public policies shift care 
work from the unpaid to the paid sector’ (Korpi, 2000: 13). As a result most policies that 
promote care outside of the home10 can be considered ‘dual earner’ regardless of whether 
the service is actually provided by the state itself or by the market. Public service 
provision is generally seen as a dual earner policy, while other forms of provision such as 
cost-subsidisation or tax incentives to use childcare services may also be considered ‘dual 
earner’. Importantly, though, Korpi does make an exception for part-time public childcare 
services for children aged between three and school-age. These policies, Korpi suggests, 
presume a parent – that is, the mother – remains primarily engaged as a household 
labourer and are therefore unlikely to promote full female market participation (Korpi, 
2010: s22; Korpi et al., 2013: 10). 
 
General family support policy 
 
Korpi’s (2000) general family support policy type captures those policies that look to 
assist families with children either through financial support or by facilitating care within 
the household (Korpi, 2000: 11). These policies rarely have an explicit objective regarding 
female economic activity or gender differences in employment. Rather, their main 
intention is to help with the additional costs and responsibilities associated with 
                                                        
9 Although the higher earner will still face a greater loss of income in absolute terms unless the 
leave benefit is set at 100% of prior earnings. 
10 And presumably that also shift care away from informal networks, since this type of care is also 
unpaid.  
45 
 
dependent children and to promote the well-being of families more generally. However, as 
these policies are often premised on the traditional family unit – with the father as a single 
earner and the mother as the specialised household labourer – they are likely to reinforce 
gendered division of labour and, by extension, constrain female labour supply (Korpi, 
2000: 11; Korpi, 2010: s21). 
 
For the most part, general family support takes the form of family-related tax and transfer 
policies (Korpi, 2000: 12-13; Korpi, 2010: s21). Similar to leave policies, family-related tax 
and transfer systems are fairly idiosyncratic so it is difficult at times to specify the exact 
policies involved. However, Korpi highlights child or family allowances – typically, a 
universal and non-conditional cash benefit paid per child, sometimes at a diminishing rate 
depending on the number of children, and often transferred directly to the mother – and 
family tax subsidies – such as joint taxation systems, dependent spouse allowances and 
family- or child-related tax credits – as particularly common provisions (Korpi, 2000: 12-
13; Korpi, 2010: s21-s22). In both cases the policy looks to increase the equivalised 
income of households with children by offsetting at least some of the direct costs 
associated with dependents and the indirect costs of earnings forgone by a parent that 
specialises in care and domestic labour (Thévenon, 2011: 58). However, because in many 
cases these policies are aimed at supporting or are even dependent on a female domestic 
worker, they are likely to encourage women to specialise in household labour and 
discourage female market participation (Korpi, 2000: 12-13; Korpi, 2010: s21-s22; 
Mischke, 2011: 447; see section 2.2.2). 
 
As noted earlier, certain forms of leave and childcare policy are also considered to be 
‘general family support’ by Korpi. The typical characteristics of flat-rate parental leave 
schemes mean that they are generally unlikely to promote maternal employment. What 
remains, then, is a leave entitlement that provides mothers with an extended period of 
absence from the labour market to give care within the home. The likely effect, intentional 
or not, is to encourage mothers to specialise in childcare (Ferrarini, 2006: 94; Bäckman 
and Ferrarini, 2010: 281). Likewise, some countries offer additional extended ‘childcare’ 
leaves that are generally long, often paid at a low, flat rate, and in many cases offer no job 
protection (Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011; Gauthier, 2011a; Gauthier, 2011b). These 
leaves are often explicitly aimed at allowing parents to remain at home to care for 
children, and due to their characteristics are mostly likely to be used by the mother (Korpi, 
2010: s22; Korpi et al, 2013: 16). As a result, similar to flat-rate parental leaves, they are 
expected to reinforce nuclear family roles and to discourage female labour participation 
(Engster and Olofsdotter Stensöta, 2011: 87). Finally, as discussed above, Korpi considers 
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part-time public childcare for slightly older children also as a general family support 
policy (2000: 12).  
 
Market oriented policy / low family support policy 
 
Empirically, Korpi’s market oriented policy approach is an absence of state legislated 
family policy as conceived of by the above two dimensions (2000: 11). Korpi is keen to 
point out that an absence of legislated family policy does not imply that such countries 
have not made explicit attempts to improve gender employment relations (Korpi et al, 
2013: 18-19). Rather, Korpi suggests that often such countries have advanced sets of 
‘freedom from’ anti-discrimination and equal opportunities legislation, but have 
consciously passed the responsibility for the provision of family policy to the market while 
also placing large emphasis on private decision making regarding work and family 
arrangements (2000: 11).  
 
Slightly problematic here is the observation made by others (e.g. Engster and Olofsdotter 
Stensöta, 2011) that several Southern European countries11 also feature little in the way of 
either dual earner or general family support policy, but yet place little emphasis on the 
market for the provision of family policy. Instead, these countries tend to rely on family 
networks for financial support and the provision of care (Engster and Olofsdotter 
Stensöta, 2011: 86). Engster and Olofsdotter Stensöta’s solution is to rename the market 
oriented approach with the catchall term ‘low family support’ (2011:86), which is perhaps 
still a little unsatisfactory but offers an improvement on Korpi’s terminology.  
 
Either way, these policy approaches have received little attention from studies operating 
within Korpi’s framework, most likely because both a market oriented and a family 
network approach are difficult to operationalise within a quantitative comparative 
setting12. Instead, the market oriented / low family support approach tends to be used as 
the control against which the effects of the more tangible dual earner and general family 
support policies are judged. 
 
Drawbacks of Korpi’s theoretical conception 
 
As noted earlier, Korpi’s theory of family policy types is not perfect, even after a few 
                                                        
11 For example, Greece, Spain and Portugal (Engster and Olofsdotter Stensöta, 2011: 86) 
12 For example, data on the provision of childcare or leave schemes by the market are scarce, and 
schemes are likely to be so diverse as to be incomparable within countries let alone across 
countries.  
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modifications. First, the accounts given in the articles cited are not always sufficiently 
detailed on how the various types of policy influence gendered labour market outcomes, in 
that they are not always explicit on the mechanisms underlying the theorised relations. 
Second, Korpi’s theory makes little mention of the possible adverse effects attached to 
certain family policies. As touched on earlier, and as discussed in more detail later in 2.2.3, 
a number of authors (Ruhm, 1998; Blau et al, 2001; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel 
and Semyonov, 2006; Pettit and Hook, 2009; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011; Akgunduz and 
Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013) suggest that certain policies may carry ‘trade 
off’ effects that constrain women’s careers and reinforce ‘glass ceilings’ simultaneous with 
any influence of female labour participation. These arguments are mostly absent from 
Korpi’s theoretical discussions, although in part this may be because Korpi objects to the 
theory on empirical grounds (Korpi et al., 2013; see section 2.3.1). Lastly, Korpi’s general 
conception mostly ignores the possibility that policies have varying effects across different 
groups of men and women.  
 
These points are not intended to be criticisms as such – indeed, the second and third 
issues may be simply outside the scope of Korpi’s work. However, given the aims and 
objectives of the thesis, they do need addressing. The following three sub-sections flesh-
out the theoretical foundation of the thesis in some detail. Using Korpi’s theory of policy 
types as the broad framework, they draw together insights from a number of authors to 
produce an outline of the theoretical effects of family policy on various aspects of gender 
equality in employment. The following sub-section (2.2.2) covers the influence of policy 
on gender equality in labour market activity, or the extent to which men and particularly 
women participate in the labour market. As this area of equality is also the focus of Korpi’s 
theory, this particular sub-section mostly only adds further detail to the account above. 
Section 2.2.3 outlines the theory behind the possible adverse effects of certain policies on 
women’s careers, or on what is termed here as gender job segregation and equality in 
occupational attainment. Lastly, 2.2.4 covers theoretical arguments on the differential 
effects of family policy on men and women with varying socio-economic characteristics. 
More specifically, it discusses the possibility that the influence of policy on various 
gendered employment outcomes may be conditioned by levels of education.  
 
2.2.2. Family policy and gender differences in labour market activity 
 
Dual earner-carer leave policy 
 
As touched on earlier, leave entitlements for mothers as a general policy type have a 
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theoretically ambiguous effect on female participation and economic activity (Jaumotte, 
2003: 11; Misra et al, 2011: 143). Put differently, when looked at as a single type of policy, 
leave programmes have a complex and uncertain theoretical relation with female labour 
supply, with the expected impact of a given leave entitlement likely to be dependent on the 
exact design of the policy at hand.  
 
Most if not all job protected leaves have at least some capacity to promote maternal 
employment continuity (Jaumotte, 2003: 11). The general starting point here is that in the 
absence of job protected leave, mothers are likely to exit the labour force upon childbirth 
and importantly remain outside of the market for a lengthy – possibly indefinite – period 
of time (Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012: 4). This might be because re-entering the market 
and finding new employment involves prohibitive search costs, because the period outside 
of the force depreciates the mother’s human capital and therefore decreases the wage 
commanded in the market to a point below which the mother is unwilling to work13, or 
because leaving the labour force triggers female specialisation in household labour. In this 
situation, job protected leaves may hasten mothers’ return to employment by eliminating 
search costs and by protecting firm-specific human capital (Ruhm, 1998: 3; Akgunduz and 
Plantenga, 2012: 4). Additionally, leaving the labour force for only a fixed and specified 
period of time may prevent the mother from becoming a fully specialised domestic worker 
– in the sense that, when on leave, the mother retains their status as an employee – and 
may maintain maternal tastes and preferences for market labour.    
 
It is also possible that legislated leaves may promote participation amongst women yet to 
become mothers. For the most part, this is because prospective parents can enter 
employment safe in the knowledge that complete labour market exit is not necessary 
should they wish to have children (Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011: 122). Additionally, 
where leaves are paid, the benefit in almost all cases is conditioned on the parent having 
been in employment for a certain length of time prior to the birth. Thus, women yet to 
become mothers have a further incentive to participate in the market prior to parenthood 
if they wish to qualify for the payment. Korpi (2000: 13) suggests this effect is likely to be 
particularly large where the leave is paid through an earnings related benefit, as the 
benefit directly reflects previous efforts to build and maintain a career.  
 
On the flip side, however, leaves available to mothers may also have concurrent damaging 
effects on female participation and gender differences in economic activity. This is 
                                                        
13 This is effect may be amplified by the fact that, in the absence of sufficient ‘dual earner childcare 
provision’, the wage commanded will have to cover additional costs associated with childcare.  
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particularly likely to be the case where the leave is long (Jaumotte, 2003: 11; Hegewisch 
and Gornick, 2011: 1225). More specifically, if leaves are of sufficient duration to remove 
mothers from the market for longer than would have been the case in the absence of any 
statutory entitlement, then the provision may act only to intensify human capital 
depreciation and reinforce women’s roles as domestic workers (Akgunduz and Plantenga, 
2012: 4). As a result, while the entitlement would continue to provide a link with 
employment and remove the need to search for a new job, the overall effect may be to 
discourage women from returning to the labour force.   
 
The actual impact of a given leave policy should depend on how the structure and design 
of the leave balances the two conflicting effects. Going by Korpi’s (2000; 2010) 
theorisation, both maternity leave and gender-neutral earnings related parental leave 
should carry mostly positive effects for female participation. The former are typically 
short and are usually concentrated around childbirth, and also are usually paid through an 
earnings related benefit. As a result, they are expected to encourage participation amongst 
prospective parents and promote employment continuity amongst mothers. The expected 
effects of gender-neutral earnings related parental leaves are slightly more uncertain. 
Empirically, these leaves tend to be moderate in length and the earnings related payment 
should both promote activity amongst women not yet parents and provide at least some 
incentive for take up by fathers. As a result, these leaves are not expected to remove for 
‘too’ long and, on balance, should carry at least some positive effects for female labour 
market participation.  
 
In contrast, parental leaves paid through a flat rate benefit are more likely to have a 
mostly negative influence on female activity. These leaves tend to be long and as discussed 
in the previous section contain strong disincentives for take up by fathers. As a result, they 
may remove mothers from the labour market from an extended period of time14, leading 
to decreases in mothers’ human capital, reinforced gender roles and, by extension, a 
reduction or at least no increase in female labour participation.  
 
Lastly, it is worth briefly expanding on the theory behind leaves targeted at fathers. 
Paternity leaves and any father-specific portions of parental leave – plus possibly also 
sharable parental leaves, to the extent that they are able to encourage fathers to take part 
– are designed to promote male participation in domestic labour (Korpi et al, 2013: 11). 
                                                        
14 Although as noted in section 2.2.1, payment rates on flat-rate parental leaves tend to be low. This 
may discourage mothers from using the leaves for long periods of time, in turn possibly offsetting 
some of the damaging effects of the lengthy entitlement.  
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This may work by altering male preferences for caregiving, or possibly by setting a care-
sharing precedent at an important breakpoint in gendered labour specialisations – 
childbirth - where mothers often begin to build a comparative advantage in unpaid labour 
and fathers in market work (Blossfeld and Drobnič, 2001: 19). Much of the effect on 
gender differences in labour participation may be indirect and to take hold only in the 
medium- to long-run, but the idea is that an increase in male domestic work should allow 
women to expand their supply of market labour. It also remains possible though that 
having assumed some responsibility for domestic work, men may also reduce their own 
level of market activity.  
 
Dual earner childcare policy 
 
There are several ways of exploring the theoretical influence of public childcare policies 
on women’s economic activity. For example, public childcare services can be seen as an in-
kind or free at point of use public service that can be consumed only once the mother is in 
employment (Jacobsen, 1998: 363), or as a service that shifts the responsibility for 
childcare from the mother to the state, releasing the mother to pursue market labour 
(Korpi, 2010: S22). In both cases, however, the theory becomes a little complex once it is 
considered that the state might ‘provide’ childcare through cost subsidisation rather than 
direct provision. In this situation, perhaps the most useful perspective is to imagine 
private childcare as a cost on maternal employment that, in the absence of state support, is 
analogous to a mother-specific tax on wages (Jacobsen, 1998: 134; Blau et al., 2001: 112; 
Blau and Currie, 2003: 6; Jaumotte, 2003: 9), all within a basic static individual model of 
labour supply.  
 
Simple neo-classical labour supply models start from the position that a rational welfare 
maximising individual allocates their labour based on the value they attach to an 
additional hour of market labour – or, more correctly, the goods they can purchase using 
the income from an additional hour of market labour – and the value they attach to an 
additional hour of non-market work (Mincer, 1984; Blau et al, 2001: 91-98). Rates of 
substitution between the two are assumed to diminish as time spent on either increases, 
so that non-market labour becomes more valuable as it becomes more scarce – that is, as 
the individual increases hours of market work – and vice versa. An individual’s own 
preferred rate of substitution reflects a variety of factors. This includes their non-market 
productivity and ability to substitute goods bought using earned income for those that 
they would otherwise have been produced using non-market labour, as well as their 
‘tastes and preferences’ that themselves may be heavily influenced by social norms, values 
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and expectations (Blau et al., 2001: 98). The level of market labour an individual finally 
chooses is determined by the number of hours at which the net market wage on offer for 
an additional hour of market labour is exactly equal to the value placed by the individual 
on an additional hour of non-market work. Should the net wage on offer be lower than the 
value placed by the individual on non-market labour at zero hours of market work – 
termed the reservation wage – then the individual will choose not to participate in the 
market at all (Blau et al., 2001: 100). 
 
Assuming that childcare is the mother’s responsibility alone, that all variants of childcare 
are of equal quality, and that it is not possible for the mother to use alternative informal 
forms of childcare, then market childcare can be seen as a fixed cost per hour that reduces 
the net wage rate on offer to the mother (Blau et al., 2001: 112; Blau and Currie, 2003: 6). 
Clearly, as the cost of market care increases, the net wage on offer decreases. The effect of 
the fall in net wages on the mother’s preferred hours of market work is indeterminate – 
while the decrease in wages will increase the relative value of non-market labour and thus 
lead to a shift away from market work, the mother may also wish to compensate for the 
drop in income associated with the fall in net wages by increasing hours of market 
labour15 (Blau et al, 2001: 107-109; Borjas, 2012: 37-38). Importantly, though, the 
effective tax should have an unambiguously negative impact on headcount participation – 
if the tax is sufficient to decrease net wages to a level below the mother’s reservation 
wage, then the mother will leave the labour force entirely (Blau et al, 2001: 98; Blau and 
Currie, 2003: 6). This scenario becomes more complex once it is considered that mothers 
may have access to alternative forms of informal and often unpaid childcare, that 
individuals may derive other non-wage benefits from employment, or perhaps that 
parents share the responsibility for childcare (Blau and Currie, 2003). Nonetheless, the 
point is that private childcare generally acts as an effective tax on maternal employment 
that broadly discourages female activity whilst leaving male employment decisions mostly 
untouched.  
 
Within this model, public childcare provision or cost subsidisation will promote female 
activity if it reduces or eliminates the implicit tax on maternal employment and therefore 
increases the net wage on offer to mothers (Blau et al., 2001: 112). Provisions may 
encourage further activity amongst mothers already in employment if they raise the 
marginal net wage by enough to induce at least an additional hour of market labour and 
the additional income does not lead to shift in preferences away from market work. More 
                                                        
15 The two distinct effects of a change in wages are termed ‘substitution’ and ‘income’ effects, 
respectively (see Blau et al, 2001: 107-109).   
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definitely, public provision will promote female headcount participation if the decrease in 
the effective tax is sufficient to increase net wages above reservation wages for at least 
some mothers (Blau et al., 2001: 112). The full effect may be dampened somewhat if public 
provisions encourage mothers to switch from informal and unpaid sources of care to 
formal, state-sponsored childcare (Jaumotte, 2003: 9), but broadly a decrease in the costs 
of childcare should lead to at least some increase in female activity.  
 
An additional consideration is that public childcare policies may also promote female 
activity through job creation, either directly in the case of public provision or indirectly by 
stimulating the market through cost subsidisation (Blau et al, 2001: 374; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006: 1916). Childcare as an employment sector has historically been female-
dominated, due perhaps to conditions that are compatible with women’s remaining care 
responsibilities, and possibly also because the skills required are well matched to those 
often developed by women (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006: 1916). If these conditions 
continue to hold as the sector expands, then public childcare policies may promote female 
labour through both demand and supply, that is, by creating jobs that are attractive to and 
demand many of the same women who are now able to participate in the market due to 
reduced care responsibilities. 
 
General family support policy  
 
As discussed earlier, general family support involves, for the most part, family-related tax 
and transfer policies, with child benefit and family-related tax subsidies given as common 
examples. These policies tend to be quite diverse and the exact effects on gender 
differences in economic activity are likely to depend upon the actual design of the policy at 
hand. The theoretical accounts given here concentrate mostly on fairly general forms of 
the two policies. The effects of ‘general family support’ leave and childcare policies on 
labour participation are not expanded upon here as fairly detailed explanations were 
given above and in section 2.2.1.   
 
Child benefits or family allowances are expected to have mostly negative effects on female 
participation16. This is likely to occur because, all else equal, any increase in non-labour 
income produces an ‘income effect’ on the labour supply decision that is likely to 
discourage market activity (Blau et al, 2001: 101; Borjas, 2012: 36). More specifically, the 
                                                        
16 From a certain viewpoint – such as the ‘difference’ view of gender equity, for example  
- these cash transfers could be seen as beneficial for women’s interests and independence if they 
are treated as some form of maternal wage. However, from the perspective of gender differences in 
employment they are expected mostly to inflate gender inequalities.  
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additional income derived from the transfer increases the ability of the individual to 
consume market goods and therefore increases the relative value attached to non-market 
labour, due to diminishing rates of substitution (Blau et al, 2001: 101; see above). All else 
equal, this should decrease preferred hours of market labour. Moreover, non-labour 
income also at least partially determines reservation wages (Borjas, 2012: 42). In certain 
cases, the additional non-labour income derived from the transfer may be sufficient to 
raise the individual’s reservation wage above the net wage on offer, so that the individual 
is unwilling to work at all and exits the labour force completely.  
 
Importantly, the effects of the transfer should be similar for both mothers and fathers until 
it is considered that the benefit is typically paid to or targeted at the mother based on 
perceived care responsibilities. In this situation the income effect may be stronger for or 
perhaps exclusive to the mother, leading to a decrease in female economic activity while 
leaving male labour supply decisions largely untouched (Jacobsen, 1998: 362). Jaumotte 
(2003: 9) points out that the transfer may have a more ambiguous impact on female 
activity if it is used as some form of childcare subsidy, or if the additional income is used to 
purchase other goods and services necessary for mothers to enter labour force in the first 
place. Nonetheless, the ‘income effect’ is expected to dominate (Jaumotte, 2003: 9). 
 
Family-related tax breaks and subsidies – including joint taxation systems, marital and 
dependent spouse or partner allowances, dependent child allowances, and marital or 
‘head of family’ and dependent child tax credits – are expected to have a similar ‘income 
effect’ on women’s labour supply, to the extent that the additional income derived from 
the subsidy is perceived to ‘belong’ to the mother (Jaumotte, 2003: 9). Additionally, in a 
number of cases these tax subsidies are conditioned on a non-working spouse or partner – 
read: wife or mother – and are therefore removed once the partner enters employment, or 
at least once they work more than a certain number of hours per week. This is problematic 
for female economic activity because the withdrawal of the subsidy increases the effective 
marginal tax rate faced by the second earner, decreasing net wages and therefore 
preferred levels of maternal labour supply (Blau et al, 2001: 349; Jaumotte, 2003: 8). Tax 
breaks and credits aimed at families on low incomes are likely to have a similar effect on 
women’s marginal tax rates, at least where eligibility is calculated on the basis of family 
income and withdrawal is not appropriately tapered (Blau et al, 2001: 349). Lastly, 
wherever family-related tax subsidies are premised or conditioned on a non-working 
mother there is also some danger that the policy will reinforce the perception that a male 
market income should provide for a dependent family, and therefore some risk that the 
subsidy will strengthen gender divisions of labour.  
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2.2.3. Family policy and gender job segregation and equality in occupational attainment 
 
As touched on earlier, several authors argue that, simultaneous with any effects on 
economic activity, certain family policies may also have some influence on gender job 
segregation and women’s career attainment (Ruhm, 1998; Blau et al, 2001; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Pettit and Hook, 2009; Hegewisch and 
Gornick, 2011; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). For the most 
part these theorised effects are negative, in that certain policies are expected to increase 
the concentration of female employees in ‘sheltered’ feminised occupations and to 
reinforce ‘glass ceilings’ on women’s occupational attainment. This gives rise to what 
Mandel and Semyonov (2005; 2006) call a ‘welfare state paradox’, whereby certain family 
policies at once promote women’s labour market participation and constrain their access 
to desirable occupations and high status and highly paid positions.  
 
Much of the theory on any such family policy ‘trade off’ concentrates on the effects of leave 
entitlements for mothers. Similar to the discussion above around links between leave 
policies and female economic activity, the effects of leave as a general policy type on 
segregation and women’s occupational attainment is theoretically ambiguous – that is, 
leave entitlements have the potential to both soften and harden glass ceilings and to both 
promote and constrain women’s relative access to high status and highly paid positions.  
 
On the one hand, leave may advance women’s position within the labour market if they 
promote female experience and productivity through increased job tenure or employment 
continuity. More specifically, entitlements may increase female human capital if they 
persuade women to return to the same employer following child birth and therefore 
support the retention of firm-specific skills and expertise (Blau et al, 2001: 363), or if they 
minimize any depreciation of human capital associated with childbirth by encouraging 
women to return to the market quicker than would otherwise be the case in the absence of 
any statutory provision. Additionally, leaves may boost women’s productivity more 
indirectly if they incentivise women to invest in either general or specific human capital 
assets prior to parenthood in the knowledge that full labour market exit is not necessary 
upon childbirth (Korpi, 2000: 13). Whatever the mechanism, any increase in women’s 
experience and productivity associated with leave should raise the market wage 
commanded and increase women’s ability to compete for skilled positions.    
 
However, leaves may also have concurrent damaging effects on women’s relative 
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occupation attainment, particularly where the entitlements are of sufficient length as to 
allow the mother to remain outside of the labour force for longer than would be the case in 
the absence of any legislated provision. The likely mechanisms here are two-fold. Most 
immediately, an extended period of absence is likely to intensify the depreciation of 
human capital associated with childbirth and will certainly reduce female experience 
(Blau et al, 2001: 363; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011: 124). The effects on productivity 
must be balanced against the retention of firm-specific skills and training, but it is feasible 
that a given woman’s productivity may be lower following a lengthy leave than it would be 
if – in the absence of any provision – they had left the market entirely but returned swiftly 
in a different job.  
 
Secondly, long female leaves may rationalise statistical discrimination if they increase the 
risks and non-wage costs – actual or perceived – associated with female employees, and in 
turn encourage risk-averse employers to avoid hiring women or to self-compensate 
through a reduction in the wages offered to female employees (Ruhm, 1998: 288; Mandel 
and Semyonov, 2006: 1914; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011: 125). For unskilled or low-
skilled positions, the non-wage costs associated with leave – such the hiring and training 
of temporary replacements – are likely only small so the effects of discrimination on 
women in low skilled positions are expected to be minimal (Mandel, 2012: 243). 
Conversely, costs are likely to be large for high-skill positions where candidates are scarce 
and where the role requires substantial on-the-job training and employer investment 
(Shalev, 2008: 432; Mandel, 2011: 171; Mandel, 2012: 243). As a result, long leaves are 
particularly likely to constrain women’s relative ability to compete for high status 
positions at the top end of the earnings distribution but may have less impact on their 
ability to find low-skilled employment. As a possible knock-on effect, this may also lead to 
an increase in segregation and the concentration of female employees in ‘feminised’ – 
typically, low-skilled – occupations as women are driven to areas of the economy that are 
less hostile to female labour.    
 
The eventual impact of leave on women’s occupational attainment should depend on how 
a given leave programme or set of leave policies balances the two effects, with the 
assertion in the ‘welfare state paradox’ literature presumably that the latter, adverse effect 
generally dominates. It is worth noting here that these adverse effects may be offset at 
least in part by the provision of father-specific leaves or by sharable leaves that are 
designed to promote take-up by the father. Indeed, if entitlements and take-up were 
identical for mothers and fathers then any depreciation effects associated with childbirth 
and any risks and non-wage costs associated with the employment of prospective parents 
56 
 
 
must also be equal for men and women. It is feasible, then, that any ‘trade off’ effects 
associated with leaves may be less severe for those dual earner leaves that at least 
theoretically encourage male take-up. This is, however, dependent on the actual use of 
these schemes by fathers and – in the case of statistical discrimination – employers’ 
perceptions of which parents are likely to take leave. As observed levels of male 
participation in sharable leave programmes tends to be low (Haas, 2003: 13; Naldini and 
Saraceno, 2008: 740; Haataja, 2009; Haas and Rostgaard, 2011; Naumann et al, 2013), it is 
possible and perhaps even likely that any adverse effects attached to leave will be driven 
mostly by the total length of general leave on offer to mothers regardless of the design or 
specific type of leave available.  
 
Adverse effects associated with other family policies receive slightly less attention in the 
‘welfare state paradox’ literature. That said, Mandel and others (Mandel and Semyonov, 
2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012) do outline 
a couple of mechanisms through which public childcare provisions – or, more specifically, 
public care services in general – may influence gender job segregation and women’s 
occupational attainment. First, as employment in care services tends for whatever reason 
to be dominated by women, an extensive public care sector may pull many women into 
such ‘female-type’ jobs and thus contribute to the concentration of female employees in 
‘feminised’ occupational niches (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006: 1916). The overall impact 
on gender job segregation may be softened somewhat once it is considered that organised 
care provision is likely to be more efficient that informal domestic care, and thus that 
public provision may still allow a sizeable proportion of women to enter the wider market 
with diminished care responsibilities. Nonetheless, the point remains that public care 
services may draw a number of women into comparatively low status care employment 
and, in effect, transfer gendered divisions of labour from the ‘private sphere to the paid 
domain’ (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006: 1916). 
 
A second and more multifaceted set of arguments revolve around employment practices 
and conditions in the public care sector. In particular, both Mandel and Shalev (Shalev, 
2008; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012) point out that as governments generally strive to be 
‘responsible’ employers with relatively compressed pay structures, they are less likely to 
practice statistical discrimination and tend to offer comparatively high wages for what are 
perceived to be low skilled jobs. As a result, women drawn into the public care sector may 
benefit from relatively high wages in comparison to what they might command in the 
wider market and, moreover, may have greater and more equal access to relatively senior 
positions inside the sector (Mandel, 2012: 244). That said, the flip side of any compressed 
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pay structure is that top pay bands also tend to be relatively low. Thus, to the extent that 
female employees are drawn into such occupations, a large public care sector may 
simultaneously restrict women’s ability to attain high wages (Shalev, 2008: 431; Mandel, 
2011: 171).  
 
2.2.4. Family policy and gender differences in employment across levels of education 
 
So far, the theoretical relations outlined in this chapter mostly treat men and women and 
homogenous groups, that is, they look at the expected effects of family policy on the labour 
market position of ‘men’ and particularly ‘women’ as single categories of individual. 
However, it is theoretically likely that the influence of family policy will differ between 
subgroups or across individuals with varying demographic or socio-economic 
characteristics. One such characteristic that has received a good deal of recent attention is 
social class, and in particular how the effects of family policy are conditioned by the socio-
economic advantages carried by education (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; 
Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012; Korpi et al, 2013). 
 
In itself, education has long been understood as an important determinant of labour 
market outcomes (Polachek, 1981; Polachek, 1995; Blau et al, 2001: 174; Polachek, 2005). 
Higher levels of education increase capabilities and labour productivity (Schultz, 1960; 
Becker, 1993), which in turn boosts earnings power, incentivises activity and increases 
access to desirable, top-level positions (England et al, 2012). Accordingly, across 
countries, highly skilled women are more likely to be employed, are likely to work longer 
hours and likely to earn higher wages than their less-educated counterparts (Evertsson et 
al, 2009; England et al, 2012). Gender differences, too, are generally less pronounced at 
higher education levels. Levels of participation, in particular, tend to be more equal 
between highly educated men and women, although in several countries the gender pay 
gap is larger amongst those who hold at least a Bachelor’s degree (Evertsson et al, 2009; 
England et al, 2012)17. 
 
Against this backdrop, several authors – particularly Hadas Mandel and colleagues 
(Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012) – challenge the 
assumption implicit in much comparative family policy research that the effects of policy 
are uniform across levels of education. Instead, they suggest the effects are ‘classed’, with 
                                                        
17 Indeed, with the noted exception of wages, Evertsson et al go as far to conclude that ‘it is almost 
as if higher social class [measured by education] neutralizes some, though of course not all, of 
women’s gender disadvantages’ (2009: 236).  
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both the benefits and costs of family policy provision distributed unequally between those 
with differing levels of education (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; 
Mandel, 2012). 
 
First off, Mandel and others (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; 
Mandel, 2012) argue that the effects of policy on economic activity are likely to be 
stronger for women with lower levels of education than for their highly educated 
counterparts whose participation is often high regardless of the policy setting (Shalev, 
2008; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). Dual earner-carer leave policies, for instance, are 
more likely to promote participation amongst less educated women whose labour market 
attachment tends to be relatively weak. For highly educated women, the potential 
earnings typically associated with a strong education already provides both a large 
incentive and the resources necessary to return to the labour market soon after childbirth 
(Mandel, 2012: 244). Moreover, highly educated women also tend to hold comparatively 
positive attitudes towards maternal employment and dual earning (Crompton and 
Lyonette, 2005: 608; Shalev, 2008), so may be less susceptible to becoming specialised 
household workers upon parenthood. In contrast, women with less education generally 
command a lower market wage and on average tend to hold less favourable attitudes 
towards maternal employment (Crompton and Lyonette, 2005: 608). Thus, the security, 
attachment and reduction in search costs provided by job-protected leaves may be 
particularly effective at promoting employment continuity amongst new mothers with 
lower levels of education (Mandel, 2011: 162). 
 
Likewise, public childcare provisions are also expected to be particularly valuable for less 
educated – typically, low paid – women (Mandel, 2012: 244). The possible mechanisms 
here are twofold. First, because the costs of market childcare are more or less constant 
regardless of income – that is, price of market care is for the most part fixed per hour – the 
effective tax placed on maternal labour by market care is proportionally larger for women 
on a lower wage. As a result, any increase in net wages associated with publicly provided 
or subsidised childcare will also be comparatively large for women on low wages, 
producing a stronger marginal effect on activity, especially where the increase is sufficient 
to lift net wages above the reservation wage (Shalev, 2008: 431; Mandel, 2012: 244). 
Second, because care service employment tends for whatever reason to be well matched 
to ‘low-skilled’ female labour, extensive public childcare provision and a large public care 
sector more generally may also be particularly effective at encouraging participation 
amongst less educated women through an increase in labour demand (Shalev, 2008: 431; 
Mandel, 2012: 244). 
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Mandel and colleagues pay less attention to tax and transfer policies, but here too it is 
feasible that any effects on economic activity may be conditioned by education. In 
particular, as less educated individuals tend to command lower market wages they also 
tend to be more exposed to any discouraging effects attached to changes in non-labour 
income, and specifically to the effects of changes in non-labour income on reservation 
wages (see section 2.2.2). In this case, even if family-related tax and transfer policies 
cause increases in reservations wages that are similar across the board, it is women with 
low education who are most likely to see their wages fall below reservation level. As a 
result, it is possible that any effects of family-related tax and transfer policies on women’s 
labour participation may be felt most strongly by women with lower levels of education.   
 
Importantly though, Mandel and others also suggest that the possible adverse effects of 
certain family policies on women’s careers are also likely to be shaped by education, with 
in this case highly educated women most exposed (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 
2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). The starting point for their argument here is the 
observation that where the policy setting makes no special provision for female 
employees, many women with low career or earnings potential are likely to absent from 
the labour force, leaving mostly only those highly skilled or highly motivated women in 
employment (Mandel, 2009: 710)18. In such a selective and relatively ‘gender blind’ 
market, women’s average relative occupational attainment tends to be high as the 
remaining skilled female workforce is to some degree able to – or, put differently, forced 
to – integrate alongside their male counterparts on fairly equal terms (Mandel, 2009: 710). 
In other words and simplifying slightly, where labour markets offer women no special 
terms of employment, highly skilled and educated women are able to compete at least to 
some extent with men for desirable and relatively senior jobs19 even if less educated 
women are not able to participate at all20. 
 
                                                        
18 See Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) for an empirical investigation into cross-national differences 
in the non-random selection of women into employment.  
19 This can be observed, for example, in the comparatively high female share of managers and low 
gender pay gaps in the highly selective southern European labour markets and to some extent also 
the United States (Mandel, 2009: 700). 
20 This is not to say that female employees in those countries that offer little in the way of family 
policy do not suffer at all from employer discrimination or that many employers do not carry 
conscious or unconscious gender biases. However, the point made by Mandel and others is that the 
provision of legislated ‘female-friendly’ entitlements in effect guarantees the differential treatment 
of male and female employees, since the two are offered (or essentially offered, where provisions 
such as parental leave are sharable) different terms of employment and thus carry systematically 
different costs and benefits for employers. In other words, the argument is that while women 
across most if not all countries suffer gender discrimination, the provision of ‘female friendly’ dual 
earner policies can or may institutionalise and thus inflate the practice.     
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Introducing ‘female-friendly’ dual earner policies may, however, produce an environment 
in which employers are reluctant to promote women to high-level, highly paid positions 
on account of the additional costs associated with gender-specific entitlements and 
regulations (Shalev, 2008: 432; Mandel, 2011: 171; Mandel, 2012: 243). Particularly 
relevant again are job-protected leaves for mothers and leave-driven statistical 
discrimination. As discussed above, the provision of leave may encourage employers to 
avoid hiring women for senior or specialised positions due to increases in the risks and 
non-wage costs – actual or perceived – associated with female employees (Shalev, 2008: 
432; Mandel, 2011: 171; Mandel, 2012: 243). Of course, all women regardless of education 
may be subject to such discrimination should they apply for elite jobs. However, as it is 
highly educated individuals who are the most likely candidates for high-level positions – 
especially in the absence of leave and other family policy provisions – it is highly educated 
women who are most at risk from any adverse discrimination effects attached to leave 
entitlements. In short, as a group, women with high level qualifications are the most 
exposed to leave-driven discrimination, and have the most to lose (Mandel, 2012: 243).  
 
Similarly, any adverse effects attached to public childcare provision and public welfare 
employment more generally may too be structured by education. As discussed earlier, 
governments tend to be relatively responsible employers and as such are less likely to 
practice statistical discrimination and are more likely to promote women to senior 
positions (Mandel, 2012: 244). However, as also noted earlier, public sector pay ceilings 
also tend to be low relative to the private sector. Thus, to the extent that highly educated 
women are drawn to senior public sector positions by female-friendly conditions, a large 
public welfare sector is likely to decrease women’s ability to earn top wages and inflate 
gender pay gaps amongst highly skilled men and women (Shalev, 2008: 431; Mandel, 
2011: 171).  
 
Taking the two sides together, Mandel and others (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; 
Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012) expect the effects of family policy provision to be skewed by 
class – dual earner provision should be beneficial mostly for women with low education, 
while many of the adverse or damaging effects associated with certain policies are likely to 
be absorbed mostly by their relatively advantaged, highly educated counterparts. Indeed, 
Shalev (2008) goes as far to suggest that an absence of dual earner provision is explicitly in 
the interest of advantaged women. From this perspective, then, the ‘welfare state paradox’ 
discussed in the previous section shifts to become some form of inter-class trade off with 
family policies concurrently promoting the interests low-skilled women and limiting those 
of their highly educated peers. 
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2.2.5. Summary of theoretical expectations 
 
Bringing the previous three sections together produces a reasonably detailed theoretical 
account of the effects of family policy provision on gendered labour market outcomes. 
Dual earner leave and childcare policies should, theoretically, encourage female economic 
activity and help close gender gaps in labour market participation. Any effects are likely to 
be strongest for less educated women, although some impact may be seen across all levels 
of education. In contrast, general family support policies – including family-related tax and 
transfer policies, plus also certain leave and childcare programmes – are likely to 
discourage female activity and inflate gender differences in market participation. Again, it 
is feasible that women with lower levels of education may feel any effects strongest, 
although the theory here is perhaps a little under-developed.  
 
Importantly, certain family policies may also have concurrent damaging effects on gender 
job segregation and women’s relative occupation attainment. Central here are leave 
programmes, which may drive women into ‘female-type’ jobs and reinforce ‘glass ceilings’ 
by reducing female experience and encouraging employer discrimination. These effects 
may be mitigated somewhat where sets of leave entitlements are well designed, although 
this is dependent on employer perceptions and patterns of take-up. Notably, it is feasible 
that these adverse effects will be concentrated largely on highly educated women who are 
most likely to be candidates for high status and highly paid positions. Thus, together with 
the expected effects of policy on economic activity, it is theoretically possible that family 
policy as a broad category of provision produces some form of inter-class trade off that 
operates to the benefit of less educated women at the expense of the careers of their more 
educated counterparts.  
 
2.3. Comparative empirical evidence on family policy and gender differences in 
employment 
 
A fairly large empirical comparative literature tests and examines links between family 
policy provision and gender equality in employment. Many of these studies are cross-
sectional in design, that is, they use and examine data on policy and employment 
outcomes that stretch across countries at a single point in time. This is certainly a sensible 
place to start, but cross-sectional comparative analyses do suffer from certain limitations, 
as discussed in more depth later in this section. More recently, several studies have 
adopted what might be termed a time-series cross-section (TSCS) approach, where data is 
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collected for a set of countries at multiple points in time. The addition of a time-series 
dimension helps these studies overcome some of the limitations inherent in cross-
sectional comparative analyses (see section 2.3.2). However, this TSCS literature is still in 
relative infancy, with relations between family policy and certain areas of gender equality 
in employment remaining under-researched.   
 
This section reviews the existing comparative evidence on relations between family policy 
provision and gendered labour market outcomes, starting in the next section with the 
cross-sectional literature before moving on to explore the more recent ‘over time’ 
literature in section 2.3.2. It should be noted here that unfortunately there is not space to 
review all relevant empirical and methodological aspects of the numerous studies 
covered. However, table A.1 in appendix A (pp316-318) describes and summarises 
various methodological features of twenty key comparative family policy studies in more 
detail.   
 
2.3.1. Cross-sectional evidence on family policy and gender differences in employment 
 
To begin, several cross-section studies (Korpi, 2000; Mischke, 2011; Korpi et al, 2013) find 
that countries with more extensive dual earner policies tend also to be those with higher 
levels of female economic activity. Mischke (2011), for example, finds that female 
economic activity tends to be higher in countries with greater levels of dual earner 
provision, while Korpi (2000) find that gender differences in inactivity are generally 
smaller in countries that are generous providers of dual earner leave and childcare 
policies. Korpi et al (2013), meanwhile, test relations between configurations of family 
policy and women’s employment on individual level data that stretch across 18 OECD 
nations. Amongst other findings, results suggest a large, positive and significant relation 
between dual earner policy and the probability that any given woman is employed. These 
results are generally consistent with well-established conclusions from other cross-
sectional analyses operating outside of Korpi’s theory (Gornick et al, 1998; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006; Misra et al, 2011; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011). Gornick et al (1998), 
for example, show that motherhood employment gaps tend to be smaller in countries that 
are more extensive providers of policies – such as maternity and paternity leave and 
public childcare provisions – that are considered by the authors as ‘supportive’ of 
maternal employment.  
 
In terms of specific policies, a number of cross-sectional studies find that leave 
entitlements for mothers have a mostly positive effect on female activity (Pettit and Hook, 
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2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Misra et al, 2011). Mandel and Semyonov (2006) look 
across 22 OECD and Eastern European countries and find a positive link between fully 
paid weeks of general leave and the female labour force participation rate, while Misra et 
al (2011) find that both maternity and parental leave have at least some positive effect on 
female working hours. These same studies also confirm that the impact of leave on activity 
may diminish as the entitlement becomes long – in that the marginal effect of leaves on 
female activity is negative past a certain number of weeks – although Misra et al (2011) 
show that the turning point is as high as two years and, more extreme, Pettit and Hook 
(2005) find that leaves can last up to three years before the marginal effect on maternal 
employment turns negative.  
 
Similarly, public childcare provisions are also cross-sectionally associated with higher 
rates of female economic activity (Van Der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002: 232; Pettit and Hook, 
2005; Pettit and Hook, 2009). Using individual level data collected from 19 OECD and 
Eastern European countries and multilevel modeling techniques, Pettit and Hook (2005) 
show that a higher rate of enrolment in public childcare for children under three is 
associated with higher rate of maternal employment. Misra et al (2011) find something 
similar for public childcare coverage for children aged less than three, although they also 
find that provisions for children aged between three and six are ineffective at promoting 
the extent of female activity. This latter result may lend at least some weight to Korpi’s 
(2000) argument that public childcare for older children is at least in part a family support 
policy. 
 
Cross-sectional evidence on the effects of general family support policy is more limited. 
Both Korpi (2000) and Mischke (2011) show that female labour force participation rates 
are generally lower in countries that are generous providers of general family support 
policy, while Korpi et al (2013) find that the provision of family support policies decreases 
the probability of a given woman finding employment, albeit with the relation statistically 
insignificant in certain model specifications. Otherwise, cross-sectional comparative 
family policy research offers relatively few clues as to how family-related tax and transfer 
policies or those certain ‘family support’ leave and childcare policies influence female 
activity.  
 
Importantly, a number of studies produce evidence in support of the theorised adverse 
effects of certain family policies on gender job segregation and women’s occupational 
attainment (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Misra et al, 2008; 
Mandel, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). In terms of broad provision, Mandel and 
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colleagues show in various articles (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 
2006; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012) that gender differences in earnings and in the 
proportion of employees working in ‘female-typed’ jobs tend to be higher, and women’s 
representation in powerful and high status positions lower, in countries that are 
‘characterised by progressive and developed welfare policies’ (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006: 
1910), including extensive leave and childcare provisions and a large public welfare 
sector. With regard to specific policies, various studies show that the length and 
generosity of leave entitlements are associated with a lower female share of managers and 
a higher gender pay gap (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; 
Mandel, 2012). Likewise, Misra et al (2008) show that very long leaves inflate the 
motherhood wage penalty, that is, the decrease in earnings associated with motherhood 
having accounted for other factors. Lastly, a large public care sector is also associated with 
inflated occupational segregation and a decreased female share of managers (Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006).  
 
Notably, Korpi et al (2013) are critical of a number of these ‘welfare state paradox’ studies. 
They argue that many of the articles cited above do not adequately account for selectivity 
in the female labour force – in that, in countries that provide little in the way of family 
policy provision, the female workforce tends to be composed disproportionately of 
women with high skill and ability – and proceed to find that, after for controlling for socio-
economic differences between women, women’s access to high earnings is generally no 
worse in countries that are generous providers of dual earner policy (2013: 25). That said, 
their same data also show a gender pay gap at the 8th and 9th earnings deciles that is far 
larger in the Scandinavian countries – and, indeed, also the liberal countries – than in the 
conservative European states in particular (2013: 25). 
 
Finally, a number of cross-sectional studies provide support for the argument that the 
effects of family policy vary with levels of education (Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 
2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012; Korpi et al, 2013). First, while participation rates for 
women with high education are generally strong regardless of policy setting (Mandel, 
2009), activity amongst less educated women tends to be high in countries that are strong 
providers of dual earner policy – namely, the social democratic Scandinavian countries – 
and comparatively very low in countries such as the conservative European nations where 
dual earner policies are relatively scarce (Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009). 
Slightly problematically, participation is also generally strong amongst women with low 
levels of education in several liberal-type countries, particularly the United States, where 
provision of dual earner policy also tends to be low. However, Mandel and Shalev suggest 
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this is out of necessity rather than choice, as these countries also provide little in the way 
of general decommodification (Daly, 2000; Mandel and Shalev, 2009). More generally, 
Korpi et al (2013) find that dual earner provision increases female employment at all 
levels of education but with the effect largest for those with low education. Notably, they 
also find that general family support policy – generally ignored in Mandel and others’ 
theorisation – has the largest depressing effect on employment amongst women with 
moderate qualifications (2013: 17). 
 
Cross-sectional associations also provide at least some support for the suggestion that any 
adverse or damaging effects attached to certain family policies are particularly strong for 
highly educated women. Mandel (2012) finds that both the length of maternity leave and 
the proportional size of public welfare employment increase the gender pay gap amongst 
highly educated men and women, and provide some evidence to suggest that the size of 
the public welfare sector reduces gender differences in earnings amongst disadvantaged 
men and women. More broadly, Mandel (2011) shows that countries that are more 
generous providers of dual earner policy tend to see greater gender differences on a wide 
measure of equality amongst advantaged groups, including women’s relative 
representation in senior positions and their relative access to top pay bands.  
 
The limitations of cross-sectional comparative evidence on family policy and gender 
differences in employment 
 
Taken together then, the cross-sectional literature largely supports the various theoretical 
relations outlined earlier in section 2.2. Dual earner leave and childcare policies appear to 
encourage female economic activity generally, but with the effects strongest for women 
with low levels of educational attainment. These same policies also, however, appear to 
limit the careers of women by obstructing female access to highly paid, top level positions. 
Notably, there is some suggestion that any adverse effects attached to policy may be 
concentrated mostly on highly educated women, who also benefit little from family policy 
provision as their own market participation tends to be high irrespective of the policy 
setting.  
 
If valid, these ‘paradoxical’ cross-sectional findings add a thick layer of complexity to the 
understanding of – and, more importantly, decision-making around – family policy 
provision. Indeed, if, in Mandel and Shalev’s words, there is ‘no unambiguously woman-
friendly pattern of state intervention’ (2009: 29), then it becomes necessary for welfare 
states to balance against one another the interests of various competing female socio-
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economic groups, bringing into question the political feasibility of extensive dual earner 
provision in all but the most solidaristic of states (Shalev, 2008: 438-439).  
 
However, this cross-sectional empirical literature does suffer from limitations, many of 
which revolve around the literature’s reliance on static associations – that is, on 
relationships based solely on between-country variation in family policy and between-
country variation in gender equality in employment and a single point in time (Hegewisch 
and Gornick, 2011: 133). This may be problematic for two main reasons.  
 
First, to be of real practical use to policy makers, family policy studies need to be able to 
identify whether a change in policy has some influence over gender equality in 
employment – in other words, the principle objective in policy research should be to 
isolate the effects of within-country variation in policy provision on within-country 
variation in outcomes (Fairbrother, 2014: 124). Unfortunately, the between-country 
associations produced by cross-sectional studies reflect only relations between variations 
that exist across countries at the point in time covered by the cross-section. Thus, cross-
sectional studies are generally poorly suited to revealing the important relationships 
around policy change that may provide the empirical foundation of future policy 
developments (Frees, 2004). 
 
To be clear, between-country variation must reflect and be driven by within-country 
change at some prior point in time – indeed, cross-sectional associations capture the net 
effects of all developments in policy and outcomes across the entirety of history up to the 
point captured by the cross-section (Baltagi and Griffin, 1984). It is possible, therefore, 
that both within-country and between-country relations will be similar or, ideally, 
identical, in which case cross-sectional studies may offer valuable clues as to the impact of 
policy on labour market outcomes. However, it requires strong assumptions to take this as 
given, at least without testing or validation (Fairbrother, 2014: 124). Between-country 
cross-sectional associations are likely to be complicated and contaminated by numerous 
complex and idiosyncratic events and processes that build up over the long run, and that 
influence how patterns of policy and employment stand at the time of the cross-section. 
Thus, using cross-sectional associations as some form of ‘best guess’ as to the impact of a 
change in policy on labour market outcomes risks producing misleading results and 
inferences (Fairbrother, 2014: 124).  
 
Second, and related to the first, between-country cross-sectional statistical associations 
are often subject to omitted variable bias due to unobserved country heterogeneity or 
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country ‘individualness’ (Dougherty, 2006: 517). In other words, country outcomes often 
differ in ways that are not fully explained by the variables included in the analysis, either 
because the appropriate explanatory variable is unknown or because it is not or cannot be 
observed (Wilson and Butler, 2007: 104). At best unobserved heterogeneity causes an 
inefficient estimation of relations, but more commonly and more problematically 
unobserved factors often correlate with variables that are included in the analysis. This 
produces omitted variable bias as the ‘true’ effects of the omitted variable are 
misattributed on to, or away from, variables that are observed and are included in the 
analysis (Dougherty, 2006: 517).  
 
For the family policy-gender equality case, isolating and attempting to control for such 
unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be important. This is because it is probable that 
variation in gender norms, values and other unobservable (or at least often excluded) 
societal-level characteristics specific to each country influence both gendered labour 
market outcomes (Pfau-Effinger, 1998; Van Der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002; Pfau-Effinger, 
2004) and also policies through political mechanisms. It would, of course, be desirable to 
include factors such as culture and values within policy analyses, as Pfau-Effinger (1998, 
2004) has begun doing for women’s employment and Jo (2011) has done for welfare 
policy analysis more generally. However, where this is not possible and to the extent that 
such unobserved factors hold influence over labour market outcomes, cross-sectional 
studies may over- or under-estimate relations between various policies and equality 
outcomes and as such produce biased or misleading results.  
 
One solution to both of these problems is to expand measures of policy and equality across 
time, complimenting cross-sectional data with a temporal, time-series dimension. 
Including information on multiple countries at multiple points in time allows for the 
explicit estimation of within-country change relations – that is, relationships between 
within-country variation in policy and within-country variation in labour market 
outcomes – in addition to the usual between-country associations (Wooldridge, 2010: 453; 
Dougherty, 2006: 514). In other words, as far as data and statistical methods permit, 
stretching cross-national analyses over time allows analyses to explore the influence of 
changes in policy on developments in gender equality in employment. Moreover, 
repeatedly observing the same set of countries at multiple points in time assists with the 
identification of country heterogeneity or ‘individualness’ (Hsiao, 2003; Frees, 2004; 
Dougherty, 2006), thereby reducing the dangers of omitted variable bias. Taken together, 
the suggestion is that adding a temporal dimension to comparative data allows analyses to 
isolate the important ‘policy change’ relations and to verify the robustness of existing 
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cross-sectional findings (Fairbrother, 2014: 124). 
 
2.3.2. Time-series cross-section evidence on family policy and gender differences in 
employment 
 
A limited number of comparative family policy studies have moved towards data that 
extends across time as well as across countries (Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Ruhm, 
1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006; Tranby, 2010; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012, Akgunduz 
and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon, 2013; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013; Nieuwenhuis, 2014). 
Most of these studies use time-series cross-section data, that is, aggregate or country level 
data collected for the same set of countries over a number of points in time. The 
exceptions are Nieuwenhuis et al (2012) and Nieuwenhuis (2014), who use what might be 
termed repeated cross-section data - individual or micro level employment data collected 
for various countries at multiple points in time21. In either case, the principle remains the 
same – by adding a longitudinal dimension to comparative data, analyses can control for 
country ‘individualness’ and examine relations between within-country change in policy 
provision and gender labour market outcomes.  
 
This emerging ‘over time’ comparative literature provides considerable evidence on links 
between changes in family policy and gender differences in labour market activity, with all 
ten of the studies cited above covering at least some aspect of equality in economic 
activity. Several focus exclusively on the impact of changes in maternity and parental leave 
programmes (Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Ruhm, 1998; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; 
Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). In all cases, increases in leave policies are found to encourage 
female employment or labour force participation. Again, this holds only for changes up to 
a certain length (Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012), although Thévenon and Solaz show that 
leaves can be extended by up to two-years before the marginal effect on the female 
employment rate turns negative (2013: 33). Two of these studies also find that extending 
leave increases female working hours and decreases differences in the depth or extent of 
economic activity (Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013).  
 
A certain number of studies are more wide-ranging in their coverage of family policies 
(Jaumotte, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012; Thévenon, 2013). Both 
Jaumotte (2003) and Thévenon (2013) find that increases in public childcare expenditure 
                                                        
21 The latter approach carries several benefits, particularly regarding the ability to control for and 
model the effects of individual level characteristics simultaneous with the effects of macro-level 
factors such as policy (Frees, 2004: 171). However, repeated cross-section data is limited in its 
availability, both in terms of available employment indicators and countries and years covered.  
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share a positive association with female labour participation, particularly part-time 
participation, while the latter also finds that female activity increases with the proportion 
of children aged under three in childcare, although their measure does capture both public 
and private provision. Others find that increasing ‘general family support’ tax and transfer 
policies may constrain female activity (Jaumotte, 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012). For 
example, using repeated cross-section data that stretch across 18 OECD countries and the 
years 1975-1999 and multilevel modelling techniques, Nieuwenhuis et al (2012) find that 
increases in family tax subsidies and child allowances decrease female employment and 
maternal employment, respectively. Ferrarini (2006), meanwhile, finds that changes in a 
broad composite measure of general family support are negatively related to female 
economic activity, although the relation does fall just short of statistical significance.  
 
These studies are not perfect. Indeed, as touched on in the introduction to the thesis and 
as discussed in more depth later in chapter 3, several may suffer from certain issues 
relating to the methods and statistical techniques used. For instance, a number (e.g. 
Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Jaumotte, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012) 
use as dependent variables measures that reflect female outcomes – as opposed to gender 
differences in outcomes – only, which opens up results to bias from any wider 
determinants of variation in the general or overall level of the given outcome22. Moreover, 
many (e.g. Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012) appear to offer 
no correction in their models for statistical complications – namely, contemporaneous and 
serial correlation of errors – that are likely to occur as a result of repeatedly observing the 
same set of countries over time (see Beck and Katz, 1995; Plümper et al, 2005; chapter 3.4 
and appendix B.4 (pp. 330-332)). Both of these technical issues could potentially have a 
considerable impact on results. Nonetheless, at face value at least, these existing ‘over 
time’ comparative studies provide a fair amount of support for both theorised relations 
between family policy and gender differences in economic activity and also for the cross-
sectional literature.  
 
However, far fewer ‘over time’ studies examine the impact of changes in family policy on 
gender job segregation and equality in occupational attainment, and even less the 
influence of changes in policy on gender differences in employment outcomes across 
levels of education. With regard to the former, two articles (Ruhm, 1998; Thévenon and 
                                                        
22 As an example, using the female labour force participation rate – rather than the gender gap in 
the labour force participation rate – as a dependent variable means that, if unaccounted for, results 
may be open to bias from any wider processes that determine variation in the overall labour force 
participation rate. To some extent at least, taking the gender difference helps control for this wider 
influences (see chapter 3.3).  
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Solaz, 2013) do explore links between changes in leave entitlements and the gender pay 
gap. Using a time-series cross-section dataset that covers nine European countries and the 
years 1968-1993 and a two-way fixed effects ‘difference-in-difference-in-difference’ 
regression model, Ruhm (1998) shows that women may pay for extensions to maternal 
leaves through decreased relative hourly wages, perhaps to the extent of a 3% drop 
following a 40 week increase in leave. Thévenon and Solaz (2013) find a similar relation, 
although notably their results suggest that the effects of leave on the gender pay gap 
diminish fairly sharply as the length of the extension grows.  
 
Akgunduz and Plantenga (2012) go a little further to explore the impact of changes in 
leave on the share of women in managerial and professional occupations, as well as the 
gender pay gap. Using a similar technique to Ruhm (1998) and a sample that covers 16 
European countries from 1970-2010, they show that extensions to leave constrain female 
representation amongst managers and professionals – although the relation is significant 
only at the 10% level – but notably also find no statistically significant relation between 
changes in leave and the gender pay gap. These three studies alone (Ruhm, 1998; 
Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013), however, represent the extent 
to which the comparative ‘within-country change’ literature covers associations between 
changes in family policy and gender job segregation and equality in occupational 
attainment23. While valuable, they are not comprehensive – all three focus only on the 
effects of leave policies, and none directly cover aspects important to the both theory and 
cross-sectional conclusions, such as the impact of policy on gender job segregation and 
women’s ability to reach high wages.  
 
Only one comparative study (Nieuwenhuis, 2014), meanwhile, explores the impact of 
changes in policy on gender equality in employment at differing levels of education. Based 
on a micro-level dataset spanning 17 OECD countries and the years 1980-1999, 
Nieuwenhuis (2014) uses multilevel techniques to examine the effects of leave and 
transfer policies on the motherhood employment gap for women with varying levels of 
education. Notably, certain findings are the direct opposite of those found in the cross-
sectional literature – while the impact of changes in family allowances does not differ 
                                                        
23 A further study, Tranby (2010), uses a sample that stretches across 14 OECD countries and the 
years 1960-2008 and covers both the gender pay gap and occupational segregation. However, the 
statistical technique used by Tranby – random coefficients models – estimates pooled relations 
based on all variation, be it between- or within-country, without distinguishing between the two. As 
a result, Tranby implicitly assumes between- and within-country relations are identical, which may 
lead to misleading results should the two differ (Fairbrother, 2014: 129). In any case, it cannot be 
said that Tranby’s findings reflect the important ‘change’ relationships only, and thus this study is 
not fully included in this review.   
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across levels of education, the effects of changes to maternal leaves on employment status 
are found to be stronger for mothers with more education (2014: 108). This result 
certainly raises questions about the validity of the cross-sectional findings outlined earlier. 
More broadly, though, this solitary study clearly does not provide a comprehensive 
examination of the effects of changes in policy across levels of education, particularly as it 
does not look to cover any adverse effects of policy on segregation and women’s careers. 
As a result, evidence on the theorised inter-class trade off effects attached to certain family 
policies continues to rely almost entirely on cross-sectional data and analyses. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
Comparative studies have produced a number of valuable insights into how state 
legislated family policies may, as macro factors, influence variations in gendered labour 
market outcomes. Family policy may affect gender equality in economic activity – both 
positively, in the case of dual earner-type leave and childcare policies, and negatively in 
the case of general family support policies – but may also inadvertently inflate gender job 
segregation and strengthen ‘glass ceilings’ on women’s career. Notably, these effects may 
be structured by education, producing some form of inter-class policy ‘trade off’ where 
certain family policies work mostly to the benefit of less educated women while 
simultaneously limiting the opportunities of their highly educated counterparts.   
 
However, the empirical side of this comparative literature does have its limits. In 
particular, much of the literature continues to rely on cross-sectional associations and on 
cross-country differences in policy provision and employment outcomes only. An 
emerging ‘over time’ quantitative comparative literature looks to overcome at least some 
of the limitations inherent to cross-sectional associations by complimenting cross-national 
data with a time-series dimension. Yet, this ‘over time’ literature is far from complete. 
While several studies examine the effects of changes in policy on gender differences in 
labour market activity, less attention has been paid to the impact of changes in policy on 
gender job segregation and occupational attainment. Research on the effects of changes in 
policy on gender differences across differing levels of education, meanwhile, remains 
severely underdeveloped. This thesis aims to address these gaps through an empirical 
investigation into relations between within-country variation in family policy and within-
country variation in the several different areas of gender equality in employment covered 
above.  
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The next chapter is concerned with the methods used throughout the thesis to produce 
this empirical investigation. It details the sample, data, indicators, and statistical 
techniques used to analyse links between changes in policy provision and developments in 
gender differences in employment outcomes.   
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Chapter 3. Methods and research strategy 
 
 
This thesis looks to answer its research questions through an empirical examination of 
links between changes in family policy and various gendered employment outcomes that 
stretches across twenty OECD countries and the years 1985-2010. In terms of broad 
research strategy, the study takes the form of a ‘large-N’ variable-oriented quantitative 
comparative investigation, in that its focus is on examining relations between quantitative 
variables that are populated by the country cases in the sample24. More specifically, it 
looks to use quantitative data drawn from the twenty sample countries and twenty-six 
sample years to isolate and understand relationships between variables that represent a 
range of family policies and labour market outcomes (Landman, 2000: 24; Hantrais, 2009: 
32). Accordingly, analysis is conducted primarily through statistical techniques.  
 
The ‘large-N’ quantitative approach is common in the comparative family policy literature 
– to varying degrees, all of the empirical studies reviewed in chapter 2.3 could be said to 
have used such a strategy – but does have its drawbacks. In particular, it requires 
measures of both policies and outcomes to be simplified and abstracted somewhat in 
order to maintain equivalence of concepts over the sample, and it restricts the depth and 
breadth of available indicators due to the need for data to be comparable across all 
countries and years (Landman, 2000: 25, 38). However, the ‘large-N’ approach also 
benefits from the ability to make use of a large sample – and, therefore, to produce 
inferences that are less likely to suffer from selection bias – and, through the use of 
statistical methods, the ability to exercise at least some level of statistical control 
(Landman, 2000: 25, 49). For these reasons, and following much of the comparative family 
policy literature, the large-N variable-oriented quantitative comparative approach is 
considered the most appropriate comparative strategy for answering the thesis’ research 
questions (see appendix B.1 (pp. 317-320) for a more detailed discussion). 
 
In terms of specifics, the thesis measures family policies through eleven quantitative 
country-level indicators based loosely around Korpi’s (2000) conception of family policy 
types (see chapter 2.2.1). Three measures reflect the provision of dual earner-carer leave 
policies, three capture dual earner childcare provisions, and three indicators measure 
general family support policies. The remaining two family policy indicators are alternative 
                                                        
24 As opposed to a ‘small-N’ case-oriented comparative approach, where more emphasis is placed 
on examining in depth and detailed the country cases themselves (Landman, 2000: 27). See 
appendix B.1 (pp. 317-320) for a more detailed discussion of comparative research strategies.  
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measures of leave programmes, used for reasons explained later on in this chapter. 
Gendered employment outcomes, meanwhile, are measured by eight quantitative 
indicators organised into three sets around the thesis’ three research questions. Two 
indicators are chosen to capture gender equality in labour market activity, and three 
measure gender segregation and equality in occupational attainment. A further three 
indicators are used to capture gender equality in employment across levels of education. 
In all cases, these indicators are measured at the country-level.  
 
Analysis is conducted primarily through time-series cross-section regression, and 
specifically through two-way fixed effects multiple linear regression. This technique does 
have its drawbacks though, particularly around the transparency of results. Accordingly, 
the thesis complements its regression analyses with detailed descriptions of changes and 
developments in the measures of both family policy and employment outcomes. These 
descriptive analyses offer both preliminary answers to the thesis’ three research 
questions, and provide an empirical background against which the results of the more 
formal regression analyses can be discussed.  
 
This chapter details and justifies these various methodological decisions in some depth. It 
starts in section 3.1 with a discussion of the size and scope of the thesis in terms of 
countries and years covered. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 concentrate on data and indicators, with 
the former covering the thesis’ measures of family policy and the latter its indicators of 
gender equality in employment. Lastly, section 3.4 describes and justifies the thesis’ 
chosen methods of analysis, with particular attention paid to the technical specification of 
the linear regression models. It is worth noting here that this chapter is fairly lengthy, at 
least as methods chapters go. In large part, this is because many aspects of the method 
used are common or similar across empirical chapters, so to avoid repetition and save on 
space it is considered best to covers all the thesis’ empirical analyses here in one go, with 
only brief reminders given in each empirical chapter.  
 
3.1. Size, scope and sample 
 
This thesis makes use of a sample that stretches across twenty OECD countries – Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United 
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Kingdom and the United States – and the twenty-six years between 1985 and 201025. 
These countries and years are selected for both theoretical and practical reasons, as 
discussed below. However, it is recognised that the use of this specific sample limits the 
scope and generalisability of results. Countries have not been randomly selected and are, 
of course, not representative of some wider population of countries. Likewise, the time 
period used has not been drawn randomly from a larger pool of possible time periods. As a 
result, any findings and conclusions emerging from analyses in this thesis cannot be used 
to make firm predictions or concrete generalised inferences to countries and periods 
other than those examined. 
 
To some degree, the countries used here are dictated by those also used in the existing 
quantitative comparative family policy literature. It is important for this study to maintain 
a reasonably similar sample base to the literature so as to increase comparability of 
results, particularly with existing cross-sectional research on occupational attainment and 
on the effects of policy across levels of education. Table 3.1 (overleaf) shows the countries 
used in twenty key family policy-gender equality studies, with the countries selected for 
use in this thesis in italics. As is apparent, the countries used here are, generally, also those 
most often used in the literature – all twenty countries selected have been used in at least 
five of the existing studies, and the eighteen most frequently sampled countries are all 
included here.  
 
That said, the exact set of countries used is also determined by a compromise between 
data availability, conceptual equivalence, and, not least, the need for a wide and 
theoretically relevant evidence base. From a broad perspective, the twenty sample 
countries share a reasonable number of similarities. All are relatively economically 
advanced, liberal capitalist democracies and all are well-established members of the 
OECD. This relative similarity aids the transferability of policy and employment concepts, 
and importantly increases the availability of comparable policy and labour market data. Of 
those countries included in existing family policy studies but excluded here, Switzerland 
and Japan could also be said to meet these criteria. However, Switzerland is omitted 
because family policies are determined entirely at the cantonical level (FSIO, 2009) – and, 
as a result, it cannot provide a coherent set of macro level family policies – while Japan is 
excluded due to a lack of comparable labour market data. The Eastern European countries 
sometimes covered in the literature are also not included here – due in part to their 
                                                        
25 Although it should be noted that the exact set of countries and years used differ slightly across 
models depending on the availability of data for and missing cases on the various dependent 
variables (see chapter 3.3).    
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transitions from communism to capitalist democracy coinciding with the period of 
examination26, but also because of a scarcity of historic data on family policy provision – 
neither are certain other East Asian and Latin American countries – such as South Korea 
and Mexico, respectively – largely because the labour market position of women in these 
countries is so different from those in the sample countries that comparison may become 
difficult27.   
 
However, the twenty sample countries are also reasonably diverse in terms of both family 
policy provision and levels of gender equality in employment. Table 3.2 groups the 
countries used by some general form of family policy typology as derived and adapted 
                                                        
26 This issue could also be extended to post-reunification Germany. A lack of employment data 
across the period of examination prevents a separate analysis of the former East and West German 
areas, and Germany is considered too important a case to exclude. To avoid any statistical problems 
relating directly to reunification, all years prior to 1991 are excluded for Germany. 
27 For instance, gender difference in labour market activity are exceptionally large in Mexico – even 
by 2010, the gender gap in labour force participation rates (15-64 year olds) in Mexico was – at 37 
percentage points – over twice the OECD average of 18 percentage points (OECD, 2013d). Similarly, 
gender gaps in occupational attainment are far wider in Korea – and to a large extent also Japan – 
than in the other twenty sample countries. Gender pay gaps in Japan and Korea are safely among 
the largest in the OECD, while the female share of managers in both is well under half the OECD 
average (OECD, 2013c).  
France 20 Spain 11
Germany 20 Greece 8
Sweden 20 Czech Republic 7
Netherlands 19 Hungary 7
United Kingdom 19 Portugal 7
Belgium 18 Switzerland 6
Denmark 18 Israel 5
Finland 18 Japan 5
Austria 17 New Zealand 5
Canada 17 Poland 4
Italy 17 Slovak Republic 4
Norway 17 Russia 3
United States 17 Iceland 1
Ireland 16 Korea 1
Luxembourg 13 Mexico 1
Australia 12 Turkey 1
Studies included: Winegarden and Bracy (1995); Gornick et al (1998); Ruhm (1998); Juamotte 
(2003); Pettit and Hook (2005); Mandel and Semyonov (2005; 2006); Ferrarini (2006); Misra et 
al (2008); Tranby (2010); Mandel (2011); Mischke (2011); Misra et al (2011); Akgunduz and 
Plantenga (2012); Mandel (2012); Nieuwenhuis et al (2012); Korpi et al (2013); 
Thévenon(2013); Thévenon and Solaz (2013); Nieuwenhuis et al (2014).
Table 3.1. Countries used in twenty key comparative family policy studies 
and their frequency of inclusion
Frequency of 
inclusion
Frequency of 
inclusion
Country Country
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from the typologies produced by Esping-Andersen (1999), Lewis (1992), Korpi (2000), 
Leitner (2003) and Misra et al (2006). As is clear, the sample includes several 
representatives from each of the usual family policy country clusters, and as result 
contains a variety of approaches to family policy and an assortment of policy 
configurations, in the cross-section at least. This diversity is important, since the sample 
needs to contain a certain level of variation in order to provide a good natural evidence 
base for an assessment of relations between policy and employment. 
 
Similar considerations regarding data availability, relevance and usefulness also lead to 
the selection of the years 1985-2010. Given that this thesis looks to explore the impact of 
changes in family policy on gender equality in employment, it is necessary for the period 
covered to be of sufficient length to capture a good level of within-country variation in 
policy provision. At the same time, however, the time period should not be so lengthy as to 
necessitate sacrifices in the quality of data and indicators employed. 
Country General family policy country groups
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Belgium1 Conservative European
France1
Austria
Germany
Ireland
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Australia
Canada
New Zealand
United Kingdom
United States
Table 3.2. Country sample for the thesis with countries sorted according to 
general family policy country groups
Scandinavian
Southern European
Liberal
Source: Adapted from Esping-Andersen (1999); Lewis (1992); Korpi (2000); Gauthier (2002); 
Leitner (2003) and Misra et al (2006)
1. Belgium and France are partially separated from the remaining conservative European countries 
to reflect the observation made by many (e.g. Esping-Andersen (1999), Leitner (2003) and Misra et 
al (2006) that these two deviate slightly from the other conservative European countries in the 
extent to which they provide public childcare services. 
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Existing ‘over time’ comparative family policy studies generally use a period that is longer 
or that starts a little earlier than 1985-2010 (see table A.1 in appendix A (pp. 314-316) for 
more detail). Ruhm (1998), for example, covers the period 1969-1993, Ferrarini (2006) 
1970-2000, and Akgunduz and Plantenga (2012) 1970-2010. Most comprehensively, 
Tranby (2010) uses data that stretches across 1960-2008. However, use of such an 
extended period does carry costs. In particular, comparable and high quality employment 
and family policy data are increasingly scarce for earlier years, so examining a longer time 
period often leads to restrictions in the countries or indicators used. Ferrarini (2006), for 
example, cannot include indicators of public childcare policy in his investigation. Tranby 
(2010), meanwhile, is forced to present several indicators of family policy in dichotomous 
yes/no form28, and cannot include Spain and Greece for historical and presumably also 
data reasons. 
 
The period 1985-2010 represents something of a compromise between competing 
demands for length in time and depth in terms of data availability. One the one hand, 
research suggests that these years at least partly capture a period of general expansion in 
family policy provision29. Much of the existing research on developments in family policy 
is based on in-depth country case studies (e.g. Lewis and Campbell, 2007; Seeleib-Kaiser 
and Toivonen, 2011; see Ferragina et al, 2013), but the few existing ‘large-N’ comparative 
analyses do find widespread developments in policy provision across countries over the 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Ferragina et al (2013), for example, suggest the years 1980-2008 
are characterised by a ‘socialisation’ of the family and a general expansion of in the 
provision of female-friendly policies across most OECD countries. Gauthier (2002) finds 
more disparate change, but a relatively common pattern of increase across 22 OECD 
countries nonetheless (see chapter 4 for a more in depth review and examination of family 
policy change). Accordingly, the years 1985-2010 should contain a good level of within-
country variation in family policy provision. 
 
On the other hand, a relatively good pool of comparable employment and particularly 
policy data are also available across the twenty sample countries for the years 1985-2010. 
                                                        
28 This is problematic because it simplifies the policy picture and in many cases prevents indicators 
from properly reflecting variations in family policy provision.  
29 Notably, the years 1985-2010 also capture at least part of a period of strong interest for studies 
of change in the welfare state more generally. In contrast to the trends in family policy provision, 
these years reflect a period marked by increasing pressure on the welfare state from de-
industrialization and economic globalisation (Held et al, 1999) and, arguably, consequential welfare 
state retrenchment (Gauthier, 2002; Korpi and Palme, 2003; Starke, 2006; Ferragina et al, 2013) 
and shifts towards the ‘competition state’ (Cerny and Evans, 2003; Horsfall, 2011). 
79 
 
Of course, the exact indicators used remain subject to constraints and several continue to 
contain missing data for certain countries and years (see sections 3.2 and 3.3 later in this 
chapter). However, for years earlier than 1985 data on public childcare policy are 
particularly limited, while data for certain tax and transfer policies also become 
troublingly scarce with the OECD publishing statistics for only a select few countries prior 
to the mid-1980s. Taking considerations together then, starting at 1985 allows for the 
thesis to use measures of family policy that are more detailed and comprehensive than 
would be the case with a longer time period, while also providing a sample base that 
should contain sufficient within-country variation to explore the impact of changes in 
policy on gendered employment outcomes.  
 
3.2. Measuring family policies 
 
Family policies are measured throughout this thesis by eleven country-level quantitative 
indicators. As touched on in the introduction to this chapter, nine of the eleven indicators 
represent the thesis’ ‘main’ or primary measures of family policy. These nine measures are 
themselves organised into three sets based loosely on Korpi’s (2000) distinction between 
types of family policy (see chapter 2.2). Three indicators are used to measure dual earner-
carer leave policy, three capture the provision of dual earner childcare policies, and three 
measure general family support provisions. These nine main indicators are used mostly as 
measures in their own right, but also in certain parts of the thesis as components in three 
policy indices that are used to summarise provision of the given family policy type (see 
later in this section). The remaining two indicators are alternative measures of leave 
policy, used for reasons explained a little later on. 
 
The following subsections describe and justify the design of the eleven indicators of family 
policy. Section 3.2.1 concentrates on the nine main indicators. It outlines each indicator 
individually and briefly describes the construction of the three family policy indices. 3.2.2 
covers the two alternative measures of leave policy, while section 3.2.3 outlines how the 
thesis deals with missing data on the measures of family policy. Descriptive statistics for 
all eleven indicators are given in table 3.3 (overleaf), while for reference full results for 
each indicator – including a map of any missing data points – in each country and year are 
shown in tables C.1-C.11 in appendix C (pp. 342-352). 
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3.2.1. Nine main indicators of family policy 
 
Dual earner-carer leave policy 
 
The first three indicators are based around the leave side of Korpi’s dual earner-carer 
family policy type. As discussed in chapter 2, not all leave policies can be classified as ‘dual 
earner’. While most job-protected leaves have the potential to encourage female 
employment – either by promoting employment continuity and attachment in the case of 
leaves aimed at mothers, or by encouraging male caregiving in the case of father-focused 
leaves (Korpi, 2000: 13; Jaumotte, 2003: 11; Misra et al, 2011: 143) – some may also 
reinforce female domestic specialisation and solidify gendered divisions of labour, 
especially where they are long and low-paid (Ferrarini, 2006: 47). Accordingly, these three 
indicators look to capture only those leave policies that are, on balance, structured in such 
a way as to promote female participation and equality in economic activity (Korpi, 2000: 
13; 2010: s22; see chapter 2 for more detail). 
 
Indicator 1. Mother-specific earnings-related job protected leave, in effective weeks 
 
This indicator measures total weeks of job-protected leave that are reserved for exclusive 
use by the mother and that are paid through an earnings related benefit. In almost all 
cases this means weeks of maternity leave. However, because some countries do not hold 
programmes explicitly labelled as maternity leave, but rather reserve a portion of parental 
leave for the mother, this indicator also includes any weeks of parental leave that share 
the characteristics of maternity leave – that is, weeks of job-protected leave that are 
designated for use by the mother and that are paid through an earnings-related benefit30. 
Following Korpi (2010), Engster and Olofsdotter Stensöta (2011) and Mischke (2011), 
amongst others, all weeks of leave are multiplied by the average wage replacement rate 
for the typical female earner across the duration of the leave, so as to present the indicator 
in ‘full-time equivalent’ form. In other words, mother-specific leaves are presented as the 
‘effective’ length in weeks if the leave had been paid at 100% of average female earnings. 
As a result, unpaid leaves – which offer few incentives for take-up (Finch, 2006: 119) – are 
discounted entirely. Data for this indicator come from a variety of sources (see ‘Data 
                                                        
30 The earnings-related component does not always form part of a strict definition of ‘maternity 
leave’, but is a part of Ferrarini’s definition (2006: 18), as well as a part of the operationalisation of 
maternity leaves in other studies operating within Korpi’s framework (Korpi, 2000; 2010; 
Baeckman and Ferrarini, 2010; Korpi et al, 2013). In addition, empirically, across the 20 countries 
used here all maternity leaves are paid through an earnings-related benefit. The only exception is 
the United Kingdom, where the maternity benefit is only partially earnings-related.  
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Sources’), with Gauthier (2011a) the primary source. There is no missing data. 
 
Indicator 2. Father-specific job protected leave, in effective weeks 
 
Indicator 2 reflects total weeks of job-protected leave that are reserved for exclusive use 
by the father. It is the sum of the maximum weeks of paternity leave, plus any weeks of 
parental leave that are reserved for the father and any bonus days associated with father 
take-up31. Importantly, this includes all father-specific weeks paid by either an earnings-
related or flat rate benefit, but not unpaid leave as these provide no incentive for take up. 
Again, prior to summation, weeks of leave are multiplied by the appropriate replacement 
rates in order to generate full-time equivalents. Data for this indicator were collected by 
the author and come from a wide range of sources (see ‘Data Sources’). There is no 
missing data. 
 
Indicator 3. Gender-neutral earnings-related job protected parental leave, in effective 
weeks 
 
Indicator 3 measures the number of weeks of job-protected earnings-related parental 
leave that are available for use by either parent. Importantly, it captures only those 
sharable leaves that are paid via an earnings-related benefit, and does not include unpaid 
schemes or those paid through a flat-rate benefit (see chapter 2.2 for justification). The 
indicator is calculated by removing any mother- or father-specific weeks from the total 
number of weeks of earnings-related job-protected parental leave. Once again, weeks of 
leave are multiplied by the average wage replacement rate for the average worker in 
order to generate the ‘effective’ full-time equivalent length of the leave. Data for this 
indicator come from a number of sources, many of which were collected by the author 
(see ‘Data Sources’). There is no missing data. 
 
Dual earner childcare policy 
 
The second set of family policy indicators are based on the childcare side of Korpi’s (2000) 
                                                        
31 Bonus days of parental leave are sometimes awarded when the father takes a certain number of 
weeks of sharable leave. Here, the bonus days are treated as father-specific leave if i) they can be 
used only by the father, as is the case in Finland since 2003 (Ellingsaeter, 2009: 8; OECD, 2013c) or 
ii) if they are conditional on the father taking a certain number of days of non-reserved gender-
neutral leave – as is the case in Germany since 2007 (Moss and Wall, 2007: 161) – in which case the 
bonus days are effectively reserved for the father so long as the number of bonus days does not 
exceed the number of days required for qualification. Bonus days that can be used by either parent 
and that can be earned by fathers taking leave that is already father-specific are not counted here.  
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dual earner policy type. In other words, the second three indicators aim to reflect those 
public childcare policies that look to promote female labour market activity by reducing 
maternal care responsibilities and increasing returns to second earning (Korpi, 2000: 13; 
Misra et al, 2011: 144; Blau and Currie, 2003). Ideally, these indicators would reflect the 
extent of public provision, the level of any cost-subsidisation and the remaining cost to 
parents, plus the hours and quality – however measured – of any publicly provided or 
funded care (Lohmann et al, 2009: 41-45). Unfortunately, however, comparable data do 
not exist for many of these aspects of public childcare policy, particularly as measures are 
required to stretch across time as well as space32. For example, while limited cross-
sectional information exists on childcare costs (Bradshaw and Finch, 2002) and the hours 
and quality of childcare (Gornick and Meyers, 2003), there are no data available on these 
areas of childcare in time series form. 
 
Because of these restrictions, the following indicators focus mostly on only those aspects 
of dual earner childcare policy for which at least some data exist and which also, not by 
coincidence, tend to be covered most often in the literature (see table A.1 in appendix A 
(pp. 314-316)). The indicators look to cover the degree of public service provision for both 
very young and for pre-school children, and also the extent of overall public support for 
childcare services. It is acknowledged that this narrowed focus means that the following 
indicators cannot fully reflect dual earner childcare provision – and results should be 
interpreted as such – but it does allow for measures to go at least some way towards 
capturing patterns and developments in state childcare policies. 
 
Indicator 4. Proportion of children under three years of age in public or publicly 
supported childcare 
 
Indicator 4 covers the proportion of children aged between 0 and 3 years of age in publicly 
run, funded or supported childcare places. The indicator reflects state efforts to directly 
provide services for very young children, although unfortunately due to a lack of data it 
cannot capture the degree of public provision in terms of hours-per-week or weeks-per-
year. Data for this indicator are compiled from a number of sources (see ‘Data Sources’). 
                                                        
32 Indeed, in their ‘over time’ studies both Ferrarini (2006: 18) and Nieuwenhuis et al (2012) do not 
measure childcare policy at all, presumably for data reasons, while Jaumotte (2003: 55) relies on 
public expenditure on childcare only. Thévenon (2013), meanwhile, uses data derived from EU-
SILC on the proportion of children enrolled in ‘formal childcare’, that is, in any kind of organised 
childcare regardless of whether it is publicly or privately provided. However, using ‘formal 
childcare’ enrolment rates as a proxy for public policy is dangerous. Changes and developments in 
overall enrolment rates may not follow or accurately reflect state childcare policies (Keck and 
Saraceno, 2011). Furthermore, overall enrolment rates are likely to provide an endogeneity risk in 
statistical analyses, as they are likely to be driven in large part by female labour market activity. 
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This indicator suffers from a very high missing data rate (61.1%) which, of course, reduces 
the ability of the indicator to accurately represent the extent of provision for under threes 
in a given country and year. However, the inclusion of this indicator is considered central 
to the measurement dual earner childcare policy. Existing evidence suggests that public 
childcare places for zero-to-three year olds are an important determinant of gender 
equality in labour market activity (Van Der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002: 232; Pettit and 
Hook, 2005, 2009; Uunk et al, 2005; Misra et al, 2011). As a result, ignoring childcare for 
very young children entirely would risk omitted variable bias. While it is recognised that 
this indicator is far from perfect, rejecting what information does exist on public provision 
for children between zero and three may be more harmful than including an indicator 
with a high level of missing data. However, this indicator should be understood strictly as 
just an indicator of public provision – rather than as a precise measure – and any findings 
should be interpreted with caution. 
 
Indicator 5. Proportion of children between three and six years of age in publicly run pre-
primary education or in primary school 
 
Indicator 5 captures the proportion of children aged between three and six years of age 
(inclusive) that are either enrolled in publicly-run pre-primary educational institutions33 
or are attending primary school. It thus reflects state efforts to provide childcare services 
for slightly older children. Data for this indicator are extracted primarily from the OECD 
education database (2012a). Because enrolment data come in absolute form, they have 
been transformed into proportions using population data from the OECD and Eurostat. 
There is a missing data rate of 20.6%. 
 
This indicator includes children enrolled in both pre-primary education and in primary 
school for two reasons. First, it is necessary to take account of cross-national differences in 
the entry age for primary education. The simplest way to do this would be to calculate 
enrolment rates for those aged between three and school age only. Unfortunately, 
however, sufficient and comparable data on enrolment in public pre-primary institutions 
are not available in a form that is disaggregated by years of age34. By also including 
                                                        
33 Where pre-primary programmes are broadly defined by the OECD as those ‘designed to meet the 
developmental and education needs of children at least 3 years old … and not older than 6’ (OECD, 
2004: 87 
34 The OECD education database gives figures for the number of children enrolled in public 
institutions and the number of children enrolled by years of age separately. Thus, within the years 
of age data it is not possible to know whether the child is enrolled in a public or private institution, 
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children between 3 and 6 that are enrolled in primary school, the indicator automatically 
corrects for different school starting ages. 
 
Secondly, from an employment perspective, there is no convincing reason why enrolment 
in primary schooling should be seen as any different to enrolment in public pre-primary 
institutions – both provide a form of care that reduces the childcare burden on mothers 
and reduces the implicit tax on female labour. Moreover, Gornick and Meyers (2003) show 
that hours and structures of primary schools tend to be similar to pre-primary 
institutions. Thus, it is possible to argue that a lower age of compulsory schooling – and 
thus a greater proportion of 3 to 6 year olds enrolled in primary schooling – is every bit as 
much of a dual earner childcare policy as pre-primary childcare provision for children of 
the same age (Gornick et al, 1997). 
 
Again, this indicator is limited. Importantly, it reflects only those children enrolled in 
publicly-run pre-primary education and not those that are in publicly-supported or 
publicly-financed private institutions35. This is likely to lead to the underestimation of 
public provision for 3 to 6 six year olds in some countries36. Like indicator 4, this measure 
also does not reflect the hours-per-week or weeks-per-year covered by each place. This 
point is particular relevant here, since part-time care for older children might do little to 
promote maternal employment (Korpi: 2000: 12). However, once more, superior data are 
not available for the countries and years covered throughout this thesis and the OECD data 
used here are considered the best available option. 
 
Indicator 6. Public expenditure on childcare services per child aged under six (US$ 1000s, 
2005 prices 2005 PPPs) 
 
Indicator 6 reflects general state efforts to provide or subsidise childcare services for 
children under school age. Raw absolute expenditure in national currency is converted to 
constant (2005) US$s and expressed per child under six years of age in order to aid 
comparability. The raw expenditure data is taken directly from the OECD social 
expenditure database (2012b), and captures ‘public spending towards formal day-care and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and within the public institution data it is not possible to know a child’s exact year of age, other 
than it must lie between 3 and 6 (inclusive) (OECD, 2004: 87).  
35 Some data on the latter are available in the OECD education database, but missing data rates are 
very high and there is no data for any country prior to 1992. 
36 For example, in Belgium in 2010 more children were enrolled in government-dependent private 
pre-primary institutions than in publicly run pre-primary institutions (OECD, 2012a). Other 
countries likely to be affected include Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain and 
Sweden.   
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pre-school services for children not yet 6 years of age’ (Adema et al, 2011: 98)37. The 
currency conversion and population data are from the OECD (2013d). The indicator has a 
missing data rate of 8.6%. 
 
It is acknowledged that public childcare expenditure data is limited. In particular, as it is 
an aggregate measure it cannot illuminate how public childcare policies are structured 
(Lohmann, 2011: 4), and thus any inferences resulting from this indicator cannot be used 
to recommend specific policies. However, this indicator can act as something of a ‘catch-
all’ measure of public childcare policy, and is used here to at least partially reflect those 
aspects of policy that cannot be measured directly due to a lack of data availability – such 
as cost subsidisation and care quality – as long as they are, at least in part, related to 
expenditure.  
 
General family support policy 
 
The final three main indicators find their theoretical basis in Korpi’s (2000) ‘general 
family support’ policy type. As covered in chapter 2, these policies rarely have an explicit 
objective regarding female labour market activity, and instead are usually aimed at 
providing financial and/or time support for the family unit. However, as they are typically 
premised on the nuclear family model, these policies often act to reinforce divisions of 
household labour with the father as single earner and mother as specialised domestic 
worker (Korpi, 2000: 11; Korpi, 2010: s21). 
 
For the most part, general family support policies take the form of tax and cash transfer 
policies, with child or family allowances and family- or child-related tax subsidies 
particularly common types of provision (Korpi, 2000: 12-13; Korpi, 2010: s21-s22). 
However, as discussed in chapter 2, certain forms of leave policy may also be considered 
‘general family support’. More specifically, flat-rate parental leaves and particularly 
childcare leaves are often classified as general family support-type policies by Korpi and 
others (Ferrarini, 2006; Bäckman and Ferrarini, 2010; Korpi, 2010; Mischke, 2011; Korpi 
et al, 2013) on account of their typical long length, their strong disincentives for take-up 
by fathers and, in the latter case only, their lack of job protection.     
 
 
                                                        
37 The SOCX data is already adjusted to take account of those countries were the age of compulsory 
schooling is less than (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) or more than (e.g. 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) six years of age (Adema et al, 2011: 98-99).  
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Indicator 7. Child benefit per month for two children, as a proportion of an average 
production worker’s gross monthly earnings 
 
Indicator 7 captures the relative generosity of child benefit or family allowance payments. 
It is the sum of child benefit per month – as defined by Gauthier (2011a), which includes 
child-conditioned cash transfers and child-conditioned tax credits (Gauthier, 2011c) – for 
the first two children in a household, expressed as a proportion of an average production 
worker’s monthly wage to ensure comparability. The indicator uses the benefit paid for 
the first two children per household as in many cases the level of entitlement varies for 
each additional child. Data for the indicator come from Gauthier (2011a), MISSOC and 
MISSCEO (2013) and the Social Security Administration (2013), and there is no missing 
data.  
 
Indicator 8. Tax subsidies for the family 
 
Indicator 8 measures the degree to which the tax system provides financial support for the 
nuclear family unit. It is calculated as the difference between the post-tax (income tax plus 
employee’s social security contributions) income for a single earner married couple with 
two children and a labour market income at 100% of average earnings, and the post-tax 
income of a single individual with no children on the same wage, expressed as a 
proportion of average earnings. The difference represents the extent to which the state 
looks to supplement net family incomes, relative to single persons, via the tax system 
(Ferrarini, 2006: 53). It is possible for the difference to be zero where the tax system 
contains no family-conditional elements, and in certain cases can be negative – that is, for 
a single earner couple with two children to face a higher tax rate than a single individual 
with no children. The latter is, however, rare38. 
 
Because of this method of calculation, the indicator acts as something of a ‘catch-all’ 
measure and captures a number of aspects of tax systems that reduce the tax burden on 
the nuclear family unit. These include joint taxation systems, marital and dependent 
spouse or partner allowances, dependent child allowances, and marital or ‘head of family’ 
and dependent child tax credits. Data for this indicator are extracted and calculated from 
the OECD tax database (2013e) and several OECD tax and benefit publications (see ‘Data 
                                                        
38 A negative difference is observed for Greece in the years 1990, 1992 and between 1997 and 
2010. Under collective labour agreements, Greek workers with dependent children and spouses are 
usually granted additional income subsidies from their employers (OECD, 1998: 228). These 
subsidies are taxable, which raises the tax burden on a worker with a family (initially) earning the 
average wage above that of a worker on an equivalent wage but without a spouse or dependent 
children.    
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Sources’). It has a missing data rate of 8.4%. 
 
Indicator 9. Flat-rate job protected parental leave and childcare leave available to 
mothers, in effective weeks 
 
This final indicator measures the combined length of flat-rate parental leave and childcare 
leave available to mothers. The indicator is the sum of weeks of paid flat rate parental 
leave – with any weeks of father-specific flat rate parental leave removed – and weeks of 
paid childcare leave. To reflect the level of support to families, weeks of leave are 
multiplied by the average wage replacement rate across the respective leave and are 
therefore presented in ‘effective’ full-time equivalent form. As a result, the indicator does 
not reflect those unpaid parental or childcare leaves which provide little incentive for 
take-up by either parent (Finch, 2006: 119). Data are drawn from a number of sources 
including Gauthier (2011a), and there is no missing data. 
 
Three composite family policy indices 
 
As touched on at the start of this section, these nine main indicators of family policy are 
used predominantly as individual stand-alone measures in their own right. This provides a 
detailed picture of variation in family policy provision across countries and of changes in 
provision over time. However, in certain situations – such as when presenting data in 
graphical or in tabular form – this detailed information may become overwhelming with 
developments in and configurations of policy hard to identify. 
 
As a way of simplifying the data, the main nine indicators are at times presented in the 
form of three composite index measures that summarise the general level of provision in 
each of the three types of family policy39. Indicators 1-3 are combined into a dual earner-
carer leave policy index, 4-6 into a dual earner childcare policy index, and 7-9 into a 
general family support policy index. These three indices provide ‘headline’ figures of 
provision (Nardo et al, 2005: 8) that are used at various points around the thesis to 
summarise patterns of and developments in the various areas of family policy. It is worth 
noting though that the policy indices are not used in any of this thesis’ more formal linear 
regression analyses. Primarily, this is because it turns out that the provision of the various 
                                                        
39 It is not uncommon for indices to be used to measure family policy. Gornick et al (1998), Mandel 
and Semyonov (2005, 2006), Korpi et al (2010), and Tranby (2010), amongst others, all use indices 
to capture family policies within their studies. Some authors (e.g. Gornick et al, 1998; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006) justify their use of indices on theoretical grounds. 
Here, however, they are used mainly for practical reasons. 
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specific policies within each index does not always correlate40, so to some extent the 
indices lack internal consistency. As a result, results inside of each dimension are at times 
fairly diverse and use of the indices as independent variables in the regression models 
would risk producing misleading inferences. 
 
Constructing the three policy indices requires a number of considerations, in addition to 
those concerning the selection of the indicators themselves. Due to space constraints it is 
not possible to provide sufficient detail on each of the various decisions here – instead, an 
in-depth discussion is given in appendix B.2 (pp. 320-325). However, as an extremely 
brief summary, the three indices are produced by first normalising the various indicators 
using Z-score standardisation, so that all hold a standard normal distribution with a mean 
of zero and standard deviation of one. This means that all indicators are expressed on a 
common scale, which increases comparability and ensures none have undue influence 
over the final index score. The standardised indicators are then combined into their 
respective indices by taking the simple unweighted arithmetic mean of the three measures 
that make up the given policy index. In other words, final values on each of the three policy 
indices are the mean average of the standardised versions of the three policy indicators 
that measure the given policy area. These methods have their downsides (see appendix 
B.2), but produce transparent index scores and intuitive ‘headline’ summaries of provision 
of a given policy type.  
 
3.2.2. Alternative measures of leave policy 
 
As outlined above, the thesis’ main family policy indicators split leave entitlements into 
several measures of various types – namely, mother-specific earnings-related leave, 
gender-neutral earnings-related leave, flat-rate parental and childcare leave, and also 
father-specific leave. This is to allow for the examination of whether different types of 
leave have varying effects – either in direction or magnitude – on gender equality in 
employment, as per Korpi and others (Korpi 2000, Ferrarini, 2006, Mischke, 2011, Korpi 
et al, 2013). However, splitting leaves in this manner might also introduce a couple of 
complications.  
 
First and foremost, it remains an empirical question whether or not the different types of 
                                                        
40 This is particularly the case with the ‘dual earner-carer leave’ policy index. Across the sample, 
mother-specific earnings-related leave and gender-neutral earnings-related leave share a moderate 
negative correlation  (r=-0.249), mostly because those countries that provide generous gender-
neutral leave tend also to provide relatively short maternity leaves, while others provide neither. 
As a result, the ‘dual earner-carer leave’ policy index is not internally consistent (cronbach’s alpha = 
0.226). 
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leave available to mothers actually have differing effects on employment outcomes. The 
logic behind Korpi’s theoretical argument is compelling, but to the author’s knowledge no 
existing studies explicitly test whether it holds empirically, at least not within a 
comparative context. To be clear, several studies do divide leaves into ‘dual earner’ and 
‘general family support’ types (Korpi 2000, Ferrarini, 2006, Mischke, 2011, Korpi et al, 
2013) but in each case the various indicators are used only in composite policy indices. As 
a result, it is not possible to know from these studies whether or not relations do indeed 
vary across specific leave types.  
 
The danger here is that if different types of leave do not have differing effects on a 
particular outcome, then splitting entitlements across several indicators may cloud or 
distort estimates of the effects of leave in general. It is possible, for instance, that the 
provision of one particular type of leave matters less for a given outcome than the total 
provision of all leave in general – as an example, leave-driven statistical discrimination 
may be based less on the provision of, say, flat-rate or earnings-related gender-neutral 
parental leaves specifically and more on just the total length of general leave available to a 
mother regardless of the exact design or payment structure. In such a situation, using 
separate indicators may lead to the miss-estimation of the influence of leave programmes.  
 
Additionally, it is known from several studies (e.g. Ruhm, 1998; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 
2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013) that any employment-facilitating effects of leave 
diminish and possibly even reverse as the total length of the entitlement becomes long, 
most likely because extended periods of absence from the labour force increases the 
difficulty of returning once the entitlements ends. The usual method of accounting for any 
such curvilinear relation in a linear regression context is to include a squared term on the 
measure of leave (Ruhm, 1998; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 
2013). However, where entitlements are split between several indicators it makes little 
sense to include a squared term as, individually, none of the leave indicators always 
represent the ‘total’ length of leave. In other words, when leave provisions are split it is 
not possible to properly capture any damaging effects of long leave as none of the 
individual indicators – which are assumed independent of one another – measure the total 
length of the entitlement on offer.  
 
To check for and guard against these issues, this thesis also uses two additional 
‘atheoretical’41 indicators of leave policy – total effective maternity and parental leave 
available to mothers, and effective childcare leave – as detailed below. The former reflects 
                                                        
41 In the sense that they cut across Korpi’s (2000) conception of family policy types.  
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the overall length of all maternity and parental leave that can be used by – but is not 
necessarily reserved for – mothers, and as such represents the overall general female 
leave entitlement regardless of exact leave type. Notably, this alternative measure is 
similar to those used to capture leave policies in much of the wider family policy literature 
(e.g. Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 
2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013; Thévenon, 2013). The second additional indicator 
captures childcare leaves only. These particular leaves are not included in the overall 
general measure as their characteristics mean that they are especially likely to reinforce 
gender divisions of labour and, consequently, particularly unlikely to promote female 
labour activity (see chapter 2.2.1). These two additional indicators are used – alongside 
the measure of father-specific leave outlined earlier – as alternative measures in most of 
the analyses presented in the thesis.  
 
Indicator 10. Total maternity and parental leave available to mothers, in effective weeks 
 
Indicator 10 measures the total number of weeks of job-protected maternity and parental 
leave that are available for use by the mother. It is calculated as the sum of all weeks of 
maternity and parental leave regardless of policy type, but with leave reserved for the 
father removed. Similar to earlier leave indicators, weeks of leave are multiplied by the 
average wage replacement rate for the average female worker in order to generate the 
‘effective’ full-time equivalent length of the leave. Data for this indicator come from a 
number of sources, including Gauthier (2011a) (see ‘Data Sources’). There is no missing 
data. 
 
Indicator 11. Childcare leave, in effective weeks 
 
Indicator 11 captures effective weeks of childcare leave available to either parent. As for 
all other leave indicators, it is calculated as weeks of leave on offer multiplied by the 
average wage replacement rate across the leave so as to present the indicator in ‘effective’ 
form and reflect incentives for take up. Data for this indicator come from a number of 
sources, again including Gauthier (2011a) (see ‘Data Sources’). There is no missing data. 
 
3.2.3. Handling missing data 
 
Lastly, it is worth making on brief note on how this thesis handles missing data on its 
measures of family policy. Although the indicators outlined above were chosen so as to 
minimise missing data, several still suffer from a certain number of missing cases – 
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indicator 4 in particular has a very high rate of missing data. This is unfortunate in itself, 
but is also problematic for the later statistical analyses as a missing value on just one 
policy indicator will, through listwise deletion, lead to the deletion of the entire case. In 
other words, any missing case on any given indicator will result in a large loss of 
information, potentially damaging estimates from the regression models for other 
unaffected variables (Little, 1992: 1230; King et al, 1998: 4) and – if enough cases are 
removed –possibly also reducing statistical power (Osborne, 2013: 118). It is important 
therefore to manage any missing data appropriately.  
 
There are a variety of methods available for dealing with and filling missing data points 
(Nardo et al, 2005: 10, 17). Unfortunately, many of the more advanced techniques, such as 
multiple imputation, cannot be used in this particular instance due to inconsistent 
estimates (see appendix B.3 (pp. 325-327) for a review of missing data techniques). The 
primary technique used here is linear interpolation, which estimates missing values based 
on a linear trend between the nearest two observed data points. This ensures that any 
imputed values follow a smooth trend over time. As interpolation cannot be used for 
missing data at the end or beginning of a series, missing values in these cases are imputed 
using ‘last value carried forward’ and ‘next value carried back’ (LVCF/NVCB) techniques, 
respectively42.  
 
It should be pointed out that neither of these methods of imputation are without their 
faults. Firstly, as ‘single-imputation’ techniques, both may under-estimate variance in the 
missing values following imputation (see appendix B.3). As a result, it is possible that they 
may contribute to an artificial increase in confidence in the estimates produced by the 
later statistical analyses (Honaker and King, 2010: 563; Nardo et al, 2005: 17). But both 
may also offer only crude approximations of the missing data, and possibly as a 
consequence lead to misleading estimates. This is particularly likely to be the case for 
those missing values imputed using using LVCF/NVCB, as the use of this method reflects 
almost total ignorance around the value of the given missing data point inasmuch as there 
is no information available on the given policy in the given year other than that which 
exists for the nearest available data point. To check for any misleading estimates produced 
by the use of LVCF/NVCB, appendix F (pp. 411-446) provides a sensitivity analysis with all 
regression models presented in this thesis re-estimated with any cases with data imputed 
using LVCF/NVCB removed. Generally, results from appendix F show that removing cases 
                                                        
42 Where ‘carry next value back/carry last value forward’ are used on expenditure data the 
next/last value is deflated/inflated using the GDP deflator, so that the real value of the policy 
expenditure is not artificially inflated/deflated by price level changes. 
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with missing data imputed using ‘last value carried forward’ and ‘next value carried back’ 
does not lead to changes in findings and inferences on the affected variables.  
 
3.3. Measuring gender differences in employment outcomes 
 
This thesis measures gender equality in employment through eight aggregate- or country-
level labour market indicators. The eight indicators are organised into three sets, with 
each set capturing a different aspect of labour market equality corresponding to the thesis’ 
three main research areas. The first set contains two indicators that cover gender equality 
in labour market activity, or in other words, equality in the extent or depth to which men 
and women are economically activity. The second set looks to reflect gender job 
segregation and equality in occupational attainment, that is, the strength of the glass 
ceiling on women’s careers and the relative extent to which female employment is 
concentrated in feminized areas of the labour market. The third and final set captures 
gender equality in employment at varying levels of education.  
 
In all cases, indicators explicitly capture gender differences in labour market outcomes, as 
opposed to female labour market performance in isolation. A number of existing family 
policy studies use measures that capture female employment outcomes only (e.g. 
Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Gornick et al, 1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Pettit and Hook, 2005; 
Ferrarini, 2006; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Misra et al, 2008; Tranby, 2010; Mischke, 
2011; Korpi et al, 2013). However, examining the influence of family policy on women’s 
outcomes without reference to the equivalent male statistic may risk producing 
misleading results. Female performance on a given indicator is likely to be at least partly 
dependent on the determinants of variation in the overall or general level of that variable 
– for instance, variations in female economic activity are likely to depend to some degree 
on the determinants of general economic activity. As a result, using measures that capture 
female outcomes alone risks bias from the effects of any wider economic processes.  
 
Taking the gender difference at least partially reduces the risk of this bias. To the extent 
that a given family policy can be assumed to have little or no effect on male labour market 
outcomes, men can be used as a control group with any remaining relation between a 
given policy measure and the gender difference on a given outcome representing the 
‘pure’ effect on women (Ruhm, 1998; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012). Of course, this may 
be a strong assumption. However, even if policies do have some influence on male 
outcomes, using the male statistic as a reference at least partially accounts for any 
variation in the overall level of the given variable and, moreover, continues to provide 
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results of strong substantive interest – that is, the effect of policy on gender differences in 
employment.  
 
All but two of the indicators measure gender differences through the use of the gender 
gap, that is, the absolute difference between the male and female values on a given 
indicator. The two exceptions are two indicators of gender equality in managerial 
employment. These indicators use the ‘female share’, for reasons explained a little later on.  
 
The use of gender gaps to capture gender differences in employment outcomes is fairly 
common practice (e.g. Eurostat, 2008; ILO, 2011; OECD, 2013c). They are straightforward 
and transparent, and provide an intuitive measure of equality in a given outcome. The 
formula for the gender gap can be expressed by: 
 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡   
 
Where 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑖
𝑡  is the gender gap for country j on indicator i at time t and 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 are the 
male and female values on the underlying indicator for country j on indicator i at time t, 
respectively. For indicators where the female value is generally higher than the male 
equivalent across the sample – such as for employment in ‘female-typed’ occupations – the 
order of the two gender values is switched so that a lower value always represents a 
situation of greater equality. Thus, the formula for the calculation of the gender gap 
becomes: 
 
𝐼𝑓 ?̅?𝑖 ≥ ?̅?𝑖, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡  
𝐼𝑓 ?̅?𝑖 ≥ ?̅?𝑖, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
Gender gaps do have drawbacks. As Rubery et al (2002: 26) point out, the absolute gender 
gap does not provide information on the size of the gap relative to the general level of the 
given indicator. In isolation at least, this increases the difficulty of establishing the 
significance of the gender gap (see also Karemessini et al, 2002). However, the primary 
alternatives – gender ratios or standardised gender gaps, which are equivalent43 – also 
suffer from limitations. In particular, they capture only proportional differences and, 
                                                        
43 The respective formulas for the gender ratio and the standardized gender gap are  
𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  
𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑗𝑖
𝑡   and 𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡−𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
 . These are sometimes presented as alternative measures of 
equality. However, as 
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡−𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
=  (
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
−  
𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
) =  (1 −  
𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
)  then  
𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 1 − (
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡−𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
)  or, 
equivalently, 𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  1 − 𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡 . 
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therefore, changes in proportional differences when traced over time. This complicates 
the interpretation of empirical relations, can produce misleading results in situations 
where the numerator is very low44, and to some degree departs from the theory where 
relations are rarely expressed in proportional terms.  For these reasons, the absolute 
gender gap is the preferred measure for the majority of indicators. 
 
The following subsections outline and describe the indicators in some detail. Descriptive 
statistics for all eight are given in table 3.4 (overleaf), while full results for each indicator 
in each country and year are shown in tables C.15-C.35 in appendix C (pp. 356-376). 
 
Gender equality in labour market activity 
 
The first set of indicators measure what is termed here as ‘gender equality in labour 
market activity’. The theoretical interest is in examining the degree to which various 
family policies promote or constrain female participation and influence differences in the 
overall extent of male and female economic activity. Accordingly, the two indicators in this 
set look to capture gender differences in the extent or depth of labour participation or, in 
other words, reflect how far men and women are active in the labour market.  
 
Indicator 1. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-54 year olds; 25-34 year 
olds) 
 
Indicator 1 is used as a headline indicator of gender equality in labour market activity. It 
captures the absolute difference in the proportion of men and women that are 
economically active, where ‘activity’ is define as those who ‘furnish the supply of labour for 
the production of goods and services during a specified time-reference period’ (ILO, 2014: 
n.p) or, in more practical terms, those who are classified as either employed or 
unemployed but not those who are ‘inactive’ (ILO, 2014: n.p). The participation rate is 
preferred over the employment rate in large part because much of the focus of the theory  
                                                        
44 As an example, let person A have an income of 50 at time t and 55 at time t+1, while person B has 
an income of 5 at time t and 10 at time t+1. At time t, the B-to-A income ratio is 0.10, while at t+1the 
ratio has grown to 0.18. Thus, even though both A and B have seen an equivalent increase in 
income, the level of equality between their respective incomes – as measured by the B-to-A ratio – 
has almost doubled.  
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is on women’s labour supply decision, rather than on their ability to find employment 
itself4546. The indicator is constructed for two age groups – a broader measure of 
participation amongst all men and women aged 25-54, and a more specific indicator for 
those of ‘prime’ childbearing age between 25 and 3447. The former – or an equivalent 
broader measure – is used most often in the comparative family policy literature (see table 
A.1 in appendix A (pp. 314-316)), and forms the ‘main’ measure here. However, because 
many – although not all48 – family policies are designed to be used around or soon after 
the birth of the child, the effects of certain policies may be stronger or clearer when 
looking at the 25-34 year old age group. Data come from the OECD (2013a). There is a 
missing data rate of 2%. 
 
Indicator 2. Gender gap in usual weekly working hours (25-54 year olds) 
 
The second indicator of equality in labour market activity is the absolute difference in the 
average usual number of hours worked per week by male and female employees. It 
captures gender disparities in the distribution of working hours, and acts here as an 
indicator of equality the extent or depth of male and female activity. In other words, it 
complements indicator 1 by reflecting how far men and women are economically active 
once they have found employment. Data come from the OECD (2013a), and unfortunately 
are available only for the broader 25-54 year old age group. There is a missing data rate of 
17%, with the United States missing entirely (13% missing within the rest of the sample).   
 
Gender job segregation and equality in occupational attainment 
 
The second set of indicators measure gender job segregation and equality in occupational 
attainment. In terms of specific theoretical interest, this set of indicators looks to capture 
                                                        
45 Additionally, to some degree the use of the participation rate also helps avoid or at least dampens 
distortions to male and female activity from external factors such as economic downturns  
46 The two are not identical as participation rates also include those who are unemployed, and it is 
feasible that they may differ in terms of patterns, trends, and associations with family policy. In the 
event, the two are extremely similar: the Pearson’s R correlation coefficient between the two across 
the sample is R = 0.99. 
47 In 2010, the average mean age of women at childbirth across the EU was 30, and in all countries 
was between 25 and 31 (Eurostat, 2014).  
48 In most countries, parents remain entitled to child benefit and child-related tax subsidies, credits 
and allowances until the child reaches ‘adulthood’ – normally between 16 and 18 but in some cases, 
such as Australia, as old as 21 (OECD, 2013g) – while marriage subsidies and spousal allowances 
are generally not conditioned by age of children (OECD, 2013g). Additionally, in some countries and 
at some points in time parents have been entitled to use at least part of their parental leave 
entitlement at any point until the child reaches as old as eight (OECD, 2013c; in this specific case, 
Denmark between 1994 and 2002), while the second and third childcare indicators covers 
provisions for children up to their seventh birthday. Thus, several policies may continue to affect 
parents’ labour supply decisions long after childbirth.      
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those aspects of employment which, according to Mandel and others (Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2009; Mandel and 
Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012), may be subject to adverse side effects from 
family policy provision. Accordingly, they look to reflect the concentration of women in 
‘feminised’ areas of the economy – which may be considered one side of horizontal job 
segregation – as well as the relative position of men and women in the labour market and 
the strength of the glass ceiling on women’s careers.  
 
Both gender job segregation and in particular equality in occupational attainment are 
fairly abstract concepts that are slightly less well defined than ‘labour market activity’. As 
a result, capturing both comprehensively is challenging, not least because of constraints 
on available comparable labour market data. The exact indicators chosen here are guided 
largely by those used in the cross-sectional studies by Mandel and others (Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Mandel, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 
2012). This aids comparability of results and ensures that findings remain theoretically 
relevant. However, it is acknowledged that there are other aspects or perspective on 
women’s position inside the labour market that are not covered by these indicators. 
 
Job segregation, for instance, is measured here by segregation in occupations only, but 
also of importance is sectoral segregation, that is, the concentration of men and women in 
certain areas of economic activity such as industry in the case of men and particularly 
various service and social service jobs in the case of women. From a cross-country 
perspective the two tend to correlate fairly strongly (Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009) but 
it is possible that trends and, importantly, the influence of policy may differ between 
segregation in occupations and segregation in employment sectors.  
 
Similarly, women’s relative occupational attainment is measured here by their relative 
access to top positions in terms of management and top earnings, but of perhaps equal 
importance is the over-representation of female employees at the bottom end of the 
labour market – the ‘sticky floor’ as opposed to the ‘glass ceiling’. However, comparative 
data on gender differences in ‘low quality’ employment are fairly scarce and, importantly, 
the theoretical influence of family policy on the concentration of women at the bottom end 
of the labour market is not covered in so much depth by the policy paradox literature 
(Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Mandel, 2009; Mandel, 2011; 
Mandel, 2012). As a result, gender differences in ‘low quality’ employment are not covered 
but it is recognised that these form an important area of gender equality in occupational 
attainment.     
99 
 
 
Indicator 3. Gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations (all 
ages) 
 
Indicator 3 measures the difference in the proportion of male and female employees (all 
ages49) that work in ‘female-type’ occupations, and reflects the relative extent to which 
female labour is concentrated in certain types of job and areas of the labour market. 
Following Mandel and Semyonov (2006), ‘female-type’ occupations are defined as those 
occupational categories where, for a given country, the share of female employees is 
greater than 150% of the female share of total employment. To avoid erratic shifts in the 
gender gap across years, these classifications are based on the average female share of 
employment over the series and are held constant throughout. Unfortunately, only data 
based on the broader one-digit ISCO classification system are available over time, so this 
indicator reflects general rather than specific ‘female-type’ occupations. Data come from 
Eurostat (2013), the ILO (2013) and the OECD (2013a). There is a fairly high missing data 
rate (41%), largely because of unavailability for all countries and years before 1992, and 
because both Italy and Portugal have no empirically-determined ‘female-type’ 
occupations. The rate within the rest of the sample is 12%. 
 
Indicator 4. Female share of managerial employment (all ages) 
 
Indicator 4 captures the female share (%) of employment in ISCO88 group 1, that is, the 
proportion of employees (all ages50) working as ‘legislators, managers and senior officials’ 
that are female. It reflects women’s relative representation in positions that are generally 
fairly senior, highly paid51 and of high status, and as a result measures at least one aspect 
of the glass ceiling on women’s occupational achievement (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; 
Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). The indicator is presented as a ‘share’, rather than a gender 
gap, as the size of ISCO88 group 1 differ sharply across countries (Eurostat, 2013; ILO, 
2014), and in some cases is very small52. As a result, in certain countries the gender gap 
would be artificially constrained. It should be noted, however, that use of the ‘female 
share’ means that this indicator runs in the opposite direction to most others – here, a 
higher value represents a greater level of equality. Data are the same as for indicator 3, so 
                                                        
49 Unfortunately, data are not available for specific age groups. 
50 Unfortunately, data are not available for specific age groups. 
51 Data from Eurostat’s Structure of Earnings Survey suggests ISCO88 group 1 has the highest mean 
pay of all 10 ISCO88 one-digit occupations (Eurostat, 2014).  
52 In Sweden in 2010, for example, employment in ISCO88 group 1 represented just 4.8% of total 
employment. In contrast, in the United Kingdom in 2010 15.3% of employees were classed as 
managers (Eurostat, 2013; ILO, 2014).  
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again are unavailable for all countries before 1992. This produces a fairly high missing 
data rate (34%) across the sample as a whole, with the missing rate within the rest of the 
sample 11%.  
 
Indicator 5. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings 
(dependent employees; 25-54 year olds; five-year intervals) 
 
This final indicator captures gender differences in the proportion of dependent employees 
(25-54 year olds53) with annual labour earnings54 that fall within the top-fifth of the 
earnings distribution. It measures the relative ability of men and women to access highly 
paid positions, and therefore reflects the strength of the ‘glass ceiling’ on women’s 
earnings attainment (Mandel, 2009; 2011; Korpi et al, 2013). Data for this indicator are 
extracted from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) (2014), a cross-national archive of 
harmonised micro-datasets that allow for cross-national and temporal comparison.  
 
Unfortunately, hourly or weekly earnings data are missing in the LIS dataset for a number 
of countries, so this indicator can make use of information on annual earnings only. As a 
result, it reflects gender differences in annual working hours as well as rates of pay. From 
one perspective, this is a disadvantage – variation in this gender gap may reflect variations 
in the depth of employment as much as pure gender pay differentials. On the other hand, 
hourly pay gaps may understate the true extent of earnings disparities and are likely to 
control-away a major component of gender inequality in economic independence (Mandel 
and Shalev, 2009: 10). Either way, the use of annual data should be kept in mind when 
interpreting results55.  
 
                                                        
53 Unfortunately, sample sizes become too small when looking at more specific age groups, so this 
indicator uses the broader 25-54 year old age group only.  
54 In most cases the annual earnings data refer to annual pre-tax and transfer paid employment 
income. However, in the following 17 cases annual paid employment income net of income taxes 
and contributions are used as gross income data are not available: Austria 1990-1994 & 2000-
2004; Belgium 2000-2004; Greece, 1995-1999 & 2000-2004; Ireland, 1990-1994, 1995-1999 & 
2000-2004; Italy 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999; Luxembourg, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-
1999; Spain 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004. If tax rates are similar on average for men and 
women the use of net data should not distort results. However, because men are more likely to be 
sole earners and therefore benefit from various dependent spouse and family related tax subsidies, 
it is possible that men may on average face lower tax rates than women. This is dangerous as it may 
‘artificially’ increase the number of men relative to women with top quintile earnings and as a 
result inflate the gender gap in those cases that use net earnings. However, inspection of the data 
reveals no substantial breaks in series inside countries where data switches from net to gross or 
vice versa, and a t-test on the gender gap within those countries that use both measures reports no 
significant difference in means (t(30) = -1.5173, p=0.139). On this evidence the two types of earnings 
data are considered acceptably comparable.  
55 Several other articles that explore family policy ‘trade-offs’ also use annual earnings data (e.g. 
Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel, 2012; Korpi et al, 2013).  
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The LIS data are relatively incomplete in terms of sample years – harmonized survey data 
are available for only 113 of the 514 sample country-years covered in this thesis. In large 
part, this is because the LIS database is organised into waves at roughly five-year 
intervals. For many countries only one harmonised survey is available per wave, although 
in certain cases several surveys are available in certain waves. In order to produce a more 
complete and balanced panel, this indicator is measured at five-year intervals. More 
specifically, it is presented using the five-year mean average of any complete cases, with 
the five-year periods used – 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009, 
and 2010 on its own – roughly corresponding to the LIS waves. This results in 86 out of a 
possible 119 complete country-waves, and a missing data rate of 28% across the sample 
as a whole and 20% within available countries and years (New Zealand and Portugal are 
missing entirely). Measurement at five-year intervals is of course not ideal, largely because 
it reduces the number of observations and obscures year-on-year variation. However, 
comparable gender-differentiated earnings data are scarce and the LIS database 
represents the most complete and detailed source available.   
 
Gender equality in employment by levels of education  
 
The final set of indicators measures gender equality in employment at varying levels of 
education. The theoretical interest here lies in exploring whether any benefits and adverse 
effects attached to family policy vary across levels of education. More precisely, the 
primary concern is in examining whether – as argued by Mandel and others (Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012) – any effects of 
policy on economic activity are concentrated mostly on less educated women and, 
conversely, whether any adverse constraints on occupational attainment fall largely on 
their relatively advantaged, highly educated counterparts. Accordingly, these three 
indicators look to capture elements of both aspects of gender equality in employment 
outlined above. 
 
The indicators used in this set are in all cases replicas of measures also used above, but 
with data disaggregated by levels of education. Slight differences in samples and missing 
data prevent full comparability. However, to some degree at least the use of similar 
measures allows for the examination of how polices relate to a given outcome at the 
overall level, and how the relationship breaks down across levels of education.  
 
It is again acknowledged that the three indicators used here do not fully capture equality 
in either activity or occupational attainment across levels of education. However, 
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comparable labour market data that are disaggregated by both gender and levels of 
education and that stretch across both countries and time are scarce. The indicators used 
here do suffer from missing data – in particular, the first two are available only for 
European countries and the years 1992-2010 – but represent some of the few areas for 
which suitable country-level labour market data are available in a form that is 
disaggregated by levels of education.  
 
Indicator 6. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate, by education level (25-49 
year olds; 25-29 year olds; 30-34 year olds; low, medium and high education) 
 
Indicator 6 captures gender differences in headcount labour market activity across levels 
of formal educational attainment. It takes the form of three sub-indicators, each measuring 
the gender gap in participation rates amongst men and women with low, medium, or high 
levels of education, respectively. In all three cases, the indicator is produced for the age 
groups 25-49, 25-29, and 30-3456, for reasons similar to those discussed earlier under 
indicator 1.  
 
The education levels used here are drawn directly from Eurostat, where distinctions 
between ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ education are based on the usual ISCED97 classification 
system: individuals with ‘low’ education are those whose highest level of formal education 
sits within ISCED97 stages 0-2 (‘pre-primary, primary of lower secondary education’ 
(UNESCO, 2006: n.p.)); ‘medium’ education reflects a highest level of formal education at 
ISCED97 levels 3 and 4 (‘upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education’ 
(UNESCO, 2006: n.p.)); and ‘high’ education represents those whose highest formal 
educational qualification corresponds to ISCED97 stages 5 and 6 (‘first and second stage of 
tertiary education’ (UNESCO, 2006: n.p.)).  
 
Data for this indicator come from Eurostat (2013), where participation rate data 
disaggregated by gender and education level are available from 1992 onwards. 
Unfortunately, no directly comparable education-differentiated participation rate data are 
available for those countries outside of the European Union (EU) plus Norway, so 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States are excluded entirely57. Together, 
                                                        
56 Unfortunately, the age groups used by Eurostat do not correspond exactly to those used by the 
OECD. In particular, they do not produce participation rate data for 25-34 year olds as a single age 
group. As a result, separate measures for 25-29 year olds and 30-34 year olds are used here.     
57 There is a danger that excluding these countries and changing the sample so drastically could 
bias results relative to those for indicator 1 (the gender gap in overall labour force participation 
rates). However, as it turns out results for indicator 6 across levels of education are largely 
consistent with those for indicator 1 at the overall level (see chapter 5.3 and 7.3).  
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these constraints result in an overall missing data rate of 45%, although the rate is only 
7.2% within the EU countries (plus Norway) between 1992 and 2010. 
 
Indicator 7. Female share of managerial employment amongst managers with a given 
level of education (all ages58; low, medium and high education) 
 
Indicator 7 measures the female share (%) of employment in ISCO88 group 1 – that is, 
employment as ‘legislators, managers and senior officials’ – amongst ISCO88 group 1 
employees with a given level of education. In other words, it uses three sub-indicators to 
capture the proportion of managers with low, medium or high education that are female. 
In doing so, it reflects women’s access to managerial employment relative to their 
similarly educated male counterparts and, by extension, provides information on the 
relative ability of women with varying levels of education to reach top positions. Data are 
from Eurostat (2013), so distinctions between levels of education are identical to those for 
the previous indicator. Similarly, the sample is again limited to the EU countries plus 
Norway and the years 1992-201059. There is a missing data rate of 48% across the sample 
as a whole, and a rate of 13% within the EU countries (plus Norway) between 1992 and 
2010. 
 
Indicator 8. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings, 
by education level (25-54 year olds; dependent employees; low, medium and high 
education; five-year intervals) 
 
This final indicator measures the male-to-female difference in the proportion of 
dependent employees (25-54 year olds60) with annual labour earnings61 that fall within 
the top-fifth of the earnings distribution, by education level. It uses three sub-indicators to 
capture gender differences in the ability of those with low, medium or high education to 
reach high earning positions. Put differently, it reflects the ability of women with varying 
                                                        
58 Unfortunately, data are not available for specific age groups. 
59 Similar to indicator 6, there is a danger that restricting the sample to the EU countries plus 
Norway and excluding the four non-European countries may bias results relative to those for 
indicator 4 (the overall female share of managers). Results for indicator 4 and indicator 7 shown 
later in this thesis are a little inconsistent, with one possible cause the difference in sample used 
(see chapter 7.4). Unfortunately, however, comparable data on the female share of managers across 
levels of education are not obtainable for the four non-European countries, and the data used here 
are considered the best available.  
60 Unfortunately, sample sizes become too small when looking at more specific age groups, so this 
indicator uses the broader 25-54 year old age group only.  
61 Just as for indicator 5, most of the earnings data here is gross pre-tax and transfer. However, 17 
cases use net annual earnings due to the unavailability of gross earnings data (see section indicator 
6).  
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levels of education to reach top wages relative to their similarly educated male 
counterparts.  
 
Like indicator 5, this measure uses annual62 earnings data extracted from the harmonised 
LIS database. Education levels are based on a standardised variable included in LIS that is 
comparable to the classification used by Eurostat: those whose highest formal 
qualification falls within ISCED97 levels 0-2 are classified as having ‘low’ education; 
individuals with a highest qualification at ISCED97 levels 3 and 4 are classed as ‘medium’; 
and those with qualifications at ISCED97 stages 5 and 6 are classified as holding a ‘high’ 
level of education. Also like indicator 5, this indicator is measured at five-year intervals – 
with the five-year average used where there is more than one complete case per five-year 
period – due to a high rate of missing survey years in the LIS database. This produces a 
final indicator with between 80 and 82 out of a possible 119 complete country-waves 
(depending on the exact level of education), and a missing data rate of between 31-33% 
across the sample as a whole and 23-25% within available countries and years (New 
Zealand and Portugal are again missing entirely). 
 
3.4. Methods of analysis 
 
Using country level measures of both family policy and gender equality in employment 
that stretch across countries and time produces what is termed pooled time-series cross-
section (TSCS) data. TSCS data are similar in structure to panel or longitudinal data, in that 
the same set of cases – in this instance, twenty countries – are observed repeatedly over a 
period time – here, over twenty-six years. The resulting dataset can be pictured as twenty-
six cross-sections of country-level data stacked on top of one another or, equivalently, as 
twenty comparable time-series for each country placed side-by-side.  
 
As TSCS data stretch across two dimensions they contain two sources of variation, namely, 
between-country or cross-sectional variation, and within-country or temporal variation. It 
is the latter that is of primary interest here. More specifically, given this thesis’ research 
questions, the major focus of analysis is on exploiting within-country variation in the 
various measures of both family policy and gender equality in employment in order to 
understand relationships between changes in policy provision and developments in 
gender equality in employment.  
 
                                                        
62 As for indicator 5 it uses annual rather than hourly or weekly earnings information due to 
missing data on the latter two. This should again be kept in mind when interpreting results.   
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The primary method used throughout the thesis to understand these within-country 
relations is TSCS multiple linear regression. To be more specific, the main method of 
analysis is fixed effects linear regression, a regression technique that strips away all 
between-country variation to produce estimates based on within-country changes in the 
dependent and independent variables only (see later in this section). Both this general and 
specific method are common in the literature – of the ten ‘over time’ comparative family 
policy studies reviewed in chapter 2.3.2, all use some form of regression analysis while 
seven use fixed effects regression, or some variant thereof. There are some important 
differences between the exact technical specifications used here and those used in the 
literature (see later in this section), but this broad similarity aids the comparability of 
findings.  
 
TSCS linear regression does, though, have its drawbacks. In particular, and as discussed in 
more depth in the following subsection, results from regression analyses are not always 
fully transparent and the use of single coefficients as estimates may over-simplify and 
remove relations from a more complex reality (Shalev, 2007a; Hantrais, 2009). To 
increase the transparency of findings, this thesis complements its various regression 
analyses with fairly detailed descriptions of patterns, trends and developments in both 
policy and labour market equality, as well as descriptions of simple bivariate associations 
between the two. Any inferences emerging from these more descriptive analyses are 
strictly provisional, but provide a reasonably detailed empirical background against which 
results from the more formal regression analyses can be discussed.  
 
The following subsections discuss both of the methods of analysis in some detail, starting 
first with the descriptive analyses. 
 
3.4.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
As touched on above, the use of regression analysis in macro comparative research is 
popular but is not without its limitations. One particularly vocal critic of the use of 
regression in cross-country comparative studies – and, indeed, of the large-N statistical 
approach to macro comparative research more generally – is Michael Shalev (2007a). He 
argues that statistical analyses often sacrifice much of the value of comparative data 
because methods such as regression transform real world cases into little more than 
observations and scores contained within variables. This is problematic, Shalev suggests, 
because country-cases are in themselves of great interest for cross-national comparative 
research. By making cases invisible and disguising proper country names, statistical 
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techniques dispose of valuable information and prevent the application of a researcher’s 
substantive knowledge of the cases under consideration. As a result, regression analyses 
produce results that are lacking in transparency and conclusions that at times are difficult 
to verify against actual real world country experience (Shalev, 2007a). 
 
To be clear, Shalev does not suggest abandoning macro-level quantitative comparative 
data analysis altogether. Rather, he suggests comparativists using macro-quantitative data 
should adopt ‘low-tech’ (2007a:261) tabular, visual and graphical methods that convey 
quantitative information while also retaining clearly visible and identifiable country case 
names. According to Shalev, these techniques are somewhat more transparent and allow 
for the application of substantive knowledge of case context, while also aiding 
identification of outliers and those cases that require further in-depth attention (Shalev, 
2007a; Shalev, 2007b). 
 
This thesis acknowledges Shalev’s critique of regression analysis and recognises the 
dangers of ignoring the real world cases from within which comparative data are 
generated. However, Shalev’s ‘low-tech’ solutions are not themselves problem-free. In 
particular, tabular and graphical methods can quickly become unwieldy and 
incomprehensible when faced with large amounts of data. This is especially the case 
where there are several potential concurrent explanatory factors, as tabular and graphical 
techniques are generally restricted to displaying relations with only a few independent 
variables at any one time. Moreover, these relatively simple methods generally struggle to 
provide statistical control, in that for the most part they cannot estimate relations after 
accounting for the influence of alternative factors or after dealing with other statistical 
complications such as trending series (Pontusson, 2007: 329) 63. 
 
These issues are highly relevant here. Firstly, this thesis looks to examine policies and 
employment outcomes across a number of countries and years and therefore faces a large 
number of data points – 415, where data are available for all countries and years64. 
Secondly, gendered employment outcomes are likely to be influenced by several factors 
                                                        
63 An alternative method capable of dealing with these dual issues – the need to retain proper case 
names, and the need to handle large quantities of data that may influence an outcome 
simultaneously – is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987; Rubinson and Ragin, 
2007). By applying formal logic and set-theory to comparative data, QCA allows researchers to 
conduct rigorous analysis covering a reasonable number of cases, all the while retaining proper 
case names. However, since a substantial part of the rationale for this thesis is to expand upon and 
verify existing cross-sectional relations produced primarily through statistical analyses, use of QCA 
is not considered a suitable option here.   
64 The years 1985-1990 are set to missing for Germany in all cases due to the need to avoid 
distortions arising directly from reunification.  
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simultaneously. Even after accounting for the influence of the various policy indicators 
outlined earlier, this thesis will need to consider and control for the effects of several other 
important independent variables such as service sector size, educational equality and 
fertility (Polachek, 1995; Huber and Stephens 2000; Blau and Kahn, 2003; Polachek, 2004; 
Abendroth et al, 2011; Lips, 2013). It is in these circumstances that multiple regression 
and related statistical techniques remain useful. In comparison to Shalev’s low-tech 
methods, they are better able to synthesise large quantities of policy and employment 
data, and most importantly can provide some level of statistical control between 
competing determining factors (Pontusson, 2007: 329). 
 
Perhaps the best approach, then, is to combine analyses conducted using both statistical 
methods such as linear regression and Shalev’s low-tech techniques. Indeed, this is the 
recommendation made by both Pontusson (2007) and Kenworthy (2007) in response to 
Shalev’s (2007a) critique. Here, this is put into practice through a series of descriptive 
analyses that are presented for each indicator of gender equality in employment prior to 
the results of the corresponding regression analysis. Put differently, before the 
presentation of the relevant set of regression models, trends and changes in each indicator 
of gender equality employment and any immediate links with changes in family policy 
provision are summarised and described using relative simple yet transparent methods. 
Techniques used include tables, figures, descriptive statistics and measures of bivariate 
linear association such as Pearson’s R correlation and, in certain cases, simple bivariate 
linear regression.  
 
These descriptive analyses are unavoidably limited. In particular, in order to produce 
manageable and interpretable analyses it is necessary to simplify the data somewhat. In 
most cases, within-country changes in policy and equality are represented by the 
difference in a given indicator between two ‘snapshot’ years at the beginning and end of 
the period covered (1985 and 2010), or the earliest and latest years available in cases with 
missing data. This, of course, disguises the timing of changes and means that these 
descriptive analyses may miss important variations in the intervening period. As touched 
on above, these relatively simple methods also suffer from a lack of statistical control, so 
any emerging relations are fully open to omitted variables bias. With these limitations in 
mind, any inferences from these analyses are strictly provisional and offer only 
suggestions as to possible relations between changes in policy and gender equality in 
employment.  
 
108 
 
 
Nevertheless, the descriptive analyses provide a valuable complement to the subsequent 
and more formal regression analyses. The methods used for the descriptive analyses 
generally retain real country names, which helps with the identification of outliers, issues 
and complications. More broadly, results provide an empirical foundation for the later 
regression analyses, and ensure that relations between policy and equality are at least 
partly grounded within a ‘real-world’ context. 
 
3.4.2. TSCS linear regression analysis 
 
Regression analysis is conducted through eight sets of two-way fixed effects linear 
regression models, with each set using one of the eight indicators of gender equality in 
employment as its dependent variable. The key independent variables across all eight sets 
of models are the nine main indicators of family policy outlined in section 3.2. Certain 
specifications do, though, use the alternative measures of leave policy – that is, total 
effective maternity and parental leave available to mothers, and effective childcare leave – 
in place of the main leave indicators for reasons outlined earlier. Each model also uses 
several additional control variables to account for alternative influences on the labour 
market outcome under consideration. These controls are described later in this 
subsection. 
 
The general set-up of the regression models is similar across the various measures of 
gender equality in employment. This set-up is described in the subsections below. It 
should be noted here though, that using TSCS data in regression analysis can introduce a 
number of potential statistical issues that may complicate estimation, particularly within 
the usual ordinary least squares (OLS) setting. Many of these issues relate to the repeated 
observation of the same set of countries over time, which if uncorrected can lead to biased 
coefficients and incorrect standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck, 2001; Wilson and 
Butler, 2007). Unfortunately, there is not enough space here to discuss these issues fully. 
The following offers only a summary of regression specifications, with a more detailed 
discussion of various issues concerning the regression models given in appendix B.4 (pp. 
327-339). 
 
General two-way fixed effects model 
 
The general econometric model is fairly similar to that used by Ruhm (1998) and later by 
Akgunduz and Plantenga (2012) and Thévenon and Solaz (2013) in their respective TSCS 
studies of changes in leave entitlements. Specifically, estimation takes place through a 
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form of fixed effects regression described by Ruhm (1998) as a ‘difference-in-difference-
in-difference’ (DDD) model – effectively, a linear regression model that uses both country 
and time fixed effects and country-specific time trends plus a ‘gender difference’ measure 
as its dependent variable. 
 
The starting point for the model is two individual two-way fixed effects difference-in-
difference models for both the male and female sides of a given labour market indicator. 
Let subscript j represent a given country and t denote a given year, with m and f standing for 
male and female, respectively:  
 
𝑌𝑚𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑗 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑗𝑡 +  𝜀𝑚𝑗𝑡                                                                (1)                                           
𝑌𝑓𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑗 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑗𝑡 +  𝜀𝑓𝑗𝑡                                                                  (2)                                            
 
Where 𝑌𝑚𝑗𝑡 is the gender-specific value on a given labour market outcome, 𝐶𝑗 and 𝑇𝑡 are 
country and time fixed effects, respectively, 𝐶𝑗 𝑇𝑡  are country-specific time-trends, 𝑃𝑗𝑡  
represents the indicators of family policy outlined in section 3.2 and 𝑋𝑗𝑡 are other included 
country-level control variables. 
 
Country fixed effects – essentially, a set of country-specific dummy variables, less one to 
avoid multicollinearity – are used to deal with unit heterogeneity, that is, to remove 
unobserved time-invariant country-specific factors that could bias estimates (Dougherty, 
2006: 412). In doing so, they also have the effect of completely absorbing all between-
country differences in the levels of all included variables (Beck, 2001: 285; Wilson and 
Butler, 2007: 120; Bartels, 2008: 6), so that all that remains is within-country variation 
and with the model transformed into one of within-country change only (Plümper et al, 
2005: 334). Time fixed effects – again, a set of year-specific dummy variables, less one – 
are included for similar reasons, that is, to control for unobserved year-specific effects that 
are common across countries (Wooldridge, 2009: 534). Lastly, country-specific time 
trends are used to de-trend the data so as to avoid bias from any country-specific time 
effects and to reduce the dangers of spurious relations arising from trending series 
(Wooldridge, 2009: 365; see appendix B.4 (pp. 333-335) for more detail). 
 
These individual gender-specific difference-in-difference models provide unbiased 
estimates of the effects of changes in family policy on a given employment outcome for a 
given gender if changes in family policy are uncorrelated with the error term, that is, 
uncorrelated with wider unobserved determinants (Thévenon and Solaz, 2013: 25). 
However, as discussed earlier in section 3.3, it is likely that both male and female labour 
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market outcomes are at least partly determined by wider economic processes that 
influence the general level of a given outcome. If such processes are not properly captured 
by the included controls and happen to correlate with the measures of family policy, then 
estimates from (1) and (2) are open to bias. As also touched on in section 3.3, one way to 
avoid at least part of this bias is to use the gender difference on a given labour market 
outcome as the dependent variable (Thévenon and Solaz, 2013: 25). In effect, this is 
equivalent to subtracting (2) from (1). 
 
𝑌𝑚𝑗𝑡 −  𝑌𝑓𝑗𝑡 =  (𝛽1𝑚𝑗 − 𝛽1𝑓𝑗)𝐶𝑗 + (𝛽2𝑚𝑡 − 𝛽2𝑓𝑡)𝑇𝑡 + (𝛽3𝑚𝑗𝑡 − 𝛽3𝑓𝑗𝑡)𝐶𝑗 𝑇𝑡  
+ (𝛽4𝑚𝑗𝑡 − 𝛽4𝑓𝑗𝑡)𝑃𝑗𝑡 + (𝛽5𝑚𝑗𝑡 − 𝛽5𝑓𝑗𝑡)𝑋𝑗𝑡 + (𝜀𝑚𝑗𝑡 − 𝜀𝑓𝑗𝑡)                                                          (3) 
 
or, equivalently,  
  
∆𝑌𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐶𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑗 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡                                                                    (4) 
 
where, 
 
 ∆𝑌𝑗𝑡 =  𝑌𝑚𝑗𝑡 − 𝑌𝑓𝑗𝑡   
 
This is Ruhm’s (1998) fixed effects DDD model. The country and time fixed effects and 
country-specific time trends serve the same purpose as in (1) and (2), that is, the former 
two remove unobserved country and time effects and turn the model into one of within-
country change only, while the country-specific time trends continue to de-trend the data 
and control for bias from linear country-specific time effects. The 𝛽 coefficients on the 
various included policy and control factors estimate the influence of within-country 
change in the given factor on within-country changes in the gender gap in a given labour 
market outcome. 
 
Cluster robust standard errors 
 
Model (4) represents the general regression model used throughout the thesis. However, 
an additional concern that needs to be discussed here is the proper estimation of standard 
errors. More precisely, a standard OLS assumption is that regression errors are ‘spherical’, 
that is, errors are identically and independently distributed with constant variance across 
observations (homoscedastic) and with no systematic dependence or correlation between 
observations (no autocorrelation) (Beck and Katz, 1995: 636; Beck, 2001: 274; Stock and 
Watson, 2007: 182). TSCS data such as those used here often violate these assumptions, as 
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repeatedly observing the same countries over time often results in ‘clustered’ data and 
subsequently non-independent errors across units and time (Beck and Katz, 1995: 636; 
Plümper et al, 2005: 329; Bartels, 2008: 2). In particular, errors from models that use TSCS 
data tend to be panel heteroscedastic, with each country having their own and different 
error variance; contemporaneously correlated, with errors for a given country correlated 
with errors for other country at a given point in time; and serially correlated, with errors 
for a given country in a given year correlated with earlier and later errors for that country 
(Beck and Katz, 1995: 636; Plümper et al, 2005: 329). The result is that the normal OLS 
standard errors are unlikely to be correct, leading to over- or under-confidence in the 
coefficients and incorrect inferences (Beck and Katz, 1995: 636; Beck, 2001: 274). 
 
Tests shown in appendix B.4 (pp. 330-332) indicate that the regression models used in 
this thesis suffer from some but not all of the complications above. More specifically, the 
tests suggest that errors from models for all dependent variables are subject to the first 
and third issues, panel heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Notably, though, all 
models do not appear to suffer from contemporaneous correlation of errors.  
 
There are a variety of methods available for dealing with issues caused by non-spherical 
errors (see appendix B.4 (pp. 330-332)). The approach used here is to estimate model (4) 
but with cluster robust standard errors (CRSEs) used in place of the normal OLS standard 
errors. CRSEs adjust standard errors to the clustered properties of the data so, 
accordingly, provide errors and inferences that are correct even in the presence of non-
spherical residuals (Rogers, 1993; Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 312-313; Baum, 2006: 138; 
see appendix B.4 for more detail).  
 
Notably, most existing ‘over time’ TSCS family policy studies do not appear to use CRSEs or 
offer any alternative correction for serial correlation or any contemporaneous correlation. 
Of the ‘over time’ studies reviewed in chapter 2.3.2 and from their respective 
methodological discussions, only Ferrarini (2006) appears to correct standard errors for 
serial correlation. Winegarden and Bracy (1995) use no correction at all, but do state that 
their residuals do not suffer either serial correlation or heteroscedasticity. Several others 
(e.g. Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012) use Huber-White 
robust standard errors to correct for general heteroscedasticity but seem to ignore the 
possibility of temporally or cross-sectionally dependent residuals. It should be pointed out 
that without direct access to their data it is not possible to know whether the models used 
in these existing studies actually suffer from either serially or contemporaneously 
correlated errors. However, results shown later in this thesis – especially in chapter 5 – 
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suggest that the use of CRSEs may in certain instances impact at least slightly on 
inferences regarding the effects of family policies. 
 
Homogenous slopes 
 
It is worth briefly highlighting here that model (4) estimates fixed or homogenous 
coefficients that summarise the association between a given dependent and given 
independent variable across the entire sample, and thus reflects relations only as they 
exist across all sample countries and years. The assumption implicit in model (4), then, is 
that that the effects of a given policy are uniform or homogenous across all countries and 
time periods. Given the diversity of employment contexts both between countries and also 
within countries over time, this may not always be strictly accurate (see e.g. Shalev, 
2007a). It would of course be valuable to explore whether – and, indeed, why – relations 
differ across countries or between subsets of the sample through, for example, the use of 
heterogeneous slopes65 (Fairbrother, 2014; see appendix B.4 (pp. 335-336)). However, 
such an exercise is likely to be costly – in terms of parameters and degrees of freedom 
(Beck, 2001: 286), but also and more practically in terms of the space needed to fully 
present results – and is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it should be pointed 
out that the presence or absence of a given association when estimated by model (4) does 
not necessarily mean that the exact same relation exists within a given country or in a 
given subset of the sample. It does mean, though, that the estimated association exists 
across the sample as a whole.  
 
Control variables 
 
Table 3.5 summarises variables used across regression models to account for alternative 
influences on the given labour market indicator. Seven controls are used in total66. Most 
are included in all models, although some are used only in certain specifications or models 
of certain labour market outcomes. 
                                                        
65 Using multilevel models, for example (see Fairbrother (2014) for an illustration of the use of 
multilevel models with TSCS data).  
66 Other controls that were considered but that are not used include gross domestic product per 
head – which would reflect the influence of general economic development, but is rejected as it is 
found to contain a unit root (see appendix B.4 (pp. 333-335)) – and gender differences in years of 
education, which could be used as an alternative indicator of gender equality in education but is 
rejected as it is found to correlate highly with service sector size. 
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 The first two controls – ‘service sector employment as a proportion of total employment’, 
and ‘government employment as a proportion of the labour force’ (see ‘Data Sources’ for 
sources) – are used in all models to capture the influence of labour market structures on 
gender differences in employment. The former measures the proportion of employees that 
work in ‘service’ activities – that is, activities in ISIC rev. 3 categories G to Q (UN, 2015) – 
as opposed to the agricultural or industrial secors. That latter captures the proportion of 
the labour force that work in all levels of government – central, local and, where 
appropriate, state government – plus also any publicly-owned companies and 
organisations67 (OECD, 2013d).    
 
The respective sizes of the service and public sectors are expected to have some effect on 
both gender equality in labour market activity and gender job segregation and 
occupational attainment. With regard to labour market activity, the expectation in both 
cases is that an increase in the size of both sectors should promote equal participation. 
Several authors identify service sector employment as central to women’s activity, as 
service jobs tend to demand and appeal to female skills (Goldin, 1990; Charles, 1992; 
Esping-Andersen, 2002; Pettit and Hook, 2005; Thévenon, 2013). Likewise, government 
employment tends to be disproportionately female, perhaps again because many public 
sector jobs demand skills that tend to be held by women, but also at least in part because 
working conditions tend to be more ‘female-friendly’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006; Thévenon, 2013). Accordingly, a larger service or public sector should 
increase opportunities for women to participate in the labour market relative to their 
male counterparts. 
 
The expected effects of both service sector size and public sector size on job segregation 
and occupational attainment are a little more ambiguous. On the one hand, drawing 
women into employment through changes in the size of the service and public sectors 
risks inflating gender segregation and the concentration of female employees in feminised 
occupational ‘niches’ (Golding, 1990; Charles, 1992; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). On the 
                                                        
67 It is worth noting that ‘government employment as a proportion of the total labour force’ 
includes any employees working in public childcare services. As a result, it is possible that this 
variable could absorb at least a part of the effect of changes in the three childcare variables on 
gender differences in employment outcomes, particularly with regard to the possible damaging 
influence of public childcare services on gender segregation and equality in occupational 
attainment and especially for the gender gap in employees working in ‘female-type’ occupations. To 
check for this, the models shown later in chapters 6 and 7 were re-run with ‘government 
employment as a proportion of the total labour force’ omitted. Although ‘government employment 
as a proportion of the total labour force’ is itself statistically significant in many of these models, 
omitting it makes no difference to results for  the three measures of public childcare policy and 
revealed no new relations as measured by significance at the 5% confidence level.   
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other, both tend to demand female skills and the public sector in particular strives to be a 
‘responsible’ employer (Mandel, 2012: 244). As a result, it is feasible that an increase in 
either may afford women more opportunities to reach high-level positions than would 
otherwise be the case. 
 
The second two controls – ‘the employment protection legislation index’ and ‘the 
economic freedom index’ (see ‘Data Sources’ for sources) – are used to reflect the 
influence of labour market institutions. The former is a summary indicator produced by 
the OECD to capture variation in the strictness of employment protection legislation 
across countries and time. It is a composite of 21 measures that reflect statutory 
requirements – such as notice periods and severance pay – faced by employers when 
conducting dismissals (both individual and collective), plus also the regulation of 
temporary contracts (OECD, 2013b). The latter is a composite of 42 measures designed to 
reflect economic ‘freedom’, in the classical or market liberal sense, again across countries 
and over time. It contains indicators from five broad areas: the size of government in 
terms of public expenditure and taxation; the strength and effectiveness of legal systems 
and property rights; ‘sound’ money, including measures of the level and volatility of 
inflation; trade openness, captured by barriers to and tariffs on trade, plus measures of 
controls on the movement of capital and people; and the regulation of business, labour 
and credit markets (Gwartney et al, 2013). Data for the ‘economic freedom index’ are 
collected primarily from international organisations, including the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and the World Economic Forum (Gwartney et al, 2013: 2). 
 
For employment protection legislation, the expectation is that an increase in the strictness 
of legislation could damage gender equality in employment. Kahn (2005), for example, 
shows that the increased firing costs associated with employment protection discourage 
job creation, with the impact falling disproportionately on newly mobilised female 
workers. As a further consequence, new female entrants may be driven into low-status 
and insecure temporary employment (Kahn, 2005), which may in turn hamper their 
ability to build careers and subsequently access high-level positions. In contrast, an 
increase in economic competition – as measured here by the ‘economic freedom index’ 
(Gwartney et al, 2013) – is expected to increase women’s ability to reach top positions and 
high wages as competitive pressures force firms to abandon discrimination in an effort to 
minimise costs and maximise productivity (Zweimüller et al, 2007). The theory in the 
latter case extends only as far as women’s occupational attainment, so the economic 
freedom index is included only in models of the female share of managers and of equality 
in access to top quintile earnings. The employment protection legislation index, however, 
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is used across models of all gender equality indicators. 
 
Two variables – ‘the crude birth rate’ and ‘the female share of tertiary education 
enrolment’ (see ‘Data Sources’ for sources) – are used to control for the role of 
demographics factors. The crude birth rate captures fertility and is defined as the number 
of live births per 1000 population (World Bank, 2012). The female share of tertiary 
education enrolment – that is, the female share of individuals enrolled in educational 
programmes classified in ISCED97 levels 5 or 6 (UNSECO, 2013) – meanwhile is used to 
measure gender equality in education.  
 
The theoretical effects of fertility are complex and ambiguous (Englehardt et al, 2004). The 
presence of motherhood ‘gaps’ in activity and earnings (Misra et al, 2006; Misra et al, 
2011) suggest that, for various reasons, parenthood damages women’s participation and 
occupational attainment relative to their male counterparts. The intuition, then, is that 
higher birth rates should translate into lower female activity (Winegarden and Bracy, 
1995) and inflated inequalities in career attainment, all else equal. However, cross-
national evidence also suggests that fertility tends to be higher in countries with greater 
female participation (Jaumotte, 2003). That said, the causal links here are likely to be 
complex – it is possible that high female participation drives high fertility through 
increases in household resources, or that both may be caused by third factors such as 
policies and institutions that facilitate both female employment and parenthood (Stier, 
Lewin-Espstein and Braun, 2001; Misra et al, 2006; Misra et al, 2011). Recent time-series 
cross-section evidence suggests that changes in fertility share a strong, clear and negative 
association with female participation (Bloom et al, 2009), so on balance it is expected that 
increases in fertility should inflate gender differences in employment outcomes.   
 
The impact of gender equality in education is expected to be more straightforward. 
Increases in the relative level of female education should raise relative female 
productivity, leading to decreases in gender differences in labour supply and in earnings 
(Blau et al, 2001; Bratti, 2003; Polachek, 2004; England et al, 2012; Thévenon, 2013). It 
should also promote women’s relative ability to reach senior positions, although this 
receives little support from existing evidence (Abendroth et al, 2011).  
 
Lastly, evidence produced later on in chapter 5 suggests that within-country variation in 
equality in working hours may be at least partly determined by changes in female 
headcount activity. Accordingly, the female employment rate is used as a control in models 
of the gender gap in usual weekly working hours. There is some danger, though, that 
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female employment may be endogenous with working hours, as increases in the 
availability of part-time employment may induce female participation (Thévenon, 2013). 
Thus, only certain models use the female employment rate with explicit comparisons 
made between those with and without this additional control. 
 
Time lags 
 
A final consideration for the regression analyses is the use of time lags on the independent 
variables. It is theoretically likely that the effects of at least some of the independent 
variables will not be felt immediately, but rather will take at least one year to register. This 
is particularly likely to be the case for leave policies aimed at or available to mothers – as 
given the length of many of these policies it is possible that any effects will take at least 
one year to manifest on a given outcome – but may also apply to other independent 
variables too. In this situation, it is desirable to apply time lags to the independent 
variables so as to properly capture the impact of a change in the variable. 
 
Unfortunately, the family policy literature is unclear on the ideal or optimal length of time 
lags on family policies. Some authors lag one or several policy variables by one year 
(Ruhm, 1998: 301; Pettit and Hook, 2005: 788; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013: 27), others by 
two years but under the suspicion that the true lag may be longer (Misra et al, 2011: 147), 
some use no apparent lags at all (Ferrarini, 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012), while Tranby 
(2010: 104) uses empirically-determined lags that range from one to five years. Each 
additional year of lag does however come at a cost – every year of lag used on any of the 
independent variables necessarily leads to the loss of one year of data on all other 
included variables.  
 
The approach taken to time lags here is fairly cautious. Leaves that are available to 
mothers – mother-specific earnings-related leave, gender-neutral earnings-related leave, 
total flat-rate and childcare leave available to mothers, and total general leave for mothers 
– are lagged by one year in all models, with the exception of those for the gender gap in 
top quintile earnings due to this indicator being measured at five-year intervals. The 
female share of tertiary enrolment is lagged by five years in all models, although in this 
case the indicator is ‘lagged’ prior to its inclusion in the dataset to avoid the loss of five 
years of data. Lastly, the three dual earner childcare indicators and the measures of both 
service sector size and public sector size are lagged by one year in models of gender 
equality in labour market activity, while the crude birth rate is lagged by one year in all 
models. In these latter cases, however, the lags are used mostly as precautionary measures 
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with the intention of reducing the risk of reverse causality (see appendix B.4 (pp. 337-
338).  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
The methods and techniques outlined in this chapter of course suffer from limitations. The 
‘large N’ quantitative comparative research strategy employed, for instance, necessitates 
the use of fairly abstract measures and limits the detail with which indicators can reflect 
policy provisions and gendered employment outcomes. It also restricts the depth and 
breadth of measures, as data are required to be available across the sample countries and 
years. As a result, the measurement of both family policy and of gender equality in 
employment is not perfect. Comparable data on public childcare provisions are 
particularly scarce, and even where it has been possible to construct indicators missing 
data rates remain high. Likewise, the three country-level indicators chosen to capture 
gender job segregation and equality in occupational attainment are unlikely to cover all 
relevant aspects of women’s career attainment or the relative position of men and women 
within the labour market – they do not reflect cover gender differences in employment at 
the bottom end of the labour market, for instance, or the concentration of men and women 
in difference economic sectors – while the three education-differentiated measures of 
gender differences in employment only touch on the various ways in which gender 
equality may differ across levels of education. Lastly, all measures of gender differences in 
employment outcomes remain fairly aggregated even after differentiating certain 
indicators by levels of education and in some cases age. As a result, any findings from 
these measures should be read as the average effect across demographic and socio-
economic groups – there remains at least some possibility that the impact of a given policy 
may differ with variations in male and particularly female charecteristics and socio-
economic status.   
 
Nevertheless, the various methods outlined above allow this thesis to go some way 
towards answering the three research questions stated earlier in chapter 1. Through the 
use of both descriptive analyses and fixed effects multiple linear regression, this thesis is 
able examine how within-country variation in measures of family policy relate to within-
country variation in measures of both gender equality in labour market activity and 
gender job segregation and occupational attainment at both the overall level and also 
across levels of education. More broadly, these methods and techniques allow this thesis 
to provide an empirical investigation into how changes in family policy provision influence 
and impact upon gender differences in a variety of employment outcomes.   
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The following four chapters put the methods described in this chapter into practice. The 
next chapter concentrates on family policies themselves. It uses descriptive techniques to 
identify trends and patterns in family policy provision, and to discuss how family policies 
have developed both within and across countries over the years following 1985. Chapter 5 
focuses on links between changes in family policy and gender differences in labour market 
activity. It contains both the descriptive and fixed effects regression analyses of relations 
between changes in family policy and developments in the two measures of gender 
differences in overall economic activity. Chapter 6 does the same for the three indicators 
of gender segregation and equality in occupational attainment, while chapter 7 explores 
relations between changes in policy and developments in the three education-
differentiated indicators of gender differences in employment.  
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Chapter 4. Changes and developments in family policy, 1985-2010 
 
 
Family policies have changed considerably in many countries in recent decades (Ferragina 
et al, 2013). A fairly substantial body of research details and describes the evolution of 
family policy provision within countries, with the bulk pointing towards widespread if 
diverse patterns of reform (Mätzke and Ostner, 2010). However, much of this literature 
takes the form of small-N case study research, with each individual article concentrating 
on developments in only one or a few countries (e.g. Rønsen and Sundström, 2002; 
Brennan, 2007; Lewis and Campbell, 2007; Lewis, 2009; Abrahamson, 2010; Knijn and 
Saraceno, 2010; Leitner, 2010; Mätzke and Ostner, 2010; Ostner, 2010; Eydal and 
Rostgaard, 2011). This is not necessarily problematic in itself – indeed, these case studies 
provide rich and detailed accounts not just of policy developments, but also of the 
policymaking process and the causes of and constraints on any reforms – but it does mean 
that many existing findings are country-specific and limited in terms of generalisability 
(Mätzke and Ostner, 2010: 387). Only a few studies take a broader approach and examine 
cross-national trends and developments in family policy from a more generalisable, large-
N comparative perspective (Gauthier, 2002; Ferrarini, 2006; Ferragina et al, 2013).  
 
For the most part, findings from these few large-N studies suggest that the past few 
decades can be characterised by a general expansion in family policy provision, albeit with 
the extent and direction of increases differing somewhat across counties. Both Gauthier 
(2002) and Ferrarini (2006) chart developments in leave entitlements and in family-
related tax and cash transfers policies between 1970 and the end of the 20th century68, 
with the former looking at 22 and the latter 18 OECD countries69. Both report widespread 
increases in provision in the years following 1970. However, they also find that the extent 
of expansion and the types of policy provided differ between states and in particular 
between groups of countries (Gauthier, 2002: 467; Ferrarini, 2006: 65-67). Leave policies 
with a dual earner orientation developed more strongly in the Scandinavian nations 
(Ferrarini, 2006: 59, 65-66). Conversely, family-related tax and cash transfer policies and 
those leaves programmes aimed more at supporting the family as a caregiving unit tended 
to develop more in the traditional conservative continental European countries (Gauthier, 
                                                        
68 Gauthier’s (2002) study runs 1970-1999, while Ferrarini’s (2006) runs 1970-2000. 
69 Gauthier (2002): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States. Ferrarini (2006): Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States. 
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2002: 459; Ferrarini, 2006: 66-67). The end result is that both studies describe a pattern 
of growth and divergence in the provision of family policy across countries.  
 
More recently, Ferragina et al (2013) explore developments in leave programmes, child 
benefits and public child care expenditure for 18 OECD countries70 between 1980 and 
2008. This investigation is only one part of a wider article on welfare state change, and as 
a result is fairly brief. Nonetheless, findings again suggest that most countries shifted 
towards a more generous package of family policy provision over the years following 1980 
– indeed, the authors go as far as to suggest that the general process represents a 
‘socialization of family policy’ (2013: 799). Only the Netherlands and Denmark decreased 
provision, although the authors explain that in both cases this may be the result of a move 
towards employer responsibility for the payment of parental leave benefits (2013: 800).  
 
This chapter looks to build on and complement these few existing large-N studies. Using 
the thesis’ nine main indicators of family policy and their three corresponding policy 
indices, it charts the development of family policy across the twenty sample OECD 
countries over the years 1985–2010. In doing so, it expands upon Gauthier (2002) and 
Ferrarini (2006) by extending the analysis up to 2010, and on Ferragina et al (2013) by 
adding detail to their relatively brief investigation. The chapter also serves a more 
practical function, in that it helps familiarise the reader with the policy data used in the 
thesis and provides a policy context for the following analytical chapters.   
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section – 4.1 – outlines and clarifies the data 
and techniques used to examine developments in family policy. Section 4.2 offers a brief 
overview of between-country difference in family policy provision, in part with the 
intention of providing a background and foundation for the subsequent examination of 
change, but also to help validate the measures of policy used throughout the chapter and, 
indeed, rest of the thesis. Sections 4.3–4.5 form the core of the chapter. Each explores and 
describes changes and developments in one of the three areas of family policy outlined 
earlier in chapter 2 – specifically, they examine changes in dual earner-carer leave policy, 
dual earner childcare policy, and general family support policy, respectively. Lastly, 
section 4.6 draws together findings from the previous three sections, discusses any broad 
trends or common patterns of development, and concludes.  
 
                                                        
70 Ferragina et al (2013): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, the United States.  
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4.1. Data and methods 
 
Family policies are measured in this chapter mostly through the three policy indices 
outlined earlier in chapter 3.2, that is, through the dual earner-carer leave policy index, 
the dual earner childcare policy index, and the general family support policy index. To 
some extent, it may be preferable to explore developments in each of the nine individual 
indicators of family policy themselves, since this would provide a more detailed picture of 
trends and patterns in provision. However, focusing on changes in each of the nine 
individual measures would quickly lead to a bloated and unmanageable analysis, and 
would increase the difficulty of identifying any general trends and patterns in policy 
provision. Thus, in much of what follows the indicators are presented mostly in the form 
of the simpler policy indices, albeit with support from the nine individual indicators at 
certain points across the chapter where appropriate.  
 
Changes in measures of family policy are examined through the use of tables, charts and 
descriptive statistics. As describing developments across each and every year in the 
sample would be unwieldy at best – each of the indicators contains up to 415 data points – 
the data presented in these tables and charts is limited mostly to results in and changes 
between two or three ‘snapshot’ time points at the beginning, middle and end of the series 
(1985, 1998 and 2010). Such a simplification means that the analysis cannot identify the 
exact timing of changes in policy and may miss variations between the snapshot years, but 
is necessary to produce a manageable investigation. Full results for each individual 
indicator and each policy index are presented in tables C.1-C.14 in appendix C (pp. 342-
355). 
 
It should be noted here that much of the discussion in this chapter refers to and is 
organised around some general family policy typology, as is shown in table 4.1 (overleaf).  
This general typology is the same as that outlined earlier in table 3.2 in chapter 3.1, and is 
derived from the various country clusters produced by Esping-Andersen (1999), Lewis 
(1992), Korpi (2000), Leitner (2003) and Misra et al (2006). As discussed in chapter 2, 
there is considerable debate around the extent to which such a typology properly 
describes variation in policy provision – indeed, results presented in the next section 
suggest that certain countries may deviate slightly from their classification in these usual 
country groups. Nonetheless, the typology is useful for structuring discussion and 
provides a means of highlighting similarities and differences in the development of 
policies between countries that are, for the most part, considered reasonably similar in 
their approach to family policy.  
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Finally, it should also be noted that it is not the purpose of this chapter to analyse the 
causes and drivers of any developments in family policy. Indeed, doing this properly 
would likely require an entire thesis in itself – especially given the number of countries in 
the sample – and might be better conducted through a method that retains more 
qualitative information. Rather, this chapter focuses almost entirely on describing 
developments and identifying any broad cross-country trends in family policy provision 
over the past few decades.  
 
4.2. Between-country differences in family policy  
 
It is well documented that patterns and configurations of family policies differ 
substantially between countries (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Korpi, 2000; Leitner, 2003; 
Misra et al, 2006; Ferrarini, 2006; Korpi et al, 2013). The Scandinavian states are usually 
found to be generous providers of ‘female-friendly’ leave and childcare policies (Esping-
Andersen, 1999; Korpi, 2000; Misra et al, 2006; Mischke, 2011; Korpi et al, 2013), while 
Country General family policy country group
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Belgium1 Conservative European
France1
Austria
Germany
Ireland
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Australia
Canada
New Zealand
United Kingdom
United States
1. Belgium and France are partially separated from the remaining conservative European countries 
to reflect the observation made by many (e.g. Esping-Andersen (1999), Leitner (2003) and Misra et 
al (2006) that these two deviate slightly from the other conservative European countries in the 
extent to which they provide public childcare services. 
Table 4.1. General family policy typology
Scandinavian
Southern European
Liberal
Source: Adapted from Esping-Andersen (1999); Lewis (1992); Korpi (2000); Gauthier (2002); Leitner 
(2003) and Misra et al (2006)
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the conservative European countries tend to be oriented more towards the provision of 
policies that support the family in its caring function (Korpi, 2000; Misra et al, 2006; 
Ferrarini, 2006; Mischke, 2011; Korpi et al, 2013). The Southern European and liberal-
type countries, meanwhile, are often found to be scant providers of all forms of family 
policy (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Korpi, 2000; Leitner, 2003; Misra et al, 2006; Ferrarini, 
2006; Korpi et al, 2013). 
 
As a starting point for the chapter, figure 4.1 illustrates between-country differences in 
configurations of family policy as they are captured by average scores across the series on 
the three family policy indices. Country series-mean scores on the general family support 
policy index are set on the vertical axis, while for ease of comparison the horizontal axis 
shows the average of series-mean scores on the two dual earner policy indices. 
 
 
 
The plot is divided into quarters around the origin, which represents the overall mean 
score on each policy index across the sample. Following Ferrarini (2006), it is possible to 
characterise the resulting quartiles as differing sets or configurations of family policies, 
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Average of mean scores on the dual earner-carer leave and dual earner 
childcare policy indices 
Figure 4.1. Country family policy configurations, mean average 
1985-2010 
Mean country scores on the general family support policy index and the 
mean average of mean country scores on the dual earner-carer leave and 
dual earner child care policy indices 
General family support policy set Contradictory/pluralistic policy set 
Dual earner policy set Low family support policy set 
Note: AUS = Australia, AUT = Austria, BEL = Belgium, CAN = Canada, DNK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, 
FRA = France, DEU = Germany, GRC = Greece, IRL = Ireland, ITA = Italy, LUX = Luxembourg, NZL = 
New Zealand, NLD = the Netherlands, NOR = Norway, PRT = Portugal, ESP = Spain, GBR = United 
Kingdom, USA = United States. For Germany, country average scores 1991-2010. 
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although it is important to note that these sets are relative to observed provision across 
the sample and not to some theoretical benchmark. Mean country scores that fall below 
zero on both axes represent a ‘low family support’ approach to family policy (Ferrarini, 
2006: 13; Engster and Olofsdotter Stensöta, 2011), while scores that are above zero one of 
the dual earner or general family support axes and below on the other signify, on average 
over the series, a ‘dual earner’ or ‘general family support’ policy set, respectively. Lastly, 
mean country scores that are above zero on both axes represent something of a 
‘contradictory’ or ‘pluralistic’ configuration of family policy. Here, on average, countries 
provide a set of policies that support both dual earning and the family in its caring 
function, and thus to some extent present families with a ‘choice’ as to how they reconcile 
work and childcare responsibilities (Ferrarini, 2006: 13). 
 
Figure 4.1 confirms a certain level of between-country variation in patterns of policy 
provision, at least on average over the series. All four policy quartiles are populated by at 
least two countries, although notably it is the low family support quartile that is – with ten 
constituent countries – by far the most populous. In other words, on average over the 
series, half of the twenty sample countries are below average providers of both dual 
earner and general family support policy. The remaining ten countries are fairly evenly 
distributed between the other three policy quartiles. On average over the period, four 
countries hold a dual earner set of policies, four a contradictory or pluralistic 
configuration, and two a general family support policy set. The latter is particularly 
notable, in that it suggests that few countries provide extensive general family support 
without also providing generous dual earner policies, although again only on average over 
the series.  
 
The placement of individual countries around figure 4.1 is fairly consistent with the usual 
distinctions made between groups of countries, albeit with certain deviations. Three of the 
four Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Sweden and, just, Norway – are placed within the 
dual earner policy quartile, which is as expected given that policies in these countries are 
usually found to be strongly supportive of female employment (Esping-Andersen, 1999; 
Korpi, 2000; Misra et al, 2006; Mischke, 2011; Korpi et al, 2013). Finland is the exception, 
falling as it does within the contradictory/pluralistic policy set. This is not an entirely 
novel finding – Mischke (2011), for example, finds that Finland is more similar in its policy 
configuration to Belgium and France than to the other Scandinavian countries – and is due 
mostly to Finland’s comparatively strong support for familial care provided through its 
generous home care allowance. 
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The conservative European countries are slightly more diverse in their placement across 
figure 4.1. Averaged over the series, Austria and Germany both display the expected 
general family support policy configuration – with scores above zero on the general family 
support index and below zero on the dual earner axis – while Belgium, France and 
Luxembourg all hold a more contradictory set of policies. In the case of the former two 
countries in particular, this contradictory approach to family policy is not altogether 
unexpected – as noted in chapter 2, a number of authors suggest that France and Belgium 
deviate slightly from the rest of the conservative pack, especially in the extent to which 
they are generous providers of childcare services (Leitner, 2003; Misra et al, 2006; 
Mischke, 2011). Ireland, meanwhile, falls within the low family support policy quartile but 
is on the border of the general family support policy set. Again, this is not entirely 
unexpected. Several authors find that Ireland is fairly similar to the United Kingdom 
(Lewis, 1992; Leitner, 2003) and the other liberal-type countries (Esping-Andersen, 1999) 
in its policy orientation, while Korpi (2000) suggests it is something of a borderline case. 
 
Finally, the placement of countries from the final two country groups – the Southern 
European group, and the liberal group – is almost entirely consistent with expectations. In 
both cases, countries are usually found to provide little in the way of either dual earner or 
general family support policy (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Korpi, 2000; Leitner, 2003; Misra 
et al, 2006; Engster and Olofsdotter Stensöta, 2011). Accordingly, almost all countries 
from these two clusters are found in the low family support policy quartile in the bottom 
left of figure 4.1. The single and clear exception is Italy, which finds itself with a dual 
earner policy configuration mostly on account of fairly generous mother-specific earnings-
related leave and father-specific leave provisions. Italy probably represents figure 4.1’s 
largest and most unexpected departure from the usual country classifications. Its 
placement here does, however, derive some support from Ferrarini (2006), who also finds 
it a reasonably generous provider of dual earner support.    
 
Notably, these familiar patterns of policy provision also remain evident at least to some 
extent across years, albeit with the general level and ‘centre of gravity’ of provision 
shifting over time. To illustrate, figure 4.2 (overleaf) recreates figure 4.1 but for 
configurations of dual earner and general family support policy at the start and end of the 
series in 1985 and 2010. 
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Panel A in figure 4.2 shows that levels of family policy provision in 1985 were, by the 
standards of the entire series, generally low. Indeed, in 1985 only three of the twenty 
countries score over 0.5 on either of the two axes, with twelve scoring below the mean on 
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Figure 4.2. Country family policy configurations, 1985 and 2010
Country scores on the general family support policy index and the mean 
average ofcountry scores on the dual earner-carer leave and dual earner 
child care policy indices
General family support policy set Contradictory/pluralistic policy set
Dual earner policy setLow family support policy set
Panel A. 1985
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both. Yet, for the most part between-country differences in configurations in 1985 were 
largely similar – in relative terms at least – to those shown in figure 4.1 (pg. 125). The 
Scandinavian countries, for example, were with the exception of Norway generally the 
most generous providers of dual earner policy, while the conservative European countries 
(plus Finland) were the most generous providers of general family support. The liberal- 
and Southern European-type countries, meanwhile, were again generally the least 
generous providers of family policy overall. In other words, while most of the twenty 
sample countries were in 1985 comparatively ungenerous providers of family policy, it 
remains possible at least to some extent to identify the usual country clusters and 
between-country variations in groupings of policy provision.  
 
Provision of family policy in 2010 was across most countries generally far higher than in 
1985 (panel B in figure 4.2). Between the two panels, a majority of the twenty sample 
countries shift to the right – indicating at least some increase in the provision of one or 
both types of dual earner policy – while many also move upwards – suggesting fairly 
widespread increases in the provision of general family support policies  – producing a 
general shift ‘north-east’ for most countries. Again though, the usual policy groups remain 
largely identifiable. All four Scandinavian countries remain among the most generous 
providers of dual earner policy and the least generous providers of general family support, 
while the conservative European countries continue to provide the highest level of general 
family support policy. Similarly, the liberal and Southern European-type countries 
generally remain the lowest providers overall even if, by 2010, many offer a set of policies 
that is comparatively generous relative to the standards set across the sample as a whole. 
 
Broadly then, the measures of family policy used in this thesis produce familiar patterns of 
provision that are mostly similar to those in the existing comparative family policy 
literature, both when looking at average levels of provision over the course of the series 
and at specific configurations at the beginning and end of the sample. Yet, as figure 4.2 
illustrates, levels of family policy provision are far from static over time – indeed, the initial 
suggestion from figure 4.2 is that the years between 1985 and 2010 may be characterised 
by a general expansion across countries in policy provision, a suggestion that is itself 
compatible with and to some extent mirrors the findings of Gauthier (2002), Ferrarini 
(2006) and Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2013). The following sections detail and 
describe these developments for each area of family policy individually, starting first with 
changes in the provision of dual earner-carer leave policies. 
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4.3. Dual earner-carer leave policy 
 
On average across countries, the years following 1985 see a steady and sustained increase 
in the provision of dual earner-carer leave policies. Figure 4.3 plots the cross-country 
mean average score on the dual earner-carer leave policy index for all years between 1985 
and 2010, along with error bars set at one standard deviation to reflect between-country 
variation in index scores in each year.  
 
 
 
The average index score rises over the series, from -0.22 in 1985 to just over 0.32 in 2010. 
Notably, much of this increase occurs over the latter half of the period. Change in the 
average index score stands at only 0.15 between 1985 and 1998, compared to 0.40 
between 1998 and 2010 – in other words, growth in dual earner-carer leave policy 
provision is consistent across the period but seems to have accelerated in more recent 
years. Also notable, though, is that the standard deviation of index scores also increases 
over the series – indeed, the standard deviation almost doubles from an initial 0.41 in 
1985 to 0.77 in 2010. Thus, although the general trend across the period is for increasing 
supply of dual earner-carer leave policy, there is some suggestion that cross-national 
differences in provision have also become more pronounced. 
 
Table 4.2 summarises how dual earner-carer leave policies have developed across 
individual countries. It shows scores on both the dual earner-carer leave policy index and 
its three individual component indicators in 1985 and 2010, and change in each between 
the two snapshot time points. It also contains country group labels according to the 
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Figure 4.3. Cross-country unweighted average score on the dual earner-carer 
leave policy index, 1985-2010 
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general family policy typology outlined earlier in table 4.1 (pg. 124) to facilitate 
comparison. Countries are ranked in descending order according to the degree of change 
on the dual earner-carer leave policy index. 
 
Consistent with the trend in the cross-country average, most of the twenty sample 
countries see at least some increase in their scores on the dual earner-carer leave policy 
index over the series. Growth is particularly large in Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal and 
Germany, but also reasonable in a majority of the countries examined. Scores are 
unchanged in three countries, while France and Denmark alone see decreases in index 
scores between 1985 and 2010. Broadly, though, table 4.2 suggests the period between 
1985 and 2010 can be characterised as one of widespread growth in the provision of leave 
policies the hold some form of dual earner or dual carer orientation. 
 
It is noticeable from table 4.2 that these developments tend to cut across the usual 
country policy groups. The ranking of countries in table 4.2 generally shares little 
association with the general family policy country typology, although there is perhaps 
some clustering of the liberal countries towards the bottom of the table and Southern 
European countries are more likely to be ranked further towards the top. However, the 
Scandinavian and conservative European countries are distributed throughout the 
rankings, and the largest reforms in dual earner-carer leave policy come from a diverse set 
of countries.  
 
That said, it is also apparent from table 4.2 that countries with very low initial scores on 
the policy index are also more likely to see little or no expansion in provision over 
subsequent years. This is illustrated best by Australia and the United States – both of 
whom provide no paid leave policies that can be classified as ‘dual earner-carer’ in either 
1985 or at any other point over the series – but also evident in New Zealand and, to a 
lesser degree, the United Kingdom. This is not to say that there is a strict or linear 
divergence in scores on the policy index over the series71. Many of those countries with 
very high initial scores see only moderate increases (Finland, Italy and Sweden) or 
decreases (Denmark) over the series, while the biggest gains in dual earner-carer leave 
policy are observed in countries that held comparatively moderate scores in 1985 
(Germany, Luxembourg, Norway and Portugal). However, it does provide some 
explanation for the increased dispersion of index scores touched on earlier – while most 
                                                        
71 The Pearson’s R correlation coefficient between scores on the index in 1985 and change in the 
index over the series is 0.23, indicating only a fairly weak positive linear association between initial 
provision and subsequent expansion.  
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countries have, to varying extents, expanded dual earner-carer leave policies over the 
series, those with very low initial provision have for whatever reason failed to introduce 
major reforms and as a result have drifted even further from the pack.   
 
In terms of specific policies, table 4.2 shows that much of the growth in the dual earner-
carer leave policy index has been driven by changes in paternity leaves or other weeks of 
leave reserved for the father. Eight countries introduce some form of father-specific leave 
at some point over the series, while five others extend existing father-specific provisions. 
Particularly notable is the increase in Luxembourg, where an individual entitlement to six 
months paid parental leave was added in 1999 to the existing two-day birth related leave. 
The new leave is paid through an extremely generous flat-rate benefit – so that, by 2010, 
Luxembourg held the most generous package of effective weeks of father-specific leave – 
and is sufficient to drive entirely the large increase in Luxembourg’s score on the overall 
policy index. 
 
Several countries also increase provision of mother-specific earnings-related leave over 
the series, although growth in terms of effective weeks is generally slightly smaller than 
for father-specific leave. The largest increase in mother-specific earnings-related leave is 
in Sweden, where since 1995 both parents have been reserved a period of earnings-
related parental leave. Most of the other increases range somewhere between two and five 
effective weeks. Only four countries reduce effective weeks of mother-specific earnings-
related leave over the series. The most notable decrease is in Denmark, where effective 
weeks fall because the ceiling on the earnings-related maternity leave benefit fails to keep 
pace with wage growth. However, as Ferragina et al (2013) note, this may be at least 
partly explained by a shift towards employer responsibility for the payment of parental 
leave benefits (2013: 799).  
 
Fewer countries introduce or expand effective weeks of gender-neutral earnings-related 
parental leave, although changes are generally large in those countries that do alter this 
aspect of dual earner-carer leave. Particularly striking is Germany, where in 2007 the 
former flat-rate parental leave scheme was replaced by a relatively generous earnings-
related parental leave programme, complete with bonus weeks for take-up by the father. 
Canada, Norway and Portugal also introduce or extend reasonably generous earnings-
related parental leave schemes over the series. Again, only a few countries – Finland, Italy 
and Sweden – reduce effective weeks of gender-neutral parental leave between 1985 and 
2010. In the latter two, this is mostly the result of rearrangements that see each parent 
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reserved – or, in Italy, effectively reserved72 – a period of the parental leave. In Finland, the 
decrease can be explained by a gradual reduction in the actual proportion of wages 
replaced by the earnings-related benefit across the leave.  
 
In summary then, developments in dual earner-carer leave policies as they are measured 
here generally match the trends described by Gauthier (2002), Ferrarini (2006) and 
Ferragina et al (2013). The data outlined in this section show a general and widespread 
expansion of dual earner-carer leaves in the years following 1985, with the pace of 
development increasing if anything in more recent years. Yet, cross-national differences in 
provision also continue to grow, mostly because a few countries – particularly Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States – persist in providing little or nothing in the way of 
dual earner-carer leave policy. Thus, the general pattern is one of increases in both 
provision and variation. Nonetheless, by 2010, most countries provided a more extensive 
set of dual earner or dual carer leave policies than they had done in 1985. 
 
4.4. Dual earner childcare policy 
 
Dual earner childcare policies also undergo considerable expansion over the years 
between 1985 and 2010. Figure 4.4 plots the cross-country mean average score on the 
dual earner childcare policy index for all years between 1985 and 2010, alongside error 
bars set at one standard deviation to represent between-country variation in the index in 
each year.  
 
The cross-country mean average index score again increases over the series, from -0.42 in 
1985 to 0.51 in 2010. Growth is a little more consistent than in dual earner-carer leave 
policy – change in the mean dual earner childcare index score was 0.46 between 1985 and 
1998, and 0.48 between 1998 and 2010 – suggesting that the expansion of childcare policy 
was fairly steady and sustained over the period. Notably, the standard deviation of index 
scores also again increases across the series. However, in this case the change is only fairly 
small – the standard deviation stood at 0.67 in 1985, and 0.87 in 2010. Thus, the general 
trend is again for increase and expansion with some slight growth in between-country 
variation in provision.  
 
 
                                                        
72 Technically, since 2000, Italian parents both hold an individual entitlement to six months paid 
parental leave. However, the leave is limited to ten months per family (Knijn and Saraceno, 2010: 
448; OECD, 2013c). This effectively means that four months are reserved for each parent, with the 
remaining two classified here as gender-neutral or sharable leave. 
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This pattern of increase is seen across all twenty of the sample countries, to varying 
degrees of course. Table 4.3 (overleaf) summarises change in dual earner childcare policy 
for each individual country. It shows change in the policy index and in each of the three 
component indicators between 1985 and 2010. Again, it also contains country group 
labels, and countries are ranked in descending order according to the degree of change on 
the dual earner childcare policy index.  
 
All countries see at least some increase in scores on the dual earner childcare policy index 
between 1985 and 2010. Growth in provision is exceptionally large in Norway and 
substantial in Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, but many others also see 
considerable growth in index scores over the series. Change in Greece and Canada is only 
marginal, but no county sees a decrease in their score on the index between the two ends 
of the series. Thus, as far as the data suggest, expansions in dual earner childcare policy 
appear fairly widespread across the sample countries over the years 1985-2010.  
 
Much of the growth in index scores is driven by expansions in public expenditure on 
childcare services. Norway leads the way, with expenditure growing from just over $1,500 
(2005 USD PPP) per child under six in 1985 to over $7,500 per child in 2009. Increases are 
also considerable in the United Kingdom – with an increase in expenditure of just under 
$5,000 per child under six between 1985 and 2009 – and in France, at just over $4,500. All 
but two countries see expenditure per child under six grow by at least $1,000 over the 
series.  
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Figure 4.4. Cross-country unweighted average score on the dual earner childcare 
policy index, 1985-2010  
With +/- one standard deviation error bars. 
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But increases are also relatively widespread in the other two dual earner childcare 
indicators. As noted earlier in chapter 3, these two indicators are not perfect and should 
be treated with some degree of caution. The measure of service coverage for children 
under three suffers from a high rate of missing data and, for certain countries, what data 
does exist may not fully reflect public provisions. The indicator of provision for older 
children, meanwhile, captures enrolment in publicly owned or run pre-primary 
institutions or primary school only and not children in publicly supported pre-primary 
education. Nonetheless, both indicate some degree of growth in public provision across 
most countries over the series.  
 
For children under three, expansions in the proportion enrolled in public or publicly 
supported care are particularly substantial in Norway and Denmark, with both achieving 
an enrolment rate of well over 50% by 2010. There are also indications of sizable 
expansions in Austria, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, 
Belgium. Notably, only Finland sees a decrease in the proportion of children under-three 
in publicly supported childcare over the series. This can be explained by a steady decline 
in demand for formal childcare following the introduction of the home care allowance in 
1985, rather than a reduction in public supply itself (Randall, 2000: 358). 
 
Several countries also see large increases in the proportion of three-to-six year olds in 
public pre-primary education or primary school. In certain cases – namely, Ireland and the 
Netherlands73 – these increases are at least partly the result of a decrease in the age at 
which children enter compulsory schooling. In others – such as Denmark, Finland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain – it is a consequence of an increase in the number of 
children enrolled in pre-primary institutions recognised as ‘public’ by the OECD data. Only 
three countries see a decrease in the proportion of three-to-six year olds in public pre-
primary education or primary school. In Greece, the change is marginal. Decreases are 
larger in Australia and New Zealand, although importantly these changes are for years 
between 2001-2010 and 2004-2010 only, due to missing data.  
 
Notably, there is again no real strong association between changes in dual earner 
childcare policy and country policy groups. Table 4.3 shows that growth in the policy 
index is strong in three of the four Scandinavian countries - with both Denmark and 
Sweden further expanding an already generous set of childcare policies, and with Norway 
                                                        
73 In the Netherlands there is effective rather than formal lowering of school entry age, as since 
2008 primary schools have been obliged to offer full-day childcare to children aged four and over 
(Knijn and Saraceno, 2010: 451). 
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shifting from a comparatively low level of provision in 1985 to become the third most 
generous provider by 2010 – but is far less dramatic in Finland. Increases are also 
generally small in the liberal-type countries, but nonetheless all see at least some 
expansion over the series and the United Kingdom in particular shifts to become a 
reasonably high spender on childcare by 2010. The Southern European and conservative 
European countries, meanwhile, are distributed throughout the table. Similar to dual 
earner-carer leave policy then, there is only limited evidence to suggest that certain types 
of countries see stronger or weaker growth in the provision of dual earner childcare policy 
over the period. 
 
To sum up, the broad picture for dual earner childcare policy is, at least as far as the data 
indicate, one of sustained and widespread growth in provision across most of the 20 
sample countries. There appears little in the way of either convergence or divergence in 
policy, while growth in both expenditure and provision come from a range of countries. 
Indeed, the general inference is that, across the years 1985-2010, there has been a fairly 
common shift towards more generous provision of public childcare policies, albeit very 
much to varying extents across countries.  
 
4.5. General family support policy 
 
Broadly speaking, trends and developments in general family support policy are a little 
more complex and less coherent than those seen in the previous two sections for the two 
areas of dual earner family policy. Figure 4.5 again plots the cross-country mean average 
score on the general family support index for the years 1985-2010, together with error 
bars set at one standard deviation of the index score for each year.  
 
Similar to the two dual earner policy indices, average provision of general family support 
increases between 1985 and 2010. However, the change is only small – the cross-country 
mean average score on the index was -0.23 in 1985, and 0.05 in 2010 – and the average 
index score fluctuates over the series. The index increases steadily to a peak of 0.14 in 
2002, before falling away slightly across the remainder of the 2000s. Notably, the standard 
deviation of index scores also exhibits a similar pattern – it increases from 0.50 in 1985 to 
a high of 0.87 in 1999, before decreasing steadily to 0.64 in 2010. Both of these trends are 
returned to and expanded upon later in this section, but for now the broad picture appears 
one of growth and slight subsequent decline in both the average provision of, and cross-
national variation in, general family support policy.  
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Table 4.4 (overleaf) summarises how general family support policies have developed 
across the individual countries. It shows changes in both scores on the policy index and in 
provision of the three individual component indicators in each country between 1985 and 
2010. Once more, countries are ranked in descending order according to the degree of 
change on the general family support policy index. 
 
Fourteen of the twenty sample countries expand general family support policy between 
1985 and 2010. Increases are particularly large in Luxembourg and Italy, but also 
considerable in New Zealand, Germany and Portugal and to a lesser extent in Australia, 
Ireland and the United States. A sizeable minority of six countries, however, decrease 
provision between the two ends of the series. These decreases are particularly 
noteworthy, as together they represent the most widespread shift away from generous 
provision observed across the three areas of family policy.  
 
Notably, several of those countries that decrease provision between 1985 and 2010 were 
initially relatively generous providers of general family support. This is particularly the 
case in Finland and France, but also to a lesser degree Austria. All three started the period 
with index scores well above the series mean, but to varying extents all three shift away 
from generous provision over the series. Moreover, a number of countries with at least 
moderate growth – namely, Australia, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and the United States – 
were comparatively very low providers of general family support policy in 1985. Taking  
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Figure 4.5. Cross-country unweighted average score on the general family 
support policy index, 1985-2010 
With +/- one standard deviation error bars. 
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the two together, there appears at least some tendency over the years examined for 
provision to shift towards some more moderate form of middle ground. 
 
Indeed, it is possible to say that there has been some degree of convergence in general 
family support policy over the series. Figure 4.6 plots changes in scores on the general 
family support policy index between 1985 and 2010 against initial scores on the index in 
1985, along with a linear fit line. Broadly, countries with low initial scores appear more 
likely to see large positive changes in the index over the series, while those with 
moderate-to-high initial provision are more likely to see a decrease in index scores 
between 1985 and 2010. This is not to say that there has been strict convergence74 – 
Luxembourg, for example, extends and expands what was already a relatively generous 
set of family support policies. However, there appears to have been some degree of ‘catch 
up’ amongst many of those countries that started the series as low providers and, vice 
versa, cutbacks in provision in several initially high providers. That said, even in 2010 the 
highest levels of provision remain in the conservative European countries – particularly 
Luxembourg, but also Germany, Belgium and France – that are traditionally the most 
generous providers of general family support.  
 
 
 
                                                        
74 Indeed, as noted earlier, the standard deviation of index scores does actually increase slightly 
over the series. However, this is heavily influenced by the extreme change in Luxembourg. When 
removed, the standard deviation falls slightly from 0.47 in 1985 to 0.42 in 2010.   
LUX 
ITA 
NZL 
DEU 
PRT 
IRL 
AUS USA BEL 
ESP 
SWE 
DNK 
NLD CAN 
AUT 
NOR FRA 
GBR GRC 
FIN 
R² = 0.0742 
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
-1 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
C
h
an
ge
 in
 s
co
re
 b
et
w
ee
n
 1
9
8
5
 a
n
d
 2
0
1
0
 
Score on general family support policy index, 1985 
Figure 4.6. Scores on the general family support policy index in 1985 and change 
in scores between 1985 and 2010  
Notes: AUS = Australia, AUT = Austria, BEL = Belgium, CAN = Canada, DNK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, FRA = France, DEU = 
Germany, GRC = Greece, IRL = Ireland, ITA = Italy, LUX = Luxembourg, NZL = New Zealand, NLD = the Netherlands, NOR = 
Norway, PRT = Portugal, ESP = Spain, GBR = United Kingdom, USA = United States. * = p<0.05 ** = p<0.01 *** = p<0.001. ^ = 
p<0.1. For Germany, change in scores 1991-2010. 
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These developments in the overall general family support policy index are produced by a 
complex mixture of changes in the three individual component indicators. Patterns of 
change in child benefit perhaps come closest to matching those in the overall index. Table 
4.4 (pg. 140) shows that a majority of the twenty sample countries see a least some 
increase in the generosity of child benefit payments between 1985 and 2010, with the 
increases in Italy and New Zealand particularly substantial. Indeed, in New Zealand the 
expansion is sufficient to drive its large increase in the overall index despite a decrease 
and no change in the remaining two component indicators. However, several countries 
towards the bottom of table do reduce the value of child benefit payments over the series. 
France, in particular, shifts from being the second most generous provider in 1985 to a 
relatively ungenerous position by 2010. 
 
A majority of countries reduce tax support for the nuclear family over the series. Thirteen 
countries see at least some decrease in the difference between the post-tax income of a 
single-earner two-child couple and single childless individual, with the decreases in 
Finland, Luxembourg and Norway particularly substantial. Notably, of all the nine main 
indicators of family policy, this is the only measure to see a cross-country average 
decrease in provision between 1985 and 2010 – in other words, this is the only area of 
family policy in which there appears to have been a general cutback in generosity over the 
series. That said, several countries do expand tax support for the family between 1985 and 
2010. Increases are largest in Germany, Portugal and the United States. The latter is 
particularly notable, given that the United States is amongst the most ungenerous of 
providers on all eight other indicators of family policy.  
 
Only ten countries introduce or adjust their provision of ‘general family support’ leave 
programmes between 1985 and 201075. Both Finland and Germany see decreases in the 
number effective weeks offered. This is due in the former to a decline in the proportion of 
wages replaced by the home care leave benefit, and in the latter to the replacement in 
2007 of the flat-rate parental leave scheme with an earnings-related system. The 
remaining seven countries introduce or increase effective weeks of flat-rate parental leave 
or childcare leave. Changes are large in Norway and Sweden, due in both to the 
introduction of home care leaves in 1998 and 200876, respectively. By far the most 
substantial increase, however, is in Luxembourg. This is the result of two reforms – first, 
                                                        
75 Only nine of these are visible in table 4.4. The tenth is Denmark, which introduced and later 
abolished a childcare leave in 1992 and 2001, respectively (see table C.29 in appendix C (pg. 370)).   
76 Sweden first introduced a home care allowance in 1994. However, this was abolished after only 
one year and was not reintroduced until 2008 (OECD, 2013c) 
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the introduction in 1988 of a two-year childcare leave paid at a relatively low flat rate, and 
second the launch in 1999 of a six month flat-rate mother-specific parental leave that was 
paid, initially at least, at close to 100% of average female manufacturing wages. These two 
leaves are the major driver behind Luxembourg’s comparatively large increase in overall 
general family support policy. 
 
Finally, before summarising it is worth briefly returning to the observation made earlier 
that average provision of general family support appears to expand and then retract over 
the series. Figure 4.7 plots changes in individual country scores on the general family 
support policy index over the first and second halves of the series, that is, between 1985 
and 1998, and 1998 and 2010. Countries are ranked in descending order according to the 
degree of change over the series.   
 
 
 
Between 1985 and 1998, fifteen countries post at least some increase in the general family 
support policy index. Changes are largest in Luxembourg, Germany, Italy and New 
Zealand, but the general trend across countries appears mostly one of expansion. Notably, 
the picture changes somewhat in the years following 1998 – here, eleven countries see a 
decrease in their scores on the policy index. Particularly interesting are the cuts to 
provision in France, Germany and Denmark – as well as, to a lesser extent, Canada, Spain, 
the Netherlands and Norway – as these countries had all previously increased general 
family support over the first half of the series. The cross-country average change in the 
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Figure 4.7. Change in scores on the general family support index between 1985 
and 1998 and between 1998 and 2010 
Countries ranked by overall change on the general family support index  
Change 1985-1998 Change 1998-2010
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general family support policy index for 1998-2010 does remain very slightly positive at 
0.0177. Nonetheless, there is perhaps some evidence to suggest the beginnings of a broad 
shift away from generous provision of general family support in more recent years, albeit 
following earlier general growth between 1985 and the late 1990s.  
 
Developments in general family support policy then, may be best described as ‘mixed’.  As 
was also found by Gauthier (2002) and Ferrarini (2006), most countries do increase 
provision of general family support policy between the two ends of the series. However, 
there is also evidence to indicate that several countries are moving away from extensive 
general family support, particularly through reductions in tax subsidies to the nuclear 
family, and especially in more recent years. Notably, several of those countries that cut 
back on provision were, at the outset, amongst the most generous providers, while 
conversely countries with low initial levels of general family support were more likely to 
see large increases in provision over the series. Thus, perhaps the most noteworthy 
finding from this section is that there appears to have been some degree of convergence 
towards more moderate levels of general family support across most of the 20 sample 
countries examined. Nevertheless, and as stated earlier, the most generous providers in 
2010 remained, generally, the conservative European states. 
 
4.6. Overview and discussion 
 
The dominant trend emerging from the previous three sections is one of general 
expansion. While a minority of countries cut back on general family support and a couple 
decrease provision of dual earner-carer leave, the broad pattern is for growth and 
increase across the three areas of family policy – in other words, between 1985 and 2010, 
the twenty sample countries have become more generous providers of family policy in 
general. This pattern of increase at least partly echoes the findings of Gauthier (2002), 
Ferrarini (2006) and Ferragina et al (2013). There as here, results suggest a shift towards 
increased generosity and widespread growth in the provision of family policy in general.  
 
This broad trend is notable in itself. As both Gauthier (2002) and Ferragina et al (2013) 
note, these developments mean that over the past few decades family policy has across 
countries become a major feature of national social policy despite pressures on welfare 
budgets and wider welfare retrenchment (Korpi and Palme, 2003; Starke, 2006; Ferragina 
et al, 2013). However, one result of this fairly common pattern is that developments 
                                                        
77 The fall in the cross-country average index score observed earlier was between 2002 and 2010.  
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between countries are for the most part distinguishable only in the magnitude or the 
extent of growth in provision, rather than in the direction or type of change. This is shown 
by table 4.5, which summarises change by country on each of the three family policy 
indices.  
 
A small group of countries have, over the series, shifted towards a ‘dual earner’ set of 
family policies through increases in provision of dual earner leave and childcare policies 
and a reduction in the generosity of general family support. In other words, to varying 
extents, these countries have reconfigured family policy so as to provide a set of policies 
that, by 2010, are more encouraging of female labour market activity and employment 
than was the case in 1985. This group includes Finland, France, Greece, the United 
Kingdom and, to a very limited extent, Austria. Norway, however, provides perhaps the 
clearest example, as illustrated by figure 4.8 (overleaf). 
 
 
Dual earner-carer 
leave policy index
Dual earner 
childcare policy 
index
General family 
support policy 
index
Denmark -0.28 1.46 0.12
Finland 0.45 0.84 -0.58
Norway 1.50 2.57 -0.35
Sweden 0.83 1.16 0.15
Belgium 0.44 0.89 0.41
France -0.05 0.74 -0.38
Austria 0.00 0.99 -0.06
Germany 1.38 0.47 0.70
Ireland 0.12 1.46 0.47
Luxembourg 1.73 1.30 1.33
Netherlands 0.82 1.41 0.07
Greece 0.32 0.15 -0.50
Italy 0.66 0.73 1.27
Portugal 1.32 1.00 0.59
Spain 0.57 1.24 0.36
Australia 0.00 0.45 0.44
Canada 0.58 0.08 0.04
New Zealand 0.24 0.45 0.98
United Kingdom 0.31 0.96 -0.49
United States 0.00 0.39 0.44
Average 0.55 0.94 0.25
Table 4.5. Summary of change on the three family policy indices
By general policy country group
Change on index, 1985-2010a
Note : The bars symbolize the magnitude of change on each index between 1985 and 2010. Lighter grey bars 
show positive change, darker grey negative change. 
a. Germany, 1991 - 2010.
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At the start of the series, Norway was a relatively low provider across all three aspects of 
family policy, particularly in comparison to the other three Scandinavian counties. 
However, a series of expansions in dual earner-carer leave policy – including several 
extensions to earnings-related parental leave in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, and the 
introduction of a father quota in 1993 and subsequent extensions in the late 2000’s – and 
large sustained increases in childcare spending see Norway become the second most 
generous provider of dual earner policy by 2010. At the same time, decreases in financial 
support for the family – particularly through reductions in family tax subsidies and 
decreases in the real value of the home care allowance in the 2000’s – shift Norway 
towards a comparatively low level of general family support provision. The result is that, 
by 2010, Norway was far more ‘dual earner’ in its orientation than it was in 1985. 
 
However, most of the twenty sample states have increased provision of both dual earner 
and general family support policy over the period, and as result have moved towards a set 
of policies that are more contradictory or pluralistic in their orientation. In other words, 
the majority countries have become more generous providers of policy all-round. In 
practical terms, such a shift means that in most cases policies in 2010 were both more 
supportive of female employment and more encouraging of female homemaking than in 
1985. This of course produces conflicting incentives, although from a more optimistic 
perspective these developments could be seen as providing mothers with greater choice 
or improved options regarding work and family responsibilities (Ferrarini, 2006: 13). 
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Figure 4.8. Scores for Norway on the three family policy indices, 1985-2010 
Dual earner-carer leave Dual earner childcare General family support
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Of course, the magnitude of the shift again varies across and between countries. For some, 
such as the Netherlands and Sweden, increases in dual earner provision are large and 
growth in general family support policy comparatively small, while in a few countries – 
particularly Australia and the United States – all changes are marginal. Others, however, 
see considerable expansion across the board. This is particularly the case in Luxembourg, 
where increases in all three policy indices are substantial. In fact, by 2010 Luxembourg 
holds a set of policies that are at once amongst the most generous in terms of support for 
both dual earning parents and the nuclear family unit.   
 
That said, and as covered in the previous section, in more recent years several countries 
that had previously expanded general family support policy have begun to cut back on the 
generosity of provision. Combined with continued increases in dual earner policies, this 
implies some form of shift towards a dual earner configuration over the latter years of the 
series. This pattern of development is observed, to varying degrees, in Canada, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Spain. Perhaps the clearest example, however, comes from Germany, 
as is shown in figure 4.9. 
 
 
 
For much of the series, Germany is the archetypal ‘general family support’ state. 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Germany provides a long, low paid flat rate 
parental leave scheme and generous tax subsidies for single earner families, while 
childcare provision is low and dual earner-carer leave policy consists only of a moderate 
earnings-related maternity leave. From around the mid-2000s, however, Germany family 
policy undergoes something of a co-ordinated transformation. The generosity of child 
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Figure 4.9. Scores for Germany on the three family policy indices, 1991-2010 
Dual earner-carer leave Dual earner childcare General family support
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benefit payments and tax support fall slightly, while the replacement of the former flat 
rate leave with an earnings-related system in 2007 drives a sharp and relatively 
simultaneous increase in dual earner-carer leave provision. This is not a complete shift to 
a dual earner model. Indeed, while Germany has abandoned much of the ‘breadwinner’ 
system, there remain several elements of German family policy that are likely to reinforce 
female caregiving (Lewis et al, 2008; Ostner, 2010) – as an example, even by 2010 tax 
subsidies for single earner families remain generous. Nonetheless, German reforms 
towards the end of the series create a policy system that, in theory at least, is far more 
encouraging of female labour market activity than was the case for much of the period 
examined.  
 
As touched on at several points over the previous three sections, it is noticeable that none 
of these patterns of development operate along the usual distinctions made between 
country policy groups. Indeed, an examination of table 4.5 (pg. 145) suggests there is little 
general association at all between developments in family policy and the typical country 
policy clusters. The liberal group does average the smallest level of change across the 
three policy indices, while the Scandinavian countries tend to see at least reasonable 
growth in dual earner childcare policy and low or negative growth in general family 
support policy. However, there are exceptions and intra-cluster variations in all groups, 
and broadly very little to suggest that any of the four clusters have their own specific 
pattern of change, or that certain types or sets of countries have developed in certain 
ways.  
 
This is not to say that countries depart from their usual policy groups – indeed, even by 
the end of the series in 2010 it remains possible to distinguish some degree of clustering 
in patterns of policy provision. The results shown in tables 4.2 (pg. 131) and 4.3 (pg. 136), 
for example, indicate that the Scandinavian countries remain generally the most generous 
providers of dual earner policy, while those in table 4.4 (pg. 140) show that the provision 
of general family support continues to be strongest in the conservative European 
countries. Results from across the tables also show that the lowest levels of overall 
provision remain in the liberal or southern European-type states, although by the 
standards of the entire series several are, by 2010, relatively generous providers of dual 
earner policy. 
 
However, even if country policy clusters remain at least partially visible in the cross-
section, the important point to take away here is that changes in family policy cut across 
and vary within the various country groups. In other words, between 1985 and 2010, each 
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policy cluster fails to develop in manner that is internally homogeneous and externally 
distinct. As a result, there is little evidence of any divergence in policy provision between 
different groups of countries, as was so strongly found by both Gauthier (2002) and 
Ferrarini (2006). Indeed, this chapter provides little evidence of any kind of general 
divergence at all, be it between or within policy clusters. Admittedly, section 4.3 does 
show some increase in cross-national variation in dual earner-carer leave policy. However, 
section 4.5 finds a certain level of convergence in the provision of general family support, 
and more widely there is little indication that different countries have moved along 
radically different policy paths. Rather, the general pattern of change found in this chapter 
– between the two ends of the series at least – is one of fairly common increase across the 
three areas of family policy.  
 
In summary then, this chapter finds a considerable level of change in the provision of 
family policy over the years between 1985 and 2010. The broad trend is for growth and 
expansion across aspects of policy and over most of the twenty sample countries. Degrees 
of change of course vary between states. However, with the partial exception of those few 
countries that cut back on general family support, most countries were more generous 
providers of general family policy in 2010 than was the case in 1985. Theories of family 
policy suggest that such changes in provision should have some visible impact on gender 
differences in employment outcomes. As discussed in detail earlier in chapter 2, changes 
in provision are expected to influence equality in economic activity – albeit in a somewhat 
ambiguous manner in those countries that have expanded both dual earner and general 
family support policy – and may also impact upon gender job segregation and women’s 
relative career attainment. The following chapters examine how the changes and 
developments outlined in this chapter relate to observed levels of gender equality in 
employment, starting first with gender differences in labour market activity.  
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Chapter 5. Do changes in family policy influence gender differences in 
economic activity? Descriptive and time-series cross-section regression 
analyses of links between changes in family policy provision and gender 
equality in labour market activity 
 
 
At the centre of theories of family policy and the comparative family policy literature is the 
argument that family policies are likely to have some influence over the relative extent to 
which men and women are active in the labour market (e.g. Korpi, 2000, Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006; Korpi, 2010; Thévenon, 2013; see chapter 2 for a detailed discussion). 
Providing dual earner-carer leave policies, for example, should boost relative female 
participation through improved incentives to build a career prior to pregnancy, increased 
employment continuity following childbirth, and possibly also through the encouragement 
of male participation in domestic labour, depending on the exact policy under discussion 
(Korpi, 2000; Ferrarini, 2006; Korpi, 2010; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2013; Korpi et al, 
2013). Likewise, public childcare policies should facilitate female market activity through 
a reduction in the female care burden and – to the extent that public childcare costs are 
lower than the market rate – through decreases in the effective childcare tax on second 
earning (Korpi, 2000; Blau et al, 2001; Blau and Currie, 2003; Misra et al, 2011). 
Conversely, general family support-type policies may constrain equal participation. Child 
benefit payments and extensive tax support for the nuclear family are expected to 
discourage second earning through income substitution (Jaumotte, 2003; Blau et al, 2001), 
while long, flat-rate parental and childcare leaves may reinforce gendered divisions of 
labour (Korpi, 2000; Ferrarini, 2006; Korpi, 2010; Korpi et al, 2013). 
 
Existing empirical evidence on links between family policy and gender equality in labour 
market activity is broadly supportive of these theoretical expectations. Simplifying 
slightly, cross-sectional comparative studies show that female employment or activity 
tends to be higher in countries with more generous packages of dual earner leave and 
childcare provision (Gornick et al, 1998; Pettit and Hook, 2005, Mischke, 2011; Misra et al, 
2011; Korpi et al, 2013) and fairly low in countries that provide extensive general family 
support policy (O’Connor, 1996; Gornick, 1999a; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002:230; 
Korpi et al, 2013). Employment rates are inconsistent in those ‘low family support’ 
countries that provide little in the way of either type of policy - the Southern European 
states, with their emphasis on familial care, tend to see the lowest rates of female 
employment, while women’s activity is generally moderate-to-high in the liberal, market-
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oriented states (O’Connor, 1996; Gornick, 1999a; Korpi, 2000; Van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 
2002:230; Korpi et al, 2013). Generally though, cross-country patterns of female 
participation mostly correspond to between-country differences in family policy provision 
(see chapter 2.3 for more detail). 
 
The emerging ‘over time’ comparative literature on associations between changes in 
family policy and gender equality in labour market activity also generally lends support to 
the theory. Several studies (Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Ruhm, 1998; Akgunduz and 
Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013) find that increases in the length of maternity 
and parental leave programmes encourage female employment or labour market 
participation – at least for adjustments up to a certain length – and promote female 
working hours (Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). Similarly, 
Jaumotte (2003) and Thévenon (2013) both find a positive association between changes 
in public childcare expenditure and female activity. Others produce at least some evidence 
to suggest that changes in general family support policy can constrain female participation 
(Jaumotte, 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012), although Ferrarini (2006) finds such a relation 
falls just short of statistical significance. Broadly, though, the theorised effects of both dual 
earner and general family support policy on labour market activity find at least some 
empirical support whether studies look at differences between countries or at within-
country changes in provision over time (see chapter 2.3 for more detail). 
 
This chapter examines whether associations between changes in family policy and gender 
equality in labour market activity hold across the twenty sample countries and years 
1985-2010. More specifically, it uses both descriptive and regression techniques to 
explore how the various developments in policy outlined in the previous chapter relate to 
changes in gender differences in both labour market participation and working hours. In 
doing so, it focuses predominately on providing answers to this thesis’ first research 
question – that is, how do within-country changes in family policy relate to within-country 
changes in gender equality in labour market activity? 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section – 5.1 – offers a brief review of the 
data, methods and techniques used in the chapter. As these methods were outlined in 
some depth earlier in chapter 3, this section provides a short reminder only. Section 5.2 
gives a brief overview of cross-sectional or between-country relations between indicators 
of family policy and measures of gender equality in both labour participation and working 
hours. This provides a background for the rest of the chapter, and to some degree also 
allows for the validation of the chosen labour market indicators. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 form 
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the main focus of the chapter, in that each contains descriptive and fixed effects regression 
analyses for one of the two measures used to capture gender equality in labour market 
activity. The gender gap in the labour force participation rate is covered in 5.3, and the 
gap in usual weekly working hours in 5.4. Finally, 5.5 brings together and discusses 
results, and concludes the chapter. 
 
5.1. Data and methods 
 
This chapter examines relations through the analysis of country-level measures of both 
family policy and gender equality in labour market activity. Family policies are captured 
principally through the nine main indicators described earlier in chapter 3.2. For the most 
part these nine policy indicators are used as individual measures in their own right, 
although their three corresponding policy indices are also used at certain points in the 
more descriptive parts of the chapter. Because splitting leave entitlements into several 
indicators of various types may disguise underlying relations with the total length of 
general leave available to mothers, this chapter also uses at various points the alternative 
measures of leave policy outlined earlier in chapter 3.2. Gender differences in labour 
market activity are measured by the gender gap in the labour force participation rate, and 
the gender gap in usual weekly working hours (see chapter 3.3 for details). The former 
offers a measure of headcount activity and reflects the relative extent to which men and 
women participate in the labour market at any level of engagement. The latter captures 
the depth or extent of male and female economic activity once they have managed to find 
employment. The gap in participation rates is measured for two age groups - all men and 
women aged 25-54, and those of ‘prime’ childbearing age between 25-34. Data on working 
hours are unfortunately available for 25-54 year olds only.  
 
Analysis is conducted primarily through fixed effects multiple linear regression. However, 
as discussed in depth earlier in chapter 3.4, regression analysis does suffer from 
drawbacks, particularly with regard to the transparency of results. In an effort to 
overcome at least some of these limitations, this chapter complements its regression 
analyses with fairly detailed accounts of trends and changes in each measure of gender 
equality in economic activity, as well as descriptions of any immediate links with 
developments in policy provision. More specifically, it uses relatively simple methods – 
including tables, charts and bivariate measures of linear association – to outline patterns 
of change and highlight any direct relations prior to the presentation of regression results 
for the labour market indicator under consideration. Of course, descriptive methods also 
have their limits. In this case, the descriptive analyses require some simplification of the 
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data and provide no statistical control for the influence of alternative factors. 
Nevertheless, they provide a valuable initial exploration of possible relations and produce 
a more transparent empirical background for the subsequent regression analyses. 
 
Details of the regression models themselves were outlined in some detail earlier in 
chapter 3.4. It is however worth providing a brief refresher. Each of the indicators of 
labour market activity are examined though their own set of fixed effects regression 
models. In each set the ‘gender gap’ measure is the main dependent variable. However, to 
help illustrate the mechanism behind any emergent relations with gender equality, each 
and every specification is also replicated with the respective individual male and female 
indicators used as dependent variables. The key independent variables across models are 
the main nine individual indicators of family policy, although for reasons touched on 
above certain specifications do use the alternative measures of leave policy. Each model 
also includes several control variables to account for alternative influences on labour 
market activity. Justifications for and details of these controls were given earlier in 
chapter 3.4. 
 
In all cases models use two-way fixed effects – that is, both country and time fixed effects – 
to account for unobserved unit and period heterogeneity. The use of country fixed effects 
also has the upshot of producing estimates based only on within-country variation in the 
dependent and independent variables – in other words, estimated relations are based 
entirely on changes in the included variables with all between-country variation removed 
entirely. All models also include country-specific time trends to de-trend the variables and 
reduce the likelihood of spurious relations. Lastly, all specifications use cluster robust 
standard errors (CRSEs) to correct for non-spherical errors. As the tests shown in 
appendix B.4 (pp. 330-332) suggest that contemporaneous correlation is not generally a 
problem, one-way CRSEs are used to correct for panel heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation only (see appendix B.4 for further discussion of these technical details). 
 
It is worth noting again that this method is similar to that used in much of the existing 
‘over time’ comparative family policy literature – as touched on in chapter 3, all ten ‘over 
time’ studies reviewed earlier in chapter 2.3 use some form of regression analysis and 
seven use fixed effects regression. This similarity aids the comparability of findings. 
However, as also noted in chapter 3, the exact technical specification used here is slightly 
‘harder’ or more conservative than that employed in much of the existing literature, 
particularly with regard to the use of CRSEs. The use of this ‘harder’ specification protects 
against false positives and does in certain instances impact on results – although, 
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generally, not broader inferences – as discussed in more detail later on in section 5.5.  
 
5.2. Cross-sectional associations 
 
Cross-country associations between family policy provision and women’s relative 
economic activity are of course fairly well established (e.g. O’Connor, 1996; Gornick et al, 
1998; Pettit and Hook, 2005, Korpi, 2000; Mischke, 2011; Misra et al, 2012; Korpi et al, 
2013; see chapter 2.3). However, as way of starting the chapter and to provide 
background, it is worth examining briefly how this thesis’ measures of family policy relate 
to gender differences in labour market activity in the cross-section before moving on to 
focus on change. The following uses tables, charts and measures of bivariate linear 
associations – namely, Pearson’s R correlation – to outline cross-sectional relations in the 
year 1998, a mid-point in the series, starting first with links between policy provision and 
the gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-54 year olds).   
 
Gender gap in the labour force participation rate 
 
As is well known, gender differences in labour participation differ considerably across 
countries. Figure 5.1 shows the gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-54 
year olds), by country and for the year 1998.  
 
The figure shows substantial variation in the gender gap in 1998. Differences between 
male and female participation rates range from as high as around 35 percentage points in 
Greece and Luxembourg to as low as 5 percentage points in Sweden, with most countries 
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Figure 5.1. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-54 year olds) 
1998 
156 
 
 
registering a gender gap of somewhere between 10 and 30 percentage points. Gaps are 
generally largest in the Southern European countries – plus Luxembourg – and are 
smallest in the four Scandinavia states, while the liberal and particularly conservative-
type countries tend to perform more moderately. This pattern of cross-country variation 
is familiar of course, but differences are striking nonetheless. 
 
Table 5.1 shows how these variations relate to cross-country differences in the provision 
of family policy. It contains a series of Pearson’s R correlation coefficients between the 
three policy indices and nine individual indicators of family policy, and the two measures 
of gender differences in labour market activity used in this chapter, with all data for 
199878. Correlations with the gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-54 year 
olds) are shown in column A, while those for the gender gap in usual weekly working 
hours – discussed in the next subsection – are in column B.  
 
Associations between family policy provision and the gender gap in the labour force 
participation rate are mostly but not fully in-line with expectations. Column A shows that 
the gender gap is negatively correlated with both dual earner policy indices or, put 
differently, that gender differences in market participation are smaller in countries that 
provide more extensive sets of dual earner policy. This is as expected, particularly given 
that the countries with the smallest observed gender gaps – the four Scandinavian states – 
were also found in chapter 4 to be amongst the most generous providers of dual earner 
policy. That said, the correlation with the dual earner-carer leave policy index is only 
weak, mostly on account of inconsistent relations between the gender gap and the three 
individual dual earner-carer leave component indicators – while both father-specific leave 
and gender-neutral earnings-related parental leave share the expected negative relation 
with gender differences in labour participation, the association for mother-specific 
earnings-related leave is positive and large. Nonetheless, the broader inference remains 
that the provision of dual earner policy is associated with decreased gender differences in 
labour participation.  
 
 
 
                                                        
78 Relations do differ slightly if different years are used. 1998 is chosen here as it is a mid-point in 
the overall series. Unfortunately there is not enough space to present or discuss cross-sectional 
correlations for other years.  
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Cross-sectional associations between the gender gap and general family support policy 
are, however, less consistent with expectations. More specifically, column A suggests that 
the provision of general family support is generally unrelated to gender differences in 
labour participation. There is a weak positive correlation between the gender gap and tax 
support for the nuclear family, but no association between the gap and either the 
generosity of child benefit transfers or the length of flat-rate parental and childcare leave. 
This is of course inconsistent with existing studies, where results suggest that gender 
differences in participation rates tend to be higher in countries that are more generous 
providers of general family support-type policies (e.g. Korpi, 2000; Mischke, 2011; Korpi 
et al, 2013). It is though driven in large part by the exceptionally large gender gaps in the 
Southern European countries, which as noted in chapter 4 tend to be very low providers 
of general family support policy.     
 
 
 
-0.20 -0.63 **
Mother-specific earnings-related  leave, in effective weeks 0.47 * -0.44 ^
Father-specific leave, in effective weeks -0.43 ^ -0.37
Gender-neutral earnings-related  parental leave, in effective weeks -0.57 ** -0.34
-0.42 ^ -0.37
Proportion of children under three years of age in publicly supported child 
care
-0.62 ** -0.47 *
Proportion of children between three and six years of age in publicly run pre-
primary education or in primary school
0.19 -0.06
Public expenditure on childcare services per child aged under six -0.50 * -0.28
0.02 -0.13
Child benefit per month for two chlldren, as a proportion of average 
earnings
-0.06 -0.14
Tax subsidy for the family 0.16 0.07
Flat-rate parental leave and childcare leave available to mothers, in effective 
weeks
-0.06 -0.28
20 18
a. Canada and the United States are missing
A
Gender gap in the 
labour force 
participation rate (25-
54 year olds)
B
Gender gap in usual 
weekly working hours 
(25-54 year olds)a
Note: * = p<0.05 ** = p<0.01 *** = p<0.001. ^ = p<0.1
Dual earner-carer leave policy index
Dual earner childcare policy index
General family support policy index
Table 5.1. Correlations between measures of family policy and indicators of gender equality in labour market 
activity, 1998
Pearson's R correlation coefficients
158 
 
 
Gender gap in usual weekly working hours 
 
Similar to the gender gap in labour participation, gender differences in working hours 
show considerable variation across countries. Figure 5.2 shows the gender gap in average 
usual weekly working hours (25-54 year olds) for each of the twenty sample countries in 
1998. 
 
The gender gap in weekly working hours ranges from as high as around 14 hours per 
week in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to just over 4 in Finland, with the gap in 
most countries somewhere between 5 and 10 hours per week. Notably, in terms of 
working hours it is the liberal-type states that tend to be the most unequal, mostly on 
account of relatively large gender differences in the likelihood of part-time employment 
(OECD, 2013a). Gender gaps are generally smaller in the Scandinavian states and 
particularly in the Southern European countries, where despite large gender differences in 
participation most employed women tend to work full-time (OECD, 2013a).   
 
Column B in table 5.1 (pg. 157) shows how these variations in gender differences in 
working hours correlate with cross-national differences in family policy. Generally, cross-
sectional associations here tell a fairly similar story to those outlined above for the 
headcount participation rate.  
 
Both dual earner policy indices are again negatively correlated with the gender gap, 
implying that gender differences in working hours are smaller where the provision of dual 
earner policy is higher. Moreover, with the exception of childcare provision for children 
aged three-to-six, associations are negative and at least moderate in strength for all 
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Figure 5.2. Gender gap in usual weekly working hours (25-54 year olds) 
 1998 
Note: Data for Canada and the United States are missing 
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individual indicators within the two dual earner policy areas. The general inference, then, 
is that in 1998 male and female working hours were more equal in countries that were 
more generous providers of dual earner policy.  
 
Again, though, associations with general family support are at least partly inconsistent 
with expectations. In this case, the correlation coefficient on the general family support 
policy index is actually negative, if fairly weak. At first glance at least, this implies that 
countries with more extensive general family support policies tend to see, at least to some 
degree, smaller gender differences working hours. However, figure 5.3 – which plots 
scores on the general family support policy index against the gender gap in weekly 
working hours for 1998 – suggests that any real association is at least a little more 
complicated.         
 
 
 
The negative association between the general family support policy index and the gender 
gap in working hours is driven largely by a cluster of five countries – mostly, the liberal-
type countries – with low provision and very high gender differences in weekly working 
hours. The relation amongst the remaining thirteen countries is actually strong and 
positive (r = 0.58), with the three most generous providers of general family support 
policy – Luxembourg, France and Germany – all holding gender gaps of at least moderate 
size. There is no good reason to exclude the cluster of five countries from the cross-
sectional relation, but the pattern amongst the remaining thirteen countries means that 
any suggestion that general family support provision can promote equality in working 
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Figure 5.3. The general family support policy index and the gender gap in 
usual weekly working hours  
1998, with fit line 
Note: * = p<0.05 ** = p<0.01 *** = p<0.001. ^ = p<0.1. See figure 4.1 for abbreviations 
r = -0.13 
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hours may be just little premature. Rather – just as for the headcount participation rate 
discussed above – the safest inference here is that general family support provision is 
generally unrelated to gender differences in working hours, in the cross-section at least.  
 
Summary 
 
Taking the two sets of associations together, cross-sectional links between family policy 
provision and this thesis’ measures of gender differences in labour market activity are 
partly but not fully consistent with both the theory and existing empirical findings. 
Associations with dual earner policy fit well with expectations – broadly, in 1998 at least, 
male and female patterns of economic activity are more equal in countries that are more 
generous providers of dual earner leave and childcare policies. However, links with 
general family support provision do not match existing findings. The evidence here 
suggests that gender differences in economic activity share no real cross-sectional 
association with levels of general family support– again, in 1998 at least – and there 
certainly is no indication here that general family support policies lead to inflated 
inequalities in labour market activity. It is against this partially familiar background that 
the following two sections explore relations between changes in policy and gender 
equality in labour market activity. 
 
5.3. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate 
 
Closing gender differences in labour participation is central to the attainment of gender 
equality in employment generally. Disproportionate inactivity amongst women carries its 
own ‘economic risks and psychic costs for women’ (Pettit and Hook, 2009: 19), but also 
contributes to inequalities in market attainment by reducing female experience and skills 
and indeed to wider gender inequalities by strengthening gender norms and reinforcing 
female financial dependence (Young et al, 1994; Pettit and Hook, 2009: 19). Accordingly, 
links between family policy and gender differences in labour participation have received 
much attention in comparative family policy research, and indeed form the primary focus 
of much of the emerging ‘over time’ comparative family policy literature (see chapter 2.3 
for a detailed review). This section adds to this literature by examining how changes in 
this thesis’ measures of family policy relate to changes in the gender gap in the labour 
force participation rate. It begins with a description of trends and developments in the 
gender gap and an overview of simple relations with changes in policy provision, before 
moving on to present the results from fixed effects regression models. It should be noted 
that because space is limited, the former concentrates on the gap in participation rates 
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amongst 25-54 year olds only. The regression analyses, however, cover gender differences 
amongst both 25-54 year olds and the more specific 25-34 year old age group.  
 
Description of trends and changes in the gender gap in the labour force participation rate 
(25-54 year olds), and links with changes in family policy 
 
On average across countries, the years following 1985 see a sharp and sustained shift 
towards gender equality in headcount participation. Figure 5.4 plots the cross-country 
unweighted average gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-54 year olds) for 
the twenty sample countries over the years 1985-2010, alongside the unweighted average 
male and female participation rates.  
 
 
 
The average difference between the male and female rates falls dramatically over the 
series, from just under 33 percentage points in 1985 to just over 12.5 percentage points in 
2010. For the most part, this decrease can be attributed to gains in female activity, rather 
than a reduction in the equivalent male rate. On average across the twenty countries 
covered, the male participation rate decreases only very slightly from 94.2% at the start of 
the series to 91.9% at the end. Female activity rates, in contrast, experience steady 
growth. In 1985 the cross-country average stood at just under 61.2%. By 2010, this had 
increased to 79.4%. 
 
Such decreases in the gender gap are observed across all of the twenty sample countries, 
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albeit to varying degrees of course. Table 5.2 ranks countries in ascending order by the 
degree of change in the gender gap in the labour force participation rate between 1985 
and 2010. To illustrate any crude links with changes in policy provision, it also 
summarises change on the indicators of family policy over the equivalent period and 
contains descriptive statistics and measures of linear association.  
 
Shifts towards equal participation are most pronounced in Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg – in all four, the gender gap falls by over 30 percentage points across the 
series. A majority of countries see more moderate but still considerable reductions in 
gender differences in labour participation. Only Denmark, Finland and Sweden show little 
or no movement towards equality – these three are the only countries to see a decrease in 
the gender gap of less than ten percentage points, with the changes in Finland and Sweden 
only nominal. Generally, though, the pattern is for considerable gains in equality in labour 
participation across most of the countries examined.  
 
These widespread decreases in gender differences are broadly in-line with expectations, 
given the general increase in dual earner policy provision observed in chapter 4. Put 
differently, consistent with the theory, almost all of the sample countries couple an 
increase in dual earner policy provision with a decrease in gender differences in labour 
participation over the years 1985-2010. That said, both theory and existing evidence 
would also suggest that the degree of growth in equality should at least roughly 
correspond to the magnitude of change in policy or, in other words, that countries with 
larger changes in policy should see larger gains in equality. The correlation coefficients 
shown at the bottom of table 5.2 – which capture linear associations between the size of 
changes in policy and in the gender gap – suggest that this may not strictly be the case. 
 
Changes in the gender gap in the labour force participation rate are negatively correlated 
with changes in both dual earner policy indices, indicating that, to some degree, countries 
with larger expansions in dual earner policy also tend to be those with larger decreases in 
the gender gap. However, in both cases relations are surprisingly weak and inconsistent. 
Several countries – Ireland, Spain, and Belgium, for example – combine large gains in 
equality with only small increases in dual earner-carer leave provision. A number of 
others twin large increases in one or both of the dual earner policy indices with only 
moderate or small reductions in the gender gap – particularly Norway, but also Germany, 
Denmark and Sweden. The general inference with regard to dual earner policy, then, is 
that a large expansion in dual earner provision is not a necessary or sufficient condition 
for a large decrease in the gender gap in the labour force participation rate.  
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Notably, table 5.2 also shows a negative correlation between changes in the gender gap 
and changes in the general family support index. This of course stands in contrast to the 
theorised effect of general family support provision, which is that increased provision 
should inflate gender differences in labour participation (Korpi, 2000; Korpi et al, 2013). 
Moreover, although still fairly weak, the negative association here is actually slightly 
stronger and more consistent than that seen on the two dual earner policy indices. Indeed, 
of the nine countries with the largest decreases in the gender gap over the series, eight 
increased general family support provision, while those that cut back on provision 
generally see only moderate or small gains in equality. It is difficult to explain this negative 
relation using the theory – indeed, it remains more than possible that the association is 
spurious, particularly given its size – but these initial results certainly provide no evidence 
to suggest that increases in general family support damage equality in headcount activity. 
 
The suggestion from table 5.2 then, is that changes in family policies are only loosely 
related to developments in gender differences in labour participation. This is a little 
striking given the strength of the theory and in particular the existing empirical literature, 
but initial findings here provide only weak evidence of the well-established links between 
family policy and gender equality in labour market activity. That said, there are a couple of 
possible complicating factors that may mask clearer underlying relations between changes 
in policy and equality in market activity.  
 
With regard to leave policies, and as discussed earlier in chapter 3, it is possible that the 
use of several indicators that reflect various leave ‘types’ could obscure or disguise links 
between activity and leave in general. The final column in table 5.2 shows results for 
changes in total effective weeks of maternity and parental leave available to mothers, an 
indicator similar to that used in much of the literature (e.g. Ruhm, 1998; Nieuwenhuis et 
al, 2012; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon, 2013; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). 
The correlation here is negative and moderate, suggesting that shifts towards equal labour 
participation are greater in those countries with larger extensions in total leave for 
mothers. However, the relation is driven in large part by the experience of Luxembourg – 
when removed, the correlation with the gender gap remains negative but falls to r = -0.17.  
 
It is also possible that relations could be distorted by outliers. For example, it is noticeable 
from table 5.2 that the Scandinavian countries – with the partial exception of Norway – 
are slight anomalies with regards to patterns and trends in the gender gap in the labour 
force participation rate. These countries see little or no gains in equality in activity over 
the series, but notably were already fairly equal at the start of the period in 1985 – indeed, 
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at 6.7 and 6.4 percentage points, respectively, the gender gaps in Finland and Sweden 
were smaller in 1985 than in any other non-Scandinavian country over the period as a 
whole (see table C.15 in appendix C (pg. 356). Thus, the absence of progress towards 
equality in these countries may perhaps be the result of a lack of scope for growth towards 
parity in crude activity. In any case, given that all have seen expansions in dual earner 
policy of at least reasonable size, the atypical pattern of change generally observed in the 
four Scandinavian countries may help explain why the relations seen in table 5.2 appear 
weak at best.  
 
Excluding the Scandinavian countries from table 5.2 does produce stronger associations 
between changes in dual earner policy and gender differences in labour participation. The 
difference for dual earner-carer leave policy is fairly small – when the Scandinavian 
countries are omitted, the association between changes in the gender gap and the dual 
earner-carer leave policy index increases slightly in strength but remains moderate at r = -
0.2679. However, the difference for relations with dual earner childcare policy is 
substantial. This is illustrated by figure 5.5, which plots change in the gender gap in the 
labour force participation rates between 1985 and 2010 against change in the dual earner 
childcare policy index. The four Scandinavian countries are shaded in light grey and the 
sixteen remaining non-Scandinavian countries in dark grey, with separate fit lines for each 
group. 
 
 
                                                        
79 For reference, when the Scandinavian countries are removed relations for the three component 
indicators stand at r = -0.43 for mother-specific leave, r = -0.36 for father-specific leave, and notably 
r = 0.38 for gender-neutral earnings related leave 
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The figure shows a clear strong and negative correlation (r = -0.71) between change in the 
gender gap and change in the dual earner childcare policy index amongst the non-
Scandinavian countries80. Interestingly, there is also an extremely strong and negative 
correlation (r = -0.97) amongst the Scandinavian countries themselves. Removing the 
Scandinavian countries from the remaining sample is clearly not ideal – although 
relatively close, participation rates in Scandinavia have not yet reached equality so any 
distorting effects on relations cannot be explained away entirely. Nonetheless, when the 
Scandinavian countries are treated separately from the remaining countries, there is at 
least some evidence to suggest that countries with larger increases in dual earner 
provision also see larger decreases in gender differences in headcount participation.  
 
Fixed effects regression analysis for the gender gap in the labour force participation rate 
(25-54 year olds, and 25-34 year olds) 
 
The fairly simple descriptive associations above then, suggest that links between changes 
in policy and gender differences in labour participation are either fairly weak or are 
conditional on the sample used. Table 5.3 builds on these initial findings by summarising 
results from fixed effects regression models for changes in the gender gap in the labour 
force participation rate for men and women aged 25-54. It contains two sets of models, 
each of which consist of three identical specifications with the gender gap and the 
individual male and female labour force participation rates as dependent variables. 
Specifications A-C are the main fixed effects models. They use all nine of the main family 
policy indicators, plus five control variables. Specifications D-F are similar but contain an 
additional set of interaction terms between the six dual earner policies indicators and a 
‘Scandinavia’ dummy, for reasons explained a little later on. 
 
Results from the main specifications in A-C show strikingly few clear relations between 
changes in family policy provision and the gender gap in the labour force participation 
rate. There is a negative and significant association between changes in the gender gap 
and the proportion of children aged between 0 and 3 in publicly funded childcare, 
indicating that an expansion in public provision for very young children may promote 
equality in activity. Likewise, there is also some suggestion of a negative relation between 
gender differences in participation and public childcare services for slightly older children.  
                                                        
80 Correlations with the three component indicators stand at r = -0.33 for provision for under 
threes, r = -0.15 for public expenditure on childcare services, and most strikingly r = -0.77 for public 
provision for older children.  
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This latter association is however significant only at the more lenient 10% level, and in 
any case the coefficient is only very small – the estimated effect of a 49 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of 3-6 year olds in public pre-primary education or school, the 
largest observed over the series, is a decrease in the gender gap of just 0.8 percentage 
points, all else equal. Thus, even if a p-value of less than 0.10 is considered statistically 
significant, the substantive impact of changes in public provision for older children is 
limited at best81.  
 
Elsewhere however, estimated coefficients on all other variables are generally small and 
in all cases far from statistical significance. There is no indication here then, that an 
expansion in general family support policy leads to inflated gender differences in market 
participation. Perhaps more surprisingly, there is also little to suggest that increases or 
extensions to the various dual earner-carer leave policies promote women’s relative 
economic activity. Indeed, the general inference from specifications A-C is that, aside from 
the effects of childcare provision for children under three, changes in family policy appear 
mostly unrelated to changes in the gender gap in the labour force participation rate.   
 
That said, there may again be a few complicating factors that obscure or disguise relations 
between changes in policy and economic activity. Firstly, as highlighted in the descriptive 
analysis above, it is possible that associations with dual earner provisions may be 
distorted somewhat by the experience of the Scandinavian countries. Specifications D-F in 
table 5.3 explore further through the inclusion of a set of interaction terms between the 
six dual earner policy indicators and a dummy variable82 representing the Scandinavian 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). This has the effect of giving separate 
slopes on each dual earner indicator to the Scandinavian countries, with the ‘main effect’ 
on the original indicators reflecting relations within the remaining sixteen countries only. 
 
The inclusion of the interaction terms makes little difference to results. Most of the 
interaction terms themselves are not significant, indicating that relations within the 
Scandinavian countries are no different to those in the remaining sixteen. The only 
exception is the interaction on gender-neutral earnings-related parental leave, which is 
negative and significant at the 5% level83. It would be premature to make firm inferences 
                                                        
81 Furthermore, the sensitivity analyses in appendix F (pp. 413-417) show that the relation falls out 
of significance altogether if cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed from the model.  
82 The Scandinavian dummy itself is dropped from all models as it is ‘averaged-out’ by the country 
fixed effects.   
83 This interaction remains statistically significant if values on the Scandinavia dummy are reversed 
so that the values for the Scandinavian are used as the ‘main effect’. In other words, the relation 
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based on this coefficient alone given that the sample size for the interaction is only four 
countries, but this result perhaps provides some suggestion that changes in this particular 
dual earner-carer leave policy can promote equality in activity if only within the context of 
the Scandinavian countries. More importantly, though, the ‘main effects’ on each of the six 
dual earner policy indicators – that is, the estimates of relations across the remaining 
sixteen non-Scandinavian countries – are almost identical to those seen in models A-C. In 
other words, with or without the four Scandinavian countries, the only statistically 
significant relation remains that on childcare provision for children under three84.  
 
Secondly, as pointed out in the previous section and as discussed in some depth in chapter 
3, it is possible that splitting leave provisions into several indicators based on Korpi’s 
(2000) theoretical types obscures some underlying relation with general leave. Table 5.4 
(overleaf) presents results from models that use the alternative set of leave indicators 
outlined earlier in chapter 3. More specifically, models A-C are similar to the main models 
(A-C) shown in table 5.3 but with ‘total maternity and parental leave available to mothers’ 
and ‘childcare leave’ substituted in for the indicators of mother-specific earnings-related 
leave, gender-neutral earnings-related parental leave and flat-rate parental and childcare 
leave. D-F, meanwhile, go a little further by adding a squared term on total maternity and 
parental leave available to mothers in order to capture any exponential or – more likely – 
diminishing effects from changes in total general leave.  
 
Using this alternative measure of total general leave again makes little real difference to 
results. Model A does show a negative relation on total maternity and parental leave 
available to mothers that is significant at the more lenient 10% level, hinting perhaps that 
increases in the length of general leave on offer to mothers can promote equal 
participation. However, the coefficient here is only very small – the estimated effect of a 24 
week extension to effective weeks of total maternity and parental leave, the largest 
observed in the sample, is a decrease in the gender gap of just 1.1 percentage points. 
Moreover, model D shows that the relation on total leave falls away from significance  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
between gender-neutral earnings-related leave and the gender gap in the labour force participation 
rate for the Scandinavian countries only is statistically significant in its own right.  
84 That said, the sensitivity analyses shown in Appendix F (pp. 413-417) suggest that when cases 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed from the model, the positive coefficient on public 
expenditure on childcare services moves into significance at the 5% level. This is curious and 
difficult to explain using the theory, in that is suggests that an increase in public spending on 
childcare increases the gender gap in participation. It is possible though, that causation runs in the 
opposite direction, with an increase in childcare expenditure a response to little or no growth in 
female economic activity.  
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completely once the squared term is added to the specification85. Thus, evidence from 
table 5.4 on any link between changes in total leave and gender differences in labour 
participation should be considered only very weak at best.   
 
Lastly, given that many – although not all86 – of the family policies covered here are 
designed to be used either around childbirth or by the parents of very young children, it is 
possible that the effects of changes in certain provisions will be stronger or clearer when 
looking specifically at men and women of ‘prime’ childbearing age. Table 5.5 (overleaf) 
shows results from two sets of models that use participation rates for men and women 
aged 25-34 only as the dependent variables. Specifications A-C are similar to models A-C 
in table 5.3, in that they use the main nine indicators of family policy as the key 
independent variables. D-F use the alternative measures of leave, plus a squared term on 
total general maternity and parental leave available to mothers. 
 
Results here are slightly more consistent with expectations, at least with regard to leave 
policies. Starting with the second set of models, estimates in model D show a sizeable if 
slightly curvilinear relation on changes in total general maternity and parental leave 
available to mothers. The coefficient on the main term is large and negative and that on 
the squared term positive but very small, with both individually significant – at the 10% 
level at least – and the two highly jointly significant with a p-value less than 0.01. The 
inference then, is that increases in general leave are associated with decreases in gender 
differences in participation amongst 25-34 year olds, albeit with marginal effects that 
diminish slightly with the length of the change in leave.  
 
Results from model A also show that leave entitlements may help close gender gaps in 
market participation. Notably, though, estimates here suggest that effects are not uniform 
across the various types of leave on offer. There is a large, negative and significant 
association between changes in the gender gap and mother-specific earnings-related leave 
– which, for the most part, means maternity leave – and some admittedly weaker  
                                                        
85 It should be noted here that when testing the significance of the coefficients on total maternity 
and parental leave and its square, the important test is the joint F-test shown at the bottom of the 
table. The joint F-test tests the null that ‘total maternity and parental leave available to mothers’ 
and ‘(total maternity and parental leave available to mothers)2’ are jointly equal to zero, that is, that 
together both total leave and its square have no effect on the dependent variable. This is important 
for two reasons. Firstly, total leave and its square are highly correlated, so it is likely that each will 
have inflated individual standard errors and therefore deflated individual t-statistics (Stock and 
Watson, 2009: 209). Secondly, substantively the two are the same variable, so what matters most is 
knowing whether, when taken together, the two have an effect that is statistically different from 
zero. 
86 As noted earlier in chapter 3.3, several policies – particularly child benefit and tax support for the 
family – may continue to affect parents’ labour supply decisions long after childbirth.      
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indication of similar relation on gender-neutral earnings-related leave. In contrast, the 
estimated effect of changes in flat-rate parental and childcare leave is effectively zero. The 
latter association is notable in itself, in as much as it suggest that these ‘general family 
support’ flat-rate leaves at least do no harm to female economic activity. However, when 
the three estimates are compared the more striking inference is that the association 
between general leave and economic activity noted above appears driven entirely by dual 
earner-carer-type leave entitlements. In other words, results here support the argument 
made by Korpi (2010) and others (Ferrarini, 2006; Mischke, 2011; Korpi et al, 2013) that 
the structure and design of leave entitlements may have a meaningful impact on the extent 
to which they promote female market participation.   
 
Finally, results across models in table 5.5 continue to suggest that changes in public 
childcare for children aged less than three can promote relative female participation. All 
other estimates, however, remain small and far from statistical significance87. The absence 
of any clear association on either child benefit or tax support for the family is particularly 
notable though – when combined with results elsewhere, the broader message is that 
changes in general family support policy in general appear to do no damage to gender 
differences in participation. 
 
Summary 
 
Findings from this section produce mixed support for the theorised effects of family policy 
on gender equality in employment. Results from across the various analyses provide no 
evidence to suggest that general family support provisions constrain female activity or 
inflate gender differences in labour participation. However, there is consistent indication 
that expanding public childcare services for children under three promotes female market 
activity, and also some suggestion that increasing or extending leave entitlements for 
mothers – both in general and particularly when designed so as to encourage dual earning 
– can help close gender gaps in labour force participation rates. 
 
It is worth noting again that the associations on leave emerge only once measures 
concentrate on participation amongst men and women aged 25-34. Indeed, results from 
both the initial descriptive analysis and from the regression models suggest that links 
                                                        
87 The sensitivity analyses shown in Appendix F (pp. 413-417) suggest that the positive coefficient 
on public childcare for 3-6 year olds does move into significance at the 10% level if cases imputed 
using LVCB/NVCF are removed from the model. The coefficient, however, remains tiny, so any 
substantive effect of a change in the provision of public services for 3-6 year olds remains 
effectively nil.  
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between leave and the gap in participation rates amongst the broader 25-54 year old age 
group are weak at best. There is nothing here that strictly conflicts with the theory – far 
from it, it makes theoretical sense for the effects of leave entitlements to be stronger and 
clearer amongst men and women of ‘prime’ childbearing age as these are the group most 
likely to make use of leaves programmes. However, given the strength of existing ‘over 
time’ evidence on associations between leave and economic activity – much of which relies 
entirely on data for broader age groups (Jaumotte, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006; Nieuwenhuis et 
al, 2012; Thévenon, 2013; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013) – it is a little surprising that links 
were not clearer for activity amongst 25-54 year olds. There may be technical or 
methodological reasons for the differences in results, as discussed later in section 5.5. For 
now though, the general inference from this section remains that expanding dual earner 
leave and childcare provision can encourage equal participation, while general family 
support policies appear to do little harm to female economic activity.      
 
5.4. Gender gap in usual weekly working hours 
 
While the effects of family policy on the headcount participation rate receives much of the 
attention in the literature, any influence on the extent of male and female economic 
activity in terms of working hours remains important. A limited number of ‘over time’ 
comparative studies do extend their analyses to include the influence of family policy on 
gender equality in working hours (Jaumotte, 2003; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; 
Thévenon, 2013; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). Generally, results in the literature are similar 
to those for the headcount activity. Akgunduz and Plantenga (2012) and Thévenon and 
Solaz (2013) find that increases in leave entitlements can reduce gender differences in 
working hours, while others (Jaumotte, 2003; Thévenon, 2013) find that changes in 
childcare coverage promote, and tax and transfers policies reduce, female full-time 
employment. The following turns attention to relations between changes in family policy 
and the gender gap in usual weekly working hours (25-54 year olds), again starting first 
with a description of trends and developments in equality in working hours.  
 
Description of trends and changes in the gender gap in usual weekly working hours, and links 
with changes in family policy 
 
Changes in equality in weekly working hours are fairly mild compared to the sharp trends 
observed in the previous section for gender difference in headline activity, on average 
across countries at least. Figure 5.6 plots the cross-country unweighted average gender 
gap in usual weekly working hours for the twenty sample countries over the years 1985- 
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2010, alongside unweighted average male and female weekly working hours on the 
secondary y-axis. 
 
Similar to the gender gap in the labour force participation rate, the average difference 
between male and female working hours declines over the series. The decrease is only 
slight, though, from just over nine hours in 1985 to around seven and a half in 2010. 
Notably, much of the drop can be attributed to a decrease in average male working hours, 
which fall from 43 hours per week at the beginning of the series to just over 41 at the end. 
Female hours are comparatively stable, changing by just over half an hour between 1985 
and 2010, although the drop is larger if the deviation from trend in 1985 is discounted –
between 1986 and 2010, average female working hours fall from just over 35 hours per 
week to just under 34. Nonetheless, on average across countries, equality in the depth of 
economic activity for those in employment changes only marginally between 1985 and 
2010.  
 
These fairly modest average trends do however mask diverse changes in working hours 
across countries. Table 5.6 (overleaf) ranks countries in ascending order by the degree of 
change in the gender gap in weekly working hours between the years 1985 and 2010. It 
also shows the gender gap at the beginning and end of the period for context, summarises 
change on the indicators of family policy over the equivalent period, and contains 
descriptive statistics. 
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Figure 5.6. Cross-country unweighted average gender gap in usual weekly 
working hours (25-54 year olds), 1985-2010 
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The gender gap in weekly hours falls, to varying extents, in nine of the 18 countries for 
which data are available. Decreases are particularly large in the United Kingdom and 
Denmark, both of which see the gap fall by over five hours per week. In nine other 
countries, however, the gap either remains constant or increases. Most notable are the 
expansions in Germany, Italy and especially Austria, where the gender gap grows by just 
over four and a half hours per week.  
 
Figure 5.7 explores the drivers behind these differential shifts in the gender gap. It shows 
change between the beginning and end of the series in both male and female average 
weekly working hours by country. Countries are sorted in ascending order according to 
change in the gender gap in weekly working hours.  
 
 
 
Male weekly working hours fall, to varying extents, in all but one of the 18 countries over 
the series. In most of those countries that see a decrease in the gender gap, the fall in male 
hours is coupled with an increase in female average weekly working hours – in other 
words, both male and female hours shift towards a more equal middle ground. In contrast, 
in those countries that see an increase in the gender gap, female weekly working hours 
decrease over the series and by more than the equivalent decrease for men88.  
                                                        
88 It is worth noting that the effects of the financial crisis make little difference to these patterns of 
development. If hours in 2007 are used in place of 2010, country rankings remain identical while 
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Figure 5.7. Change in male and female usual weekly working hours between 
1985 and 2010  
Countries ranked in ascending order by change in the gender gap in weekly working hours 
Change in male average weekly working hours (1985-2010)
Change in female average weekly working hours (1985-2010)
ᵃ Austria, 1995-2010; Finland, 1995-2010, Germany, 1991-2010; New Zealand, 1986-2010; Norway, 1995-2010; Portugal, 
1986-2010; Spain, 1987-2010, Sweden, 1995-2010. Canada and the United States are missing entirely. 
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It is noticeable from figure 5.7 that many of those countries that see a decrease in female 
weekly hours over the series are also those that saw large decreases in the gender gap in 
headcount participation earlier in section 5.3. Belgium, Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg, 
for example, all twin substantial gains in equality in crude activity with a decrease in 
female working hours. Likewise, many of those that see female hours increase – such as 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand, and particularly Denmark and Sweden – also saw 
lesser gains in equality in headcount activity earlier in 5.3. Indeed, changes in average 
female weekly working hours are negatively correlated with changes in female activity 
rates more generally (r = -0.62). To some degree then, gains in female participation appear 
to be at least slightly offset by decreases in the average hours worked by female 
employees – in other words, there appears some ‘trade off’ whereby average female 
working hours fall in countries that have seen large gains in female market participation.  
 
It is not easy to isolate the drivers of such an activity ‘trade off’ with the aggregate data 
used here. It is possible that many of those women that are entering the market and 
driving down gender gaps in headcount activity also wish to work only part-time, 
simultaneously inflating the gender gap in working hours. It is also possible though, that 
many newly encouraged women want to work full-time but are unable to find appropriate 
employment. The latter is supported to some degree by figure 5.8, which plots changes in 
female employment rates between 1985 and 2010 against changes in the proportion of 
employed women that are in involuntary part-time employment. ‘Involuntary’ here is 
defined as those who are in part-time employment because they ‘could not find a full-time 
job’ (OECD, 2013f).  
 
Despite a few outliers – particularly Italy, Norway and the Netherlands – the correlation 
between changes in the two rates is moderate and positive (r = .29), that is, those 
countries that have seen the largest (smallest) increases in female employment between 
1985 and 2010 also tend to be those with larger increases (decreases) in the proportion of 
employed women in involuntary part-time employment. Put differently, in countries 
where large numbers of women have entered the labour force, an increasing number of 
employed women have found themselves working shorter hours only because they could 
not find a full-time job. The inference then, is that labour markets struggle to fully 
accommodate newly mobilised female labour in cases where increases in female 
participation are large. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
decreases in male weekly hours are observed in almost all countries. Changes in female hours 
continue to vary across countries, and in a manner similar to that seen in figure 5.7. 
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Against this fairly complex ‘trade-off’ background, it is not entirely surprising that changes 
in the gender gap in weekly working hours are mostly only weakly related to changes in 
family policy provision. This is shown by the correlation coefficients at the bottom of table 
5.6 (pg. 176). The dual earner childcare policy index does share a moderate and negative 
relation with changes in the gender gap in weekly working hours. This overall association 
is though driven almost entirely by a strong and negative correlation between change in 
public expenditure on childcare services and the gender gap in working hours – in other 
words, those countries with larger (smaller) increases in childcare spending over the 
period are more likely to see decreases (increases) in gender differences in weekly 
working hours. On its own, this relation makes theoretical sense. However, it is notable 
that associations with the remaining two childcare indicators are only weak, particularly 
in the case of provision for children under three.  
 
Elsewhere, changes in the dual earner-carer leave policy index share only a weak and in 
fact positive relation with changes in gender differences in working hours. Likewise, there 
is also a weak and positive association between changes in the gender gap and the general 
family support policy index. Tax support for the family does share a moderate and positive 
correlation with the gender gap, implying that countries with increases (decreases) in 
family tax subsidies are more likely to see increases (decreases) in the gender gap in 
weekly working hours. This would make some theoretical sense, if increases in household 
net incomes cause a decrease in the number of hours preferred by female second earners. 
However, correlations for the other two component general family support indicators are 
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Figure 5.8. Change in the female employment rate and change in female 
involuntary part-time employment, 1985-2010 
With fit line 
Source: OECD (2013a) 
Note: * = p<0.05 ** = p<0.01 *** = p<0.001. ^ = p<0.1. See figure 4.1 for abbreviations 
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r = 0.29 
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only nominal. 
 
Fixed effects regression analysis for the gender gap in weekly working hours 
 
Table 5.7 summarises the results of two sets of fixed effects models for the gender gap in 
usual weekly working hours. A-C are again the main or standard fixed effects regression 
models. D-F are similar but include the female employment rate as an additional control to 
account for the possible link between female headcount activity and working hours 
highlighted above89. 
 
Notably, the results shown in table 5.7 suggest that changes in family policy are almost 
entirely unrelated to changes in gender differences in working hours. The main 
specification – model A – shows exactly zero significant associations between within-
country changes in family policy provision and the gender gap in weekly working hours, 
even if the significance level is extended to include coefficients with a p-value of less than 
0.10. Furthermore, models B and C show that these overall relations with the gender gap 
are the product of – in all cases – very small and insignificant associations with the 
individual indicators of male and female working hours. In other words, A-C suggest that 
changes in policy provision are not only unrelated to movements in the gender gap, but 
also to changes in working hours more generally. Indeed, more widely, models A-C 
suggest changes in gender differences in working hours are independent of almost all 
included factors including the controls. The only significant factor is the size of the service 
sector, which shares a positive relation with the gender gap on account of a negative 
relation with female hours. 
 
Adding the female employment rate as an additional control makes little difference to 
results. Consistent with the discussion above, model D does show a positive and 
significant coefficient on the female employment rate with the relationship driven mostly 
by a negative association with female working hours. In other words, increasing the 
proportion of women in employment is associated with an inflated gender gap in working 
hours through a decrease in women’s average weekly hours90. However, despite this  
                                                        
89 There is some danger that the female employment rate may be endogenous with working hours, 
as increases in the availability of part-time or shorter-hours employment may induce female 
participation (Thévenon, 2013). Using the female employment rate only in certain specifications 
allows for comparisons between models with and without the additional control and for the 
checking of any possible biasing effects.  
90 As discussed earlier, there are two likely mechanisms behind this: new female entrants to the 
labour market may demand shorter hours, reducing average female hours; and new female 
entrants may struggle to find full-time employment, again reducing average female working hours.     
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association the coefficients on all other included variables remain more or less unchanged 
– in other words, even after controlling for the influence of changes in employment rates, 
there remains little suggestion of any significant association between changes in family 
policy and gender equality in working hours. 
 
As for the gender gap in the labour force participation rate, it is possible that relations 
between changes in leave entitlements and gender differences in working hours may be 
obscured by the use of several indicators of leave based around Korpi’s (2000) theoretical 
policy types. Table 5.8 recreates models D-F from table 5.7 but with leave policies 
measured through the alternative set of leave indicators outlined earlier in chapter 3. 
Models A-C use ‘total maternity and parental leave available to mothers’ and ‘childcare 
leave’ in place of the measures of mother-specific leave, gender-neutral earnings-related 
parental leave and flat-rate parental and childcare leave. D-F add an additional squared 
term on total leave available to mothers.  
 
Using the alternative set of leave policy indicators has little impact on results. Relations in 
models A and D are more or less identical to those in D in table 5.7, with none of the 
coefficients on the family policy indicators significant at either the 5% or 10% level. 
Notably, B-C and E-F do show positive significant relations between both father-specific 
leave and childcare leave and the individual male and female working hours indicators, 
but coefficients are almost exactly equal for both genders with the result no clear 
association with the gender gap. As for the earlier models, then, both A-C and D-F provide 
no clear evidence of any link between changes in family policy provision and gender 
differences in the quantity of hours worked. 
 
Summary 
 
Taken together, results from this section suggest family policies have little or no influence 
over gender differences in average working hours. There is no solid evidence that altering 
dual earner leave and childcare policies can promote equality in weekly working hours, 
and likewise no indication that increasing general family support constrains women’s 
hours and inflates gender differences in working time. It is worth pointing out again that 
the data used here are for 25-54 year olds only – in the last section, clear relations were 
similarly scarce when participation rates were measured for the broader age group. 
However, results continue to conflict with other ‘over time’ studies that also use working 
hours for 25-54 year olds (Jaumotte, 2003; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon,  
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2013; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013) and that find, for example, that leave policies reduce 
gender differences in working hours (Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012) or that the 
provision of childcare promotes female full-time employment (Jaumotte, 2003). As 
touched on at the end of section 5.3, there may be technical reasons for differences in 
results (see the following section). Nonetheless, the major inference here is that changes 
in family policies do not appear important for changes in gender equality in working 
hours.  
 
5.5. Discussion 
 
Chapter 4 showed large and widespread changes in the provision of family policy across 
the twenty sample countries over the years between 1985 and 2010. According to both 
theories of family policy and the existing empirical literature, these developments should 
lead to changes in levels of gender equality in labour market activity (e.g. Ruhm, 1998; 
Korpi, 2000; Jaumotte, 2003; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Ferrarini, 2006; Korpi, 2010; 
Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012; Korpi et al, 2013; Thévenon, 
2013; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). Those countries that have expanded dual earner policy 
should, all else equal, see a shift towards equal participation, mostly through the 
promotion of female activity. These gains may be offset somewhat in those countries that 
have also expanded general family support as these policies may create disincentives for 
second earning. Nevertheless, theory and evidence suggests that all countries should see 
at least some change in the relative level of male and female labour market activity on 
account of developments in policy provision. 
 
At face value, broad trends and developments in gender equality in labour market activity 
are generally consistent with these expectations. Trends shown in sections 5.3 and 5.4 
indicate that all of the twenty sample countries have seen at least some increase in 
equality in economic activity over the years between 1985 and 2010. These widespread 
gains are concentrated mostly on the labour force participation rate, with developments in 
equality in working hours fairly mixed. Nonetheless, decreases in gender differences in 
economic activity appear almost universal over the years examined, albeit to varying 
extents between countries. This of course provides little direct evidence of any damaging 
effect of general support provision. Broadly, though, for most countries the period 1985-
2010 was one in which a general expansion of dual earner policy coincides with 
considerable progress towards gender equality in labour market attainment. 
 
Relations are a little less clear-cut, however, once the size and timing of changes in policy 
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and equality are taken into account. The two descriptive analyses, for instance, suggests 
links between changes in dual earner policy and gender differences in labour market 
activity are either fairly weak or conditional. Put simply, countries with large changes in 
dual earner-carer leave policies do not necessarily see larger gains in equality in labour 
market activity – and, indeed, many of the most substantial gains are observed in 
countries such as Ireland and Spain where changes to leave entitlements are 
comparatively small – while such a relation with changes in dual earner childcare 
provision only becomes evident once the experience of the Scandinavia countries is 
discounted. The descriptive analyses also show that those countries that have expanded 
general family support policy tend to see larger decreases in gender differences in activity, 
an association that runs in contrast to the theorised constraining effect of general family 
support provision. These descriptive analyses are admittedly fairly crude, but offer only 
limited initial support for the theorised effects of family policy on economic activity 
nonetheless.  
 
Results from the more formal regression analyses, meanwhile, are mixed. Consistent with 
findings from the descriptive analysis, estimates suggest that within-country changes in 
family policy are generally unrelated to observed shifts in gender differences in working 
hours. Likewise, with the exception of public childcare for children under three, changes in 
policy also appear largely irrelevant to movements in participation rates amongst the 
broader 25-54 year old age group. Certain policies do though seem to influence gender 
gaps in activity once the regression models concentrate specifically on participation 
amongst men and women aged 25-34. There remains no indication that general family 
support policies damage female activity, but there is evidence to suggest that changes in 
leave entitlements – specifically, dual earner mother-specific and gender-neutral earnings 
related leave policies – can in addition to public childcare for children under three help 
close gender gaps in labour participation rates. In other words, findings provide support 
for the theorised effects of dual earner policy, but only when looking at gender differences 
in headcount activity amongst men and women of ‘prime’ childbearing age.   
 
In broad terms then, overarching inferences from this chapter are not too dissimilar to 
those from many existing ‘over time’ comparative family policy studies (e.g. Winegarden 
and Bracy, 1995; Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 
2012; Thévenon, 2013; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). Findings suggest that, as expected, 
increasing or expanding leave entitlements for mothers and public childcare provisions 
may encourage female economic activity and help close gender gaps in labour 
participation. On a couple of occasions, results from this chapter are able to add a little 
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extra detail to established conclusions. For example, a particularly notable finding from 
section 5.3 was that the positive effects of general leave on female activity appear driven 
solely by changes in dual earner-type entitlements. This fits well with the theory (Korpi, 
2000; Korpi, 2010; Korpi et al, 2013) of course, but is relatively novel since existing 
comparative family policy studies that use Korpi’s distinction between ‘dual earner’ and 
‘general family support’-type leaves measure both only within broader composite policy 
indices (Korpi 2000, Ferrarini, 2006, Mischke, 2011, Korpi et al, 2013). Broadly speaking 
though, the general conclusion remains that leave and childcare policies represent 
important tools for the promotion of gender equality in economic activity.  
 
Yet, it is noticeable that results from this chapter are considerably less conclusive than 
those from much of the literature. Of particular note is the almost complete absence here 
of clear and significant associations between changes in leave and childcare policies and 
gender differences in economic activity – in terms of both market participation and 
working hours – when looking at the broader 25-54 year old age group. To reiterate, it is 
not particularly surprising that links with leave and childcare provisions should be 
stronger and clearer when looking at activity amongst men and women of ‘prime’ 
childbearing age. This makes sense in terms of the theory (see chapter 3.3), and is 
consistent with existing evidence – both Ruhm (1998) and Akgunduz and Plantenga 
(2012), for example, also find that the effects of changes in leave are concentrated mostly 
on women aged 25-34. However, as noted earlier, most other ‘over time’ family policy 
studies use data for a broader age group – either in combination with a younger and more 
specific cohort (e.g. Ruhm, 1998; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012) or in several cases 
exclusively (e.g. Jaumotte, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012; see table A.1 in 
appendix A (pp. 314-316)) – and continue to find statistically significant associations 
between policy and economic activity. Jaumotte (2003), for example, finds that expansions 
in both parental leave programmes and public childcare spending are associated with 
increases in participation rates amongst women aged 25-54. Likewise, Akgunduz and 
Plantenga (2012) find that extending leave entitlements for mothers promotes the 
average working hours of female employees aged 25-54.   
 
It is possible that differences in results are a consequence of decisions around sampling 
and operationalisation. In particular, it is feasible that the specific sample used here – and 
especially the time period selected – restricts the number of clear and significant 
associations. Much of the literature uses an earlier or longer time period91, and as a result 
                                                        
91 Winegarden and Bracy (1995): 1959-1989 (at ten-year intervals); Ruhm (1998): 1969-1993; 
Jaumotte (2003): 1985-1999; Ferrarini (2006): 1970-2000; Akgunduz and Plantenga (2012): 1970-
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capture different within-country variations in policy and labour market outcomes. That 
said, the sample used in this thesis remains relatively lengthy and contains a good deal of 
variation in both family policy provision and in economic activity (see chapter 4 and 
earlier in this chapter). If otherwise established findings are not visible in this study 
purely because of the sample used, it surely brings doubt as to the external validity of 
existing results. 
 
It is also possible though, that there are technical explanations for differences in results. 
As noted earlier in chapter 3, the statistical approach used across the regression models in 
this chapter could be described as fairly ‘conservative’. The use of ‘gender gaps’ as 
dependent variables, for example, demands that policies influence gender differences in 
outcomes and not just female activity alone. A number of other existing ‘over time’ studies 
(e.g. Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Jaumotte, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al, 
2012) use measures that capture female employment outcomes in isolation. This may 
place fewer demands on the data, but also means that these studies risk producing 
misleading findings due to bias from wider determinants of variation in economic activity 
(see chapter 3.3)92.  
 
Likewise, the use of cluster robust standard errors (CRSEs) may reduce the likelihood of 
finding (overly optimistic) statistically significant results by correcting standard errors for 
serially correlated or heteroscedastic residuals (Rogers, 1993; Beck and Katz, 1995: 636; 
Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 312-313; see chapter 3.4 and appendix B.4 (pp. 330-332)). 
Notably, as discussed in chapter 3, many existing ‘over time’ comparative studies do not 
appear to use CRSEs or offer any alternative correction for serial correlation. The 
difference in technical specification may seem only small, but may have non-trivial effects 
on the significance tests on estimated relations. 
 
Tables D.1 and D.2 in appendix D (pg. 378 and pg. 379) illustrate the impact of correcting 
standard errors for serial correlation and panel heteroscedasticity. These alternative 
models are exact replicas of models shown in sections 5.3 and 5.4 for the gender gap in 
participation rates (25-54 year olds) and the gap in weekly working hours (25-54 year 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2010; Thévenon (2013): 1980-2007; Thévenon and Solaz (2013): 1970-2010.   
92 The danger here is well illustrated by results shown earlier in this chapter. Table 5.4 in section 
5.3, for example, shows a positive and significant relation between the female participation rate 
(25-54 year olds) and changes in total maternity and parental leave available to mothers. 
Importantly though, it also shows a similar relation with the equivalent male rate. Accordingly, the 
two produce no clear association with movements in the gender gap in participation rate for 25-54 
year olds, with one possible inference being that both coefficients are biased by some external 
influence on the labour force participation rate for 25-54 year olds more generally.  
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olds) – so, accordingly, the regression coefficients themselves are identical to those shown 
in the earlier tables – but importantly use normal OLS standard errors in place of CRSEs. 
In almost all cases, the OLS standard errors are smaller than the CRSEs used in the models 
shown throughout this chapter. As a result, many more estimates are found to be 
statistically significant. More importantly, perhaps, inferences from these alternative 
models are – in certain cases at least – closer to those from the existing ‘over time’ family 
policy literature. For instance, table D.1 shows negative and significant associations 
between changes in leave and the gender gap in labour force participation rates for 25-54 
year olds. Likewise, table D.2 suggests that both dual earner leave policies and childcare 
provisions for slightly older children may help close gender differences in weekly working 
hours. Yet, the validity of these alternative models is questionable, as it is known from the 
tests shown in appendix B.4 (pp. 330-332) that residuals suffer serial correlation and that 
standard errors should be corrected accordingly. Of course, without direct access to the 
exact data used, it cannot be known whether the models used in other existing studies 
suffer from the same issues. In this case, however, far greater weight should be placed on 
the results presented throughout this chapter that use CRSEs and that, unfortunately, 
show very few significant relations between changes in policy and gender differences in 
activity amongst 25-54 year olds. 
 
There may be good reasons then, for the failure of this chapter to match the literature in 
finding clear and significant associations between changes in policy and gender 
differences in economic activity amongst the broader 25-54 year old age group. These 
differences in findings are important of course, because in at least some cases they add a 
certain level of uncertainty to previously well established conclusions. As noted above, any 
discrepancies do not lead to huge changes in broad inferences around the effects of leave 
and childcare policies on gender difference in labour market participation – findings for 
the younger age groups continue to suggest that these policies may represent useful tools 
for the promotion of gender equality in activity rates. Even so, it remains notable that 
results here suggest few policies have any kind of clear impact on the broader gender gap. 
If nothing else, this implies that family policies may be slightly less effective at closing 
overall gender gaps than the existing literature might suggest, in terms of direct impact at 
least.  
 
More importantly, perhaps, results here do add considerable uncertainty to existing 
conclusions around the effects of family policy on working hours. It should be emphasised 
at this point that the findings presented in this single chapter certainly do not ‘disprove’ 
those from existing studies – there are as touched on above several possible reasons for 
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differences in findings, including the sample and operationalisation. It is also worth 
pointing out again that data on working hours are available only for the 25-54 year old age 
group – it remains possible that links with policy would be stronger or clearer if the 
analysis could concentrate on hours amongst a younger or more specific age group. 
Nonetheless, based on the available information, there is little in this chapter to support 
the suggestion in the literature that changes in leave and childcare policies can reduce 
gender differences in average weekly working hours.  
 
Finally, it should not be forgotten that results from across the chapter – regardless of the 
exact dependent variable or model specification used – provide little support for the 
argument that general family support provisions are likely to damage female labour 
supply (Korpi, 2000; Jaumotte, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006; Korpi, 2010; Nieuwenhuis et al, 
2012; Korpi et al, 2013). Indeed, the broad inference here is that general family support 
policies are generally neutral with respect to gender gaps in economic activity. This is 
important for understandings around gender differences in employment of course, but is 
also noteworthy because these policies often have wider objectives outside of 
employment. More specifically, both child benefit and family-related tax subsidies are 
used in many countries as a central mechanism for the reduction of child poverty (Oxley et 
al, 1999; Pressman, 2011; Gornick and Jäntti, 2012), while flat-rate ‘general family 
support’ leave policies are generally introduced with the intention of assisting families 
with the additional responsibilities associated with dependent children. It remains notable 
in the latter case that these ‘general family support’ leaves seem to do nothing to promote 
female economic activity. Nonetheless, the important point in terms of the theory is that 
changes in general family support policies generally appear to do no harm to female 
economic activity. Accordingly, the suggestion here is that these policies may continue to 
fulfil their wider functions without fear of detrimental side effects on women’s market 
participation.   
 
In summary then, this chapter produces partial support for the theorised effects of leave 
and childcare policies on gender differences in labour market activity. Results are slightly 
less clear-cut than those in much of the literature – perhaps on account of the fairly 
‘conservative’ approach used – and in particular provide no indication that changes in 
policy can influence gender gaps in average working hours. There is also nothing here to 
suggest that changes in general family support provisions damage female labour supply. 
Nonetheless, the overarching conclusion remains that certain leave policies – specifically, 
dual earner-carer-type leaves available to mothers – and public childcare services for 
children aged less than three continue to represent useful and effective instruments for 
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the promotion of gender equality in economic activity.  
 
That said, the positive effects of these certain dual earner leave and childcare policies 
might not come without costs. More specifically, and as discussed earlier in chapter 2, it is 
possible that both policies may inadvertently encourage job segregation and reinforce 
‘glass ceilings’ on women’s careers, with leave entitlements particularly likely to damage 
women’s access to senior positions and top wages. These possible ‘trade off’ effects are 
examined in the next chapter, which concentrates on associations between changes in 
family policy provision and gender job segregation and equality in occupational 
attainment.   
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Chapter 6. Do changes in family policy influence women’s relative 
position within the labour market? Descriptive and time-series cross-
section regression analyses of links between changes in family policy and 
gender job segregation and equality in occupational attainment.  
 
 
Theories of family policy suggest that policy provision may – in addition to any influence 
over gender equality in labour market activity – also play at least some role in determining 
variation in levels of gender job segregation and inequalities in occupational attainment 
(Ruhm, 1998; Blau et al, 2001; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; 
Pettit and Hook, 2009; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; 
Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). More specifically, several authors – most notably Mandel and 
Semyonov (2005, 2006) – argue that certain family policies carry ‘trade off’ effects that 
increase the concentration of women in ‘sheltered’ labour markets and lead to a hardening 
of the ‘glass ceiling’ on women’s careers. Combined with the theorised beneficial effects of 
the same policies on gender differences in economic activity, these trade off effects lead to 
what is termed the ‘family policy paradox’ whereby policy provision at once promotes and 
damages gender equality in the labour market (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006).  
 
Much of the theory around family policy trade offs concentrates on the effects of leave 
entitlements on women’s relative career attainment. The central issue here is that 
legislated mother-specific leaves – and also sharable leaves, to the extent take-up is 
dominated by the mother – may allow women to temporarily exit the labour force for a 
longer period of time than would be the case without a statutory entitlement. This may 
have a two-fold effect women’s ability to compete with their male counterparts. Firstly, 
the extended period of absence may intensify the depreciation of human capital associated 
with childbirth and will certainly – if taken – reduce experience (Blau et al, 2001; 
Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011: 124). The effects on productivity may be offset somewhat 
by the retention of firm-specific skills and training, but there remains at least some 
possibility that leaves could reduce female human capital. Secondly, the leave may 
rationalise statistical discrimination on account of an increase in the relative non-wage 
costs – actual or perceived – of female employment, in turn encouraging risk-averse 
employers to avoid hiring women or to self-compensate through a reduction in the wages 
offered to female employees (Ruhm, 1998; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Hegewisch and 
Gornick, 2011: 125). The effects of both are likely to be particularly severe for women’s 
access to highly skilled positions at the top-end of the earnings distribution where roles 
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require extensive experience and candidates for ‘maternity cover’ are scarce (Shalev, 
2008; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). Thus, introducing or extending leaves for mothers 
may cause particular damage to women’s ability to reach high-level positions and top 
earnings, and additionally may help drive female employees into ‘female-friendly’ – 
typically, low-skilled – occupations.  
 
The side effects of leaves entitlements may be at least partially offset by the provision 
father-specific leave or sharable leaves that are structured so as to encourage male take-
up. Indeed, if the length and take-up of leaves were equal for men and women it follows 
that the effects of depreciation and discrimination would also be identical, while leaves for 
fathers may also encourage some redistribution of domestic labour within the household 
(Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel, 2007; Tanaka and Waldfogel, 2007). However, this is 
dependent on the use of these schemes by fathers and – in the case of statistical 
discrimination – employers’ perceptions of which parents are likely to take leave. Given 
low observed levels of male participation in sharable leave programmes (Haas, 2003: 13; 
Naldini and Saraceno, 2008: 740; Haataja, 2009; Haas and Rostgaard, 2011; Naumann et 
al, 2013), it is possible and perhaps even likely that any trade off effects associated with 
leaves will be blind to the ‘type’ of leave offered. Rather, any adverse effects of leave may 
correspond only to the total length of leave on offer to mothers.  
 
Trade-off effects associated with dual earner childcare policies receive slightly less 
attention than those related to leave provisions. Nonetheless, Mandel and Semyonov 
(2005, 2006) outline a couple mechanisms through which public childcare may harm 
women’s relative position within the labour market. Most prominently, they suggest an 
expansion in general public care services may act only to transfer gendered divisions of 
labour from the domestic to the paid sector, with many women ‘channelled’ into 
segregated and isolated labour markets with only limited scope for career progression 
(Mandel and Semyonov, 2005, 2006). Importantly, as governments are typically 
‘responsible’ employers they are less likely to practice statistical discrimination and 
perhaps more likely to promote women to senior positions (Mandel, 2012: 244). However, 
top pay bands also tend to be relatively low in the public care sector so – to the extent that 
women are drawn into such jobs – an expansion in government care services may restrict 
women’s ability to attain high wages (Shalev, 2008: 431; Mandel, 2011: 171). Accordingly, 
an expansion of public childcare provision may lead to some increase in gender job 
segregation and perhaps also a reduction in women’s relative access to high earning 
positions.  
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Existing evidence on these policy trade off effects relies mostly on cross-sectional 
associations. Broadly, women’s share of managerial employment and representation 
amongst the highest earnings bands tends to be lower in countries that provide longer 
leaves (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Mandel, 2009; Mandel, 2012). Conversely, 
occupation segregation and gender pay gaps are generally higher in countries that are 
generous providers of both leave and public childcare policy (Mandel and Semyonov, 
2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Pettit and Hook, 2009). More generally, the relative 
position of women once inside the labour force appears more limited in countries that are 
‘characterised by progressive and developed welfare policies’ (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006: 
1910).  
 
Evidence from the emerging ‘over time’ comparative literature is more limited. Two 
studies (Ruhm, 1998; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013) explore links between changes in leave 
entitlements and the gender pay gap only. Both find that extensions in the length of leave 
inflate the gender pay gap. Akgunduz and Plantenga (2012) go a little further and explore 
the influence of changes in leave on the share of women in ‘high-level’ managerial and 
professional occupations, as well as on the gender pay gap. They find that increases in 
leave decrease the female share of high status managerial and professional employment – 
although the relation is significant only at the 10% level – but notably also find no 
statistically significant relation between changes in leave and the gender pay gap. These 
three studies alone, however, represent the extent of empirical comparative knowledge on 
links between changes in family policy and gender job segregation and equality in 
occupational attainment.  
 
This chapter builds on these few studies by examining associations between changes in 
family policy and changes in job segregation and women’s relative career attainment 
across the twenty sample countries and years 1985-2010. More specifically, it uses both 
descriptive and regression techniques to assess how the various changes in policy 
outlined earlier in chapter 4 impact on measures of the relative concentration of women 
in ‘female-typed’ jobs and on women’s access high status and highly paid positions. Thus, 
it concentrates mostly on providing answers to the thesis’ second research question – how 
do changes in family policy relate to changes in gender job segregation and gender 
equality in occupational attainment? 
 
The structure of this chapter is similar to that used in chapter 5. The next section – 6.1 – 
offers a brief review of the data and methods used, while 6.2 provides a short overview of 
cross-sectional associations between family policy and the measures of segregation and 
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occupational attainment. 6.3-6.5 form the core of the chapter, with each containing both 
descriptive and regression analyses of relations between changes in policy and changes in 
gender differences in outcomes. 6.3 covers links with changes in the gender gap in the 
proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations, 6.4 the female share of managerial 
employment, and 6.5 the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top-quintile 
earnings. Lastly, 6.6 brings together the results from the preceding sections, discusses 
findings in light of the literature, and concludes. 
 
6.1. Data and methods 
 
This chapter again explores relations through the analysis of country-level measures of 
both family policy and gender jobs segregation and equality in occupational attainment. 
Like chapter 5, family policies are measured primarily through the nine main indicators 
described earlier in chapter 3.2, with the support of the three policy indices in the more 
descriptive parts of the chapter. In this case though, because it is feasible that any leave-
driven trade off effects will be determined as much by the total length of leave available to 
mothers as by the type of leave on offer, considerable emphasis is also placed on the 
alternative measures of leave, and in particular on the indicator ‘total effective maternity 
and parental leave available to mothers’. Gender segregation and women’s relative career 
attainment are captured by the gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ 
occupations, the female share of managerial employment, and the gender gap in the 
proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings. Data for the first two come 
from Eurostat and the ILO, where comparable series are available from 1992 onwards. 
Data for the third are extracted from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and are 
available from 1985. Unfortunately, though, as the LIS data are produced only in waves, 
this latter indicator is measured at five-year intervals only (see chapter 3.3 for more 
detail). 
 
It is acknowledged that the measures of segregation and attainment used in this chapter 
are not comprehensive. As noted in chapter 3.3, the concept of gender job segregation and 
equality in occupation attainment is fairly wide and abstract, particularly when compared 
to the more easily quantifiable notion of equality in labour market activity as covered in 
the previous chapter. For continuity and comparability, the indicators selected here 
generally follow those that are the focus of the theory and that are used by Mandel (2009; 
2012) and others (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; 2006; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012). 
There are though certainly other aspects of, or perspective on, women’s position inside 
the labour market that are not covered by these three measures.  
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It should also be noted that the ability of these indicators to properly capture the 
identified aspects of equality is hindered somewhat by the availability of comparable data. 
As detailed in chapter 3.3, the first two indicators used here – the gender gap in the 
proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations, and the female share of managerial 
employment – are only able to use data based on the fairly broad one-digit ISCO88 
categories. As a result, they reflect women’s relative representation in wide rather than 
specific occupations. Moreover, as data for the first two measures are available only from 
1992 onwards, both fully ignore observed variations in family policy prior this point. The 
use of five-year intervals for the third indicator – the gender gap in top quintile earnings – 
meanwhile, reduces sample size and disregards subtler variations in policy and equality 
within the five-year periods. Nonetheless, these data and indicators are considered the 
best and most relevant available.   
 
Analysis is again conducted primarily through fixed effects multiple linear regression, 
albeit with the support of fairly detailed descriptions of trends and changes in the various 
measures of segregation and attainment plus simple bivariate analyses of crude links with 
changes in policy provision. The specifications of the regression models themselves are 
similar to those in chapter 5. Each indicator of equality is examined through its own set of 
regression models with – in each case other than the female share of managers – the 
gender gap as the main dependent variable but with all models replicated using the 
equivalent individual male and female indicators as dependent variables. Unfortunately, 
due to the way it is constructed, it is not possible to split the female share of managers into 
individual male and female indicators. As a result, models here use only the headline 
‘equality’ indicator as a dependent variable. The key independent variables across models 
are again the nine main measures of family policy, although as noted above certain models 
use the alternative set of leave indicators. Additionally, each model also includes several 
control variables to account for alternative influences on gender job segregation and 
occupation attainment. Details of these controls were given earlier in chapter 3.4. 
 
All models again use two-way fixed effects – that is, both country and time fixed effects – 
to account for unobserved unit and period effects. As noted at several points during the 
thesis, this has the upshot of producing estimates based only on within-country variation – 
that is, changes – in the included variables only. All models also use country-specific time 
trends to de-trend the variables and reduce the likelihood of spurious relations. Lastly, 
models of both the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations and the female 
share of managerial employment use one-way cluster robust standard errors (CRSEs) to 
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correct for non-spherical errors caused by panel heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
It should be noted, though, that models for the gender gap in top quintile earnings use the 
normal OLS standard errors rather than CRSEs. This is because, in this instance, the CRSEs 
are at times smaller than the OLS standard errors, possibly on account of the relatively 
small number of observations used in these models (Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 319; 
Wooldridge, 2010: 311; see table D.3 in appendix D (pg. 380)). Tests shown in appendix 
B.4 do suggest that models for the gender gap in top quintile earnings may suffer from 
both panel heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, so the absence of any correction for 
these issues should be taken into account when interpreting results93. 
 
6.2. Cross-sectional associations  
 
As touched on in the introduction to this chapter, the bulk of existing evidence on any 
adverse effects of family policy on women’s position within the labour market relies 
mostly on cross-sectional data and associations (e.g. Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel 
and Semyonov, 2006; Mandel, 2009; Pettit and Hook, 2009; Mandel, 2012). Before moving 
on to explore the effects of changes in policy on women’s careers, it is worth briefly re-
examining these cross-sectional associations using the data and indicators used in this 
chapter. This relatively short section uses charts and a series of Pearson’s R correlation 
coefficients to explore cross-sectional links between family policy and this chapter’s three 
measures of segregation and occupational attainment in 1998, a mid-point in the series, 
starting first with the gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ 
occupations.  
 
Gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations 
 
The relative concentration of female employees in ‘female-typed’ occupations varies 
considerably across countries. Figure 6.1 shows the gender gap in the proportion of 
employees in ‘female-type’ jobs, by country and for the year 1998.  
 
The gender gap ranges from as low as just under 8 percentage points in Greece to as high 
as 34.3 percentage points in the United Kingdom, with the gap in most countries standing 
somewhere between 15 and 30 points. Notably, the figure shows that degrees of job 
segregation cut across the usual country clusters. The gender gap is as expected generally 
fairly large in the Scandinavian countries, but the highest levels of segregation are seen in  
                                                        
93 Alternative methods of correcting for panel heteroscedasticity and serial correlation were 
explored but in this instance the OLS standard errors appear the most conservative.  
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conservative (France and Ireland) and liberal-type states (the United Kingdom). Likewise, 
the smallest gaps come from a diverse range of countries, with Australia, Belgium and 
Greece all registering gaps of less than 15 percentage points.  
 
Despite these varied patterns of segregation, cross-sectional associations between policy 
provision and the gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ jobs are 
mostly in line with the theory and existing evidence. Table 6.1 (overleaf) shows how levels 
of policy provision correlate with the three indicators of gender segregation and 
differences in occupational attainment, in 1998. Correlations for the gender gap in ‘female-
type’ employment are shown in panel A, while those for the female share of managers and 
the gender gap in top quintile earnings – discussed in the following subsections – are in B 
and C, respectively.  
 
Most immediately, panel A in table 6.1 shows that the gender gap in ‘female-type’ 
employment is positively if moderately correlated with the provision of dual earner 
childcare policy. Put differently, the relative proportion of female employees that work in 
‘female-type’ occupations tends to be higher in those countries that are more generous 
providers of all types of public childcare policy. This fits well with Mandel and Semyonov’s 
(2006) suggestion that public childcare provision serves only to produce ‘feminine 
occupational niches’ (2006: 16) through the transfer of female care work to the paid 
sector. 
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Figure 6.1. Gender gap in the proportion of employees in 'female-type' 
occupations, 1998 
Note: data for Italy, Portugal and the United States are missing 
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The gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations also shares a 
positive correlation with the general family support policy index, at least partly on account 
of a moderate and positive association with the provision of flat-rate parental and 
childcare leave. This makes some theoretical sense – if these long leaves drive gender 
discrimination, women may find themselves attracted to feminised occupations where 
conditions are more suited to their needs as mothers (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006: 
1917). Notably, though, there is little evidence of any such association with dual earner-
carer leave policy – both the policy index and all three individual dual earner-carer leave 
policy indicators appear generally unrelated to the relative proportion of female 
employees in ‘female-type’ occupations. The tentative suggestion here then, is that 
different types of leave may have different influences on gender segregation. Nonetheless, 
the positive correlation between the gender gap and total maternity and parental leave – 
shown in the final row in panel A – implies that the provision of leave in general remains 
associated with inflated gender job segregation.  
 
Female share of managerial employment 
 
Female representation amongst managers also varies fairly substantially across countries. 
This is shown by figure 6.2, which plots the female share of managers, by country and for 
the year 1998.  
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Figure 6.2. Female share of employment as managers, legislators and senior 
officials, 1998 
Note: data for Italy and the United States are missing 
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Cross-national differences in the female share of managers offer fairly immediate support 
for the argument that certain policies may damage women’s relative career attainment. 
The female share is generally lowest in the Scandinavian countries94, albeit with the 
partial exception of Sweden. Conversely, women’s access to managerial employment tends 
to be highest in the liberal-type states, with Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
all holding three of the four largest female shares. From the start then, and given the 
patterns of policy provision outlined in chapter 4, there is some indication that women’s 
opportunities are more limited in countries that are more generous providers of dual 
earner policy.  
 
Panel B in table 6.1 (pg. 198) adds a little more formality to these associations, with 
correlations in most cases supportive of the argument that certain family policies can 
reinforce glass ceilings on women’s careers. The dual earner-carer leave policy index, for 
instance, shares a negative and at least moderate correlation with the female share of 
managerial employment. The association is not perfect, but the suggestion is that – 
consistent with Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) and others (e.g. Akgunduz and 
Plantenga, 2012) – female access to managerial positions tends to be restricted where the 
provision of dual earner-carer leave policy is more generous. Notably though, this overall 
relation is driven mostly by a moderate and negative correlation with effective weeks of 
mother-specific earnings-related leave. Associations with gender-neutral earnings-related 
parental leave – which should restrict female access to managerial positions only as far as 
take up is, or is perceived to be, dominated by mothers – and father-specific leave – which 
should not restrict female managerial employment at all – are only weak. 
 
Effective weeks of ‘general family support’ flat-rate parental and childcare leave also share 
a negative and moderate relation with the female share of managerial employment – in 
other words, the female share of managers tends to be lower in countries that provide 
longer and more generous flat-rate parental and childcare leaves. Notably, the negative 
correlation here is a little stronger than that on ‘dual earner’ gender-neutral parental 
leave. Again, this makes theoretical sense – flat-rate leaves are particularly likely to drive 
statistical discrimination on account of their long length and disincentives for male take-
up (Ruhm, 1998; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012). 
Nonetheless, relations are negative across all measures of leave policy, suggesting that 
leave entitlements in general may damage women’s access to managerial positions. 
                                                        
94 It is important to remember here that this indicator share runs counter to the other six, in that a 
higher rather than lower score represents a greater level of equality. 
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Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile earnings 
 
Lastly, figure 6.3 shows the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile 
annual earnings, by country and for the five-year interval 1995-1999. 
 
 
 
Similar to the female share of managers, variations across countries in the gender gap in 
top earnings provide some support for the suggestion that policy provision may place 
restrictions on women’s careers. Gaps again tend to be comparatively large in the 
Scandinavian countries – particularly Norway and Sweden – although they are also 
considerable in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, possibly due to the exceptionally 
high rates of female part-time employment in these countries (OECD, 2013a). In contrast, 
gaps are generally smaller in the Southern European countries – especially Spain – plus 
also the United States. The initial suggestion here then, is that gender differences in high 
earnings tend to be larger in countries that are also typically more generous providers of 
family policy in general. 
 
Panel C in table 6.1 (pg. 198) shows how these differences in the gender gap in top 
quintile earnings correlate with the various measures of family policy. The dual earner-
carer leave policy index is, as expected, positively correlated with the gender gap in top 
quintile earnings – in other words, gender differences in high earnings are larger where 
the provision of dual earner-carer leave policy is more generous. Likewise, the dual earner 
childcare policy index also shares a positive correlation with the gender gap. The latter 
association is a little hard to explain using the theory, although it is possible that it is 
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Figure 6.3. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile 
earnings, 1995-1999 
Note: data for France, Germany, New Zealand and Portugal are missing 
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simply a consequence of the correlation between the provision of dual earner childcare 
and dual earner-carer leave policies. Regardless, together these associations are 
supportive of the broad argument (Mandel and Semyonov 2006) that women’s relative 
access to high earnings tends to be lower in countries that are more generous providers of 
dual earner family policies. 
 
Notably, panel C also shows a negative if weak association between the gender gap and 
effective weeks of ‘general family support’ flat-rate parental and childcare leave – put 
differently, there is some suggestion here that gender differences in top earnings are at 
least slightly smaller where weeks of ‘general family support’ leave are longer. This of 
course conflicts with the theoretical suggestion that these flat-rate leaves should cause 
particular damage to women’s relative career attainment, and moreover is inconsistent 
with the association shown above for the female share of managers. In any case, the 
association with total maternity and parental leave – shown in the final row of panel C in 
table – remains positive and moderate, so the broader inference continues to be that 
gender differences in top earnings are larger in countries that provide more generous 
packages of general leave for mothers.   
 
Summary 
 
Taken as a whole, cross-sectional associations between family policy and gender 
segregation and equality in occupational attainment are – despite some inconsistencies 
across indicators – mostly and broadly supportive of the argument that certain family 
policies may damage or constrain women’s careers (Ruhm, 1998; Mandel and Semyonov, 
2006; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012). In short, in 1998, 
countries that were more generous providers of leave and public childcare policies tended 
also to see a greater relative concentration of women in ‘feminised’ occupations and larger 
barriers for women to managerial employment and high earning positions. These cross-
sectional associations provide the background to the following exploration of links 
between changes in policy and developments in segregation and equality in occupational 
attainment. 
 
6.3. Gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations  
 
Theories of family policy trade offs suggest the provision of certain policies may 
inadvertently inflate gender job segregation and channel female employees into 
‘feminised’ occupational niches (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 
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2006; Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). More specifically, theory suggests 
public childcare policies – and public care services more generally – are likely to pull 
women into traditionally feminised sectors by offering jobs with conditions well suited to 
female labour, while leave entitlements may drive women into more accommodating 
‘female-friendly’ occupations by increasing the hostility of the general labour market to 
female workers (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). This section explores the extent to which 
changes in family policy are associated with developments in this thesis’ measure of job 
segregation – the gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations 
– over the eighteen countries for which data are available95 and the years 1992-2010.  
 
Description of trends and changes in the gender gap in the proportion of employees in 
‘female-type’ occupations, and links with changes in family policy 
 
On average across countries, levels of gender-based job segregation fall fairly steadily over 
the years between 1992 and 2010. Figure 6.4 plots the cross-country unweighted average 
gender gap in the proportion of employees working in ‘female-type’ occupations for the 
eighteen countries for which data are available and the years 1992-2010, along with the 
equivalent unweighted average male and female rates.  
 
 
                                                        
95 Italy and Portugal are missing on this indicator as in these countries there are no empirically 
determined ‘female-type’ occupations - that is, on average over the series there are no occupations 
where the female share of employment is greater than 150% the female share of total employment. 
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The average gap in the proportion of men and women working in feminised jobs 
decreases by just over 3.5 points across the series, from just under 26 percentage points in 
1992 to just over 22.5 in 2010. This decrease is due mostly to a fall in the proportion of 
female employees working in ‘female-type’ jobs. The male proportion increases slightly 
from just over 12% in 1992 to just under 13% in 2010, with all of this increase occurring 
in the last two years of the series. The proportion of female workers in such occupations, 
meanwhile, decreases by just less than 3 percentage points over the series, although it 
would have been far larger – at 5.8 percentage points – if the series had stopped before the 
financial crisis in 2008. Broadly though, figure 6.4 suggests the unweighted average 
labour market appears to have become steadily less segregated between the early nineties 
and 2010. 
 
These average developments do, however, disguise fairly diverse changes across countries 
in the proportion of male and female employees working in ‘female-type’ jobs. Table 6.2 
ranks countries in ascending order by the degree of change in the gender gap between the 
years 1992 and 2010. It also shows the gender gap at the beginning and end of the period 
for context, summarises change on the indicators of family policy over the equivalent 
period, and contains descriptive statistics. 
 
A majority of countries – thirteen – see the gender gap fall between 1992 and 2010. 
Decreases are particularly large in Luxembourg, France and Denmark, but most of the 
thirteen countries see a considerable drop in gender differences in employment in 
‘feminised’ jobs over the series. Five countries see some increase in the gender gap 
between 1992 and 2010, although generally these increases are only small. Growth is 
largest in Austria, where the gender gap rises by 3.7 percentage points.  
 
From the start then, trends in the gender gap provide little support for any argument that 
increasing the provision of leave and particularly childcare policy leads to inflated 
segregation and increases in the concentration of women in female-type occupations. 
Indeed, despite the widespread expansion of dual earner childcare policy and various 
types of leave policy over the series, in most countries labour markets appear less 
segregated in 2010 than they were in 1992. Of course, it remains possible that increasing 
the generosity of leave and childcare policy may moderate an otherwise relatively general 
trend towards decreased segregation. However, the correlation coefficients shown at the 
bottom of table 6.2 – which represent relations between the size of changes in policy and 
in the gender gap – generally suggest that this is not the case either. 
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Changes in both dual earner policy indices, for instance, are negatively correlated with 
developments in the gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ 
occupations – in other words, decreases in the gender gap appear greater in countries 
where increases in dual earner provisions are larger. With regards to individual policies, 
there is a moderate and positive correlation between changes in the gender gap and 
mother-specific earnings-related leave. However, associations with changes in father-
specific and notably gender-neutral earnings related leave are both negative. More 
importantly, perhaps, correlations with changes in the three childcare indicators are 
negative if weak across the board. Thus, in contrast to the argument that public childcare 
provision may contribute to gender segregation, these associations suggest that countries 
with more sizeable increases in public childcare see slightly larger decreases in the 
relative concentration of female employees in ‘female-type’ occupations.  
 
Associations with general family support policy meanwhile, are mostly weak. The 
correlation between changes in the gender gap and the policy index is tiny, as also are the 
relations on all three individual policy indicators. Notably, the association on flat-rate 
parental and childcare leave is actually slightly negative, which contrasts sharply with the 
strong positive cross-sectional association outlined in the previous section. Generally, 
though, table 6.2 suggests that changes in general family support policy are mostly 
unrelated to the relative concentration of female employees in ‘feminised’ jobs.  
 
Broadly then, these initial associations provide little evidence to suggest that expansions 
in policy provision lead to increases in the relative concentration of female employees in 
feminis ed occupations. Indeed, far from inflating segregation, the bivariate associations 
shown in table 6.2 indicate if anything that an increase in leave and, to a lesser extent, 
childcare provision might even boost growth in the integration of male and female 
employees. 
 
Fixed effects regression analysis for the gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-
type’ occupations 
 
Table 6.3 summarises results from two-way fixed effects linear regression models for the 
gender gap in the proportion of employees working in ‘female-type’ occupations. 
Specification A is the main fixed effects model for changes in the gender gap. B and C are 
identical, but use the individual male and female rates as dependent variables. In all three 
cases, models use the nine main family policy indicators, plus five controls.  
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Model A shows very few clear associations between changes in family policy and 
developments in the gender gap in the proportion of employees working in ‘female-type’ 
occupations. None of the dual earner-carer leave or childcare policy indicators are 
statistically significant, even at the 10% level. Moreover, models B and C suggest that 
changes in the dual earner indicators are also unrelated to the individual male and female 
rates of employment in ‘female-type’ occupations. The only exception is a negative relation 
between changes in public childcare provision for older children and the male rate, but 
even this association is cancelled out by a similar if insignificant relation with the 
proportion of female employees in ‘feminised’ jobs. Generally, then, models A-C suggest 
that changes in dual earner policy are almost entirely unrelated to movements in gender-
based job segregation.  
  
It is broadly a similar story for changes in general family support policy. Model A shows 
that neither tax support for the family nor flat-rate parental and childcare leaves share a 
statistically significant relation with changes in the gender gap. There is, though, a curious 
positive and significant coefficient on within-country changes in child benefit payments, 
driven mostly by a positive association with the proportion of female employees in 
‘female-type’ occupations. This finding is a little difficult to explain theoretically – it 
suggests that, all else equal, an increase in the generosity of child benefit somehow 
encourages women to work in ‘feminised’ occupations. Upon investigation, however, the 
relation is driven mostly by the experience of Australia where reform to family support 
and child care benefit in 2000 (Gauthier, 2011c) coincides with a jump in the proportion of 
women working in ‘female-type’ jobs. Without Australia, the coefficient on changes in 
child benefit falls by almost a third to 0.60 and moves out of statistical significance even at 
the 10% level96. This is no clear reason to exclude Australia from the model. However, the 
fragility of the relation coupled with the absence of any good theoretical explanation 
means that it might be risky to place too much emphasis on this result. 
 
As for the models presented earlier in chapter 5, it is possible that measuring leave 
policies through several indicators of various types hides some underlying relation with 
total general leave. Indeed, splitting leaves may be particularly hazardous here if statistical 
discrimination is based more on the total length of leave on offer to mothers than on the 
provision of various leave types (see chapter 3.2). Table 6.4 presents results for models 
that are similar to those in 6.3, but that use the alternative set of leave policy indicators. 
More specifically, A-C substitute in ‘total maternity and parental leave available to  
                                                        
96 The p-value on child benefit per month for two children increases to 0.117 when Australia is 
removed.  
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mothers’ and ‘effective weeks of childcare leave’ for the indicators of mother-specific 
earnings-related leave, gender-neutral earnings-related parental leave and flat-rate 
parental and childcare leave. D-F, meanwhile, add a squared term on total leave available 
to mothers to capture any diminishing or exponential effects of long leaves.  
 
Using the alternative measures of leave produces results that are broadly similar to those 
in the main specifications. Estimated relations in A-C are almost identical to those in table 
6.3, although notably the curious positive relation on child benefit is no longer statistically 
significant. Interestingly, after adding the squared term in model D, total general leave 
available to mothers and its square do become jointly significant97, if only at the more 
lenient 10% level98. The coefficient on the ‘main’ term is positive, hinting perhaps that 
increase in the general length of leave on offer to mothers might inflate gender-based job 
segregation. However, the coefficients on both total leave and its square are tiny – the 
predicted effect of a 24 week extension to effective weeks of total leave is an increase in 
the gender gap of just 0.17 points. In other words, even if a P-value of less than 0.10 is 
considered statistically significant, the substantive effect of a change in total leave on the 
relative concentration of female employees in ‘feminised’ jobs remains effectively nil. 
 
Overall then, the regression models shown in tables 6.3 and 6.4 provide little support for 
Mandel and Semyonov’s (2005, 2006) argument that certain family policies may 
encourage gender-based job segregation. That said, family policies are only one side of 
Mandel and Semyonov’s thesis regarding segregation. As discussed in chapter 2.2, the 
broader argument is that in ‘developed welfare states’ (2006: 1917), family policies operate 
alongside a large general public care sector to push and draw women into ‘protected’ 
female-type public service employment. It is worth noting that the latter half of this 
argument does receive some support from the regression models presented in tables 6.3 
and 6.4. Across specifications, changes in the size of the public sector as an employer are 
consistently positively related to changes in the gender gap in the proportion of 
employees in ‘female-type’ jobs. Put differently, the results suggest that increases 
(decreases) in public sector employment may increase (decrease) gender job 
segregation99. Nonetheless, public sector employment cannot be considered an explicit 
                                                        
97 As noted in chapter 5, when testing the coefficients on total maternity and parental leave and its 
square, the important test is the joint F-test shown at the bottom of the table (see chapter 5.3). 
98 P = 0.081. Interestingly, the diagnostics presented in appendix E show that when the possibly 
highly influential observation ‘Luxembourg 2010’ is dropped from the model, this relation becomes 
statistically significant at the stricter 5% level. The coefficient, however, remains tiny (see appendix 
E (pp. 395-401) for more detail).  
99 It should noted that due to the way it is measured, public sector size includes any employees 
working in public childcare services. As a result, it is possible that the positive association between 
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family policy, at least not as it is measured here100. As a result, while this particular finding 
may produce some support for Mandel and Semynov’s (2006) broad argument, it 
continues to provide no direct evidence of a ‘trade off’ effect on segregation specific to 
explicit family policies.  
 
Summary 
 
Taken together, results from this section generally reject the argument that family policies 
may inflate gender job segregation and the relative concentration of female employees in 
feminised jobs. The trends outlined earlier show that the period between 1992 and 2010 
is one in which most countries combine a general increase in family policy with a decrease 
in job segregation, while the bivariate associations in table 6.2 suggest that, if anything, 
decreases in the gender gap tend to be larger in countries with more substantial growth in 
policy provision. The regression models shown above meanwhile, find that changes in 
family policy do no apparent damage to the gender gap in the proportion of employees in 
‘female-type’ occupations. As noted earlier in this chapter, the data used here to measure 
segregation does suffer limitations, and it remains possible that the use of more detailed 
occupation data might produce different results. Nonetheless, based on the available 
comparable information, the general conclusion from this section is that changes in the 
relative concentration of women in ‘feminised’ jobs appear mostly independent of changes 
in family policy provision.  
 
6.4. The female share of managerial employment 
 
As part of the same mechanism behind the concentration of women in ‘feminised’ jobs, 
family policy trade off theories suggest that certain policies may reinforce gendered ‘glass 
ceilings’ and strengthen barriers to high-level employment for women (Ruhm, 1998; Blau 
et al, 2001; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Pettit and Hook, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
public sector size and the gender gap may reflect at least in part changes in public childcare 
provision and, more concerningly, could be hiding or absorbing the expected association between 
changes in the three measures of public childcare provision and gender differences in employment 
in ‘female-type’ occupations. To check against this all models in tables 6.3 and 6.4 were re-
estimated with ‘public sector size’ removed. Doing so made no difference to results for the three 
childcare variables – with or without ‘public sector size’, none of the three share a positive 
significant association with changes in the gender gap in employment in ‘female-type’ occupations.  
100 As detailed in chapter 3.4, the measure used here is ‘government employment as a proportion of 
the total labour force’. In their 2006 article, Mandel and Semyonov use a rather more specific 
measure - ‘the proportion of the workforce employed in the public welfare sector (public health, 
education and welfare)’ (2006: 1919) – which at least in part can be viewed as measuring public 
policy efforts to shift many domestic responsibilities to the public sphere (2006: 1916). 
Unfortunately, such data that stretch across both countries and time are not available.   
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2009; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012). Particularly 
important here are leave entitlements for mothers, which are likely to restrict women’s 
access to high-skill and high-status jobs by damaging female human capital, recreating 
gendered divisions of labour and encouraging statistical discrimination (Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2011; Mandel 
2012). This section examines links between changes in family policy and this chapter’s 
measure of women’s relative access to high-level employment – the female share of 
managerial employment – with particular focus on associations with changes in leave 
entitlements for mothers.  
 
Description of trends and changes in the female share of managerial employment, and links 
with changes in family policy 
 
Figure 6.5 shows the cross-country unweighted average female share of managerial 
employment for the twenty sample countries over the years 1992-2010. It is worth 
remembering here that this indicator runs in the opposite direction to all other indicators 
of gender equality in employment used in this thesis, so in this case a higher value 
represents a greater level of equality. 
 
 
 
Similar to developments in gender job segregation, the unweighted average female share 
of managers moves steadily towards equality over the series. In 1992, women’s average 
share of managers stood at just over 26%. By 2010, this had increased to just under 32%. 
The share does peak in 2008 at 32.6%, before falling slightly to 31.1% in 2009 following 
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the financial crisis. Nonetheless, despite the fluctuation there is a clear upward trend in 
women’s average access to managerial employment over the period examined.  
  
This shift towards equality in managerial employment is observed, to varying extents, in 
almost all of the twenty sample countries. Table 6.5 (overleaf) ranks countries in 
descending order by the degree of change in the female share between the years 1992 and 
2010. It also shows the female share of managerial employment at the beginning and end 
of the period for context, summarises change on the indicators of family policy over the 
equivalent period, and contains descriptive statistics.  
 
Women’s representation amongst managers increases in eighteen of the twenty countries 
covered. Gains are particularly large in Ireland and the Netherlands – both of which had 
relatively low female shares in 1992 – but are also fairly substantial in several others. The 
female share does fall in Luxembourg and Portugal, by just under 4 and 5 percentage 
points respectively. In general, though, most countries see at least some improvement in 
women’s access to managerial positions between 1992 and 2010. 
 
Just as was the case for gender job segregation then, these broad trends provide little 
immediate support for the argument that certain family policies damage women’s access 
to high-level positions. While family policy ‘trade off’ theories would suggest that the 
general increase in family policy and particularly leave entitlements observed in chapter 4 
should lead to inflated barriers to managerial employment for women (Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2011; Mandel 
2012), the developments shown in table 6.5 suggest that across countries women are 
increasingly able to compete with their male colleagues for managerial positions. That 
said, the bivariate correlations shown at the bottom of table 6.5 – which measure 
associations between the size of changes in policy and in the female share of managers – 
do hint at some constraining effect of leave on gains in the female share, albeit only in 
specific instances.  
 
At first glance, correlations between changes in dual earner-carer leave policy and the 
female share of managerial employment fit fairly well with the theory. Changes in the dual 
earner-carer leave policy index share a negative and moderate-to-strong relationship with 
change in the female share, indicating that gains in female access to managerial positions 
are smaller where changes in dual earner-carer leave are larger. Notably, though, this 
overall relation is not driven by mother-specific leave. Rather, it is the product of negative 
associations with both gender-neutral earnings-related parental leave and particularly  
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father-specific leave. The former is perhaps feasible – gender-neutral leave may encourage 
discrimination and damage women’s relative skills as long as take up remains dominated 
by mothers – but the correlation is only weak. The stronger association with father-
specific leave, on the other hand, is curious and difficult to explain using the theory. It is 
though, driven in large part by the experience of Luxembourg and Portugal – when the 
two are removed, the correlation reverses to r = 0.29101. Taken as a whole, this produces 
only very limited evidence to suggest that increases in dual earner-carer leave may inflate 
barriers for women to managerial employment. 
 
Likewise, there is also little to suggest that increases in flat-rate ‘general family support’ 
parental and childcare leave constrain women’s access to managerial employment. The 
correlation between changes in these ‘general family support’ leaves and the female share 
is negative, but the association is only very weak. This is a little surprising, given that the 
earlier cross-sectional analysis suggested that these leaves are particularly likely to 
obstruct women’s access to top positions. However, table 6.5 shows that only Luxembourg 
combines a large increase in flat-rate leave with a decrease or even only a small increase 
in the female share. Otherwise, countries with increases in flat-rate leaves are scattered 
throughout the rankings, with two countries – the Netherlands and Norway – coupling a 
considerable expansion in flat-rate parental and childcare leave with large increases in the 
female share of managerial employment. Together with relations for dual earner-carer 
leave policy then, there is little here to support the argument that leave entitlements can 
damage women’s careers. 
 
However, and as pointed out at several points throughout the thesis, it is possible that 
splitting leave policies between several indicators of various ‘types’ may obscure a clearer 
relation with overall general leave. The final column in table 6.5 shows relations between 
changes in the female share and the alternative measure of total general leave available to 
mothers. Notably, the correlation here is negative and at least moderate in strength – in 
other words, those countries with larger (smaller) increases in total general leave for 
mothers are more likely to see smaller (larger) increases in the female share of managerial 
employment over the series. It is worth noting that this correlation is again driven largely 
by the experience of Portugal and Luxembourg – without the two the correlation 
coefficient shrinks to as low as r = -0.10. Nonetheless, the comparative strength of the 
association on general leave suggests that any ‘trade off’ relation between leave and 
                                                        
101 Without Luxembourg and Portugal, the correlation on the overall dual earner/carer leave policy 
index also reverses to r=0.09, but the relation with gender-neutral earnings-related leave remains 
negative at r= -0.19. 
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women’s access to managerial employment may be captured best by a measure of total 
leave available to mothers – as opposed to the individual or split indicators of various 
types of leave – and more substantively that any ‘trade off’ effect is blind to the type of 
leave entitlement offered. More importantly, it also provides at least some evidence to 
suggest that increases in leave provisions may reinforce barriers for women to managerial 
employment.  
 
Finally, elsewhere changes in dual earner childcare provision are mostly positively 
correlated with changes in the female share. There is a negative if fairly weak association 
on provision for children under three, but correlations with changes in the overall policy 
index, provision for children over three, and public spending on childcare services are all 
moderate and positive. Mandel and Semyonov (2006) are less specific about the effects of 
childcare provision on women’s access to top positions, but the inference from these 
associations is that growth in the female share of managerial employment tends to be 
higher in countries with larger increases in public childcare provisions. 
 
Fixed effects regression analysis for the female share of managers 
 
Table 6.6 builds on these descriptive bivariate relations through a series of two-way fixed 
effects regression models for the female share of managerial employment. As it is not 
possible to run individual male and female models for this indicator, this table is a little 
simpler than those elsewhere. Model A is the main fixed effects specifications and uses the 
main set of nine family policy indicators, plus controls. B is similar but uses the alternative 
set of leave policy indicators, while C adds a squared term on ‘total effective weeks of 
maternity and parental leave available to mothers’. Given the findings of the above, these 
alternative specifications receive particular attention here.  
 
The main specification – model A – shows precisely zero statistically significant 
associations between changes in the female share of managers and both the nine main 
measures of family policy and the five controls. On occasion coefficients are reasonably 
large, and there is perhaps some hint at positive and negative associations on father-
specific leave and childcare provision for older children, respectively. Broadly though, the 
suggestion here is that changes in policy provision are mostly unrelated to developments 
in women’s representation amongst managers. This is perhaps not entirely surprising, 
given that the descriptive analysis above found that bivariate relations with the nine main 
family policy indicators were generally small. However, it is striking that none of the 
included variables including controls share any kind of clear link with changes in the  
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female share of managers. Put simply, model A fails to explain within-country variation in 
women’s representation in managerial employment in any meaningful way. 
 
Using the alternative measures of leave produces results that are a little closer to those 
predicted by the theory and existing evidence. Estimates in B are similar to A, with a small 
and insignificant coefficient on total general leave for mothers and all other variables far 
from significance at the 5% level. However, model C – which adds a squared term on total 
general leave – reveals a notable and sizeable quadratic relation on total leave available to 
mothers. The coefficient on the ‘main effect’ is fairly large and negative and that on the 
squared term far smaller but positive, while the joint F-test on the two suggests that 
together both are highly jointly significant with a p-value of 0.008. In other words, changes 
in total weeks of leave share a negative and highly significant relation with the female 
share of managers, albeit with the effect diminishing as the size of the change in total 
maternity and parental leave available to mothers increases. The effect peaks at a 24 week 
change in leave where, all else equal, the estimated impact on the female share of 
managerial employment is a decrease of 3.55 percentage points. Thereafter the estimated 
marginal effect of any additional weeks of leave becomes positive, although coincidentally 
– and as noted previously – the largest within-country change in total leave observed in 
the series also stands at 24 weeks.  
 
Model C, then, provides considerable support for the argument that leave entitlements 
may restrict women’s access to high status positions (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; 
Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2011; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Mandel, 2012). It is 
important to keep in mind that the trends shown in the previous subsection suggest a 
broad upward shift in the female share of managerial employment across almost all of the 
countries examined. Thus, the effect of changes in leave may be best interpreted as a 
leave-induced constraint on growth in female access to managerial positions. It is also 
worth pointing out again that the relation on total general leave available to mothers 
remains the only statistically significant association across all three models – other than 
the constraining impact of general leave, within-country variation in the female share of 
managers remains completely unexplained. As the estimated effect of change in leave is 
negative, this solitary relation cannot account for the general increase in the female share 
of managers observed earlier. Put differently, while the effects of leave may offer insight 
into why gains in the female share vary across countries, all models in table 6.6 remain 
ignorant to the drivers of the observed widespread gains in female access to managerial 
employment. This does not, however, fully detract from the relation between leave and the 
female share – regardless of other results, the broad inference here is that increases or 
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extensions to the length of maternity and parental leave may damage women’s 
representation amongst managers. 
 
Summary 
 
On balance, results from this section provide support for the argument that extending 
leaves available to mothers may reinforce ‘glass ceilings’ and constrain women’s access to 
high-level positions. While the trends outlined in table 6.5 show that most countries have 
combined an increase in leave provisions with an increase in the female share of 
managerial employment, the crude bivariate associations suggest these gains tend to be 
smaller where increases in the total leave available to mothers are larger. The regression 
models in table 6.6 reinforce the latter, finding that – after removing trends from the data 
and controlling for other, ultimately insignificant, influences – changes in total maternity 
and parental leave for mothers are negatively related to the female share of managerial 
employment, albeit with the effect diminishing as the size of the change in leave increases.  
 
This result is in-line with the findings of Akgunduz and Plantenga (2012). Indeed, as 
touched on earlier, they find a relation that is statistically significant only at the 10% level 
– here, even with the use of the ‘harder’ cluster robust standard errors, the relation 
between changes in leave and female access to managerial employment is statistically 
significant at a far stricter level of P < 0.01. If anything, then, the results above solidify and 
expand upon existing conclusions around links between leave entitlements and women’s 
access to high-status positions. Regardless, the broad inference here as there is that 
extending leaves available to mothers may through whatever mechanism – be it inflated 
statistical discrimination, decreases in female human capital or the reinforcement of 
gendered norms and division of labour (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel, 2011; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Mandel, 2012) – damage women’s ability to 
compete for managerial positions.    
 
6.5. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings 
 
A possible further consequence of any impact of family policy on women’s ability to 
compete at the top end of the labour market is that policy provision may influence 
women’s relative access to high earnings (Ruhm, 1998; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; 
Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; 
Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). The theoretical mechanisms here are identical to those for 
the female share of managers – leave policies are again central, with gender imbalances in 
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entitlements expected to damage women’s ability to reach top wages by reducing female 
human capital and by increasing the reluctance of employers to hire women for high-
paying positions (Ruhm, 1998; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 
2006; Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 
2012). This last section examines associations between changes in family policy provision 
and the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings 
across the eighteen countries for which data are available102. It worth noting again that, 
unfortunately, this indicator is measured at five-year intervals only.  
 
Description of trends and changes in the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top 
quintile annual earnings, and links with changes in family policy 
 
Similar to the previous two indicators, average gender differences in access to top 
earnings decrease over the period examined. Figure 6.6 shows the cross-country 
unweighted average gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual 
earnings for the eighteen countries for which data are available at five-year intervals 
between 1985-1989 and 2010. It also shows the equivalent rates for both male and female 
employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
102 Data for New Zealand and Portugal are missing entirely.  
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Figure 6.6. Cross-country unweighted average gender gap in top quintile 
earnings, 1985-2010 
With the average proportion of male and female employees with top quintile earnings 
Cross-country unweighted average gender gap in top quintile earnings
Cross-country unweighted average proportion of male employees with top quintile earnings
Cross-country unweighted average proportion of female employees with top quintile earnings
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The cross-country average gender gap falls fairly steadily over the series from 23.7 
percentage points in 1985-1989 to just under 16.6 points in 2010, due mostly to an 
improvement in access to top earnings for women. The average share of male employees 
with top quintile annual earnings decreases very slightly, from 30.2% in 1985-1989 to 
28.2% in 2010. The average female rate, in contrast, jumps substantially from just under 
6.5% to 11.6%. In other words, on average, large gains in women’s ability to reach top 
quintile earnings have led to considerable decreases in inequality in the representation of 
women and men in high earning positions. 
 
Such decreases in the gender gap are once more fairly widespread across the eighteen 
countries examined. Table 6.7 (overleaf) ranks countries in ascending order by the degree 
of change in the gender gap between the 1985-1989 five-year average and the gap in 
2010, or the latest period available. It also shows the gender gap at the beginning and end 
of the series for context, summarises change on the indicators of family policy over the 
equivalent period, and contains descriptive statistics. 
 
Fourteen of the eighteen countries for which data are available see the gender gap fall 
over the series, albeit to varying extents. Notably, decreases are generally largest in the 
liberal-type countries – particularly the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada – 
but are also considerable in several Scandinavian countries and Greece. Four countries – 
all of which are continental European states – see the gender gap increase over the series. 
In all four the gap is relatively moderate at the beginning of the series but comparatively 
large by the end. Generally, though, most countries see gender differences in the 
proportion of employees in the top-fifth of the annual earnings distribution decrease 
between 1985-1989 and 2010.  
 
Again, this general trend provides little immediate support for the argument that family 
policies carry adverse effects for gender equality in occupational attainment, in as much as 
most countries couple at least some increase in leave and dual earner childcare provision 
with at least some decrease in gender earnings inequality. It is important to remember 
that this gender gap is based on annual earnings data, so this general decrease may at least 
partially reflect changes in annual working hours. That said, the results outlined earlier in 
table 5.5 (pg. 172) suggest changes in gender differences in working hours are mixed and 
generally  
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fairly modest103. In any case, the general pattern of development provides no direct 
evidence to suggest that women ‘pay’ for leave and childcare policies through inflated 
barriers to high earnings. 
 
Inferences from relations between the size of changes in policy and the gender gap – 
illustrated by the correlation coefficients at the bottom of table 6.7 – are fairly similar. 
There is a positive if fairly weak correlation between changes in the gender gap and the 
dual earner-carer leave policy index, suggesting that gains in earnings equality are slightly 
smaller in countries where increases in dual earner-carer leave policy are larger. 
However, this overall relation is driven almost entirely by a positive correlation with 
change in father-specific leave. Similar to the negative association between father-specific 
leave and the female share of managers discussed in the previous section, this relation 
seems unlikely to be causal. Put differently, it is difficult to see how introducing or 
expanding father-specific leave could constrain women’s relative access to high earnings, 
so perhaps the safest inference here is that both this specific correlation and that on the 
overall policy index are likely to be spurious. 
 
Elsewhere, relations are generally nominal. Notably, there is a correlation of exactly zero 
between changes in the gender gap and effective weeks of flat-rate parental and childcare 
leave. Together with the absence of any convincing association on dual earner-carer leave 
policy, this (non-)correlation suggests that movements in the gender gap in top quintile 
earnings are almost entirely unrelated to changes in leave provision. Such a conclusion 
finds further support in the final column of table 6.7, which shows only a weak positive 
correlation between changes in the gender gap and total effective weeks of leave available 
to mothers. More broadly though, the correlations shown at the bottom of table 6.7 
suggest that changes in the gender gap in high earnings are mostly unconnected to 
developments in the various measures of family policy.     
 
Fixed effects regression analysis for the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top 
quintile annual earnings 
 
Table 6.8 (overleaf) summarises the results of the main two-way fixed effects linear 
regression models for the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile 
earnings. Model A is the main fixed effects model for changes in the gender gap, and uses  
                                                        
103 The Pearson’s R correlation coefficient between change in the gender gap in usual weekly 
working hours and change in the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile 
earnings is 0.50, suggesting changes in working hours may partially but not fully explain changes in 
equality in access to top annual earnings.  
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the nine main indicators of family policy, plus six controls. B and C are similar, but use the 
individual male and female indictors as dependent variables. It is worth noting again that 
these models use the normal OLS standard errors, as opposed to the cluster robust 
standard errors used in all previous models. This does risk estimating incorrect standard 
errors – although, importantly, not incorrect coefficients – as residuals from these models 
are known to suffer panel heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (see appendix B.4 (pp. 
330-332)). However, on this particular indicator OLS standard errors are in almost all 
cases larger than the CRSEs – and indeed larger than other alternative standard errors, 
such as panel-corrected standard errors – and as a result represent the most 
‘conservative’ option (see chapter 3.4 and table D.3 in appendix D (pg. 380)). 
 
Similar to the previous two indicators, these main specifications show few clear relations 
between changes in policy and the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top 
quintile earnings. First off, none of the dual earner policy indicators are statistically 
significant, at the 5% level at least. There is a tentative suggestion of a positive relation 
between the gender gap and changes in weeks of gender-neutral earnings-related leave, 
but this is significant only at the 10% level of confidence. Likewise, two of the three 
general family support indicators are also far from statistical significance. There is, 
though, a notable positive and significant coefficient on changes in tax support for the 
family. This relation is slightly unexpected, in that the literature says little about the 
effects of tax and transfer policies on equality in occupational attainment. It is possible, 
perhaps, that expanding financial support for the family produces some kind of 
disincentive for second-earner women to push for high earning positions, perhaps on 
account of increases in household net incomes. Alternatively, family-related tax subsidies 
may increase incentives for first- or sole-earners – typically men – to reach high wages if 
they reduce marginal tax rates on high earnings104. Either way, the suggestion that altering 
tax support for the family influences gender equality in high earnings is fairly novel. 
 
                                                        
104 It is also plausible that certain family-related tax policies may have a stronger influence on male 
net earnings compared to female net earnings – perhaps because men are more likely to be a sole 
earner and therefore benefit from dependent spouse and family subsidies – and as a result 
artificially increase the proportion of male employees with top quintile earnings relative to female 
employees. As noted in chapter 3.3, most of the annual earnings data here refer to pre-tax and 
transfer labour income so changes in tax policies should not directly influence observed annual 
earnings. However, out of necessity 17 cases use net labour income data (see chapter 3.3). When 
these 17 cases are removed from model A the coefficient on tax support for the family does shrink 
slightly to 0.302 and the indicator does move out of statistical significance (p-value = 0.37). 
However, the coefficient on tax support for the family for the proportion of male employees with 
top quintile earnings reported in model B actually increases, from 0.205 to 0.256. In other words, 
changes in tax support for the family have a larger influence on the proportion of male employees 
with high wages when only cases that use gross income are included. For this reason the use of net 
earnings data in certain cases is not considered a sufficient explanation for this result.      
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Elsewhere, there is some suggestion of a negative relation between changes in the gender 
gap and the relative size of the public sector as an employer. This makes theoretical sense 
– as pointed out by Mandel (2012), governments typically strive to be ‘responsible’ 
employers so may be more likely to promote women to highly paid positions105. 
Coefficients on all other variables, though, are far from statistical significance106. As was 
also the case for the indicators of both gender segregation and the female share of 
managerial positions then, the main fixed effects models in table 6.8 are generally poor at 
explaining changes in women’s relative access to high earnings. 
 
As ever, it is possible that the operationalisation of leave policies in table 6.8 obscures 
some underlying relation with changes in total general leave. Table 6.9 presents results 
from a second set of models that use the alternative measures of leave policy. Models A-C 
are similar to A-C in table 6.8, but substitute in ‘total maternity and parental leave 
available to mothers’ and ‘effective weeks of childcare leave’ for the indicators of mother-
specific earnings-related leave, gender-neutral earnings-related parental leave and flat-
rate parental and childcare leave. D-F, meanwhile, include an additional squared term on 
total maternity and parental leave available to mothers.  
 
Using the alternative set of leave policy indicators produces more substantial results. In 
model A, the coefficient on total maternity and parental leave is positive and significant. In 
other words, in-line with the theorised ‘trade off’ effects of leave policy, increases in the 
total length of leave available to mothers are associated with decreases in women’s 
relative access to high earnings. Importantly, using the alternative measures of leave also 
moves several other policy variables into or out of significance. The coefficient on tax 
support for the family, for instance, decreases by a third and moves out of significance at 
the 5% level, while curiously effective weeks of childcare leave are found to be negatively  
                                                        
105 Similar to models of the gender gap in ‘female-type’ employment, because public sector size 
includes any employees working in public childcare services it is possible that it’s inclusion in the 
models shown in tables 6.8 and, later, 6.9 could hide, distort or absorb some association between 
changes in three measures of public childcare provision and the gender gap in top quintile earnings. 
As a check against this, all models shown in tables 6.8 and 6.9 were re-run with public sector size 
removed. This made no difference to results – regardless of whether or not public sector size is 
included, none of the three childcare measures share a statistically significant association with 
changes in the gender gap in the proportion of employees with ‘top quintile’ earnings.   
106 The sensitivity analyses shown in appendix F (pp. 427-429) suggest that when cases imputed 
using LCVF/NVCB are removed from the model, the negative coefficient on public expenditure on 
childcare services increases in size and moves into significance at the 10% level. This would, if 
valid, provide at least a hint that increasing public spending on childcare can promote female 
occupational attainment. However, the coefficient on public childcare expenditure remains small 
and far from significance – even at the 10% level – in all other models regardless of whether cases 
imputed using LCVF/NVCB are used or not. As a result, it is considered safest not to place too much 
emphasis on this result.  
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and significantly related to changes in the gender gap. Most notably, though, the coefficient 
on father-specific leave shifts to become large, negative and significant – that is, model A 
suggests that introducing or extending paternity leave or parental leaves reserved for 
fathers leads to an increase in equality in access to top annual earnings. This is fully 
consistent with theories of family policy trade offs (e.g. Ruhm, 1998; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011), as 
providing male leaves should at least partly reduce the rationality behind statistical 
discrimination and perhaps encourage some redistribution of household labour 
(Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel, 2007; Tanaka and Waldfogel, 2007). It is also important in 
substantive terms, inasmuch as it suggests that the provision of father-specific leave can 
offset at least in part the damaging effects of leaves available to mothers.  
 
Models D-F add a squared term on total effective weeks of maternity and parental leave 
available to mothers. Broadly, results are fairly similar to those in A-C. The ‘main effect’ of 
changes in total leave available to mothers remains positive and significant, while the 
coefficient on the squared term is comparatively small and negative and the joint F-test on 
the two significant at the 5% level. The general suggestion then, is that increasing weeks of 
general maternity and parental leave available to mothers reduces women’s relative 
access to top annual earnings, with the effect diminishing as the size of the change 
increases and the impact peaking at around a 54 week increase in leave. Elsewhere, the 
curious relation on changes in childcare leave moves out of significance, at the 5% level at 
least. The coefficient on changes in effective weeks of father-specific leave, meanwhile, 
remains negative and significant and actually increases in size slightly. Lastly, the negative 
coefficient on public sector size becomes highly significant – as it also was in A – indicating 
that an expansion in the size of the public sector as an employer may indeed increase 
women’s ability to access for top earnings. 
 
Summary 
 
Unlike most of the previous indicators, the results presented in this section are a little 
inconsistent. The initial descriptive analysis shows that gender differences in top quintile 
earnings have fallen in almost all of the countries examined, and suggest that these gains 
in equality are generally unrelated to developments in family policy. In other words, it 
provides no immediate evidence that family policies either promote or, more importantly 
perhaps, harm gender equality in high earnings.  
 
However, results from the regression models above provide considerable support for the 
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argument that certain policies may affect women’s access to top wages. After removing 
trends from the data and controlling for other influences, the regression models find that 
increases in effective weeks of general maternity and parental leave available to mothers 
inflate gender differences in the proportion of employees with top-quintile annual 
earnings, while notably leaves reserved for fathers appear to have the opposite effect. It is 
important to reiterate that the models shown in tables 6.8 and 6.9 use normal OLS 
standard errors – rather than the cluster robust standard errors used in earlier regression 
analyses – and as a result estimated standard errors may be smaller than their ‘true’ value 
(see chapter 3.4). However, the parameter estimates in table 6.9 – which importantly are 
not biased by non-spherical errors (Beck and Katz, 1995) – suggest in any case that the 
estimated effects of changes in general leave for mothers and father-specific leave on top 
earnings are large107. In other words, even if the standard errors and significance tests are 
of uncertain validity, there remains at least some suggestion that changes in the provision 
of leave policies – both for mothers and for fathers – have a meaningful impact on female 
access to top earnings. 
 
These findings fit well with the existing empirical literature, where others also find links 
between increases in leave available to mothers and inflated gender pay gaps (Ruhm, 
1998; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). Notably though, no existing ‘over time’ comparative 
studies investigate the influence of paternity leave or father-specific leaves on gender 
differences in wages or top earnings. To some degree then, the link established above in 
table 6.9 is relatively novel. Importantly, results here are also compatible with those 
outlined in the previous section for changes in the female share of managerial 
employment. Taken together, findings generally support the argument that the provision 
of certain family policies – namely, leave entitlements for mothers – may reinforce ‘glass 
ceilings’ and damage women’s relative occupational attainment (Ruhm, 1998; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2009; Mandel and 
Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Mandel, 2012), albeit with 
the possibility that at least part of the effect can be offset by the provision of leaves 
reserved for use by the father only. 
 
 
                                                        
107 All else equal, the estimated effect of 7.61 week extension to total maternity and parental leave – 
the mean change in total leave observed across countries between 1985-2010 – is a 4.11 point 
increase in the gender gap, while a 3.61 week increase in father-specific leave – again, the mean 
observed change over the series – is estimated to reduce the gender gap by 1.21 points. To put this 
in context, the change in the unweighted cross-country average gender gap between 1985-1989 
and 2010 was a decrease of 7.10 percentage points. 
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6.6. Discussion 
 
Theories of family policy ‘trade offs’ and existing empirical evidence suggest the large and 
widespread changes in family policy outlined in chapter 4 are likely to have some impact 
on gender job segregation and equality in occupational attainment (Ruhm, 1998; Blau et 
al, 2001; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; Pettit 
and Hook, 2009; Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011; 
Mandel, 2011; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Mandel, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). 
Those countries that have extended leave entitlements for mothers over the series – to 
varying extents, almost all of the countries examined – should see a hardening of the ‘glass 
ceiling’ and heightened restrictions on women’s access to high earnings and high status 
positions (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011; Mandel, 2011; 
Mandel, 2012). This ‘hardening’ may be offset somewhat by the provision of leaves 
reserved for fathers, but this is likely to depend on the uptake or at least perceived uptake 
of the leaves by fathers. Those countries that have increased public childcare provisions, 
meanwhile, may perhaps see some increase in gender job segregation on account of an 
expansion in ‘female-type’ care service jobs. This is particularly likely to be the case when 
combined with an expansion in leave entitlements, so as to create a hostile private sector 
that helps push women into ‘protected’ public care service jobs (Mandel and Semyonov, 
2006). 
 
By and large, broad trends in gender job segregation and equality in occupational 
attainment are at odds with these expectations. The patterns of development outlined 
across this chapter show that most of the sample countries have seen a shift away from 
segregation and a softening of the glass ceiling on women’s careers over the years 
examined. Gains are most widespread in the female share of managerial employment, but 
a majority of countries also see decreases in gender differences in employment in 
‘feminised’ occupations and in access to the top-fifth of the earnings distribution. In other 
words, over the series most countries combine at least some expansion in leave and 
childcare policy with a decrease in segregation and an improvement in the relative 
position of female employees within the labour force.  
 
Examining the size and timing of changes in policy and equality does however reveal some 
evidence to suggest that changes in family policy may influence or moderate the 
magnitude of gains in equality in occupational attainment. The initial descriptive analyses 
presented in sections 6.3 and 6.5 show little if any damaging effect of changes in policy 
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provision on either gender job segregation or equality in access to high earnings. 
However, those in 6.4 do hint at a link between changes in leave entitlements for mothers 
and gains in the female share of managerial employment – crudely, growth in the female 
share tends to be small or even negative in countries with large increases in weeks of 
maternity and parental leave available to mothers, and likewise larger in countries with 
only small changes to female leave entitlements. The initial suggestion then, is that 
extending weeks of leave available to mothers may constrain gains in women’s 
representation amongst managers. 
 
Results from the regression models shown across the chapter are a little more concrete. 
There is again no evidence of any relation between changes in family policy and the 
relative proportion of female employees working in feminised occupations, although in-
line with the theory there is a link with the size of the wider public sector as an employer. 
However, the regression estimates in sections 6.4 and 6.5 show that – after controlling for 
trends in the data and other potential influences – increases in the length of general 
maternity and parental leave available to mothers are associated with both decreases in 
the female share of managers and increases in gender differences in access to top 
earnings. Notably, the results in 6.5 also suggest that introducing or extending leaves for 
fathers has the opposite effect on the gender gap in top-quintile earnings, all else equal. 
The broader inference then, is that certain family policies may indeed inadvertently 
damage women’s position within the labour market, and more specifically that changes in 
leave – or perhaps more correctly, the gender balance of leaves – may influence women’s 
relative ability to reach top jobs.  
 
These results do suffer from limitations, particularly with regard to the sample and data 
used. As discussed earlier in section 6.1, the three indicators used in this chapter to 
measure ‘gender job segregation and equality in occupational attainment’ are not 
comprehensive, and it is likely that there are other relevant aspects of women’s position 
with the labour market that are not covered by the these measures. The indicators 
themselves, meanwhile, are constrained by the availability of comparable data. In 
particular, both of the first two cover European countries and the years 1992-2010 only, 
while the third – the gender gap in top quintile earnings – is measured only at five-year 
intervals.  
 
Nonetheless, as far as the data and indicators used do capture the underlying concepts, the 
headline finding from this chapter is that altering the provision of leave can impact on 
women’s relative career attainment. This finding fits fairly well with results from several 
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existing cross-sectional studies (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 
2006; Pettit and Hook, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012), as well as those from the 
rather limited ‘over time’ comparative literature (Ruhm, 1998; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 
2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). Indeed, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter, 
these existing ‘over time’ studies concentrate mostly on the effects of leave on the general 
gender pay gap with only one (Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012) examining how changes in 
leave impact on women’s access to senior positions. Thus, to some degree findings from 
this chapter expand and extend existing knowledge and add important weight to the 
theoretical argument that leaves may be particularly harmful to women’s access to top 
positions (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012).  
 
It is important to reiterate that the broad trends outlined in this chapter suggest a general 
shift across countries towards greater equality in occupational attainment, so in 
substantive terms the relation may be best interpreted as a policy-induced constraint on 
gains in equality rather than an outright hardening of the ‘glass ceiling’. It is also worth 
remembering that in both sections 6.4 and 6.5, the association with changes in leave only 
emerges once leaves are measured through the alternative measure of total general 
maternity and parental leave available to mothers, as opposed to the various measures of 
separate leave ‘types’. There may be statistical reasons for this discrepancy. For example, 
it is possible that splitting variation in total leave between several indicators of various 
types generates individual variables that are too ‘slow-moving’ – that is, that contain too 
little within-country variation – to produce identifiable relations with female attainment 
within a fixed effects model (Plümper and Troeger, 2007)108. More substantively though, it 
may also be the case that any adverse effects attached to leave correspond less to the 
provision of any particular type of entitlement, and more to the length of total leave on 
offer to the mother – in other words, that leave-driven trade off effects are blind to the 
structure or detail of the leave offered. In any case, the inference remains that leave 
entitlements in general might impede women’s access to high-level positions.  
 
Establishing that changes in leave policies may damage women’s careers is particularly 
important in light of results from the previous chapter. There, estimates suggest that 
changes in leave entitlements may promote female activity and encourage equal market 
participation, if only when looking at 25-34 year olds. Combined with findings from this 
                                                        
108 This argument is weakened somewhat, however, by the significant associations found in the 
previous chapter between the individual dual earner-carer leave policy indicators and the gender 
gap in the labour force participation rate.  
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chapter, the general inference is that leave policies may indeed carry paradoxical effects 
for women’s employment – in other words, they may as theorised simultaneously promote 
equal participation and inadvertently harm women’s positions within the labour market 
(Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2011; 
Mandel, 2012). This is important of course, because it adds weight to Mandel and Shalev’s 
(2009) assertion that it is difficult to provide an unambiguously ‘woman-friendly’ set of 
family policies, and more substantively that it is necessary for policy-makers to weigh up 
and balance the competing interests of women when considering leave provisions. To be 
sure, maternity and parental leaves hold other objectives and benefits – such as for child 
health and development (Berger et al, 2005; Rossin, 2011) – aside from female 
employment. However, the presence of contradictory effects continues to imply that 
policy-makers need to at least consider the potential damage caused by the entitlement 
when deciding on desired levels of provision.  
 
That said, the suggestion from section 6.5 that father-specific leaves can help promote 
female career attainment should not be downplayed. Taken together with results for 
leaves available to mothers, the safest inference here is probably that father-specific 
leaves can help offset at least part of the damaging effect of leaves for mothers – perhaps 
by reducing the grounds for statistical discrimination, for example – rather than having a 
positive impact on female attainment in and of themselves. In other words, the suggestion 
from this chapter is that what matters most for women’s relative occupation attainment 
may be the gender-balance of leaves. Nevertheless, if female-focused leaves are 
considered valuable for their effects on female activity and wider associated benefits, then 
results here suggest that they may be provided at a reduced cost to women’s occupational 
attainment if offered alongside extensive leaves reserved for fathers. 
 
Elsewhere, results from this chapter suggest that both dual earner childcare provisions 
and family-related tax and transfer policies have few clear adverse – or indeed, beneficial – 
effects on women’s position within the labour market. As far as public childcare services 
for children under three are concerned, this is fairly encouraging – when combined with 
results from chapter 5, it implies that increases in provision may promote female 
economic activity and help close gender gaps in participation seemingly without damaging 
women’s careers. However, for both childcare for slightly older children and family-
related tax and transfer policies, the absence of any clear and consistent associations here 
mean that – when taken alongside results from chapter 5 – changes in both of these types 
of policy seem to have little impact on gender differences in employment outcomes in 
general. Again, these policies do have wider objectives outside of the labour market. Pre-
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primary education, for instance, is found to promote child performance in later stages of 
education (Berlinski et al, 2009; Schütz, 2009), while childcare more generally is linked in 
various ways to child health and development, not always positively (Melhuish, 2004) but 
with beneficial effects that appear particularly large for children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds (Anderson et al, 2003; Melhuish, 2004). Child benefit and family-related tax 
and transfer polices, meanwhile, are as mentioned in the previous chapter often used as 
an important tools for tackling child poverty (Oxley et al, 1999; Pressman, 2011; Gornick 
and Jäntti, 2012). Nonetheless, from the perspective of employment alone, results from 
this and the previous chapter suggest that both childcare services for children aged 3-6 
and ‘general family support’ tax and cash transfer policies appear mostly unimportant for 
women’s relative experience of the labour market.  
 
All this said, it remains possible that relations differ between or vary across groups or 
subsections of the population. Indeed, given that demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics are known to be important determinants of women’s labour market 
outcomes (e.g. Evertsson et al, 2009; England et al, 2012), it is perhaps even probable that 
the effects of family policy will differ between groups. Thus, it is possible that both 
childcare for older children and tax and transfer policies do have some influence on 
employment outcomes for certain women, but that the effect is not of sufficient size to 
show up as a clear association at the aggregate level. More importantly, perhaps, it may be 
less the case that leave entitlements simultaneously promote the activity and damage the 
careers of all women – as is implied by the discussion above – and more that the benefits 
and costs of provision fall on certain and perhaps different groups of women.   
 
As discussed earlier in chapter 2.2, education is particularly likely to be one such 
moderating factor. More specifically, the theory suggests that any effects of policy on 
labour market activity should be most pronounced amongst men and women with lower 
levels of education, while any adverse effects attached to leave may be particularly severe 
for the careers of highly educated women (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; 
Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). This is the subject of the next chapter, which examines links 
between changes in family policy and gender differences in employment outcomes across 
levels of education.  
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Chapter 7. Do the effects of changes in family policy differ by levels of 
education? Descriptive and time-series cross-section regression analyses 
of links between changes in family policy and gender equality in 
employment outcomes across levels of education  
 
 
So far, the investigations carried out in this thesis have treated men and women as single 
homogeneous groups under the implicit assumption that the effects of family policy are 
uniform across all individuals of the same sex. This assumption is of course unlikely to be 
correct – indeed, as discussed in chapter 2, it is theoretically likely that the influence of 
family policy will differ across individuals with varying demographic or socio-economic 
backgrounds. Recently, the comparative family policy literature has paid much attention 
to whether or not the influence of policy varies across class divisions, and in particular to 
differences in the effects of provision between individuals with different levels of 
education (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 
2012; Korpi et al, 2013). 
 
First off, the effects of policy on economic activity are expected to be stronger for women 
with lower levels of education than for their highly educated counterparts, whose 
participation tends to be high regardless of policy context (Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2011; 
Mandel, 2012). Dual earner leave policies, for example, are more likely to promote 
participation amongst low skilled women where labour market attachment tends to be 
relatively weak (Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). Likewise, public childcare provisions 
should be especially valuable for women with low levels of educational attainment as the 
lower market wages typically commanded by these women mean that private childcare 
costs act as a particularly punishing effective tax on maternal employment (Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel, 2012). Moreover, any discouraging effects of family-related cash transfers and tax 
subsidies may also impact disproportionately on low skilled women, in this case because 
of the higher relative value of any transfers to market wages.  
 
Similarly though, any negative trade off effects of policy on women’s relative occupational 
attainment are also likely to be conditioned by education. In particular, any adverse effects 
associated with maternal leave programmes are expected to fall mostly on relatively 
advantaged, highly educated women (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 
2011; Mandel, 2012). As covered earlier, leave entitlements for mothers may damage 
women’s ability to be compete for highly-skilled and highly-paid positions as – should they 
cause women to temporarily exit the labour force for longer than would otherwise be the 
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case – they may lower female human capital and encourage statistical discrimination 
(Ruhm, 1998; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Shalev, 2008; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011; 
Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). As it is highly-educated individuals who are most likely to 
be candidates for these elite positions, it is the attainment of highly educated women 
relative to similarly educated men that is at particular risk from any trade-off effects 
associated with leave entitlements (Mandel, 2012). Together with the expected class-
conditioned effects of policy on market activity, this produces a theoretical inter-class 
‘policy paradox’ with low skilled women the primary beneficiaries of family policy 
provision and their highly educated counterparts – for the most part, at least – the 
inadvertent benefactor. 
 
Mandel and other proponents of this view illustrate the trade-off using cross-sectional 
data (Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). While activity rates are 
universally high amongst highly educated women, participation amongst their low skilled 
peers tends to be very low in countries that provide little in the way of female-friendly 
policy – particularly the Southern European states – and comparatively high in countries 
with extensive leave and public childcare provisions (Mandel and Shalev, 2008: 29; 
Mandel, 2009: 704; Korpi et al, 2013: 17). Conversely, women’s access to senior positions 
and the highest earnings bands is lower in Scandinavia than elsewhere (Mandel, 2009: 
700), while countries that are generous providers of dual earner policy tend to see 
comparatively large gender pay gaps amongst highly educated men and women (Mandel, 
2012: 253) and a smaller gap between those with low levels of educational attainment 
(Korpi et al, 2013: 23). In other words, in the cross-section, the provision of dual earner-
type policies appears to benefit less educated women through increased labour market 
activity but also cause particular harm to highly skilled female employees through a 
hardening of the glass ceiling on career attainment and earnings.  
 
Only a single ‘over time’ study explores differential relations between policy and labour 
market outcomes at varying levels of education across both countries and time 
(Nieuwenhuis, 2014). Notably, the findings of this study are the opposite of that predicted 
by the theory and cross-sectional evidence – using the motherhood employment gap as 
the dependent variable, Nieuwenhuis (2014) finds that within-country changes in leaves 
are more beneficial for the market participation of mothers with more education, while the 
effects of changes in transfers do not differ across levels of education (2014: 108). This 
solitary study is limited, however, in that it looks only at the differential effects of policy 
on headcount employment.  
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This chapter examines whether the effects of changes in family policy differ across levels 
of education. More specifically, it explores how changes in policy relate to measures of 
both gender differences in labour market participation and gender equality in 
occupational attainment once indicators of both are broken down by levels of educational 
attainment. In doing so, it looks to provide answers to the thesis’ third research question – 
that is, do relations between within-country changes in family policy and within-country 
changes in the various areas of gender equality in employment differ with levels of 
education? 
 
The structure of this chapter is similar to that used in chapters 5 and 6. Section 7.1 offers a 
brief review of the data and methods used, while 7.2 provides an overview of cross-
sectional associations between family policy and the various measures of gender equality 
in employment at differing levels of education. Sections 7.3-7.5 represent the core of the 
chapter. 7.3 presents the results of descriptive and fixed effects regression analyses for 
the gender gap in the labour force participation rate by levels of education, while 7.4 and 
7.5 do the same for two indicators of occupational attainment – the female share of 
managers, by education level, and the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top 
quintile earnings, by education level, respectively. Lastly, 7.7 discusses results and 
concludes.    
 
7.1. Data and methods 
 
This chapter once again explores associations through the analysis of country-level 
measures of both family policy and gender equality in employment. Family policies are 
captured primarily through the nine main indicators outlined earlier in chapter 3.2, albeit 
with the three policy indices also used in the more descriptive parts of the chapter and the 
alternative measures of leave policy used at certain points were appropriate. Gender 
equality in employment, meanwhile, is measured through three country-level indicators, 
each of which are differentiated by levels of education. Gender differences in labour 
market activity at varying levels of education are captured by the gender gap in the labour 
force participation rate (25-49 year olds; 25-29 year olds; 30-34 year olds) for those with 
low, medium and high education. This is the only measure of labour market activity used 
in this chapter, in part due to constraints on space. Women’s occupational attainment 
relative to their similarly educated male peers is measured through two indicators - the 
female share of managers (all ages) with low, medium and high education, and the gender 
gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile earnings for employees (25-54 year 
olds) with low, medium and high education.  
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Data for the labour force participation rate and the female share of managers come from 
Eurostat, where unfortunately education-differentiated data series are available only from 
1992. As a result, the sample on these indicators is limited to sixteen European countries 
in the sample and the period 1992-2010. The third indicator is extracted from the 
Luxembourg Income Study and is available from 1985 onwards, but is again measured 
only at five-year intervals (see chapter 3.3 for more details). 
 
Analysis is conducted primarily through fixed effects multiple linear regression, albeit 
once again with the support of fairly detailed descriptions of trends and changes in each 
indicator at each level of education and a simple bivariate analysis of any immediate links 
with changes in family policy. In this case, due to the volume of data to be presented, the 
description of links with policy concentrates mostly on associations with the three policy 
indices. Specifications of the regression models themselves are mostly similar to those 
used in the previous two chapters. Each measure of gender equality at each level of 
education is examined through its own set of models. In this chapter, due to constraints on 
space, only models that use the ‘gender gap’ or gender difference versions of the relevant 
indicators are presented in the chapter itself. Full results including models with the 
individual male and female measures as dependent variables are though given in tables 
D.5-D.12 in appendix D (pp.382-389). The key independent variables across models are 
again the nine individual family policy indicators, although certain specifications do use 
the alternative set of leave policy indicators for reasons explained earlier in chapter 3.2. 
Each model also includes several controls. These controls are identical to those used in the 
equivalent models earlier in chapter 5 and 6, with the exception of the female share of 
enrolment in tertiary education which is dropped from all models. Justifications for and 
details of these controls were given earlier in chapter 3.4. 
 
All models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and all use two-way fixed 
effects – that is, both country and time fixed effects – to account for unobserved unit and 
period effects. To reiterate, the use of country fixed effects also eliminates all between-
country variation in both the dependent and independent variables, so estimated relations 
are based on within-country changes in the included variables only. All models include 
country-specific time trends to de-trend the variables and reduce the likelihood of 
spurious relations. Finally, models for the gender gap in the labour force participation rate 
and for the female share of managers again use one-way cluster robust standard errors 
(CRSEs) to correct for non-spherical errors caused by panel heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation (see chapter 3.4 and appendix B.4. (pp. 330-332) for further discussion of 
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these technical details). It should be noted, though, that models for the proportion of 
employees with top-quintile earnings use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors only – 
that is, standard errors that correct for heteroscedascity in the residuals but not for 
cluster-related issues such as serial correlation. This is because, similar to models for the 
overall gap in top quintile earnings shown in the previous chapter, in certain instances the 
CRSEs are smaller and therefore less conservative than either heteroscedasticity-robust or 
normal OLS standard errors, possibly due to the relatively small number observations 
available for these models (Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 319; Wooldridge, 2010: 311).  
 
7.2. Cross-sectional associations  
 
As noted above, almost all of the existing empirical evidence on variations in the effects of 
family policy across levels of education comes from between-country cross-sectional 
studies (Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012; Korpi et al, 
2013). As a way of starting the chapter and in part to help familiarise the reader with the 
data used, it is worth briefly replicating these studies and exploring cross-sectional links 
between the thesis’ measures of family policy and gender equality in employment at the 
various levels of education. The following describes cross-sectional relations in 1997109, 
beginning with links between policy and gender differences in labour market participation 
for individuals (25-49 year olds) with low, medium or high education.  
 
Gender gap in the labour force participation rate, by education level 
 
The extent to which gender equality in economic activity is structured by education differs 
markedly across countries. This is illustrated by figure 7.1 (overleaf), which shows the 
gender gap in the labour force participation amongst men and women (25-49 year olds) 
with low (ISCED 0-2) and high (ISCED 5-6) education, by country and for 1997.  
 
The figure does show some commonalities across countries – for instance, in all but one of 
the sample countries the gender gap in labour participation is larger amongst less 
educated men and women than amongst their highly-educated counterparts. However, the 
degree to which gender gaps vary across levels of education differs considerably between 
countries. Notably, most of this variation is due to cross-national differences in the gender 
gap for men and women with low levels of education. Gender differences in participation  
 
                                                        
109 1997, rather than 1998, is used in this chapter due to unusually high rates of missing data for the 
gender gap in the labour force participation by levels of education in 1998. 
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amongst less educated individuals vary widely, from a high of just over 47 percentage 
points in Italy to a low of 3.7 points in Finland, and with a cross-country standard 
deviation of 13.7 points around a mean of 28.9. In contrast, the gap amongst highly 
educated men and women is far more consistent – here, the cross-country standard 
deviation stands at just 4.3 percentage points around a mean of 8.4. Clearly, gender 
differences in market participation amongst less educated individuals are far more 
sensitive to variation in societal context than are differences in activity between highly 
educated men and women.  
 
Table 7.1 shows how these variations relate in the cross-section to the provision of family 
policy. It contains a series of Pearson’s R correlation coefficients between each indicator of 
family policy and the gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-49 year olds) at 
each level of education.  
 
Notably, table 7.1 shows that most correlations are fairly uniform across levels of 
education. In particular, both dual earner policy indices – as well as several of the 
individual dual earner policy sub-indicators – are negatively correlated with the gender 
gap across the board, with the strength of the relation broadly similar regardless of 
whether the gender gap covers individuals with low, medium or high levels of education. 
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Figure 7.1. Gender gap in the  labour force participation rate (25-49 year olds), 
by education level, 1997 
Low Education (ISCED 0-2) High Education (ISCED 5-6)
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This is not to say, though, that the size of any effect is necessarily similar across levels of 
education. Indeed, given that variance in the gender gap is far higher at low levels of 
education, the magnitude of any effect associated with dual earner policy is likely to be far 
larger amongst those men and women with lower formal qualifications. This is illustrated 
by figure 7.2 which plots, for 1997, scores on the dual earner childcare policy index 
against the gender gap in the labour force participation rate for those with low and high 
education. While the relation is negative at both levels of education and the association 
perhaps a little ‘tighter’ for those with high education, the slope is far steeper for the 
gender gap in the participation rate amongst less educated men and women. In other 
words, despite comparable correlations, the inference emerging from figure 7.2 is that the 
provision of dual earner childcare policy has a greater influence on equality in activity 
amongst those with low formal education. 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional associations between general family support policy and gender differences 
in participation at varying levels of education are somewhat simpler. The overall index 
shares a weak negative association with the gender gap at low levels of education, no 
relation at medium education and a moderate positive correlation with the gap amongst 
those with high formal qualifications. A similar pattern is evident across all three sub-
indicators. Curiously then, the broad suggestion here is that any damaging effects of 
general financial support are concentrated on activity amongst individuals with high 
education, rather than on their less educated peers.  
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Score on the dual earner childcare policy index 
Figure 7.2. The dual earner childcare policy index and the gender gap in the 
labour force participation rate for men and women with low and high 
education  
1997, with fit lines 
Low Education (ISCED 0-2) High Education (ISCED 5-6)
Linear (Low Education (ISCED 0-2)) Linear (High Education (ISCED 5-6))
Note: * = p<0.05 ** = p<0.01 *** = p<0.001. ^ = p<0.1. see figure 4.1 for abbreviations 
r = -0.59 ** 
r = -0.46 * 
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Female share of managerial employment, by education level 
 
The structuring of women’s access to managerial employment by education is a little 
inconsistent across countries. Figure 7.3 shows the female share of managerial 
employment amongst managers with equivalent education, for those with low and high 
education, by country in 1997. 
 
 
 
In general, women hold a greater share of managerial employment amongst managers 
with low education than amongst mangers with high-level qualifications. This is true in 
twelve of the sixteen sample countries, with differences between education levels in 
certain cases substantial. In Germany, for instance, the female share amongst managers 
with low education is – at just under 45% – around 30 percentage points higher than the 
female share of highly educated managers. The inference in these countries then is that 
low-skilled women are more able to compete with similarly educated men for managerial 
positions than are their highly educated counterparts.  
 
However, in four other countries the female share is larger among managers with high-
level qualifications. Notably, this group includes three of the four Scandinavian nations – 
Finland, Norway and Sweden – where, according to Mandel and others (Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012), opportunities for 
highly educated women are expected to be most restricted. Moreover, in these countries 
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Figure 7.3. Female share of managerial employment amongst managers with 
equivalent education level, 1997 
Low Education (ISCED 0-2) High Education (ISCED 5-6)
Note: Data for Sweden is for 2001 
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the female share of highly educated managers tends also to be high in absolute terms – for 
example, in Sweden the female share is approaching equality at just under 40%. In other 
words, in these four countries highly educated women are generally more able to compete 
with similarly educated men for managerial positions, both in real terms and relative to 
less educated women.   
 
From the start then, between-country variations in female access to managerial 
employment at differing education levels are at least a little out of line with the argument 
that certain family policies – especially leave policies – should cause particular damage to 
the careers highly educated women. This is made more concrete by panel A in table 7.2, 
which shows how cross-country variations in the female share correlate with the 
provision of family policy.  
 
The table shows inconsistent associations between the various indicators of leave policies 
and the female share of managers with low or moderate levels of education. The dual 
earner-carer leave policy index, for example, is negatively associated with both. 
Conversely, the provision of ‘general family support’ flat-rate parental and childcare leave 
shares a moderate positive correlation with the female share of moderately educated 
managers, and a strong positive correlation with the female share of managers with low 
levels of education. It is probably a little dangerous to draw firm inferences from such 
inconsistent relations, but there is perhaps some suggestion here that dual earner-type 
leaves hamper, and general family support-type leaves actually help, less educated women 
to compete with similarly educated men for managerial positions.    
 
Perhaps more importantly though, the table also shows little clear linear association 
between the provision of leave and the female share of managers with high education. 
Both the dual earner-carer leave policy index and effective weeks of ‘general family 
support’ flat-rate leave are uncorrelated with the female share of highly educated 
managers, although there are conflicting relations amongst the individual component dual 
earner-carer leave indicators – mother-specific earnings-related leave, for example, shares 
a strong negative correlation with the female share of highly educated managers, while  
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gender-neutral earnings-related leave has a moderate positive association with the same 
female share. Broadly though, the suggestion from table 7.2 is that highly educated 
women are no more or less able to compete with similarly educated men for managerial 
employment in countries that are generous providers of either dual earner or general 
family support-type leaves.  
 
To reinforce the point a little further, the last row in panel A – which shows correlations 
between total effective weeks of maternity and parental leave available to mothers and the 
female share at the three levels of education – suggest that total leave may even share a 
weak positive association with the female share of highly educated managers. In other 
words, the female share of managers with high education is if anything slightly higher in 
countries that provide longer overall leave entitlements for mothers. This, of course, 
provides little support for the argument that leave policies damage the relative attainment 
of highly educated – or indeed, any other – women.  
 
Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings, by education 
level 
 
Cross-country variations in the second indicator of gender equality in occupational 
attainment – the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual 
earnings – offer more support for arguments around class-based trade-offs. Figure 7.4 
shows the gender gap in the proportion with top quintile earnings for those with low and 
high education, by country and for the five-year interval 1995-1999. 
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Figure 7.4. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile 
earnings by education level, 1995-1999  
Low Education (ISCED 0-2) High Education (ISCED 5-6)
Note: Data for Australia is for 1985-1989, and for France and Germany is for 2000-2004 
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In all countries the gender gap is far larger amongst employees with high education than it 
is for those with low educational attainment, indicating that women with low levels of 
education are universally more able to compete with similarly educated men for high 
earning positions than are their highly educated counterparts. There is, however, a fair 
amount of cross-country variation in the size of the gender gaps, particularly at high levels 
of education.  
 
Gender differences in the proportion of highly educated employees with top annual 
quintile earnings range from a peak of 45 percentage points in the Netherlands to a low of 
25 points in Canada – in other words, in the Netherlands the proportion of highly educated 
women in the highest earnings band is almost 50 percentage points lower than the 
proportion of highly educated men, while the equivalent difference in Canada is only 25 
points. Notably, and in-line with the theory, the largest gender gaps for employees with 
high education are generally in the Scandinavian countries. Conversely, the smallest gaps 
are seen mostly in Southern European and liberal-type countries. In other words, highly 
educated women are more able to compete for top earnings in countries that are typically 
low providers of leave policies and indeed family policies more generally.  
 
Patterns in the gender gap amongst employees with low education are fairly different. The 
largest gaps come from a variety of countries – with gender differences particularly large 
in Ireland, Australia and Norway – as do the smallest gender gaps, with France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States all showing gaps less than ten 
percentage points. Generally, the size of the gender gap in the proportion of low-skilled 
employees with top quintile earnings bears little relation to the usual country groupings 
or policy ‘regime’ types. 
 
The structuring of relations between policy and earnings equality by education is made 
more explicit by the correlations shown in panel B in table 7.2 (pg. 245). The dual earner-
carer leave policy index, for instance, is positively correlated with the gender gap at all 
levels of education but shares a far stronger association with the gap amongst highly 
educated employees. In other words, in countries that are generous providers of dual 
earner-carer leave policies women with high levels of education find it particularly hard to 
compete with similarly educated men for top wages110. Likewise, weeks of ‘general family 
                                                        
110 There are also similar associations between the three gender gaps and the dual earner childcare 
index. However, this may be a consequence of the correlation between the dual earner leave and 
childcare policy indices.  
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support’ flat-rate parental and childcare leave also share a positive if weak association 
with the gender gap amongst highly educated employees, although notably correlations 
with the gap for men and women with low or medium education are negative. Broadly, 
though, leave entitlements are associated with larger inequalities at all levels of education 
but with the association particularly strong for female employees with high-level 
qualifications.  
 
This general association is illustrated a little further by the final row in panel B, which 
shows associations between total effective weeks of maternity and parental leave 
available to mothers and the gender gap at the three levels of education. Associations are 
positive across the board, but the correlation is particularly strong for the gap in top 
quintile earnings amongst highly educated employees. Put differently, in countries with 
longer general leave entitlements, women with high levels of education are particularly 
less able to compete with similarly educated men for top wages.  
 
Summary 
 
In sum, cross-sectional associations between family policy and the three education-
differentiated indicators of labour market equality used here are mostly but not fully in-
line with the class-based arguments put forward by Mandel and colleagues (Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). Firstly, dual earner 
policies are associated with decreased gender differences in labour market participation 
at all levels of education, but with effects that appear particularly strong for the gender 
gap amongst men and women with low levels of education. Similarly, leave entitlements 
are associated with increased gender differences in high earnings across the board, but 
may be especially damaging to highly educated women’s relative access to top wages. 
Notably, there is no evidence of an equivalent relation for the female share of managers. 
Nonetheless, the broad inference is that, in the cross-section, less educated women appear 
the primary ‘winners’ from the provision of family policies, and their highly educated 
counterparts possibly the chief ‘loosers’ (Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 
2011; Mandel, 2012). It is against this background that the following three sections 
examine the impact of changes in policy on outcomes across levels of education. 
 
7.3. Gender gap in the labour force participation rate, by education level 
 
At the centre of Mandel and others’ (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 
2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012; Korpi et al, 2013) class-based extension to theories of 
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family policy is the suggestion that the influence of policy – particularly dual earner policy 
– on labour market activity is likely to be stronger for women with low education than for 
their relatively advantaged, highly educated counterparts. This section explores whether 
the effects of changes in policy on gender differences in labour market participation differ 
across levels of education, and in the process whether any effects of policy are 
concentrated mostly on activity amongst men and women with low levels of education. It 
begins as in previous chapters with a description of trends and developments in the 
gender gap across the three levels of education, before moving on to present findings from 
the fixed effects regression models. It should be noted that – because of a lack of space and 
similar to chapter 5 – the descriptive analysis concentrates on participation rates for 25-
49 year olds only. The regression analyses, however, cover gender differences amongst 
25-29 and 30-34 year olds in addition to participation rates among the broader 25-49 year 
old age group.  
 
Description of trends and changes in the gender gap in the labour force participation rate 
(25-49 year olds) by level of education, and links with changes in family policy 
 
The trends presented earlier in chapter 5 showed that gender differences in labour force 
participation rates have decreased considerably across countries over the years since 
1985. Broadly speaking, the following suggests that such decreases can be seen across all 
levels of education, but are far more pronounced among men and women with lower 
levels of educational attainment. Figure 7.5 plots the cross-country unweighted mean 
average gender gap in the labour force participation rate for men and women with low, 
medium and high levels of education between 1992 and 2010. 
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Figure 7.5. Cross-country unweighted average gender gap in the labour force 
participation rate (25-49 year olds), by education level, 1992-2010 
Low Education (ISCED 0-2) Medium Education (ISCED 3-4)
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The cross-country average gender gap in headcount activity falls at all levels of education 
However, the size of the decrease is far larger amongst men and women with low level 
qualifications – the cross-country average gap for highly educated men and women, for 
instance, falls by only 5 percentage points between 1992 and 2010, while the equivalent 
gap for those with low levels of education drops by 17.1 points over the same period. In 
short, progress over the series towards equality in headcount activity is, on average, far 
sharper amongst low-skilled men and women than it is amongst their highly educated 
peers. 
 
A similar pattern is observed within almost all of the sixteen countries for which data are 
available. Table 7.3 shows changes in the gender gap in the labour force participation rate 
by country and education level, with the gap for those with low, medium and high 
education shown in panels A, B and C, respectively. In each case, countries are ranked in 
ascending order according to the degree of change in the gender gap between 1992 and 
2010. The table also summarises change in family policy – although due to constraints on 
space it covers the three policy indices plus total maternity and parental leave available to 
mothers only – and contains descriptive statistics and measures of bivariate linear 
dependence. To describe differences in the size of associations between education levels, 
this includes the beta coefficient from a simple bivariate linear regression, in addition to 
the Pearson’s R correlation coefficient. 
 
A majority of countries see a decrease in the gender gap at all levels of education, but in 
most cases changes are larger for individuals with low levels of education. Ireland and 
Spain see consistently large decreases regardless of education, while Belgium, Greece and 
Luxembourg also perform well across all three levels. Only a minority of countries see an 
increase in gender differences in participation at any level of education – Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden see increases across the board, while Austria also sees an increase in 
the gap amongst men and women with high-level qualifications. For the most part, though, 
patterns of change and country rankings are similar across levels of education, albeit with 
the magnitude of change decreasing as education increases. 
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Given that country performance and placement is roughly comparable regardless of 
education, it is not surprising that simple associations between changes in policy and the 
gender gaps are fairly similar across level of education. Changes in the dual earner-carer 
leave policy index, for example, share a negative and weak-to-moderate correlation with 
changes in all three gender gaps. This correlation is, of course, similar to that seen earlier 
in chapter 5 for the gender gap in the overall participation rate. Also like the relation 
found earlier in chapter 5, changes in the general family support policy index are 
negatively associated changes in the gender gap at all levels of education. In both cases, 
then, levels of education appear to make little difference to the strength and direction of 
crude relations between policy and gender differences in participation.   
 
However, as within-country variation in the gender gap is so much larger at lower levels of 
education, both of these relations do translate into effects of far larger size amongst men 
and women with lower education attainment. This is illustrated by the bivariate linear 
regression coefficients at the bottom of table 7.3 – in both cases, the crude regression 
slope is far steeper for the gap in participation rates amongst men and women with low 
education that it is for the gap amongst their more highly educated counterparts. In other 
words, changes in both dual earner-carer leave policy and general family support appear 
to have a similar type of effect across levels of education, but with the size of any effect far 
larger at lower levels of education.  
 
Notably, though, associations between changes in the dual earner childcare policy index 
and the gender gap in participation do appear to differ slightly across levels of education. 
Changes in the policy index share no relation with movements in the gender gap for those 
with high-level qualifications, but a positive if still weak association with changes in the 
gap at low and particularly moderate levels of education.  
 
That said, and as was also the case in chapter 5, these overall associations are distorted 
somewhat by the experience of the Scandinavian countries111. The effect of excluding the 
Scandinavia countries is illustrated by figure 7.6, which plots changes on the dual earner 
childcare policy index against changes in the gender gap in the labour force participation 
rate for individuals with low and high levels of education. The four Scandinavian countries 
are unshaded, and the fit lines are for the non-Scandinavian countries only. 
 
                                                        
111 This point is especially relevant here as the Scandinavian countries’ status as outliers is inflated 
in this shortened series, given the general increase in the gender gap observed in three of the four 
Nordic states between 1992 and 2010. 
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Excluding the Scandinavian countries reveals fairly similar relations across levels of 
education. Of the remaining twelve countries, those with substantial increases in the dual 
earner childcare index – Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain – tend to see 
relatively large decreases in the gender gap, particularly at low levels of education, while 
those with smaller adjustments in childcare policy typically see smaller gains in equality. 
More generally, amongst the non-Scandinavian nations, changes in the dual earner 
childcare policy index share a moderate-to-strong correlation with changes in all three 
gender gaps112. Again, though, the size of any effect is larger for the gender gap amongst 
individuals with low levels of education113.  
 
Fixed effects regression analysis for the gender gap in the labour force participation rate 
(25-49 year olds; 25-29 year olds; 30-34 year olds), by levels of education 
 
Table 7.4 (overleaf) summarises results from fixed effects linear regression models for the 
gender gap in the labour force participation rate (25-49 year olds) at the three levels of 
                                                        
112 Amongst the twelve non-Scandinavian countries, the correlations stand at r= -0.42 for the 
gender gap in the labour force participation rate for those with low education, r=-0.46 for those 
with medium education, and r=-0.52 for those with high education.  
113 Amongst the twelve non-Scandinavian countries, the beta coefficients stand at -9.45 for the 
gender gap in the labour force participation rate for those with low education, -7.52 for those with 
medium education, and -5.37 for those with high education. 
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Change in the dual earner childcare policy index, 1992-2010 
Figure 7.6. Change in the dual earner childcare policy index and change in the 
gender gap in participation rates amongst men and women with low and high 
education, 1992 to 2010 
 with fit lines for the non-Scandinavian countries only 
Low Education (ISCED 0-2) High Education (ISCED 5-6)
Linear (Low Education (ISCED 0-2)) Linear (High Education (ISCED 5-6))
Note: * = p<0.05 ** = p<0.01 *** = p<0.001. ^ = p<0.1. See figure 4.1 for abbreviations 
r = -0.46 * 
r = -0.51 * 
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education. Models A-C are the main or standard models, in that they use the main nine 
indicators of family policy as the key independent variables. The gender gap for men and 
women with low education is the dependent variable in model A, while the gap in 
participation rates for men and women with moderate and high levels of education are the 
dependent variables in models B and C, respectively. Models D-F are similar, but use the 
alternative measures of leave policy outlined earlier in chapter 3.2 – in other words, they 
substitute in ‘effective weeks of total maternity and parental leave available to mothers’ 
and its square plus ‘effective weeks of childcare leave’ for the indicators of mother-specific 
earnings-related leave, gender-neutral earnings-related parental leave and flat-rate 
parental and childcare leave114.  
 
These main models provide a few point of interest. First and foremost, various results 
from across table 7.4 suggest that certain policies may as theorised be most effective at 
promoting the relative participation of women with low levels of education. Estimates 
from models A-C, for example, show that changes in childcare services for children aged 
less than three share a large, negative and significant115116 association with changes in the 
gender gap at low levels of education, but no clear relation with gender differences in 
participation amongst men and women with moderate and high education. In other words, 
estimates indicate that increasing public childcare for children aged 0-3 is particularly – 
and perhaps only – effective at encouraging equal participation amongst less educated 
men and women. This of course fits well with Mandel and others (Shalev, 2008; Mandel 
and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012), who argue that public 
childcare services are likely to be far more valuable for women with lower levels of 
education.  
 
Similarly, models D-F – which, as noted above, use the alternative measure of leave policy 
– provide some tentative suggestion that changes in total general leave available to 
mothers may promote equal participation but only among men and women with low 
                                                        
114 Given the results of the descriptive analysis, it would also be worth exploring whether or not the 
experience of the Scandinavian countries has any impact on results. There is not space here to 
present a third set of models, but table D.4 in appendix D (pg. 381) shows results from alternative 
specifications that include an additional set of interactions between the six dual earner policy 
indicators and a ‘Scandinavia’ dummy. These interaction models reveal no new relations within the 
remaining non-Scandinavian countries. 
115 The diagnostics in appendix E (pp. 401-410) show that this relation moves out of significance at 
the 5% level if the possibly influential case ‘Portugal 1993’ is removed from the model. However, it 
remains significant at the 10% level and, importantly, the coefficient remains far larger than the 
equivalent for the gender gap in participation at high and moderate levels of education. As a result, 
inferences remain broadly the same regardless of whether ‘Portugal 1993’ is or is not included.  
116 The sensitivity analyses in appendix F (pp. 429-432) also show a similar relation in model D – 
that is, the negative coefficient on public childcare services for 0-2 year olds is significant at the 5% 
level – when cases imputed using LCVF/NVCB are removed from the model.   
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education. The estimated coefficient in model D is negative and relatively large, while the 
equivalent estimates in models E and F – for men and women with moderate and high 
levels of education, respectively – are comparatively small, and in the latter case actually 
slightly positive. It should be emphasised that the joint F-test in model D is significant only 
at the more lenient 10% level, so the association on less educated men and women is far 
from conclusive. Nonetheless, it continues to provide at least a hint that changes in general 
leave may be particularly effective at closing gender gaps in participation among men and 
women with low levels of education, which again makes sense according to the theoretical 
argument put forward by Mandel and others (Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2009; Mandel and 
Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012).  
 
Lastly, there is also some suggestion in model A of a negative and significant association 
between changes in tax support for the family and the gender gap amongst men and 
women with low levels of education. This finding is a little curious – in contrast to the 
theorised effects of financial support for the family, it implies that expanding family-
related tax subsidies can encourage female activity and promote equality in labour 
participation. It is worth noting, though, that because the association is concentrated on 
individuals with low education, it is also concentrated on those men and women that are 
most likely to be living in low-income households. A possible explanation in this situation 
is that increasing household resources through family-related tax subsidies might allow 
families to purchase goods and services – most importantly, private childcare – that are 
necessary for a second earner to enter the labour market in the first place. In other words, 
tax subsidies might ease liquidity constraints on low-income families that otherwise 
prevent second earning (Jaumotte, 2003). In any case, the association certainly provides 
evidence to dispute any claim that financial support for the family discourages female 
activity, amongst those with low levels of education at least. 
 
Importantly though, certain results elsewhere in table 7.4 suggest that the effects of family 
policy on gender differences in labour participation may not be exclusive to men and 
women with low levels of education. More specifically, estimates suggest that certain 
policies may help close gender gaps in participation rates specifically amongst men and 
women with high-level qualifications. Both model C and model F, for example, show a 
negative and highly significant association between changes in father-specific leave and 
the gender gap for men and women with high education, while models A-B and D-E show 
no equivalent association for the gender gaps among those with low and moderate 
education. This relation is notable in itself – inasmuch as it provides some suggestion that 
introducing or extending leaves reserved for fathers can actually reduce gender gaps in 
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economic activity – but of particular interest here is the suggestion that these ‘dual earner’ 
type father-specific leave policies are effective only at promoting equality among men and 
women with high levels of education. Likewise, model F shows a negative and 
significant117 association between childcare provision for 3-6 year olds and the gender gap 
for men and women with high levels of education118. In both cases the substantive effect of 
changes in the policy may be limited – the coefficient on changes in childcare provision for 
slightly older children in particular is only very small, with the estimated effect of a 49 
percentage point increase in coverage, the largest change observed over the series, a 
decrease in the gender gap of just 1.2 percentage points. Nonetheless, both associations 
suggest that highly educated women may gain at least to some degree from changes in 
certain family policy provisions.  
 
This all said, earlier in chapter 5 associations between changes in policy and gender 
differences in labour participation were found to be stronger and clearer when looking at 
activity rates amongst men and women of ‘prime’ childbearing age. It is then worthwhile 
examining how associations vary across levels of education within this more specific age 
group. Estimates for men and women of ‘prime’ childbearing age are shown in tables 7.5 
and 7.6 (overleaf). In both cases, models are identical in specification to those shown in 
table 7.4, but with participation rates for individuals aged 25-29 at varying levels of 
education used as dependent variables in table 7.5, and those for individuals aged 30-34 
in table 7.6119.  
 
Results from both tables provide further indication that the beneficial effects of family 
policy are concentrated mostly but not exclusively on women with lower levels of 
education. Models A-C in table 7.5, for example, show that changes in mother-specific 
earnings-related leave share a negative, large and highly significant association with the 
gap in participation rates among 25-29 year olds with low education, while models A-C in 
table 7.6 show something similar for changes in ‘dual earner’ gender-neutral earnings- 
                                                        
117 The diagnostics in appendix E (pp. 401-410) show that this relation moves out of significance at 
the 5% level if the influential case ‘Luxembourg 1994’ is removed from the model. 
118 The sensitivity analysis show in appendix F (pp. 429-432) show something similar for model C – 
that is, the negative coefficient on public childcare services for 3-6 year olds moves into significance 
at the 5% level – if cases imputed using LCVF/NVCB are removed from the model.  
119 It is worth pointing out that because the mean age of women at childbirth increases with levels 
of education, there is a danger that these more specific models may systematically underestimate 
the effects of policy on women with higher levels of education. That said, across countries most 
births even by highly educated women occur when the mother is aged between 25-34. Data on 
fertility that is disaggregated by education are a little patchy, but even by 2010 the modal age of 
highly educated women at time of birth was between 30 and 32 in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Portugal and Sweden. The only exceptions, where data are available, are Greece and Spain 
where the modal age of women at time of childbirth was 33 and 34 respectively (Eurostat, 2014).  
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related parental leave. In both cases changes in the two leaves have no effect on the 
gender gap among 25-29 or 30-34 year olds with moderate or high levels of education, 
implying that changes in these ‘dual earner’ type leaves are most effective at promoting 
equal participation among men and women with low education.  Both sets of models also 
continue to suggest that the effects of changes in childcare for children aged less than 
three are strongest and clearest at lower levels of education120. Yet, in table 7.5 at least, 
there remains a negative and significant association between changes in father-specific 
leaves and gender differences in participation among highly educated men and women, 
with a coefficient that is in this case actually fairly large. Thus, the broader inference 
remains that the changes in family policy – in the broad sense – operate largely but not 
entirely to the benefit of less educated women.  
 
Finally, before moving on, it is worth making a brief note on a couple of other curious 
associations that emerge from tables 7.5 and 7.6. Specifically, models A and D in table 7.5 
suggest that changes in childcare spending have a large and positive effect on the gap in 
participation rates among 25-29 year olds with low education, while models B and E in 
table 7.6 indicate that increases in the generosity of child benefit may promote equal 
participation amongst 30-34 year olds with moderate levels of education. In both cases the 
association is hard to explain using the theory, although in the former it is possible that 
causality runs the other way with increases in childcare spending a response to increasing 
or stagnant gender gaps amongst less educated 25-29 year olds. In any case, given that the 
two associations are both unexpected in terms of the theory and that there is no evidence 
of a similar relation elsewhere – either in models for the other specific age group, in those 
for the broader age group in table 7.4, or in chapter 5 at the overall level – it is probably 
best not to place too much emphasis on these single results.  
 
Summary 
 
Results from the two sub-sections above provide some albeit slightly mixed support for 
the argument that any benefits associated with family policy provision are likely to be 
concentrated mostly on women with lower levels of education (Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 
2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). Just as for changes in the 
overall labour force participation rate covered in chapter 5, the initial descriptive analysis 
                                                        
120 The sensitivity analyses shown in appendix F (pp. 432-435) suggest that the negative coefficient 
on changes in public childcare services for 0-2 year olds in model D in table 7.5 does move out of 
significance if cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed. However, it remains significant in 
model A in table 7.5 regardless of whether cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are included or not, 
and in any case estimated coefficients continue continue to suggest that any beneficial effects of 
public childcare for very young children are likely to be most substantial for less educated women.   
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suggests any links between changes in dual earner policy and headcount participation are 
either weak or conditional at all levels of education, while associations with general family 
support policy are again negative – not positive – regardless of education. That said, table 
7.3 also shows that changes in the gender gap are far larger at low levels of education, so 
the size of any policy effect would be larger amongst low-skilled men and women than for 
their more highly educated counterparts. In other words, the strength and direction of 
crude bivariate relations are similar across levels of education, but there is some 
suggestion that the size of any impact from changes in policy would be greater for men 
and women with low levels of education.  
 
Results from the linear regression models mostly – but not completely – point in a similar 
direction. There is consistent indication across models that the effects of childcare 
provision for very young children are concentrated on individuals with low-level 
qualifications, while unexpectedly tax support for the family also appears to encourage 
equal participation only amongst men and women with low levels of education. There is 
also evidence to suggest that dual earner-type leaves for mothers may be particularly 
effective at promoting equal participation among men and women with lower levels of 
education, if only once the regression models concentrate on men and women aged 25-34. 
Taken in isolation, these results are consistent with and supportive of the argument that it 
is women with low education that benefit most from family policy provisions (Shalev, 
2008; Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012).  
 
However, results elsewhere suggest that certain other family policies may promote the 
relative participation of highly educated women. In particular, results consistently 
indicate that introducing or extending leaves reserved for fathers encourages equal 
participation amongst highly educated men and women – which is notable in itself given 
that the existing comparative literature says little about the possible positive effects of 
father-specific leave on equality in economic activity (see table A.1 in appendix A (pp. 
314-316)) – while there is also some suggestion that childcare services for slightly older 
children promote the relative activity of women with high level qualifications. These two 
relations might not hold quite the same prominence as those above – the effect sizes on 
both are only fairly small, and on balance women with low levels of education do appear 
to gain more from family policy provision in general. Nonetheless, both relations at least 
suggest that any benefits attached to family policy provision in general are not fully 
exclusive to women with low levels of education.  
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7.4. The female share of managerial employment, by education level 
 
The flip side of the class-based ‘policy paradox’ is that any adverse trade off effects 
attached to certain family policies are expected to cause particular damage to the careers 
of relatively advantaged, highly educated women (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; 
Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). Results shown in chapter 6 support the argument that 
certain policies – particularly leave entitlements – may strengthen obstacles for women to 
high status and high paying positions. However, according to Mandel and others though, 
because it is highly educated individuals who are mostly likely to be competing for such 
positions121, it is also highly educated women who are likely to suffer most from any trade 
off effects. This section examines whether links between changes in family policy and the 
female share of managers vary across levels of education, with a particular focus on 
whether or not any damaging effects attached to leave policies are exceptionally severe for 
highly educated women.    
 
Description of trends and changes in the female share of managers by level of education, and 
links with changes in family policy 
 
Results earlier in chapter 6 showed that women’s relative access to managerial 
employment increased in almost all of the countries examined over the period between 
1992 and 2010. By and large, the following suggests that these gains are concentrated 
mostly on women with high-level qualifications. Figure 7.7 plots the cross-country 
unweighted average female share of managerial employment among managers with low, 
medium and high education for the years 1992 and 2010.  
 
The female share of managers increases, to varying extents, at all levels of education. 
However, gains are far larger among managers with high education – where the increase 
between 1992 and 2010 stands at 14.18 percentage points – than for those with moderate 
and particularly low level qualifications. Indeed, while the female share of managers with 
low education fluctuates a little over the series, the general trend is fairly flat with the  
                                                        
121 Empirically, highly educated individuals hold a disproportionately high share of managerial 
employment. Across the sample, highly educated individuals hold a mean average 35% of 
managerial employment and highly educated women 34% of female managerial employment. For 
comparison, the highly educated share of total employment is only 25% and the highly educated 
share of female employment just 28%. That said, managerial employment is by no mean rare at 
lower levels of education. Individuals with low education hold a mean average of 26% of 
managerial employment, and women with low education 28% of total female managerial 
employment.  
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increase between 1992 and 2010 standing at just over 1 percentage point only. Generally 
then, on average across countries, the ability of highly educated women to compete with 
similarly educated men for managerial employment increased considerably over the years 
following 1992, while the relative ability of women with low education remained fairly 
stagnant.  
 
Differences across levels of education are illustrated further by table 7.7 (overleaf). Panels 
A, B and C summarise, by country, changes in the female share of managerial employment 
amongst managers with low, medium and high education, respectively. In this case, 
countries are ranked in descending order according to change in the female share between 
1992 and 2010, as on this indicator an increase represents a shift towards equality. The 
table again includes descriptive statistics and measures of linear dependence.  
 
Panel A shows that developments in the female share of managers with low education are 
fairly mixed across countries. Eight see gains in the female share at this level of education, 
with the Scandinavian countries in general and Denmark in particular performing well. In 
seven other countries, however, the female share of managers with low education falls 
between 1992 and 2010. Decreases in the female share are considerable in Belgium, 
Germany and France, and exceptionally large in Portugal. 
 
In contrast, panels B and C suggest that growth in the female share of managers with 
either moderate or high education is widespread across almost all of the countries 
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examined. Increases in the female share are generally larger at high levels of education – 
with the gains in Ireland, Spain and, notably, Portugal exceptionally large – but several 
countries also see considerable growth in the female share of managers with moderate-
level qualifications. Broadly, then, table 7.7 points towards an almost universal 
improvement in the ability of women with at least moderate-level qualifications to 
compete with similarly educated men for managerial positions, but more inconsistent 
developments for women with low levels of education.  
 
Given the general expansion of family policy observed in chapter 4, these trends provide 
little immediate support for the argument that policy provision is particularly likely to 
inflate obstacles to top positions for highly educated women. If anything, the opposite 
appears true – shifts towards equal representation in management are particularly large 
for women with high levels of education, while in several countries women with low 
education are less able to compete with similarly educated men for managerial positions 
in 2010 than they were in 1992. As ever, though, it is possible that these broad trends 
mask an underlying correlation between the size or magnitude of changes in policy and 
equality at whatever level of education.  
 
Panel A in table 7.7 shows that changes in the female share of managers with low level 
qualifications share fairly strong links with changes in dual earner policy provision. The 
female share of managers with low levels of education shares a strong and positive 
correlation with the childcare policy index, with several countries – particularly Denmark, 
Ireland and Norway – coupling a considerable increase in female representation with a 
large expansion in general dual earner childcare provision. Conversely, the association 
with changes in the dual earner-carer leave policy index is strong and negative – put 
differently, countries with larger (smaller) increases in dual earner-carer leave policy are 
more likely to see decreases (increases) in the female share of managers with low 
education. Elsewhere, associations with changes in the general family support index and 
total leave are only weak. In the latter case, however, the relation is heavily influenced by 
the experience of France – when removed, the correlation between changes in the female 
share of managers with low education and total leave available to mothers becomes 
negative and moderate-to-strong (r = -0.44). In other words, when France is excluded, 
countries with large increases in the length of general leave available to mothers are more 
likely to see a shift away from equal representation among managers with low-level 
qualifications.  
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Panels B and C suggest crude relations are somewhat weaker for the female share of 
managers with either medium or high education. In both cases there is no real correlation 
between movements in the female share and either dual earner policy index, although 
notably both do share a positive correlation with the general family support policy index. 
Most important, perhaps, correlations for both with changes in the length of total 
maternity and parental leave available to mothers are only weak. The relation for the 
female share of managers with high education is negative, and just as for the share of 
managers with low education does increase in strength if France is excluded (r = -0.35). 
Equally though, the correlation turns positive is Luxembourg is removed (r = 0.21) and the 
association is in general more inconsistent than that seen on the female share of managers 
with low education. On the whole, changes in the female share of managers with either 
medium or high education appear mostly unrelated or, in the case of general family 
support policy, positively related to movements in policy provision.  
 
The broad suggestion here then, is that if changes in family policies do inflate barriers to 
managerial employment for women – as was indicated by the results of chapter 6 – then 
the effects seem to fall mostly on women with low rather than high levels of educational 
attainment. There is also some suggestion that changes in dual earner childcare policy 
may promote access to managerial positions for women with low education. Overall, 
though, these initial associations provide little support for the argument that any adverse 
effects attached to family policy are likely to impact most strongly on relatively 
advantaged, highly educated women.  
 
Fixed effects regression analysis the female share of managers, by level of education 
 
Table 7.8 shows results from fixed effects models for the female share of managerial 
employment at the three levels of education. Models A-C are the main or primary models, 
in that they use the main nine indicators of family policy as the key independent variables. 
The female share of managers with low education is the dependent variable in model A, 
and the share of managers with medium and high education the dependent variables in B 
and C respectively. D-F are similar, but use the alternative measures of leave policy 
outlined earlier in chapter 3.2. 
 
The main models in A-C contain several notable results. Model A, for instance, shows a 
positive and significant relation between changes in father-specific leave and the female 
share of managers with low education. This makes theoretical sense – as discussed earlier 
in chapter 6, leaves reserved for fathers should weaken grounds for discrimination and go 
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some way towards redistributing household divisions of labour. It is notable, though, that 
no such relation is evident among managers with moderate or high levels of education. 
Both models A and C, meanwhile, show positive and significant relations between changes 
in various childcare policies and the female share of managers with low and high 
education, respectively. In the former, there is a large and positive coefficient on the 
proportion of children under three in publicly funded care, while in the latter case there 
are positive significant associations on changes in childcare provision for both younger 
and older children. Curiously, model B shows a negative and significant association 
between provision for older children and the female share of managers with moderate 
education, although the coefficient here is only small122 123. This latter result is difficult to 
explain, in that using the theory it is hard to see why an increase in public childcare 
provision should damage the female share of managers at any level of education, or why 
the relation for moderately-educated managers should differ from those for managers 
with low and high education. Broadly, though, these results provide a least some 
suggestion that an expansion in public childcare services can help at least some women 
into managerial employment.  
 
These main models do not, however, produce any indication that any adverse effects 
associated with leave policies are concentrated on women with high levels of education. 
Indeed, all three models provide little solid evidence of any negative effect of leave on the 
female share of managers at any level of education – the only relation even close to 
significance at the 5% level is the negative coefficient in model A on flat-rate parental and 
childcare leave, which provides a hint that changes in these ‘general family support’ leaves 
may damage the female share of managers with low education124. That said, in chapter 6 
clear and significant relations between leave and the female share did emerge only once 
leave policies were measured through the alternative measure of total general leave 
available to mothers, rather than through the separate indicators of various leave types. 
What may be of more importance, then, are relations between the three female shares and 
changes in total leave available to mothers. This is explored in models D-F in table 7.8, 
which as noted above use the alternative measures of leave as independent variables.  
 
                                                        
122  The diagnostics in appendix E (pp. 401-410) also show that the same is true for model A if the 
possibly influential case ‘Denmark 1992’ is dropped from the model.  
123 The sensitivity analysis in appendix F (pp. 438-442) also shows that the negative coefficient on 
public childcare services for 3-6 year olds in model E moves into significance at the 5% level if any 
cases imputed using LVCB/NVCF are removed from the model. The coefficient, however, remains 
very small, and the association in general remains hard to explain using the theory.  
124 Notably, the diagnostics in appendix E (pp. 401-410) show that if ‘Denmark 1992’ is dropped 
from model A the negative coefficient on flat-rate parental and childcare leave moves into 
significance at the 5% level.  
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At face value, results from models D-F continue to provide little guidance as to how any 
relation between changes in general leave and the female share of managers is structured 
by education. In all three models, associations between changes in total leave available to 
mothers and the female share of managers are not statistically significant at the usual 5% 
level, implying that there is no clear link between changes in general leave and female 
representation amongst managers once data are disaggregated by levels of education125. 
This is curious of course, given that the association with the overall female share found 
earlier in chapter 6 must exist at some level of education, although it should be 
reemphasised that – because no comparable education-differentiated data are available 
for Australia, Canada, New Zealand or the United States – the sample used in table 7.8 is a 
little different to that used in chapter 6126.  
 
Yet, there are interesting differences across the three models in the estimated coefficients 
on total general leave available to mothers that may say at least something about how 
associations between changes in leave and the female share of managers differ by 
education. For ease of interpretation, these estimates are plotted in figure 7.8. 
 
 
 
                                                        
125  It may be worth noting that the coefficients in both models D and F move into significance at 
p<0.05 if OLS standard errors are used in place of the CRSEs. 
126 If these same four countries are also excluded from the models shown earlier in table 6.6 in 
chapter 6, the negative relation with total leave available to mothers also falls out of statistical 
significance.  
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Within-country change in total effective weeks of maternity and parental leave available to 
mothers 
Figure 7.8. Estimated effects of changes in total effective weeks of maternity 
and parental leave available to mothers on the female share of managerial 
employment, by education level 
Based on fixed effects estimates from models D-F in table 7.8 
Female share of managerial employment - low education (ISCED 0-2)
Female share of managerial employment - medium education (ISCED 3-4)
Female share of managerial employment - high education (ISCED 5-6)
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The figure shows that the estimated effects of changes in general leave vary markedly 
across levels of education, albeit with considerable uncertainty in all three cases given the 
size of standard errors. The estimate for the female share of managers with low education 
is similar in direction and in fact larger in size than that seen in chapter 6 for the overall 
female share – here, the estimated effect of a 24-week change in total general leave is, all 
else equal, a decrease of just over 15 percentage points in the female share of managers. In 
contrast, the effect for the female share of managers with moderate education is 
effectively zero regardless of the length of change. More strikingly, the estimate for the 
female share of managers with high education is positive if curvilinear and of at least 
moderate size – in this case, a 24 week change is associated with an increase in the female 
share of managers of just under 10 percentage points.  
 
Given the lack of statistical significance, none of these estimates should be used to make 
their own firm inferences. It cannot be said with any confidence that leave-driven trade off 
effects are concentrated on women with low education – at least not on this evidence 
alone – and more so that leaves may promote the female share of managers with high 
education. However, when compared against one another, what the coefficients from 
models D-F do suggest is that any adverse effects attached to changes in general leave are 
unlikely to be particularly strong for highly educated women. Indeed, given that the 
estimate for highly educated managers is both positive and not too far from significance in 
itself, models D-F provides no indication at all that leave entitlements damage the careers 
of highly educated women, let alone have effects that are particularly severe for the group.  
 
Summary 
 
Considered as a whole, results from this section provide little evidence to support the 
suggestion that any adverse effects attached to family policy – particularly leave policies – 
are especially damaging for highly educated women (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 
2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). Indeed, the trends outlined in table 7.7 show that 
growth in the female share of highly educated managers is particularly large and 
widespread across almost all of the sample countries, while gains for women with low 
education are generally far smaller and more inconsistent. Put differently, across 
countries highly educated women are increasingly capable of competing with similarly 
educated men for top positions, while in several countries women with low education 
were less able to compete in 2010 than they were in 1992. Given the observed general 
increase in family policy provision over the period examined – and in particular the 
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expansion in leave entitlements – these trends provide little immediate indication that it is 
highly educated women who are most exposed to any policy trade off effects.  
 
The linear regression models shown in the subsection above struggle to produce clear 
evidence on the effects of changes in leave entitlements, but loosely point the same way. 
The models provide no strong indication of any link between leave and the female share of 
managers at any level of education, which is at least a little concerning given that chapter 
6 found a clear and significant association when the female share of managers is measured 
at the overall level. However, particularly when considered alongside the trends and 
simple bivariate associations shown in table 7.7, estimates provide absolutely no support 
for the argument that highly educated women are especially vulnerable to any adverse 
effects attached to leave entitlements. Rather, changes in the female share of managers 
with high education appear at worst independent of changes in maternity and parental 
leave.    
 
Elsewhere, the regression models do produce a couple of other interesting – and, indeed, 
statistically significant – results. Father-specific leaves appear to promote the female share 
of managers with low education. This ties in well with the tentative suggestion in the 
previous subsection that it is less educated women who are most at risk from leave-driven 
trade off effects, with the broader inference being that the female share of managers with 
low education is fairly sensitive to the gender balance of leave entitlements in general. 
Changes in childcare provision, meanwhile, are found to increase the female share of 
managers with both low and high education, although curiously not those with moderate 
education. This is a reasonably novel result as no existing comparative ‘over time’ studies 
find or indeed explore the influence of public childcare on women’s relative attainment, 
although it might be used with some caution given that no equivalent relation was found 
earlier in chapter 6 for the overall female share of managers, and also that it remains 
difficult to explain why no similar relation is found for moderately-education managers. 
Regardless, it provides at least some indication that public childcare provisions may help 
women access high status positions.  
 
7.5. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings, by 
education level 
 
In theory, relations between family policy and gender equality in access to high earnings 
should be structured by education in a manner similar to that predicted – but not found – 
in the last section for the female share of managerial employment. The results shown 
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earlier in chapter 6 confirm that changes in certain policies – specifically, leave 
entitlements for mothers – may inflate gender differences in top earnings. According to 
Mandel and others (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012), 
these adverse trade off effects should be concentrated on and strongest for highly 
educated women, who would otherwise be the most likely candidates for high earning 
positions127. This last section examines whether relations between changes in policy and 
the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings vary 
across levels of education, with particular attention again paid to links between changes in 
leave policies and gender differences in top earnings among highly educated employees.   
 
Description of trends and changes in the gender gap in top quintile annual earnings by level 
of education, and links with changes in family policy 
 
Patterns of development across levels of education in the gender gap in top quintile 
earnings are not dissimilar to those seen in the last section for the female share of 
managers. Figure 7.9 plots the cross-country unweighted average gender gap in the 
proportion of employees with top-quintile annual earnings for employees with low, 
medium and high levels of education between 1985-1989 and 2010. 
 
 
 
                                                        
127 Employees with high education are, in the sample, disproportionately likely to have annual 
earnings in the top fifth of the earnings distribution. On average across the sample counties and 
years, 38% of employees with high education hold top quintile earnings. That said, a reasonable 
proportion of employees with low education and medium education also achieve top earnings – the 
mean averages for the two across the sample are 8% and 15%, respectively.  
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Figure 7.9. Cross-country unweighted average gender gap in the proportion of 
employees with top quintile earnings by education level, 1985-2010  
Low Education (ISCED 0-2) Medium Education (ISCED 3-4)
High Education (ISCED 5-6)
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Over the years examined, average gender differences in top quintile earnings fall at all 
levels of education. Again, though, decreases in the gender gap are far larger among 
employees with high-level qualifications than they are amongst their less educated 
counterparts. The unweighted average gender gap at low levels of education, for example, 
falls by just under 3.5 points over the series, from around 10 percentage points in 1985-
1989 to just under 7 points in 2010. Conversely, the equivalent gap for employees with 
high education drops from 37.5 points in 1985-1989 to just over 26 in 2010. To be clear, 
the average gap is far smaller in size for employees with low levels of education, and 
proportional changes are comparable at all three levels of education128. However, the 
general inference from figure 7.9 is that highly educated women have made particular 
progress in their ability to compete with similarly educated men for high earnings over the 
years 1985-2010. 
 
Patterns of change across the individual countries tell a mostly similar story. Panels A, B 
and C in table 7.9 (overleaf) summarise by country changes in the gender gap in the 
proportion of employees with top quintile earnings for employees with low, medium and 
high education, respectively. Countries are ranked in ascending order according to change 
in the gender gap between the first five-year period (1985-1989) and 2010, or the latest 
period available. The table once more includes descriptive statistics and measures of 
linear dependence.  
 
At all three levels of education, a majority of sample countries see at least some decrease 
in the gender gap in top earnings. Indeed, in each case only between two and three 
countries experience any kind of increase in gender differences in high earnings. Those 
countries that perform poorly are fairly consistent across levels of education – Austria and 
Belgium in particular see either an increase or only a small decrease in all three gender 
gaps. High performing countries, however, are a little more diverse. Ireland, for example, 
sees the largest decrease in the gender gap at both low and medium levels of education, 
but only a comparatively small decrease in the gap amongst highly educated employees. 
Australia, meanwhile, performs exceptionally well at high education, but shows only a 
marginal gain in equality amongst employees with moderate level qualifications. More 
widely, gains in equality are considerable at all three levels of education but are generally 
largest among employees with high education. The general picture then, is that gains are  
 
                                                        
128 The gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings for employees 
with low education falls by 33.6% over the series, while the equivalent proportional change for 
employees with medium education is 34.9% and for high education 29.8%.  
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fairly widespread across countries and levels of education but with progress towards 
equal representation sharpest at high levels of education.  
 
These broad trends again provide little immediate support for the argument that family 
policies are particularly likely to harm the careers of highly educated women. Indeed, just 
as for the female share of managerial employment discussed in the last section, for most 
countries the period 1985-2010 is one that couples a general increase in family policy 
provision with a decrease in gender earnings inequality across at all levels of education, 
but particularly amongst highly educated employees.  
 
Generally, associations between the size of changes in policy and the various gender gaps 
suggest developments in access to top earnings are mostly unrelated to policy change at 
all levels of education. Correlations with changes in both dual earner policy indices are 
very weak across education levels. Relations with general family support policy are 
slightly stronger – particularly for the gender gap in top quintile earnings for employees 
with moderate education – and notably are negative, but remain fairly modest 
nonetheless. Perhaps most important given the results of chapter 6, correlations with 
changes in total maternity and parental leave are also weak across levels of education. 
Broadly then, these initial relations indicate that changes in all three gender gaps are 
mostly independent of changes in policy.  
 
Fixed effects regression analysis the gender gap in top quintile annual earnings, by level of 
education 
 
Table 7.10 (overleaf) presents results from fixed effects regression models for the gender 
gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile annual earnings at varying levels of 
education. Models A-C are again the main or primary fixed effects models. The gender gap 
in top quintile earnings for employees with low education is the dependent variable in 
model A, while the gaps for employees with moderate and high levels of education are the 
dependent variables in B and C, respectively. Models D-F are again similar, but use the 
alternative measures of leave policy as independent variables.  
 
The main models in A-C generally show few statistically significant results across all three 
levels of education, although a couple of estimates remain noteworthy nonetheless. Model 
C, for instance, shows a positive and highly significant association between changes in tax 
support for the family and the gender gap in top quintile earnings for employees with high  
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education. Notably, a similar relation was also found for the overall gender gap in chapter 
6 – the extension here is to suggest that the effect is concentrated almost entirely on 
employees with high levels of formal education129. Models A and C, meanwhile, both hint 
at some kind of negative relation between changes in childcare provision for children 
under three and the gap in top quintile earnings for employees with low and high 
education, respectively. Both are significant only at the more lenient 10% level, and so 
should be used with caution130 131. However, it is noticeable that in both cases similar 
relations were also found in the last section for the female share of managers. As a result, 
they add at least a little weight to the suggestion from section 7.5 that childcare provision 
may help promote women’s relative attainment.  
 
Most importantly though, estimates from across the three main models again offer no 
indication that highly educated women are at particular risk from any adverse effects 
attached to leave policies. Indeed, if anything estimates from A-C point towards negative 
associations between changes in at least some leaves and gender differences in high 
earnings amongst more educated employees. Models B and C, for example, show negative 
and very large coefficients on mother-specific earnings related leave, while model C also 
shows a similar estimate on changes in flat-rate ‘general family support’ parental and 
childcare leave. In all cases these associations are non-significant132 at the 5% level at 
least, so none can be used to make any kind of definite inference. However, what remains 
noteworthy is that all three estimates are negative and so substantial in size, while the 
equivalent coefficients in model A for employees with low education are in all cases 
positive if small. It would be a stretch to conclude from these estimates that increases in 
either mother-specific earnings-related leave or flat-rate parental and childcare leave can 
                                                        
129As noted in section 6.4, this association is curious and difficult to explain using the theory. 
Potential explanations given in section 6.4 include the possibility that tax support for the family 
may produce some disincentive for second earner women to push for high earning positions on 
account of increased household income, and that tax subsidies may encourage first earner men to 
reach high wages due to reduced marginal tax rates for first earners. The concentration of the 
association on highly educated men and women only increases the curiosity of the relation – it is 
difficult to see why either of these effects should be particularly strong for highly educated men and 
women, other than the fact that the relative earnings attainment of highly educated men and 
women may be most sensitive to changes in policy simply because many high earners tend to be 
highly educated in the first place.  
130 The diagnostics shown in appendix E (pp. 401-410) suggest that the relation in model C for the 
gap amongst employees with high education becomes moves into significance at the 5% level if 
‘Denmark 1985-89’ is dropped from the model.  
131 The sensitivity analyses in appendix F (pp. 443-446) show that in both cases the association 
moves out of significance altogether if cases imputed using LVCF/NVCF are removed from the 
models. However, this may be due as much to a lack of statistical power in these alternative models 
(n = 65) than to the removal of the imputed cases themselves (see appendix F for more discussion).  
132 That said, the diagnostics shown in appendix E (pp. 401-410) suggest that the relation in model 
B for the gap amongst employees with moderate education becomes significant if either ‘Ireland 
2010’, ‘Austria 1990-94’, ‘Austria 2000-04’ are removed from the model.  
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actively help close gender gaps in top earnings among men and women with higher levels 
of education. However, they certainly provide no evidence to suggest that changes in these 
leaves damage highly educated women’s access to top earnings, let alone have adverse 
effects that are particularly severe for the group.  
 
That said, once again, in chapter 6 clear evidence of the damaging effects of leave on 
gender differences in top quintile earnings only became visible once leaves were 
measured through the alternative set of indicators. This alternative specification is 
recreated for the gender gap at the three levels of education in models D-F in table 7.10 
(pg. 276). 
 
Associations between changes in total maternity and parental leave available to mothers 
and the gender gap in top quintile earnings are once more not statistically significant 
across all three models133. Similar to the female share of managers covered in the last 
section then, models D-F provide no clear or immediate evidence as to how changes in 
leaves for mothers influence equality in high earnings across levels of education. However, 
also like models for the female share of managers, differences across the three models in 
the estimated coefficients on total maternity and parental leave for mothers do perhaps 
provide some clues or hints as to how relations may be structured by education. For ease 
of interpretation, figure 7.10 plots the estimated effects of changes in total leave on the 
gender gap in top quintile earnings for employees with low, medium and high education.  
 
The estimated effect of changes in general leave on high earnings amongst employees with 
low education are similar to those seen in chapter 6 for the overall gender gap – a 24 week 
extension in the total length of leave on offer to mothers is estimated to increase the 
gender gap amongst less educated employees by just under 10 percentage points, all else 
equal. In contrast, the equivalent estimate is – at 2.7 percentage points – far smaller for 
employees with moderate education, while the estimated effect on the gender gap 
amongst employees with high education is effectively zero. 
 
It is important to reiterate once more that all three relations are not statistically 
significant and cannot stand alone. Thus, there is again no strong evidence of any link 
between leave entitlements and top earnings at any level of education, which is in itself 
curious given the association found in chapter 6 for the overall gender gap. However, for 
                                                        
133 Notably, the diagnostics presented in appendix E (pp. 401-410) show that the negative 
coefficient on total maternity and parental leave available to mothers in model D for the gap 
amongst employees with low education increases in size and becomes highly significant if the 
influential case ‘Sweden 1990-94’ is dropped from the model.  
279 
 
 
 
the gender gap amongst those with moderate and particularly high education this lack of 
statistical significance is half the point – changes in leave entitlements for mothers appear 
completely unrelated to movements in gender differences in top quintile earnings for 
employees with higher levels of educational attainment. When considered together with 
the comparatively tiny coefficient on general leave for the gender gap amongst highly 
educated employees – as well as the estimates for the various different types of leave 
outlined above – this lack of significance again provides absolutely no support for the 
argument that any adverse effects attached to leave policies are likely to be strongest for 
or concentrated on women with high levels of education.  
 
Summary  
 
Overall, results from this section produce inferences that are not dissimilar to those for 
the female share of managers. Trends and changes in the gender gap in top quintile annual 
earnings suggest that all female employees regardless of education are increasingly 
capable of competing with similarly educated men for high earnings, but with progress 
particularly large for highly educated women. Initial descriptive associations suggest these 
developments are mostly unrelated to changes in policy – in other words, there is no 
immediate link between the size or direction of changes in policy provision and the 
magnitude of progress towards equality at any level of education. Likewise, results from 
the linear regression analyses also show few clear and statistically significant relations. 
Nonetheless, several results remain interesting. 
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to mothers 
Figure 7.10. Estimated effects of changes in total effective weeks of maternity 
and parental leave available to mothers on the gender gap in top quintile 
earnings, by education 
Based on fixed effects estimates from models D-F in table 7.10 
Gender gap in top quintile earnings - low education (ISCED 0-2)
Gender gap in top quintile earnings - medium education (ISCED 3-4)
Gender gap in top quintile earnings - high education (ISCED 5-6)
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First and foremost, the regression models again provide little support for the argument 
that any leave-driven trade off effects are likely to be particularly severe for highly 
educated women. Indeed, they provide no evidence to suggest that changes in leave 
entitlements have any damaging effect at all on earnings attainment amongst women with 
high levels of education. To reinforce the point, relations with neither total leave for 
mothers nor any other indicator of leave are statistically significant at any level of 
education. Nonetheless, estimates once again at least suggest that leave policies do little or 
no harm to the careers of women with higher levels of educational attainment.  
 
Results elsewhere, meanwhile, provide clearer evidence of effects on gender differences in 
top earnings that differ across or are specific to employees with particular levels of 
education. For example, models across table 7.10 show a positive and significant 
association between changes in tax support for the family and the gender gap in top 
quintile earnings at high levels of education, while there is again some admittedly weak 
indication that expanding childcare provision for children under three reduces the gender 
gap for employees with low and particular high education. Notably though, this latter 
association is consistent with a similar link found for the female share of managers in the 
last section. In any case, the headline finding from this section remains that changes in 
leave policies appear to do no damage to the relative occupational attainment of women 
with higher levels of education. 
 
7.6. Discussion  
 
In a series of recent papers, Mandel and colleagues (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 
2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012) argue that the benefits and costs of family policy 
provision are likely to be structured by class and in particular education. Women with low 
levels of education are likely to be the primary beneficiaries of dual earner policies. 
Publicly funded childcare should be especially valuable for less educated women due to 
the lower market wages typically commanded, while leave policies may be particularly 
effective at preserving the relatively weak labour market attachment amongst women 
with low formal qualifications (Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2011, Mandel, 2012). Highly 
educated women, meanwhile, are likely to be most exposed to any adverse effects 
attached to family policy and in particular leave programmes. Leave-driven trade off 
effects – caused perhaps by inflated discrimination, decreased female human capital or 
reinforced gender norms – may of course impact on all women aspiring to high status and 
high wage employment. However, as it is highly educated individuals who are most likely 
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to be applying for such positions, it is the ability of highly educated women to compete 
with similarly educated men that should suffer most from any constraints placed on 
attainment by leave policies. Taken together, the two form the basis of a class-based 
‘policy paradox’ where women with high education ‘pay’ for increased activity amongst 
their lower skilled peers through a hardened glass ceiling and additional constraints on 
career attainment (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012).  
 
Results from the previous three sections are not entirely consistent with this class-based 
policy trade off argument. First off, trends show broad movements over the series towards 
equality in both economic activity and occupational attainment at all levels of education. 
Gains in the former do tend to be larger among men and women with low education, but 
progress towards equal representation in high earnings and amongst managers is 
generally largest for highly educated women. In other words, in a period characterised by 
a widespread expansion of dual earner family policy provision, women with low education 
have made particular gains in activity but their highly educated counterparts have also 
benefitted from substantial growth in their relative occupational attainment. From the 
start then, there is no immediate indication that relatively advantaged women have 
somehow ‘paid’ for increased activity amongst low-skilled women through constrained 
career opportunities.  
 
Findings from the linear regression models generally point the same way. Results for 
changes in the headcount participation rate – shown in section 7.3 – suggest that the 
effects of certain policies are as theorised concentrated on activity amongst men and 
women with low levels of education. Most prominently, changes in childcare provision for 
children aged less than three appear to promote equality in labour participation primarily 
amongst men and women with low formal qualifications, as also does tax support for the 
family, somewhat surprisingly. Similarly, dual earner-type leaves for mothers appear 
particularly effective at encouraging activity amongst less educated women, at least once 
models concentrate on participation rates for men and women aged 25-34. However, 
these same models also show that certain other policies – specifically, father-specific 
leaves and possibly childcare services for slightly older children – operate mostly to the 
benefit of highly educated women. In substantive terms, the size of the respective 
coefficients mean that – on balance – women with low education may gain more from 
family policy provisions in general. Nonetheless, findings continue to indicate that the 
benefits of family policy are not exclusive to women with low formal education.  
 
Results for the two indicators of occupational attainment, meanwhile, provide no evidence 
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to suggest that it is highly educated women who suffer most from any adverse trade off 
effects attached to leave programmes. To be clear once again, the regression models 
presented in sections 7.4 and 7.5 struggle to produce clear and statistically significant 
relations between leave and attainment at any level of education. However, in both cases 
estimates suggest that changes in maternity and parental leave policies are – however 
measured – at worst unrelated to changes in the ability of highly educated women to 
compete for top positions and high earnings, both in isolation and particularly also when 
compared to equivalent estimates for their less educated peers. When combined with the 
trends and bivariate associations shown across the two sections – which themselves 
suggest that gains in the relative attainment of highly educated women are comparative 
large across countries whatever the change in policy – the broad inference is that highly 
educated women have made particular progress in their ability to compete for top 
positions regardless of changes to leave entitlements. In other words, leave policies seem 
to do no harm to the careers of highly educated women, and – in contrast to theories 
around any class-based ‘policy paradox’ – certainly do not appear to carry damaging 
effects that are particularly severe for women with high level qualifications.   
 
As the data, methods and technical specifications used in these analyses are so similar to 
those also used in the previous two chapters, the results above are subject to all the same 
caveats, qualifications and limitations. Firstly, the technical specifications used throughout 
the linear regression analyses remain reasonably conservative so tests are again fairly 
‘hard’. The use of gender gaps or equality-based measures as dependent variables, for 
instance, once again demands that policies influence gender differences in labour market 
outcomes at the various levels of education, rather than female outcomes only. Likewise, 
the use of cluster robust standard errors (CRSEs) to correct for complications caused by 
non-spherical errors may once more ‘reduce’ the number of statistically significant 
relations134.  
 
Second, results are as ever limited by the data and measures used. In particular, data for 
two of the three indicators used here – the labour force participation rate and the female 
                                                        
134 Notably, if models for the female share of managers are run with the normal OLS standard 
errors, changes in total general leave available to mothers share a negative and significant relation 
with the female share of managers with low education, and a positive and significant association 
with the female share of managers with high education. This would – if used – provide further and 
more solid evidence to suggest that leave entitlements constrain the attainment of low-skilled 
women, and actually promote the achievement of their highly educated counterparts. Again, though, 
these estimates are of uncertain validity. Tests shown in appendix B.4 (pp. 330-332) confirm that 
residuals from models for the female share of managers suffer from panel heteroscedasiticity and 
serial correlation, so OLS standard errors are likely to be open to bias (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck, 
2001). 
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share of managers – cover the European sample countries and the years 1992-2010 only. 
As a result, estimates ignore changes in policy and equality within the four excluded non-
European countries, and those that occurred before 1992 in all countries. In the case of the 
female share of managers, it is possible that the loss of the four non-European countries – 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States –may help explain the lack of 
statistical significance on associations between changes in leave and women’s access to 
managerial employment at all three levels of education. That said, the same is also true for 
associations between changes in leave and the gender gap in top quintile earnings where 
country coverage is more comprehensive and consistent with chapter 6 even if 
measurement remains only at five-year intervals. There also remain issues around 
operationalisation. As discussed earlier in chapter 6, the female share of managers and the 
gender gap in top quintile earnings are unlikely to perfectly capture gender equality in 
occupational attainment, and their use here provides only an indication of the relative 
labour market achievements of men and women at any levels of education. Lastly, the 
employment data used remain fairly aggregated despite by being broken down by levels of 
education and, in the one case, age. It is more than feasible that different relations exist 
amongst, for example, parents and non-parents. Unfortunately, comparable country-level 
data that are broken down by parenthood status – with or without further disaggregation 
by education – are not available.  
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, results from this chapter carry important if not 
particularly straightforward implications. First and foremost, the general inference 
regarding leave entitlements for mothers is that any contradictory effects do not seem to 
operate along class divisions – as is argued by Mandel and colleagues (Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012) – in as much as highly educated 
women do not appear to ‘pay’ for the provision through decreased career attainment. This 
is not to say that leaves do not carry paradoxical effects – the results of chapter 6, after all, 
continue to suggest that changes in leave may moderate gains in women’s relative 
attainment – but the important point here is that these costs do no appear to fall on a 
group of women – those with high education – who would otherwise gain little from the 
provision. This of course compromises at least part of the basis of the theorised class-
based policy paradox.   
 
The problem in this situation, though, is that logic suggests that the associations found at 
the overall level in chapter 6 must exist at some level of education. On balance, results 
shown across the chapter hint – but only hint – that it may be the careers of women with 
lower levels of education that are most likely to be at risk from any adverse effects 
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attached to leave. Growth in women’s relative attainment is comparatively mild at lower 
levels of education, and estimates from the regression models in section 7.4 and 7.5 – 
while generally highly uncertain – consistently point towards negative effects from leave 
programmes for women with low education that are far larger in size than any equivalent 
effect on their more educated counterparts. It should be stressed that the evidence here is 
far from conclusive – the estimates for less educated women are ultimately not significant 
– and any association certainly requires further study, but if proven further such a relation 
would mean that any policy paradox is less ‘inter-class’ and more ‘intra-class’, with both 
the benefits and costs of policy provision falling mostly on women with low level 
qualifications. Regardless, the central point remains that leaves entitlements appear to do 
no harm to the attainment of highly educated women.   
 
Explaining the absence of any adverse effects from leave on highly educated women - and, 
by implication, the possibility of an ‘intra-class’ trade off – requires some modification of 
the policy paradox argument. One possible reason why changes in leave appear generally 
irrelevant to highly educated women’s experience of the labour market is that highly 
educated women are typically less likely to make use of entitlements in the first place. As 
Moss (2010) notes, information on the take up of leave across socio-economic groups is 
unfortunately scarce. However, where data are available the suggestion is that women 
with high level qualifications are less likely to take leave and, when they do, are typically 
on leave for a shorter period of time than their less educated counterparts (Moss, 2010: 
32). More widely, several studies find that better qualified women return to work sooner 
after childbirth (Gustafsson et al, 1996; Macran, et al, 1996; Rönsen and Sundström, 1996; 
Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2005) – with Pronzato (2007) showing this pattern holds across 
European countries regardless of policy setting – while Ruuskanen (2006) finds that 
women without a university degree are far more likely to fail to return to employment at 
all once their leave entitlement ends. In addition, fertility in most countries generally 
decreases with education (Mathews, 1997; Eurostat, 2014) – indeed, based on US census 
data, León (2004) estimates that each additional 3-4 years of education for the mother 
reduces the number of children by one. Taken together, this suggests that women with 
high education are less likely to need and take leave, are likely to use less leave, and are 
more likely to return to employment once their entitlement expires. Thus, as a group 
women with high formal qualifications typically represent a smaller relative ‘risk’ for 
employers looking for candidates for high-level positions, in comparison to their less 
educated female counterparts at least.  
 
Of course, most career oriented women whatever their level of education might 
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themselves be expected to behave in a manner similar to that observed for highly 
educated women – that is, to have fewer children, to take less leave, and to return to 
employment fairly quickly after childbirth. As a result, none of the factors outlined above 
are consistent with a human capital or gender role reinforcement explanation of leave-
driven trade off effects. However, a statistical discrimination approach would suggest that 
a risk-averse employer will treat a given individual based on the average characteristics of 
their demographic. As a result, if employers are aware of the above, then all women with 
lower education may be judged as high risk while highly educated women may be treated 
in a manner at least slightly more similar to men135. Put differently, changes in leave may 
have little effect on the careers of highly educated women because employers expect that – 
on average – such women are likely to make only limited use of the entitlement, while 
their less educated counterparts may continue to suffer from leave-driven discrimination 
on account of the relatively high level of use of leave across the group as whole.   
 
Amongst this discussion, it should not be forgotten that this chapter also provides several 
other notable and, indeed, statistically significant results. Tax support for the family, for 
instance, appears to both promote equality in economic activity amongst men and women 
with low education, and constrain equality in top earnings amongst highly educated 
employees. Thus, there is some evidence here of an inter-class policy trade off, even if both 
sides of the trade off are mostly unexpected in terms of the theory. 
 
Dual earner-type leave policies, meanwhile, are associated with decreases in gender 
differences in participation generally but with the profiting group dependent on the exact 
policy under consideration. More specifically, dual earner-carer leaves available to 
mothers – mother-specific and gender-neutral earnings-related leaves – operate as 
expected mostly to the benefit of less educated women, but father-specific leaves appear 
to promote equal participation only amongst men and women with higher levels of 
education. The latter result is notable in itself as leaves for fathers are largely ignored in 
the ‘over time’ comparative family policy literature (see table A.1 in appendix A (pp. 314-
316)) – thus, the suggestion that changes in father-specific leave can influence equal 
participation at any level of education is relatively novel. However, a further implication 
here is that while Mandel and colleagues (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 
2011; Mandel, 2012) appear correct in their assertion that the benefits of leaves for 
mothers fall mostly on women with low education, evidence from this chapter suggests 
                                                        
135 Furthermore, men with high education are themselves more likely to take leave and use a longer 
period of sharable leaves (Moss, 2010). To some degree, this may further equalise the treatment of 
highly educated men and women by employers.  
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that other groups may be able to gain from different forms of dual earner-carer leave 
policy. In other words, countries may wish to provide a diversity of leaves and target 
entitlements specifically at men as well as women if they want to balance the positive 
effects of child-related leaves across groups. 
 
Lastly, and perhaps most prominently, results provide consistent evidence to suggest that 
changes in public childcare services for children aged less than three promote both 
equality in economic activity amongst low-skilled men and women, and also the relative 
occupation attainment of women with both low and high levels of education. Put 
differently, using public services to reduce new mothers’ caring responsibilities and 
increase returns to second earnings appears to encourage participation and increase the 
ability of women with various levels of education to compete with similarly educated men 
for high status and high earning positions. Taken alongside the absence of any link 
between changes in provision for children under three and gender job segregation (see 
chapter 6), these findings suggest that public services for very young children seem to 
promote gender equality in employment unambiguously.  
 
To sum up, results from this chapter confirm that the effects of changes in family policy on 
gender differences in employment may vary across levels of education. This finding is 
important in itself – if nothing else, it suggests that examining fully aggregated data may 
not always be the most useful approach and may even at times produce misleading results. 
However, in this particular case variations across education are not always 
straightforward, and in certain instances are notably inconsistent with theories around a 
class-based family policy paradox (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; 
Mandel, 2012). Changes in policy operate mostly but not exclusively to the benefit of less 
educated women, while leave entitlements appear to do no harm to the careers of highly 
educated women. These findings of course have implications for arguments around and 
understandings of the family policy ‘paradox’. These implications, along with those 
emerging from the previous two chapters, are discussed in depth in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 8. Discussion and conclusion 
 
 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to provide an empirical examination into the effects 
of changes in family policy on developments in gender equality in employment. It explored 
links between within-country variation in policy provision and a variety of gendered 
labour market outcomes, including gender differences in economic activity and access to 
high level and high paying positions, as well as outcomes at differing levels of education. 
This final chapter looks to bring together the various parts of the thesis in order to draw 
broad conclusions and discuss any implications from the study for both understandings of 
the effects of family policy and future comparative family policy research. It begins in 
section 8.1 with a short summary of the rationale behind and the broad methods and 
approach used in the thesis – a brief overview of ‘what was done and why’ – plus a review 
in section 8.2 of the limitations of the study. Section 8.3 synthesises findings from across 
the thesis and offers answers to its three main research questions, while 8.4 discusses any 
lessons and implications that emerge from these findings for the comparative family policy 
literature. Lastly, section 8.5 reviews the contribution of the thesis to the literature, 
suggests directions for future research, and offers final reflections on the study as a whole.  
 
8.1. Summary of the thesis: what was done and why 
 
Theories of family policy provide a relatively detailed account of how family policy, as a 
macro factor, may influence gender differences in labour market outcomes. Much of the 
theory concentrates on the effects of policy on the supply of market labour. Dual earner 
leave and public childcare policies, it is argued, should encourage female market activity 
and help close gender gaps in labour participation (Korpi, 2000; Ferrarini, 2006; Korpi, 
2010; Mischke, 2011; Korpi et al, 2013), particularly amongst men and women with lower 
levels of education (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). 
In contrast, general family support policies – such as family-related tax and transfer 
schemes, as well as certain leave and childcare provisions – are likely only to reinforce 
gender roles and constrain female market participation (Korpi, 2000; Ferrarini, 2006; 
Korpi, 2010; Mischke, 2011; Korpi et al, 2013).  
 
Importantly, though, many of these same family policies may also carry inadvertent 
adverse ‘trade off’ effects that inflate gender job segregation and reinforce ‘glass ceilings’ 
on women’s careers simultaneous with any influence over economic activity (Ruhm, 1998; 
Blau et al, 2001; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Pettit and 
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Hook, 2009; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and 
Solaz, 2013). Most important here are leave programmes, which unless well designed may 
damage female human capital and rationalise employer discrimination, with negative 
consequences for women’s access to top positions and the concentration of female 
employees in ‘feminised’ occupations (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006). Again, these adverse effects are theoretically likely to differ across 
socio-economic groups. Here, though, it is highly educated women who are expected to be 
most exposed to any adverse effects attached to policy provision (Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 
2012). Together with the expected effects of policy on market participation, this leads to 
the theorisation of an inter-class ‘policy paradox’ where family policy in the broad sense 
operates mostly to the benefit of less educated women at the expense of the careers of 
their more educated counterparts (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; 
Mandel, 2012). 
 
This thesis looked to test empirically whether these theoretical relations hold when 
looking at changes in family policy provision over time. As per the three research 
questions outlined at the start of the thesis, it asked:  
 
Q1. How do within-country changes in family policy relate to within-country changes in 
gender equality in labour market activity? 
 
Q2. How do within-country changes in family policy relate to within-country changes in 
gender job segregation and gender equality in occupational attainment? 
 
Q3. Do relations between within-country changes in family policy and within-country 
changes in the various areas of gender equality in employment differ with levels of 
education? 
 
The emphasis on change or within-country variation in these research questions is 
important. A body of existing empirical comparative research examines and largely 
supports the theorised relations between family policy and gender equality in 
employment. However, much of this existing literature is based on cross-sectional data 
and therefore relies on between-country differences in policy and observed levels of 
gender equality only. This is problematic, because such associations are open to omitted 
variables bias – and, therefore, to potentially misleading results – and because static cross-
national relations may say little about the impact of a change in policy on gendered labour 
market outcomes (Frees, 2004; Dougherty, 2006; Wilson and Butler, 2007; Bartels, 2008; 
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Fairbrother, 2014). This thesis looked to overcome these limitations by combining cross-
national data with a time-series dimension in order to examine links between changes in 
policy provision and gender equality in employment.   
 
It should be reiterated that a growing time-focused comparative family policy literature 
has begun to explore relations between within-country variation in policy and gender 
differences in labour market outcomes (Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Ruhm, 1998; 
Jaumotte, 2003; Ferrarini, 2006; Tranby, 2010; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012, Akgunduz and 
Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon, 2013; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013; Nieuwenhuis, 2014). 
However, this emerging ‘over time’ comparative literature remains in its infancy. Almost 
all of the literature focuses on the effects of policy change on what is termed here labour 
market activity. As a result, answering this thesis’ first research question has to some 
degree represented a replication study. Yet, many of these existing ‘over time’ studies may 
suffer from technical issues that are known to increase the likelihood of finding overly-
optimistic or misleading results. Thus, much of the value of this part of the thesis comes 
from the re-examination of existing results with methods that provide a ‘harder’ or more 
conservative test of relations. In the event, certain results are found to differ even if broad 
inferences remain fairly similar.  
 
This thesis’ second and third research questions aimed to fill more obvious gaps in the 
literature. Few comparative studies examine relations between changes in policy and 
gender segregation and equality in occupational attainment – and, where they do, they 
concentrate almost entirely on the overall gender pay gap only (Ruhm, 1998; Akgunduz 
and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013) – while associations between changes in 
policy and gendered labour market outcomes at varying levels of education are severely 
under researched. Thus, existing knowledge on the ‘policy paradox’ and more so on any 
inter-class policy trade off remains mostly cross-sectional. These areas of the thesis then 
looked to go at least some way towards providing an understanding of how within-
country variations in policy relate to changes in segregation and gender equality in career 
attainment, and to labour market equality at varying levels of education, respectively.  
 
The thesis looked to answer its three research questions through a ‘large-N’ macro 
quantitative comparative investigation that stretched across twenty OECD countries and 
the years 1985-2010. Chapter 4 concentrated solely on family policies. It examined trends, 
patterns and developments in the thesis’ measures of family policy – themselves based 
loosely around Korpi’s (2000) distinction between dual earner and general family support 
policy types – and charted how provisions have changed and evolved across the twenty 
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sample countries between 1985 and 2010. This exercise held its own value, but was also 
helpful in that it outlined the policy context and ‘set the scene’ for the subsequent analyses 
of associations between policy change and developments in gender equality in 
employment. 
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 used statistical techniques to examine links between changes in 
measures of family policy and macro-level indicators of the various aspects of gender 
equality in employment covered by the thesis’ three research questions. Chapter 5 focused 
on answering the first research question. It set within-country variations in measures of 
family policy against two macro-level indicators of gender equality in labour market 
activity – the gender gap in the labour force participation rate, and the gap in usual weekly 
working hours. Chapter 6 did the same for the thesis’ second research question, with 
changes in policy examined against three macro-level measures of segregation and 
equality in occupational attainment – the gender gap in employment in ‘female-type’ 
occupations, the female share of managers, and the gender gap in top quintile annual 
earnings. Lastly, chapter 7 disaggregated three earlier measures – the gender gap in the 
labour force participation rate, the female share of managers, and the gap in top quintile 
annual earnings – by levels of education in order to explore if and how relations between 
policy and equality vary across men and women with differing levels of educational. 
 
In all three chapters analysis was conducted primarily through two-way fixed effects 
multiple linear regression, a form of regression that estimates relations based on within-
country variation in the dependent and independent variables only (Ruhm, 1998; 
Dougherty, 2006; Wilson and Butler, 2007; Bartels, 2008; Wooldridge, 2009). The use of 
regression in macro comparative research does have its drawbacks, many of which 
revolve around the transparency of results and the over-simplification of relations (Shalev, 
2007a; see the following section). This thesis does acknowledge these drawbacks – indeed, 
they motivate the inclusion in this thesis of fairly detailed descriptions of trends and 
developments in that various measures of policy and employment outcomes. However, the 
strength of regression is in its ability to handle and synthesise large quantities of data, and 
to provide some level of statistical control between competing determining factors 
(Pontusson, 2007). Thus, its use throughout this thesis has allowed the study to examine 
the effects of a range of family policies on gendered labour market outcomes after 
controlling for the influence of other policies and alternative determinants, and to make 
use of all observed within-country variation in both policy and equality from across the 
sample. In other words, at least as far as data are available, regression analysis has 
allowed this thesis to base its conclusions on experiences relating to policy change from all 
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twenty sample countries over all years between 1985 and 2010.  
 
8.2. Limitations of the study 
 
Efforts have been made throughout this thesis to identify and highlight limitations and to 
draw attention to key decisions and compromises relating to the methods and techniques 
employed. However, some of these limitations impact upon the reading of results and 
what findings do and do not say. Before moving on to discuss findings and results then, it 
is worth reiterating these limitations and outlining any implications for general inferences. 
These limitations are split into three – those that relate to the thesis’ overall research 
strategy, those that emerge from the data and indicators used, and those that are caused 
by the use of regression as the primary method of analysis.   
 
General research strategy 
 
The ‘large-N’ quantitative comparative research strategy used in this thesis carries several 
benefits in terms of sample size and in the extent to which it reduces the risks of selection 
bias, particularly in comparison to ‘small-N’ in-depth qualitative comparative studies 
(Landman, 2000: 24, 49). It also, however, has its drawbacks. Many of these revolve 
around the need for comparable measures and data that stretch across the sample. In the 
case of this thesis, comparability was for various reasons and in various ways restricted, 
which led to compromises in both the measures and sample used.  
 
First, the need to ensure that policy and employment concepts were transferable across 
countries and time points led to the use of measures of both that were somewhat 
abstracted. In other words, to make certain that measures had a similar meaning across 
cases, it was necessary to use stylised or simplified indicators of several family policies 
and some labour market outcomes. This is important, because simplifying measures 
impacts on the practical usefulness of results. Specifically, it means that most findings 
emerging from this thesis – and also from most other large-N comparative family policy 
studies, for that matter – shed light only on relations between stylised forms of a certain 
family policies and employment outcomes. As a result, findings and inferences cannot 
really be used to advise policy-makers on the exact design of policies, but rather offer 
guidance on the broad types of policy that may or may not impact on gender differences in 
outcomes.  
 
Second, restrictions on the availability of comparable data mean that the thesis had to 
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balance depth in terms of coverage of policies and employment outcomes with breadth in 
terms of sample countries and years. This had twin consequences for the degree to which 
the thesis could improve understandings on the influence of changes in policy on gendered 
labour market outcomes. On the one hand, it meant that the sample used in the thesis was 
restricted to a relatively select group of countries and a fairly moderate time period, which 
limits the generalisability of results. Concurrently, it also placed restrictions on the 
measures and indicators of both family policies and particularly employment outcomes. 
This concern was covered in some depth in chapters 3.2 and 3.3 and is discussed further 
in the following subsection, but the broad point is that the use of a ‘large-N’ comparative 
research strategy led to compromises in the depth and detail with which this thesis could 
capture policies and employment outcomes. As a result, findings reflect relations between 
only those policies and aspects of employment for which at least some comparable data 
were available.  
 
Data and indicators  
 
The data and indicators used throughout this thesis did suffer from various limitations – 
not least, some measures were subject to high rates of missing data. These limitations 
were covered in some depth in chapters 3.2 and 3.3 and at various points throughout the 
thesis. However, two concerns relating to the measurement of gendered labour market 
outcomes bear repeating here as they impact on the reading of results.  
 
First, it is acknowledged that the indicators of gender equality in employment used in this 
thesis were not comprehensive, in that they did not capture every aspect or every possible 
angle on the various areas of employment under consideration. This was particularly true 
for the measures of gender job segregation and equality in occupational attainment, which, 
as noted in chapter 3.3, is a broad and multifaceted area of equality. The selection of 
indicators of segregation and occupational attainment was based primilarily on those used 
in the existing family policy paradox literature (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006; Mandel, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012) with a view to maintaining 
theoretical and empirical comparability across studies. However, it is recognised that the 
use of these particular indicators means that the thesis may have missed the influence 
changes in family policy on various other aspects of gender segregation and occupational 
attainment – most important perhaps, the effects of policy on sectoral segregation but also 
the influence of policy on gender differences in employment at the bottom end of the 
labour market. Similarly, this thesis’ three measures of gender equality in employment 
across levels of education only touch the surface of education-conditioned gender 
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differences in labour market outcomes. Restrictions on the number of indicators used 
were necessary in part due to the availability of data, but also because of space in the 
thesis. Nonetheless, it should be noted that findings and inferences reflect relations 
between changes in policy and certain aspect parts of gender equality in employment only. 
There is certainly room for further research that uses wider or alternative measures of the 
various aspects of gender equality in employment. 
 
Second, it is worth reiterating that most measures of gender equality in employment used 
in this thesis remain fairly aggregated, even after differentiating certain indicators by 
levels of education and in some cases age. Again, the use of aggregate country level 
indicators was necessary due to the availability of comparable data and in particular to the 
scarcity of comparative micro data that stretches across countries and time. However, it 
does mean that findings and inferences should be read as the average effect of changes in 
policy on equality across demographic and socio-economic groups. It remains possible 
that family policies have differential effects across groups. For example, given certain 
results from chapter 5 and 7, it is feasible that relations between policy and the various 
other outcomes differ across age groups. It was unfortunately not possible to produce 
measures differentiated by age on any indicator other than the gap in labour force 
participation rates, but use of more specific age groups might reveal clearer associations 
between family policy and working hours, and perhaps also differing links with the 
various measures of gender job segregation and equality in occupational attainment. 
Likewise, it is also possible that associations may vary across other demographic and 
socio-economic groups. The existing family policy literature suggests that relations are 
particularly likely to differ between parents and non-parents (Gornick et al, 1998; Misra, 
et al, 2008; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012; Nieuwenhuis, 2014) but the effects of changes in 
family policy may also vary across the numerous other markers of demographic and socio-
economic status, such as single-parenthood or family size and structure (Maldonaldo and 
Nieuwenhuis, 2014). Again, repetition of this thesis’ analyses with data dissagregated by 
socio-economic groups might reveal different relations between changes in policy and 
gender differences in employment outcomes.  
 
Regression as the method of analysis 
 
Lastly, while the specific method used throughout the thesis – two way fixed effects 
multiple linear regression – carries a number of benefits, it is worth noting again that it 
also restricts what results can and cannot say about relations between changes in policy 
and gendered labour market outcomes. As touched on above and as covered in chapter 
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3.4, the use of multiple regression in macro comparative research has been criticised on 
the grounds that it lacks transparency and over-simplifies relations (Shalev, 2007a). A 
particularly pertinent aspect of this criticism for the reading of relations revolves around 
the fact that regression analyses generally – but not necessarily – produce only one single 
fixed coefficient to summarise the relation between a given independent variable and 
dependent variable as it exists over the entire sample. Shalev (2007a) in particular 
suggests this is unrealistic, as diverse contexts across time and especially place mean that 
the effects of a given variable may vary across the sample.  
 
Almost all of the models produced in this thesis are open to this criticism, as they too 
summarise relations through only a single fixed coefficient that is assumed to hold across 
countries and years. As a result, it is important to note that any findings and inferences 
apply to the sample as a whole, and that the effects of a given policy may differ for a given 
country or within a certain subset of the sample. As discussed in appendix B.4 (pp. 335-
336), it would of course be valuable to explore whether or not associations differ across 
countries or time periods. However, such an exercise is expensive – particularly in terms 
of space – and is beyond the scope of this thesis.   
 
Improvements 
 
With the possible exception of the need to move measures of policy and employment to 
higher levels of abstraction, most of these limitations are not inevitable – in almost all 
cases they are caused by constraints on the availability of comparable data, and in some 
cases by a lack of space in the thesis. Future research undertaking a similar exercise may 
wish to use individual or micro level repeated cross-section survey data as its source of 
information on employment outcomes, ideally in combination with multilevel modelling 
techniques. Such micro data would allow the analysis to better differentiate between 
different groups of individuals and, dependent on the survey, may contain information on 
a wider range of employment outcomes. Multilevel models, meanwhile, not only have the 
ability to estimate the effects of variation in macro level factors such as policy provision on 
micro level units (Frees, 2004; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012; Fairbrother, 2014), but 
also have the capacity to neatly and concisely estimate variations in relations across macro 
units (Beck and Katz, 2007; Bartels, 2008; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012; Fairbrother, 
2014). Thus, combining micro level repeated cross-section data with multilevel models 
would help overcome several of this thesis’ major limitations.  
 
Unfortunately, suitable repeated cross-section data are currently scarce. For their 
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multilevel analyses of relations between policy change and the likelihood of female 
employment, Nieuwenhuis et al (2012) and Nieuwenhuis (2014) used micro data derived 
from the Eurobarometer survey series. The Eurobarometer data are, though, heavily 
restricted in their coverage of employment outcomes. Other possible sources include the 
Luxembourg Income Study, although as noted earlier data here are generally available 
only at 5-year intervals and coverage of outcomes is fairly limited in earlier years. Perhaps 
the most promising sources of repeated cross-section data come from Eurostat, the 
European Union’s statistical office. The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), for 
example, offers comparable micro data on numerous employment outcomes that stretches 
across all EU member states from 1983 onwards, or from the first year following their 
accession. However, access to the EU-LFS data is difficult. Efforts were made to access the 
EU-LFS micro data during the course of this study, but were unfortunately unsuccessful. 
The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey offers a 
more accessible alternative. However, EU-SILC only started in 2004 so at present offers 
little scope for analyses of the effects policy change. Once the survey has been running for 
a sufficient number of years, it may offer a fruitful avenue for the investigation of the 
impact of within-country variation in family policy on gendered labour market outcomes. 
 
8.3. Synthesis of findings 
 
Despite its limitations, the thesis produced a number of notable findings. In terms of broad 
trends, it has shown that in a period characterised by a general expansion in dual earner 
leave and childcare policy – as well as, in varying directions, changes to policies that are 
more supportive of the nuclear family unit – there has been a near universal decrease in 
gender differences in labour market outcomes across areas of employment and levels of 
education. It has also shown, however, that relations between changes in policy and these 
developments in equality outcomes are not always quite as clear or straightforward as the 
existing literature might suggest. At this point it might be useful to return to the thesis’ 
three research questions before looking to bring results together and draw any emerging 
broad conclusions.  
 
The thesis’ first research question asked how changes in family policy provision relate to 
developments in gender equality in labour market activity, that is, differences in the extent 
of male and female market participation. In broad terms, findings from chapter 5 suggest 
that as expected changes in dual earner leave and childcare policies may help close gender 
gaps in market participation, even if only amongst 25-34 year olds. Particularly 
noteworthy here was the finding that the positive effects of general leave on activity 
  
296
appear driven solely by leave programmes with a dual earner orientation – changes in flat-
rate ‘general family support’ parental and childcare leaves, in contrast, were found to be 
neutral with respect to the gender gap in market participation. Thus, results from chapter 
5 provide at least some support for Korpi’s (2000; 2010) assertion that the structure and 
design of leave policies can have a meaningful impact on the extent to which they 
encourage dual earning. Also of note was the finding that general family support policies 
seem to cause little damage to gender gaps in economic activity. Indeed, general family 
support policies appear largely irrelevant to the relative extent to which men and women 
are active in the labour market.  
 
It is worth pointing out again that results from chapter 5 did suggest changes in policy are 
generally unrelated to gender differences in working hours, and also for the most part to 
participation rates when the latter is measured for the broader 25-54 year old age group. 
In both cases this is inconsistent with much of the existing ‘over time’ empirical literature 
(e.g. Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 
2012; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012), perhaps for reasons discussed in the following section. 
Regardless, broad inferences remain mostly similar – increases in dual earner provisions 
may help promote female economic activity and encourage equal participation even if they 
have no impact on working hours.   
 
Findings from chapter 6 were more immediately in line with expectations. The thesis’ 
second research question asked how changes in family policy relate to changes in gender 
job segregation and equality in occupational attainment, with a particular view to whether 
or not changes in leave and childcare policies inflate segregation and reinforce ‘glass 
ceilings’ on women’s careers. Results suggest that changes in neither dual earner 
provisions nor any other family policies have any clear effect on developments in the 
relative concentration of women in ‘female-type’ occupations. However, changes in total 
general leave available to mothers do appear to constrain growth in women’s relative 
access to both high status managerial positions and to top quintile annual earnings, while 
notably there is also some suggestion that the introduction of, or extensions to, leaves 
reserved for fathers may improve women’s relative access to high earnings, all else equal. 
These results provide considerable support for arguments around policy trade offs or the 
welfare state ‘policy paradox’ (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; 
Pettit and Hook, 2009), particularly when combined with those from chapter 5.  
 
Finally, the thesis’ third research question asked whether relations between policy and 
gender equality in employment vary across levels of education, with particular focus on 
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the theorised inter-class policy paradox put forward by Mandel and other (Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). Chapter 7 found that the effects of 
several policies do indeed differ with levels of education. However, these variations did 
not always follow the expected pattern.  
 
With regard to labour market activity, chapter 7 did find that the effects of public childcare 
for children under three were concentrated mostly on women with lower levels of 
education, as also were the effects of certain dual earner-carer leave policies. However, 
other policies – specifically, father-specific leaves and childcare for slightly older children 
– were found to promote equal participation only amongst highly educated men and 
women. The inference here then is that family policy as a whole does not benefit only less 
educated women – rather, different policies appear to be effective at promoting equality in 
activity amongst different socio-economic groups, even if on balance less educated women 
may gain more.  
 
Chapter 7 generally struggled to produce clear findings on relations between policy and 
occupational attainment at differing levels of education, but several associations were 
noteworthy nonetheless. There was some evidence to suggest that childcare provision for 
very young children may promote the relative attainment of women with both low and 
high levels of education, and surprisingly also that family-related tax subsidies may 
constrain highly educated women’s access to top earnings. However, the headline finding 
from this part of the thesis was that there was no evidence to suggest changes in leave 
entitlements cause particular damage to the careers of highly educated women – indeed, 
changes in the relative attainment of women with high education appear at worst 
unrelated to alterations in the provision of leave programmes. Thus, the latter half of 
chapter 7 produced no support at all for the argument that highly educated women in 
particular ‘pay’ for policy provisions through decreased career attainment, in turn 
compromising at least part of the class-based policy paradox (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and 
Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012).  
 
Bringing these various findings together produces an overall account of the effects of 
family policy that is slightly ‘messier’ than the neat description given in the literature 
(Korpi, 2000; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Mandel and 
Shalev, 2009; Korpi, 2010; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012; Korpi et al, 2013). Results suggest 
that dual earner-type leave and childcare policies may indeed help close gender gaps in 
labour market activity. These effects operate mostly to the benefit of less educated 
women, but certain policies – most notably father-specific leaves – do seem to promote 
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equal participation specifically amongst men and women with high levels of educational 
attainment. At the same time, certain provisions – specifically, leave entitlements for 
mothers – may inadvertently damage female attainment and reinforce ‘glass ceilings’ on 
women’s careers. Yet, this does not appear to apply to highly educated women, whose 
careers were expected to be most at risk from any adverse effects attached to leave 
entitlements. Findings are unfortunately unclear on which group or groups are subject to 
these leave-driven ‘trade off’ effects, but results suggest at least that highly educated 
women’s experience of the labour market is largely unaffected by changes in leave 
entitlements for mothers.  
 
To some extent then, the overarching finding from across the thesis’ empirical chapters is 
that associations are largely consistent with some form of broad family policy paradox 
(Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Pettit and Hook, 2009) but 
provide less support for the more recent class-based extension to the policy paradox 
theory (Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2009; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 
2012). In other words, findings indicate that dual earner policy – and leave entitlements in 
particularly – may at once both promote and damage women’s position in the labour 
market, but there is less evidence to suggest that these contradictory effects operate 
neatly and clearly along class lines or produce some kind of precise trade off between the 
separate interests of women with different levels of education.  
 
8.4. Lessons and implications 
 
These various findings carry a number of lessons and implications for the comparative 
family policy literature. Many of these implications were touched on at various points 
during the thesis, but several bear repeating here at the conclusion. As a means of 
organisation, the following splits these lessons into two – first, those that have 
implications for comparative family policy research and in particular the methods and 
techniques used in future family policy studies, and second those that impact on the 
theory and understandings of links between family policy provision and gender equality in 
employment.  
 
Lessons for research and methods 
 
First off, certain results from various parts of the thesis suggest that there may be 
meaningful differences between the ways in which policy and employment outcomes are 
associated in the cross-section, and how the two are related when looking at within-
  
299 
country changes over time. Much of the rationale behind this thesis was to examine 
whether relatively well-established cross-sectional associations between policy and 
equality also hold when relations are stretched across time. This was motivated in large 
part by concerns about the validity and usefulness of cross-sectional findings, due 
primarily to their openness to omitted variable bias and their static nature, respectively 
(Frees, 2004; Dougherty, 2006; Wilson and Butler, 2007; Bartels, 2008; Fairbrother, 
2014). As it turns out, many cross-sectional relations remain evident when looking at 
changes over time. However, in certain instances the ‘within-country’ relations produced 
by thesis did not match those from the cross-sectional literature, most often because the 
given relation was simply not clear or apparent. 
 
This is perhaps best illustrated by results from chapter 7 on associations between changes 
in policy and the relative occupational attainment of women with differing levels of 
education. The broad pre-existing argument here – that leaves and perhaps public 
childcare services are particularly likely to damage the careers of highly educated women 
– was based entirely on between-country differences in policy provision and the career 
attainment of women with varying levels of education (Shalev, 2008; Mandel, 2009; 
Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). When looking over time, 
however, there is simply no evidence to suggest that increases in leave or childcare 
provisions constrain the careers of women with high education, and in fact highly 
educated women have made particular progress in terms of relative occupational 
attainment over a period that can be characterised by a widespread expansion of dual 
earner policy. This has implications for theory and understandings of course, but the point 
here is that the use of the cross-sectional association alone may have led to inaccurate or 
misleading conclusions regarding the impact of policy on women’s careers.  
 
The implication in terms of methods then, is that it might be unwise to place too much 
emphasis on associations based only on cross-national or between-countries differences 
alone. This is not to say that cross-sectional analyses are not worthwhile – far from it, 
cross-sectional comparative family policy research has generated numerous important 
insights and has stimulated much of the debate on comparative family policies – or that 
time-series cross-section techniques and other ‘over time’ methods are infallible or 
somehow superior to cross-sectional analyses. Indeed, given data constraints and other 
complications, comparative studies that focus on within-country variation cannot in many 
cases – including this one – offer the same level of detail and sophistication as pure cross-
sectional studies. It also not to say that, where relations differ, the cross-sectional 
association is necessarily ‘wrong’. As Shalev (2007a) argues, it is feasible that ‘the effect of 
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a given independent variable may be quite different in time series and cross-section’ (2007a: 
280), most likely because the causal mechanism differs between the two in some way. 
However, it should be recognised that cross-sectional comparative studies are vulnerable 
to omitted variable bias and that the results produced may not always accurately reflect 
the impact of a change in policy on a given outcome.  
 
Notably though, results produced by this thesis did not only differ from those in cross-
sectional family policy studies, but also in certain instances from findings in the emerging 
‘over time’ comparative family policy literature. This was particularly the case in chapter 
5, where models produced no evidence of links between changes in policy and gender 
differences in working hours, and few clear associations between family policy and the 
gender gap in labour force participation rates among 25-54 year olds. In both cases, clear 
and statistically significant associations are common in the existing time-series cross-
section family policy literature (e.g. Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 
2003; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012; see table A.1 in appendix 
A (pp. 314-316)).  
 
It was argued at the end of chapter 5 that these discrepancies were most likely due to 
differences in statistical methods and specifications – specifically, the use in this thesis of 
gender gaps to reduce the risk of bias from wider labour market processes, and more so 
cluster robust standard errors to prevent bias from residuals that suffer panel 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. It should be reiterated that without direct access 
to the data used, it cannot be known whether existing studies suffer from these biases, and 
results presented in this thesis certainly do not disprove those from the existing literature. 
Indeed, the mismatch in results may also be a consequence of differences in other areas, 
such as the sample or the exact measures used. It is also worth stating that in the event, 
these discrepancies did not lead to major differences in inferences – the broad conclusion 
from chapter 5 remained that certain leave and childcare policies may promote gender 
equality in economic activity, even if there was no evidence of any impact on working 
hours. Nonetheless, the differences in results and the evidence used to support the 
argument above – particularly the alternative models shown in appendix D (pp. 377-390) 
that use the normal uncorrected OLS standard errors – continue to suggest that failure to 
correct for statistical issues may influence findings.  
 
The wider lesson here then is that addressing statistical concerns and correcting for 
potential issues and complications may have a considerable impact on results. To be clear, 
this thesis has not been written on econometric methodology and it does not claim to 
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present any kind of methodological innovation – indeed, the techniques referred to above 
are common in wider social science research136. Nevertheless, certain results presented in 
this thesis do provide useful applied examples of the importance of considering statistical 
complications, and highlight the potential vulnerability of comparative policy research to 
misleading results should such concerns not be fully addressed.  
 
Lastly, it is worth making a brief note on the importance of disaggregated data and 
variations in findings across subgroups. Results from chapter 7 suggest that there might 
be fairly substantial differences in relations across levels of education – and also age 
groups, for that matter – with in several cases important implications for broad 
conclusions on the effects of family policy. As an example, results presented in table 7.4 
indicate that increases in father-specific leave may promote equal participation but only 
amongst highly educated men and women. Importantly, this relation was not at all 
apparent in chapter 5 when looking at links between policy and the overall participation 
rate. As a result, this and several other potentially useful findings would have been 
invisible had this thesis used only aggregate level data.  
 
Of course, allowing relations to differ across levels of education barely scratches the 
surface of possible variations across subgroups. As noted above, existing research already 
suggests that relations are likely to differ between parents and non-parents (Gornick et al, 
1998; Misra, et al, 2008; Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012; Nieuwenhuis, 2014), while the impact of 
policy may also vary across the numerous other markers of demographic and socio-
economic status – for instance, single-parenthood or family size and structure 
(Maldonaldo and Nieuwenhuis, 2014) – all of which may further modify and possibly 
compromise existing conclusions on links between policy and employment outcomes. 
However, the point here is that use of fully aggregated employment data may disguise 
important relations between policy and labour market outcomes.   
 
The final broader lesson then is that focusing too much on relations between policy and 
aggregate or overall employment outcomes may lead to inferences that are misleading or 
perhaps even dangerous. As noted above in section 8.2, the use of aggregated data is often 
necessitated by data availability, particularly in situations such as this where information 
is required to stretch across countries and time. Nonetheless, the limitations of aggregated 
                                                        
136 For example, the routine for cluster robust standard errors is built into Stata – a mainstream 
statistical software package – as standard, and the article detailing its introduction to Stata (Rogers, 
1993) has according to Google Scholar received 1975 citations. More generally, the seminal article 
by Beck and Katz (1995) on the dangers of non-spherical errors in time-series cross-section 
regression has been cited over 4000 times, again according to Google Scholar.  
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data should at least be acknowledged, and efforts should be made wherever possible to 
use data that allows for investigation across subgroups.    
 
Implications for theory and knowledge 
 
In addition to these technical lessons, several results from across the thesis carry 
implications for theories of and conclusions around the effects of policy on gendered 
labour market outcomes. As always, it would be premature to place too much emphasis on 
or to draw strong policy conclusions from one single set of results. Nonetheless, a number 
of findings do have at least some impact on understandings around how family policies 
influence gender differences in employment. 
 
First and foremost, results from across the thesis provide considerable support for 
arguments around the wider ‘family policy paradox’ (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; 
Mandel and Semyonov, 2006), in a much as there is consistent suggestion that changes in 
certain policies – specifically, leave entitlements for mothers – have contradictory effects 
on gender differences in employment outcomes. Of course, in broad terms the concept of a 
policy trade off is far from new – as discussed in chapter 2.3, a sizeable cross-sectional 
literature already finds that gender gaps in economic activity tends to be lower and gender 
differences in occupational attainment higher in countries that are more generous 
providers of leave and childcare policies (e.g. Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006; Misra et al, 2008; Mandel, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). However, 
the contribution here is to show that these contradictory effects are also observable when 
looking at changes in provision within countries over time137. In other words, at least as 
far leave entitlements for mothers are concerned, findings from this thesis verify and 
solidify cross-sectional associations and suggest that policy trade offs are more than 
simply a coincidental artefact of between-country differences in policy provision and 
patterns of gendered employment outcomes. 
 
In substantive terms, establishing that changes in at least some policies carry 
contradictory effects is important in as much as it adds further weight to the argument 
                                                        
137 To be clear, several ‘over time’ comparative studies already show that changes in leave 
entitlements for mothers encourage female economic activity (e.g. Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; 
Ruhm, 1998; Jaumotte, 2003; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013). However, 
as discussed in chapters 2 and 6, evidence on links between changes in leave and women’s 
occupational attainment is limited to only one single study (Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2012) that, in 
the event, finds an association between leave and the female share of managerial and professional 
employment that is significant only at the more lenient 10% level. Findings from this thesis build 
and expand upon this study to solidify the argument that changes in leave policies have 
contradictory effects on women’s employment outcomes.  
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that it is difficult to provide a set of family policies that are unambiguously ‘woman-
friendly’ (Mandel and Shalev, 2009). Much of the cross-sectional literature frames the 
discussion of gender trade offs almost in terms of a zero-sum game – the paradoxical 
effects of family policy mean that it is not possible to promote all aspects of gender 
equality in employment simultaneously, so countries are forced to ‘choose’ – based on 
prevailing gender politics and the wider ideological context – between different forms of 
gender stratification138 (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Mandel, 2009). Interpretations here 
are maybe not quite so strict, particularly given that there is no evidence in this thesis to 
suggest that dual earner childcare policies do any damage to women’s careers. Thus, in the 
particular case of childcare services, it may be possible to provide policies that are 
generally beneficial for women’s labour market outcomes. Nevertheless, the wider point 
remains mostly valid – the presence of contradictory effects on leave entitlements means 
that it may be necessary for countries to weigh up and balance the relative merits of using 
leaves to promote female economic activity against those of providing a labour market 
that best allows women to reach top positions.  
 
It is worth highlighting here that certain results from across the thesis suggest countries 
may be able to maximise the benefits and minimise the ‘costs’ of leave programmes 
through the provision of certain types or combinations of entitlements. For example, a 
major finding from chapter 5 was that leaves with ‘dual earner’ characteristics appear 
particularly effective at encouraging equal participation. Results from chapters 6 and 7, 
meanwhile, suggest that the damaging effects of leaves for mothers may be at least 
partially offset by the provision of father-specific entitlements. The rough inference then, 
is that countries may be able to provide a set of leaves that are mostly or at least more 
beneficial for women’s labour market outcomes generally if provisions contain the right 
structures and designs, and if entitlements are offered on a basis that at least approaches 
some form of gender-balance. Yet, to some extent these are side issues – the major 
implication remains that certain policies appear to carry contradictory effects, and that it 
is important to recognise that provision may involve compromises and trade offs between 
the competing labour market interests of different women.  
 
Importantly though, results from the thesis failed to provide support for the more recent 
argument that the contradictory effects of leave policies – as well as the benefits and 
‘costs’ of wider dual earner provision, for that matter – are likely to be divided neatly and 
                                                        
138 The social democratic countries, for example, prefer to provide policies that promote full female 
activity even at the expense of women’s careers. Liberal-type states, in contrast, favour a gender-
neutral approach that allows at least some women to reach top positions even if it does less to 
promote the position of most women (Mandel, 2009: 708-712).  
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clearly by levels of education. Indeed, chapter 7 produced only mixed support for theories 
around the class-conditioned effects of policy provision more generally (Shalev, 2008; 
Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2011; Mandel, 2012). For example, while Mandel and 
others appear broadly correct in their assertion that it is less educated women who stand 
to gain the most from dual earner leave and childcare provisions, certain policies – 
specifically, father-specific leave and public childcare services for slightly older children – 
seem to operate mostly to the benefit of women with high level qualifications. More 
notably perhaps, there was very little support in chapter 7 for the suggestion that any 
adverse effects attached to leave or indeed any other dual earner-type policies are 
particularly severe for highly educated women. Rather, the careers of these women appear 
largely safe from any harmful effects attached to policy provision. 
 
This broad set of findings carries several implications. For instance, establishing that 
different dual earner policies seem to promote economic activity amongst different groups 
of women implies that countries may need to adopt a diversity of provisions if they wish to 
balance the benefits of family policies across groups. The apparent resistance of highly 
educated women to any adverse effects attached to leave policies, meanwhile, means that 
countries may provide entitlements for mothers at least without fear of damaging the 
careers of a demographic that – while comparatively privileged – has generally struggled 
the most to compete with similarly educated men for top positions (see chapter 7.2 and 
tables C.30-C.35 in appendix C (pp. 371-376)). However, perhaps the most considerable 
implications here revolve around the fact that results suggest any family policy paradox 
does not seem to operate neatly along class lines. In other words, while changes in certain 
policies may indeed have contradictory effects on women’s employment outcomes, there 
is little in this thesis to indicate that these contradictions produce some strict trade off 
between the labour market interests of women from separate demographic groups.  
 
From a mostly academic perspective, the failure to find a clear inter-class trade off is 
important in as much as it implies that theories around the class-conditioned effects of 
family policy may need at least some modification. This is particularly so with regards to 
how any adverse effects attached to leave policies are structured by education, since 
findings here are clearly inconsistent with the expectation that it should be the careers of 
highly educated women that are most at risk (Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; 
Mandel, 2012). Results in this thesis are unfortunately unclear on which group or groups 
of women are subject to the adverse effects observed at the overall level, so any further 
theorisations are admittedly a little speculative. Nonetheless, the apparent immunity of 
highly educated women to the damaging effects of leave implies at least that whatever 
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mechanisms lie behind leave-drive trade off effects – statistical discrimination, for 
example – may not apply to or extend across all women equally. The cautious suggestion 
at the end of chapter 7 was that highly educated women may be relatively safe from the 
harmful effects of leave simply because they are less likely to make use of leave 
entitlements in the first place. As a result, women with high level qualifications may, on 
average, represent a comparatively small risk to employers looking for candidates for 
high-end positions. This was, however, very much a post-hoc explanation and was not 
hypothesised by the author prior to the production of results. There is certainly a need for 
further investigation into the ways in which any negative side-effects attached to leave 
policies interact with class, and indeed into how leave policies impact differently on 
women with different resources and socio-economic backgrounds more generally.  
 
The absence here of a clear inter-class trade off also has more practical implications 
though, particularly in the extent to which it provides evidence against the argument that 
policy trade off effects may compromise the the political feasibility of extensive leave and 
childcare provisions. As touched on briefly in chapter 2, theories around the class-
conditioned effects of family policy at times stretch beyond simply describing the expected 
impact of policy across groups to argue that inter-class policy trade offs – and in particular 
the concentration of any ‘costs’ of dual earner policies on women with high education – 
are likely to damage political support for dual earner policies (see Shalev, 2008). More 
precisely, they suggest that because highly educated women are set to gain the least and 
lose the most from generous leave and childcare policies, they are also unlikely to lend 
political support to, and may even actively resist, any general shift towards extensive dual 
earner provision. Crucially, the severity of the issue is likely to be amplified by the fact that 
highly educated women tend to hold the largest political capital. The end result – so the 
argument goes – is that the labour market interests of highly educated women are likely to 
prevent or obstruct generous policy provision in all but the most solidaristic of states139 
(Shalev, 2008: 438-439). 
 
Yet, results from chapter 7 suggest that neither leave nor childcare policies need cause any 
such political opposition amongst relatively privileged women, since there is no evidence 
of an inter-class trade off generally and no indication that dual earner policies do any 
harm to the careers of women with high level qualifications specifically. This is not to 
trivialise the possibility of trade off effects amongst other groups of women. Again, results 
                                                        
139 Indeed, following a comparison of policy provision and gender outcomes between the United 
States and Sweden, Shalev goes as far as to suggest that ‘class interests and gender politics stand in 
the way of moving the United States toward a radically different set of employment and family 
policies’ (2008: 439).     
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are unfortunately unclear on which groups are most vulnerable to the damaging effects of 
leave observed at the overall level, but the tentative suggestion at the end of chapter 7 was 
that it may be the careers of less educated women that are at most risk. If proven further, 
this would mean that any paradoxical effects of policy shift to become mostly ‘intra-class’ 
which may, of course, still lead to compromises and difficulties when looking to balance 
the varying labour market interests of different women. Nonetheless, the central point 
remains that any benefits from leave or other dual earner policies do not seem to come at 
the expense of the careers of an entire demographic – highly educated women – that 
otherwise stand to gain little from the provision. As a result, any trade off effects attached 
to family policies – particularly leave policies – need not necessarily compromise the 
political feasibility of extensive dual earner provision. 
 
Elsewhere, results from across the various empirical chapters carry implications for 
general family support provisions in as much as they suggest that changes in these policies 
– including both flat-rate ‘general family support’ leave entitlements and family-related tax 
and transfer policies – seem to do little or no harm to gender differences in economic 
activity. Broad inferences with regards to flat-rate parental and childcare leaves are a little 
complicated of course, given that results from chapter 6 suggest leave policies in general 
may damage women’s relative career attainment – thus, even if these leaves do not 
discourage female labour supply their provision appears to remain outright harmful to 
women’s labour market interests. However, as far are family-related tax and transfer 
policies are concerned, the absence here of any damaging side effects on female market 
activity could and should be regarded as a positive.  
 
As noted at various points earlier in the thesis, both child benefit and tax subsidies for the 
family are used in many countries as key measures against child poverty and are often 
central to state efforts to boost the incomes of households with children (Oxley et al, 1999; 
Pressman, 2011; Gornick and Jäntti, 2012). Thus, establishing that these policies do no 
harm to female activity should only reinforce the case for – or at least remove one 
potential obstacle against – their provision. Moreover, there was some suggestion in 
chapter 7 that changes in family-related tax subsidies may even actively promote equal 
participation amongst less educated men and women. This latter finding was unexpected 
theoretically and would certainly require further testing before being used to justify 
policy. However, if confirmed, it would perhaps even enhance the rationale behind the 
provision of financial support for the family, on the grounds that it may also help boost the 
incomes of households with less educated parents indirectly through labour market 
participation. In any case, the broader point remains that changes in family-related tax and 
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cash transfer policies seem to do no damage to female labour supply, and thus may be 
used to provide families with financial support without the risk of inflating gender gaps in 
market activity.  
 
Findings from across the thesis also carry implications for the provision of public childcare 
services, particularly in the extent to which they underline the importance of public or 
publicly supported childcare for children aged less than three. More specifically, results 
from the various empirical chapters indicate that changes in provision for children under 
three may not only help reduce gender gaps in labour force participation rates – both 
generally and in particular amongst less educated men and women – but also and 
importantly carry no apparent side effects for gender job segregation or women’s careers. 
Indeed, the suggestion from chapter 7 was that changes in childcare for the under threes 
may even promote equality in occupational attainment amongst individuals with either 
low or high levels of education. It is notable that changes in provision for slightly older 
children appear to have only limited effects on gender differences in employment, and 
more so that changes in public childcare spending seems to have no impact at all. 
Nonetheless, results consistently suggest that public services for children less than three 
may represent a particularly effective tool for the promotion of women’s labour market 
interests.  
 
It should be acknowledged that public childcare provisions are not cheap. Indeed, in 2010, 
public spending on early childhood education and care reached in the most generous 
countries – such as Denmark and Sweden – as high as 2% of GDP, or around 6.7% of total 
social expenditure (OECD, 2013d). It should also be emphasised here at the conclusion 
that the data used to measure childcare provision for children between zero and three is 
far from perfect – the indicator suffers from a high rate of missing data, and even where 
cases are complete the data are unlikely to fully capture public childcare provisions (see 
chapter 3.2). Nonetheless, as far as the data do reflect state efforts to provide or support 
childcare services for very young children – and to the extent that countries are willing to 
fund extensive public childcare systems – the broad inference here is that supporting 
childcare services for the very young may be one of the most promising avenues for 
provision, not only with respect to female market participation but also for gender 
equality in employment more generally. 
 
Finally, before closing, it is worth making a brief note on the effects of father-specific leave. 
As mentioned at several points across the thesis, father-specific leaves are generally 
understudied in the comparative family policy literature and in particular in ‘over time’ 
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comparative family policy research (see table A.1 in appendix A (pp. 314-316)). Findings 
from this thesis, however, suggest that leaves reserved for fathers may have important 
and meaningful effects on gender difference in employment outcomes – specifically, 
results suggest that father-specific leaves may help close gender gaps in economic activity 
– albeit possibly only among highly educated men and women – and perhaps more 
importantly can help offset at least some part of the damaging effect of leaves for mothers 
on women’s career attainment. Findings from one single study are of course hardly 
conclusive, and the impact of father-specific leave on gender differences in labour market 
outcomes certainly needs further investigation. However, these initial results suggest that 
leaves for fathers – which, as outlined in chapter 4, are already becoming increasingly 
common and extensive across countries – may well represent an important policy tool for 
governments seeking to promote gender equality in employment outcomes.   
 
8.5. Final reflections and conclusions 
 
It was stated at the start of the thesis that understanding the effects of changes in family 
policy on gender differences in employment outcomes is central to identifying the best 
route towards a more efficient and equitable labour market. Motivated in large part by 
concerns around the validity of well-established cross-sectional associations and 
limitations in the scope of existing ‘over time’ research, the principle aim of this study was 
to provide an empirical investigation into the role played by changes in family policy in the 
development over time of gender gaps in various employment outcomes. The thesis faced 
its challenges, especially with regard to the availability of suitable and useful comparative 
data. Nonetheless, it was able to go at least some way towards addressing certain gaps and 
deficiencies in the comparative family policy literature, particularly around the lack of 
breadth in existing studies that examine links between within-country variation in policy 
and women’s careers and the almost entire absence of research on the impact of changes 
in policy on outcomes at differing levels of education.    
 
The primary empirical contribution of the thesis was to show that while changes in certain 
policies may indeed have contradictory or paradoxical effects on women’s employment 
outcomes, any such paradox does not seem to operate neatly and clearly along class lines. 
Results indicate that dual earner leave and childcare policies promote equal market 
participation, while at the same time certain policies – specifically, leave entitlements for 
mothers – may inadvertently damage women’s ability to reach top positions and high 
wages. Results also suggest that these effects may vary by levels of education. Yet, these 
variations were not always as the theory predicts. The effects of policy on economic 
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activity appear to operate primarily but not exclusively to the benefit of men and women 
with low levels of education, while any damaging effects attached to leave do not seem to 
apply to highly educated women. Thus, while the provision of family policy may still 
involve difficulties when looking to balance the concerns of different women, it does not 
appear the case that policies produce some form of strict trade off between the separate 
interests of women from different socio-economic groups. Put simply, certain family 
policies may well have paradoxical effects on female employment outcomes, but the 
benefits do not appear to accrue only to less educated women while the costs do not 
appear to fall only – or, indeed, at all – on their highly educated counterparts.  
 
In some ways, these findings open up as many avenues for research as they close. For 
instance, establishing that at least some family policies have contradictory effects on 
gender differences in employment outcomes raises other questions around how countries 
may structure provisions so as to maximise the benefits and minimise the damaging ‘costs’ 
of policy provision. As touched on in the section above, there was some indication in this 
thesis that leaves with ‘dual earner’ characteristics may be particularly effective at 
promoting equal participation, and also that father-specific leaves may help offset at least 
some of the damaging effects attached to leave entitlements for mothers. More 
importantly, perhaps, there was also consistent evidence to suggest that public childcare 
services for children under three may encourage female activity seemingly without any 
adverse effects on women’s careers. Both sets of findings are encouraging and offer clues 
as to how countries may mitigate or avoid policy trade offs, but most are fairly novel and 
all need further verification before being used to inform policy. There certainly remains a 
need for future family policy research to consider not only whether or not policies have 
paradoxical effects, but also how and in what way countries can construct a set of policies 
that best promotes gender equality in employment while also causing the minimum of 
harm to women’s occupational attainment.  
 
There is undoubtedly also a demand for further investigation into the impact of changes in 
family policy on employment outcomes across levels of education. Findings from this 
thesis suggest that there may be important differences in the ways in which policies affect 
the outcomes of individuals with different levels of education, but results from one study 
are of course hardly decisive. This is particularly the case with regard to how the 
damaging effects of leave policies on women’s careers are structured by education. As 
noted above, results here indicate that changes in leave policies have no detrimental 
effects at all on highly educated women’s ability to reach managerial positions and high 
wages. However, this raises at least a couple of further questions around the ways in 
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which leave-driven trade off effects interact with education. 
 
Firstly, the apparent immunity of highly educated women to the adverse effects of leave 
policies remains at least slightly curious in itself, given both the expectations of the theory 
(Shalev, 2008; Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Mandel, 2012) and that positions at the top end 
of the labour market are generally dominated by individuals with high level qualifications. 
The cautious suggestion earlier was that highly educated women may escape any 
damaging effects mostly because they are less likely to make use of leave entitlements in 
the first place, but it should be emphasised that this was post-hoc reasoning only. There is 
certainly a need for further theoretical and empirical research into the ways in which 
leave policies do or do not impact on the careers of highly educated women, and 
particularly for investigation into how or why women with high level qualifications appear 
largely safe from any adverse effects attached to leave policies.    
 
Secondly, if highly educated women are not subject to the damaging effects of leave, then 
the question remains which group or groups of women are vulnerable to the effects seen 
at the overall level? As discussed earlier, answers in this thesis are unfortunately unclear – 
there was a hint in chapter 7 that it may be women with low education that are most at 
risk from leave-driven trade off effects but, given the lack of statistical significance on the 
association, evidence there was far from conclusive. There is then a need for further 
investigation into links between leave and women’s occupational attainment across levels 
of education generally. However, the prospect that it may be less educated women that are 
particularly susceptible to any adverse effects – and, by implication, the possibility of a 
policy paradox with both sides concentrated mostly on women with lower levels of 
education – may warrant particular attention from future research.  
 
Lastly, in broader terms, results from across the thesis highlight a general need for future 
comparative family policy research to both consider relations between changes in policy 
and outcomes over time, and to take into account possible differences in associations 
across various socio-economic and demographic groups. As noted earlier, meeting these 
twin requirements is difficult at present due primarily to limitations on country-level data 
and constraints on the availability of repeated cross-section micro data. However, as and 
when suitable data become available, family policy research may wish to explore further 
how changes in policy impact differentially on men and women with varying 
characteristics.   
 
As a final point, it should not be forgotten that the broad message from the thesis in terms 
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of trends and developments in gender equality is largely positive. Although women’s 
economic activity and attainment continues to lag behind that of their male counterparts 
on all indicators used, the trend across countries and areas of equality is for falling gender 
differences in outcomes with decreases that are in many cases substantial. This is 
particularly true for equality in labour participation – especially amongst less educated 
men and women – but also and importantly broadly the case across measures of 
segregation and occupational attainment. While the role of family policy in these 
developments appears fairly messy and contradictory, these broad trends provide at least 
some cause for optimism even if – and this should be stressed – male and female labour 
market outcomes remain unequal across all countries examined.  
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Appendix A. Summary of methodological and empirical aspects of 
twenty key comparative family policy studies 
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w
h
o
 a
re
 m
ar
ri
ed
 o
r 
w
h
o
 h
av
e 
ch
ild
re
n
 u
n
d
er
 s
ix
. 
Fe
rr
ar
in
i (
2
0
0
6
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
an
d
 
ac
ro
ss
 t
im
e
1
8
 O
EC
D
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
9
7
0
-2
0
0
0
D
u
al
 E
ar
n
er
 P
o
lic
y:
 W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
p
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
-r
el
at
ed
 p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
.  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
G
en
er
al
 F
am
ily
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
: W
ee
ks
 o
f 
fl
at
-r
at
e 
p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
; 
Le
ve
l o
f 
ch
ild
 b
en
ef
it
s;
 L
ev
el
 o
f 
lu
m
p
-s
u
m
 m
at
er
n
it
y 
gr
an
ts
So
ci
al
 C
it
iz
en
sh
ip
 In
d
ic
at
o
r 
P
ro
gr
am
m
e 
(S
C
IP
) 
D
at
ab
as
e.
Fe
m
al
e 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 r
at
e 
(2
0
-4
4
 
ye
ar
 o
ld
s)
O
EC
D
 L
ab
o
u
r 
Fo
rc
e 
St
at
is
ti
cs
; I
LO
 
La
b
o
u
r 
St
at
is
ti
cs
P
o
o
le
d
 t
im
e-
se
ri
es
 c
ro
ss
-
se
ct
io
n
: f
ix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
 O
LS
 
re
gr
es
si
o
n
D
u
a
l e
a
rn
er
 p
o
lic
ie
s 
p
ro
m
o
te
 f
em
al
e 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
. G
en
er
a
l f
a
m
ily
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 p
o
lic
ie
s 
ar
e 
n
eg
at
iv
el
y 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
si
gn
if
ic
an
tl
y 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 f
em
al
e 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
cp
at
io
n
. 
M
an
d
el
 a
n
d
 S
em
yo
n
o
v 
(2
0
0
6
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
2
2
 O
EC
D
 a
n
d
 
Ea
st
er
n
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
M
id
d
le
-t
o
-l
at
e-
1
9
9
0
's
W
el
fa
re
 S
ta
te
 In
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
 In
d
ex
 (
W
SI
I)
: W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 E
n
ro
le
m
en
t 
o
f 
p
re
-
sc
h
o
o
l c
h
ild
re
n
 in
 p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
; S
iz
e 
o
f 
p
u
b
lic
 s
o
ci
al
 s
er
vi
ce
 
se
ct
o
r.
  
V
ar
io
u
s:
 u
n
o
b
ta
in
ab
le
G
en
d
er
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 o
d
d
s 
o
f 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
; i
n
 o
d
d
s 
o
f 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
in
 a
 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l p
o
si
ti
o
n
; i
n
 o
d
d
s 
o
f 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
in
 a
 'l
u
cr
ac
ti
ve
' m
an
ag
er
ia
l p
o
si
ti
o
n
; a
n
d
 in
 
o
d
d
s 
o
f 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
in
 a
 'f
em
al
e-
ty
p
e'
 
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
 (
al
l 2
5
-6
0
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
 
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
 In
co
m
e 
St
u
d
y 
(L
IS
) 
M
ic
ro
-d
at
a
M
u
lt
ile
ve
l l
o
gi
st
ic
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
Th
e 
W
SI
I m
ea
su
re
 is
 p
o
si
ti
ve
ly
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 f
em
al
e 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
, b
u
t 
n
eg
at
iv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 w
o
m
en
's
 
ac
ce
ss
 t
o
 m
an
ge
ri
al
 p
o
si
ti
o
n
s 
an
d
 p
o
si
ti
ve
ly
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 t
h
e 
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 o
f 
fe
m
al
e 
em
p
lo
ye
es
 in
 'f
em
al
e-
ty
p
e'
 jo
b
s.
  
315 
 
Ta
b
le
 A
.1
 (
co
n
t'
d
.)
. S
u
m
m
ar
y 
o
f 
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
gi
ca
l a
n
d
 e
m
p
ir
ic
al
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
tw
en
ty
 k
ey
 c
o
m
p
ar
at
iv
e 
fa
m
ily
 p
o
lic
y 
st
u
d
ie
s
A
u
th
o
r(
s)
 (
Ye
ar
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
an
d
/o
r 
ac
ro
ss
 t
im
e
C
o
u
n
tr
y 
sa
m
p
le
Ye
ar
(s
) 
sa
m
p
le
d
Fa
m
ily
 p
o
lic
ie
s 
co
ve
re
d
 
Fa
m
ily
 p
o
lic
y 
d
at
a 
so
u
rc
es
 o
r 
d
at
as
et
La
b
o
u
r 
m
ar
ke
t 
o
u
tc
o
m
es
 c
o
ve
re
d
La
b
o
u
r 
m
ar
ke
t 
d
at
a 
so
u
rc
es
 o
r 
d
at
as
et
M
et
h
o
d
 o
f 
an
al
ys
is
K
ey
 f
in
d
in
gs
M
is
ra
, B
u
d
ig
 a
n
d
 
B
o
ec
km
an
 (
2
0
0
8
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
8
 O
EC
D
 a
n
d
 
Ea
st
er
n
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
C
ir
ca
 1
9
9
5
/2
0
0
0
W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 W
ee
ks
 
an
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
; W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 
w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
p
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 E
n
ro
lm
en
t 
in
 
p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 u
n
d
er
 t
h
re
e;
 E
n
ro
lm
en
t 
in
 p
u
b
lic
 
ch
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
re
e 
an
d
 f
iv
e.
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
B
o
ec
km
an
, B
u
d
ig
 a
n
d
 M
is
ra
 (
2
0
1
2
) 
W
o
rk
-
Fa
m
ily
 P
o
lic
y 
In
d
ic
at
o
rs
M
o
th
er
h
o
o
d
 w
ag
e 
ga
p
 (
2
5
-4
9
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
 In
co
m
e 
St
u
d
y 
(L
IS
) 
M
ic
ro
-d
at
a
Tw
o
-s
ta
ge
 H
ec
km
an
 
es
ti
m
at
io
n
 m
o
d
el
s
M
at
er
n
it
y,
 p
ar
en
ta
l a
n
d
 p
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e 
al
l d
ec
re
as
e 
th
e 
m
o
th
er
h
o
o
d
 w
ag
e 
p
en
al
ty
, a
lt
h
o
u
gh
 t
h
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f 
p
ar
en
ta
l 
le
av
e 
w
ee
ks
 a
re
 c
u
rv
ili
n
ea
r 
in
 t
h
at
 t
h
ey
 in
fl
at
e 
th
e 
w
ag
e 
p
en
al
ty
 w
h
en
 v
er
y 
lo
n
g 
o
r 
ve
ry
 s
h
o
rt
. P
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
u
n
d
er
 t
h
re
es
 d
ec
re
as
es
 t
h
e 
m
o
th
er
h
o
o
d
 w
ag
e 
p
en
al
it
y,
 w
h
ile
 
p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
th
re
e 
to
 f
iv
e 
ye
ar
 o
ld
s 
sh
ar
es
 n
o
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
re
la
ti
o
n
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
m
o
th
er
h
o
o
d
 w
ag
e 
p
en
al
ty
. 
Tr
an
b
y 
(2
0
1
0
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
an
d
 
ac
ro
ss
 t
im
e
1
4
 O
EC
D
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
9
6
0
-2
0
0
8
P
re
se
n
ce
, w
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 P
re
se
n
ce
 a
n
d
 w
ee
ks
 o
f 
p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
; P
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
p
at
er
n
it
y 
b
en
ef
it
s;
 W
ee
ks
 o
f 
an
d
 p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
p
ai
d
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 
le
av
e;
 P
u
b
lic
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 le
av
e 
p
o
lic
ie
s;
 E
n
ti
tl
m
en
t 
to
 a
n
d
 
en
ro
lm
en
t 
in
 p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 u
n
d
er
 t
h
re
e;
 
En
ti
tl
m
en
t 
to
 a
n
d
 e
n
ro
lm
en
t 
in
 p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
re
e 
an
d
 s
ch
o
o
l a
ge
; P
u
b
lic
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 
ch
ild
ca
re
; P
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
ta
x 
re
lie
f 
fo
r 
ch
ild
ca
re
; P
u
b
lic
 
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 f
am
ily
 a
llo
w
an
ce
s.
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
A
u
th
o
r'
s 
o
w
n
 f
ro
m
 n
u
m
er
o
u
s 
so
u
rc
es
 
Fe
m
al
e 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 r
at
es
 (
1
5
-
6
4
; 1
5
-2
4
; 2
5
-3
4
; 3
5
-4
4
; 4
5
-5
4
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
; 
fe
m
al
e 
p
ar
t-
ti
m
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
s;
 f
em
al
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
p
ar
t-
ti
m
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t;
 f
em
al
e 
in
vo
lu
n
ta
ry
 p
ar
t-
ti
m
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t;
 g
en
d
er
 
p
ay
 g
ap
; o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
 s
eg
re
ga
ti
o
n
 (
al
l a
ll 
ag
es
).
 
V
ar
io
u
s,
 p
ri
m
ar
ily
: O
EC
D
 L
ab
o
u
r 
Fo
rc
e 
St
at
is
ti
cs
; I
LO
 L
ab
o
u
r 
St
at
is
ti
cs
P
o
o
le
d
 t
im
e-
se
ri
es
 c
ro
ss
-
se
ct
io
n
: r
an
d
o
m
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 
m
o
d
el
s
P
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
s 
an
d
 p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 p
ro
vi
si
o
n
 in
cr
ea
se
 la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 a
m
o
n
gs
t 
yo
u
n
g 
w
o
m
en
. P
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 
p
ro
vi
si
o
n
 a
ls
o
 d
ec
re
as
es
 w
o
m
en
's
 c
o
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 in
 p
ar
t-
ti
m
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
an
d
 in
 in
vo
lu
n
ta
ry
 p
ar
t-
ti
m
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t,
 a
n
d
 
re
d
u
ce
s 
th
e 
ge
n
d
er
 p
ay
 g
ap
. P
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
s 
an
d
 p
u
b
lic
 
ch
ild
ca
re
 s
h
ar
e 
n
o
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
 w
it
h
 o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
 
se
gr
eg
at
io
n
. F
am
ily
 a
llo
w
an
ce
s 
an
d
 b
en
ef
it
s 
re
d
u
ce
 la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 a
m
o
n
gs
t 
yo
u
n
g 
w
o
m
en
 a
n
d
, i
m
p
o
rt
an
tl
y,
 
in
cr
ea
se
 o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
al
 s
eg
re
ga
ti
o
n
. 
M
an
d
el
 (
2
0
1
1
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
5
 O
EC
D
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
2
0
0
7
W
ee
ks
 o
f 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
an
d
 p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
; P
ro
vi
si
o
n
 o
f 
ch
ild
ca
re
 
fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 u
n
d
er
 t
h
re
e;
 P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 e
m
p
lo
ye
d
 in
 t
h
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
se
ct
o
r;
 P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 e
m
p
lo
ye
d
 in
 t
h
e 
p
u
b
lic
 s
ec
to
r;
 p
u
b
lic
 
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 f
am
ily
 s
er
vi
ce
s;
 p
u
b
lic
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 f
am
ily
 
ca
sh
 t
ra
n
sf
er
s;
 p
u
b
lic
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 f
am
ily
 t
ax
 m
ea
su
re
s.
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
V
ar
io
u
s,
 p
ri
m
ar
ily
: O
EC
D
 F
am
ily
 D
at
ab
as
e;
 
O
EC
D
 E
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
O
u
tl
o
o
k;
 H
au
sm
an
n
 e
t 
al
 (
2
0
0
9
) 
Th
e 
G
lo
b
al
 G
en
d
er
 G
ap
 R
ep
o
rt
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 a
m
o
n
g 
m
o
th
er
s 
(a
ll 
ag
es
);
 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 r
at
es
 (
al
l a
ge
s)
; 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 a
m
o
n
g 
si
n
gl
e 
m
o
th
er
s 
(a
ll 
ag
es
);
 w
o
m
en
's
 r
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 in
 m
an
ge
ri
al
 
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s 
(a
ll 
ag
es
);
 w
o
m
en
's
 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 in
 t
o
p
 w
ag
e 
q
u
in
ti
le
 (
2
5
-6
4
 
ye
ar
 o
ld
s)
; w
o
m
en
's
 r
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 in
 
su
p
er
vi
so
ry
 p
o
si
ti
o
n
s 
(a
ll 
ag
es
)
V
ar
io
u
s,
 p
ri
m
ar
ily
: L
u
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
 
In
co
m
e 
St
u
d
y 
(L
IS
) 
M
ic
ro
-d
at
a;
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 S
o
ci
al
 S
u
rv
ey
 
P
ro
gr
am
m
e
Ex
p
lo
ra
to
ry
 f
ac
to
r 
an
al
ys
is
 a
n
d
 
d
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
Th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
f 
fa
m
ily
 p
o
lic
ie
s 
va
ry
 b
y 
cl
as
s 
p
o
si
ti
o
n
. T
h
o
se
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
th
at
 p
ro
vi
d
e 
ex
te
n
si
ve
 f
am
ily
 p
o
lic
ie
s 
p
ro
m
o
te
 
eq
u
al
it
y 
am
o
n
g 
d
is
ad
va
n
ta
ge
d
 g
ro
u
p
s 
b
u
t 
h
o
ld
 g
re
at
er
 
in
eq
u
al
it
ie
s 
am
o
n
gs
t 
ad
va
n
ta
ge
d
 g
ro
u
p
s.
 T
h
e 
o
p
p
o
si
te
 is
 t
ru
e 
fo
r 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
w
it
h
 r
el
at
iv
el
y 
u
n
ge
n
er
o
u
s 
se
ts
 o
f 
fa
m
ily
 p
o
lic
y.
 
M
is
ch
ke
 (
2
0
1
1
) 
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
EU
1
5
2
0
0
5
D
u
al
 E
ar
n
er
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
:W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
p
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
-r
el
at
ed
 p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
; C
o
ve
ra
ge
 o
f 
p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 
fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 u
n
d
er
 t
h
re
e.
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
G
en
er
al
 F
am
ily
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
:W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
o
f 
fl
at
-
ra
te
 p
ar
en
ta
l a
n
d
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 le
av
es
; C
o
ve
ra
ge
 o
f 
p
u
b
lic
 
ch
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 a
ge
d
 t
h
re
e 
to
 s
ch
o
o
l a
ge
; P
u
b
lic
 
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 c
h
ild
 a
n
d
 f
am
ily
 b
en
ef
it
s;
 T
ax
 s
av
in
gs
 f
o
r 
fa
m
ili
es
 
V
ar
io
u
s,
 p
ri
m
ar
ily
: M
o
ss
 a
n
d
 O
'B
ri
en
 
(2
0
0
6
) 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
P
ar
en
ta
l 
Le
av
e 
P
o
lic
ie
s 
an
d
 R
el
at
ed
 R
es
ea
rc
h
; 
Eu
ro
st
at
; O
EC
D
 B
en
ef
it
s 
an
d
 W
ag
es
Fe
m
al
e 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 r
at
es
 (
al
l 
ag
es
)
Eu
ro
st
at
 L
ab
o
u
r 
M
ar
ke
t 
St
at
is
ti
cs
; 
M
o
ss
 a
n
d
 O
'B
ri
en
 (
2
0
0
6
) 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
P
ar
en
ta
l 
Le
av
e 
P
o
lic
ie
s 
an
d
 R
el
at
ed
 
R
es
ea
rc
h
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
w
it
h
 g
re
at
er
 le
ve
ls
 o
f 
d
u
a
l e
a
rn
er
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 p
o
lic
y 
al
so
 
te
n
d
 t
o
 h
av
e 
h
ig
h
er
 f
em
al
e 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 r
at
es
. 
A
kg
u
n
d
u
z 
an
d
 
P
la
n
te
n
ga
 (
2
0
1
2
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
an
d
 
ac
ro
ss
 t
im
e
1
6
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
9
7
0
-2
0
1
0
To
ta
l w
ee
ks
 o
f 
p
ai
d
 le
av
e 
av
ai
la
b
le
 t
o
 m
o
th
er
s 
(w
ei
gh
te
d
 b
y 
th
e 
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
).
V
ar
io
u
s,
 p
ri
m
ar
ily
: G
au
th
ie
r 
an
d
 B
o
rt
n
ik
 
(2
0
0
1
) 
C
o
m
p
ar
at
iv
e 
M
at
er
n
it
y,
 P
ar
en
ta
l, 
an
d
 C
h
ild
ca
re
 D
at
ab
as
e
G
en
d
er
 g
ap
s 
in
 t
h
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 (
1
5
-6
4
; 
2
5
-3
4
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
, i
n
  w
ee
kl
y 
w
o
rk
in
g 
h
o
u
rs
 (
2
5
-
5
4
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
, i
n
  h
o
u
rl
y 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g 
w
ag
es
 
(a
ll 
ag
es
),
 in
 w
ag
es
 f
o
r 
'f
in
an
ci
al
 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
ri
es
' (
al
l a
ge
s)
; a
n
d
 t
h
e 
fe
m
al
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
in
 h
ig
h
-l
ev
el
 
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s 
(a
ll 
ag
es
)
O
EC
D
 L
ab
o
u
r 
Fo
rc
e 
St
at
is
ti
cs
; I
LO
 
La
b
o
u
r 
St
at
is
ti
cs
; E
u
ro
st
at
 L
ab
o
u
r 
M
ar
ke
t 
St
at
is
ti
cs
P
o
o
le
d
 t
im
e 
se
ri
es
 c
ro
ss
 
se
ct
io
n
: f
ix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
 O
LS
 a
n
d
 
w
ei
gh
te
d
 le
as
t 
sq
u
ar
es
 
re
gr
es
si
o
n
s
Th
e 
le
n
gt
h
 o
f 
le
av
e 
av
ai
la
b
le
 t
o
 m
o
th
er
s 
sh
ar
es
 a
 c
u
rv
ili
n
ea
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
 w
it
h
 f
em
al
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
s 
an
d
 w
ee
kl
y 
w
o
rk
in
g 
h
o
u
rs
. S
h
o
rt
 p
er
io
d
s 
o
f 
le
av
e 
p
ro
m
o
te
 f
em
al
e 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 b
u
t 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 d
im
in
is
h
es
 p
as
t 
a 
ce
rt
ai
n
 le
n
gt
h
. T
h
e 
le
n
gt
h
 o
f 
le
av
e 
is
 
u
n
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 f
em
al
e 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g 
w
ag
es
. H
o
w
ev
er
, t
h
e 
le
n
gt
h
 o
f 
le
av
e 
is
 n
eg
at
iv
el
y 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 f
em
al
e 
w
ag
es
 in
 
'f
in
an
ci
al
 in
te
rm
ed
ia
ti
o
n
' a
n
d
 t
o
 t
h
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
w
o
m
en
 in
 h
ig
h
-
le
ve
l o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s.
 
M
an
d
el
 (
2
0
1
2
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
2
1
  O
EC
D
 a
n
d
 
Ea
st
er
n
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
C
ir
ca
 1
9
9
5
/2
0
0
0
W
el
fa
re
 S
ta
te
 In
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
 In
d
ex
 (
W
SI
I)
: W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 E
n
ro
le
m
en
t 
o
f 
p
re
-
sc
h
o
o
l c
h
ild
re
n
 in
 p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
; S
iz
e 
o
f 
p
u
b
lic
 s
o
ci
al
 s
er
vi
ce
 
se
ct
o
r.
  
V
ar
io
u
s:
 u
n
o
b
ta
in
ab
le
St
an
d
ar
d
iz
ed
 g
en
d
er
 p
ay
 g
ap
,  
b
y 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 (
2
5
-6
0
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
 In
co
m
e 
St
u
d
y 
(L
IS
) 
M
ic
ro
-d
at
a
M
u
lt
ile
ve
l l
in
ea
r 
re
gr
es
si
o
n
Th
e 
W
SI
I i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
ea
rn
in
gs
 in
eq
u
al
it
ie
s 
am
o
n
gs
t 
h
ig
h
ly
 
ed
u
ca
te
d
 m
en
 a
n
d
 w
o
m
en
 b
u
t 
h
as
 n
o
 e
ff
ec
t 
o
n
 t
h
o
se
 w
it
h
 lo
w
 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
. L
ea
ve
 e
n
ti
tl
em
en
ts
 in
cr
ea
se
 e
ar
n
in
gs
 in
eq
u
al
it
ie
s 
am
o
n
gs
t 
b
o
th
 g
ro
u
p
s,
 b
u
t 
w
it
h
 a
n
 e
ff
ec
t 
th
at
 is
 f
ar
 la
rg
er
 f
o
r 
m
en
 a
n
d
 w
o
m
en
 w
it
h
 h
ig
h
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
. C
h
ild
ca
re
 h
as
 n
o
 e
ff
ec
t 
at
 e
it
h
er
 le
ve
l o
f 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
. P
u
b
lic
 w
el
fa
re
 e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
ea
rn
in
gs
 in
eq
u
al
it
ie
s 
am
o
n
gs
t 
h
ig
h
ly
 e
d
u
ca
te
d
 m
en
 
an
d
 w
o
m
en
 b
u
t 
h
as
 n
o
 e
ff
ec
t 
o
n
 t
h
o
se
 w
it
h
 lo
w
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
.
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Ta
b
le
 A
.1
 (
co
n
t'
d
.)
. S
u
m
m
ar
y 
o
f 
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
gi
ca
l a
n
d
 e
m
p
ir
ic
al
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
tw
en
ty
 k
ey
 c
o
m
p
ar
at
iv
e 
fa
m
ily
 p
o
lic
y 
st
u
d
ie
s
A
u
th
o
r(
s)
 (
Ye
ar
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
an
d
/o
r 
ac
ro
ss
 t
im
e
C
o
u
n
tr
y 
sa
m
p
le
Ye
ar
(s
) 
sa
m
p
le
d
Fa
m
ily
 p
o
lic
ie
s 
co
ve
re
d
 
Fa
m
ily
 p
o
lic
y 
d
at
a 
so
u
rc
es
 o
r 
d
at
as
et
La
b
o
u
r 
m
ar
ke
t 
o
u
tc
o
m
es
 c
o
ve
re
d
La
b
o
u
r 
m
ar
ke
t 
d
at
a 
so
u
rc
es
 o
r 
d
at
as
et
M
et
h
o
d
 o
f 
an
al
ys
is
K
ey
 f
in
d
in
gs
M
is
ra
, B
u
d
ig
 a
n
d
 
B
o
ec
km
an
 (
2
0
1
2
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
2
1
 O
EC
D
 a
n
d
 
Ea
st
er
n
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
C
ir
ca
 2
0
0
0
W
ee
ks
 o
f 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 w
ee
ks
 o
f 
p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
; 
En
ro
lm
en
t 
in
 p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 u
n
d
er
 t
h
re
e;
 
En
ro
lm
en
t 
in
 p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
re
e 
an
d
 
si
x.
B
o
ec
km
an
, B
u
d
ig
 a
n
d
 M
is
ra
 (
2
0
1
2
) 
W
o
rk
-
Fa
m
ily
 P
o
lic
y 
In
d
ic
at
o
rs
Fe
m
al
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
h
o
u
rs
 (
2
5
-5
4
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
; 
fe
m
al
e 
an
n
u
al
 w
ag
es
 (
2
5
-5
4
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
 In
co
m
e 
St
u
d
y 
(L
IS
) 
M
ic
ro
-d
at
a
Tw
o
-s
ta
ge
 H
ec
km
an
 
es
ti
m
at
io
n
 m
o
d
el
s
W
ee
ks
 o
f 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e 
p
ro
m
o
te
 w
o
m
en
's
 w
o
rk
in
g 
h
o
u
rs
 
an
d
 e
ar
n
in
gs
, w
h
ile
 w
ee
ks
 o
f 
p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
 h
av
e 
cu
rv
ili
n
ea
r 
ef
fe
ct
s 
o
n
 b
o
th
. P
u
b
lic
 p
ro
vs
io
n
 o
f 
ch
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
u
n
d
er
 t
h
re
es
 
p
ro
m
o
te
s 
b
o
th
 h
o
u
rs
 a
n
d
 e
ar
n
in
gs
, w
h
ile
 p
u
b
lic
 p
ro
vi
si
o
n
 o
f 
ch
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
th
re
e 
to
 s
ix
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s 
is
 n
eu
tr
al
. 
N
ie
u
w
en
h
u
is
, N
ee
d
 a
n
d
 
va
n
 d
er
 K
o
lk
 (
2
0
1
2
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
an
d
 
ac
ro
ss
 t
im
e
1
8
 O
EC
D
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
9
7
5
-1
9
9
9
W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 W
ee
ks
 
o
f 
ch
ild
ca
re
 le
av
e;
 L
ev
el
 o
f 
fa
m
ily
 a
llo
w
an
ce
s;
 L
ev
el
 o
f 
ta
x 
re
lie
f 
fo
r 
fa
m
ili
es
. 
G
au
th
ie
r 
an
d
 B
o
rt
n
ik
 (
2
0
0
1
) 
C
o
m
p
ar
at
iv
e 
M
at
er
n
it
y,
 P
ar
en
ta
l, 
an
d
 C
h
ild
ca
re
 
D
at
ab
as
e;
 G
au
th
ie
r 
(2
0
0
3
) 
C
o
m
p
ar
at
iv
e 
B
en
ef
it
s 
D
at
ab
as
e
Fe
m
al
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
st
at
u
s 
(2
0
-5
0
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
Eu
ro
b
ar
o
m
et
er
 M
ic
ro
-d
at
a
M
u
lt
ile
ve
l l
o
gi
st
ic
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 h
ig
h
er
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
s 
fo
r 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e 
an
d
 w
ee
ks
 o
f 
ch
ild
ca
re
 le
av
e 
p
ro
m
o
te
 f
em
al
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t.
 
.W
ee
ks
 o
f 
m
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e 
h
av
e 
a 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n
 t
h
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
o
f 
n
o
n
-m
o
th
er
s.
 F
am
ily
 a
llo
w
an
ce
s 
re
d
u
ce
 t
h
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
o
f 
m
o
th
er
s,
 a
n
d
 f
am
ily
 t
ax
 b
en
ef
it
s 
re
d
u
ce
 t
h
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
o
f 
al
l w
o
m
en
. 
K
o
rp
i, 
Fe
rr
ar
in
i a
n
d
 
En
gl
u
n
d
 (
2
0
1
3
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
5
 O
EC
D
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
2
0
0
0
D
u
al
 E
ar
n
er
 C
ar
er
 P
o
lic
y:
 W
ee
ks
 a
n
d
 w
ag
e 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
ra
te
 
o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
-r
el
at
ed
 p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
; W
ee
ks
 o
f 
p
at
er
n
it
y 
le
av
e;
 
En
ro
lm
en
t 
in
 p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 u
n
d
er
 t
h
re
e;
 
En
ro
lm
en
t 
in
 f
u
ll-
ti
m
e 
p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
re
n
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
th
re
e 
an
d
 s
ch
o
o
l a
ge
.  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Tr
ad
it
io
n
al
 F
am
ily
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
: L
ev
el
 o
f 
ch
ild
 b
en
ef
it
; E
n
ro
lm
en
t 
in
 p
ar
t-
ti
m
e 
ch
ild
ca
re
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 a
ge
d
 t
h
re
e 
to
 s
ch
o
o
l a
ge
; 
W
ee
ks
 o
f 
ch
ild
ca
re
 le
av
e;
 M
ar
ri
ag
e 
su
b
si
d
ie
s.
V
ar
io
u
s,
 p
ri
m
ar
ily
: S
o
ci
al
 C
it
iz
en
sh
ip
 
In
d
ic
at
o
r 
P
ro
gr
am
m
e 
(S
C
IP
) 
D
at
ab
as
e;
 
Eu
ro
p
ea
n
 U
n
io
n
 E
u
ry
d
ic
e 
D
at
ab
as
e;
 
G
o
rn
ic
k 
an
d
 M
ey
er
s 
(2
0
0
3
) 
C
o
m
p
ar
at
iv
e 
Fa
m
ily
 B
en
ef
it
s 
D
at
ab
as
e
Fe
m
al
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
st
at
u
s,
 b
y 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
le
ve
l (
2
5
-5
4
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
; W
o
m
en
's
 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 in
 t
o
p
 e
ar
n
in
gs
 q
u
in
ti
le
 (
2
5
-5
4
 
ye
ar
 o
ld
s)
, b
y 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
 le
ve
l. 
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
 In
co
m
e 
St
u
d
y 
(L
IS
) 
M
ic
ro
-d
at
a
M
u
lt
ile
ve
l l
o
gi
st
ic
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
D
u
a
l e
a
rn
er
 c
a
re
r
 p
o
lic
ie
s 
p
ro
m
o
te
 f
em
al
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
at
 a
ll 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
, b
u
t 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
sl
ig
h
tl
y 
la
rg
er
 f
o
r 
th
o
se
 w
it
h
 lo
w
 a
n
d
 m
ed
iu
m
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
.T
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l f
a
m
ily
 
su
p
p
o
rt
 p
o
lic
y 
is
 n
eg
at
iv
el
y 
b
u
t 
m
o
st
ly
 in
si
gn
if
ic
an
tl
y 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 
fe
m
al
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
at
 a
ll 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
. B
o
th
 p
o
lic
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
d
ec
re
as
e 
th
e 
p
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 o
f 
h
ig
h
ly
 e
d
u
ca
te
d
 w
o
m
en
 
re
ac
h
in
g 
to
p
 q
u
in
ti
le
 w
ag
es
. H
o
w
ev
er
, a
ft
er
 c
o
n
tr
o
lli
n
g 
fo
r 
so
ci
o
-e
co
n
o
m
ic
 s
el
ec
ti
vi
ty
 in
 w
o
m
en
's
 e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t,
 m
aj
o
r 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 w
o
m
en
's
 c
h
an
ce
s 
o
f 
fi
n
d
in
g 
to
p
 q
u
in
ti
le
 e
ar
n
in
gs
 
ca
n
n
o
t 
b
e 
fo
u
n
d
. 
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o
n
 (
2
0
1
3
)
A
cr
o
ss
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
an
d
 
ac
ro
ss
 t
im
e
1
8
 O
EC
D
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
9
8
0
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0
0
7
P
u
b
lic
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 f
am
ily
 b
en
ef
it
s;
 P
u
b
lic
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 
ch
ild
ca
re
 s
er
vi
ce
s;
 P
u
b
lic
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 le
av
e 
an
d
 b
ir
th
 
gr
an
ts
; W
ee
ks
 o
f 
p
ai
d
 le
av
e;
 S
er
vi
ce
 c
o
ve
ra
ge
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
 
u
n
d
er
 a
ge
 3
; R
el
at
iv
e 
ta
x 
ra
te
 o
f 
se
co
n
d
 e
ar
n
er
; F
in
an
ci
al
 
in
ce
n
ti
ve
 t
o
 w
o
rk
 p
ar
t-
ti
m
e
O
EC
D
 F
am
ily
 D
at
ab
as
e
Fe
m
al
e 
la
b
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 r
at
e 
(2
5
-5
4
 
ye
ar
 o
ld
s)
; f
em
al
e 
fu
ll-
ti
m
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
(2
5
-
5
4
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
; f
em
al
e 
p
ar
t-
ti
m
e 
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
(2
5
-5
4
 y
ea
r 
o
ld
s)
.
O
EC
D
 L
ab
o
u
r 
Fo
rc
e 
St
at
is
ti
cs
P
o
o
le
d
 t
im
e-
se
ri
es
 c
ro
ss
-
se
ct
io
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Appendix B. Methodological appendix to chapter 3 
 
 
Chapter 3 outlined the data, methods and techniques used in the thesis in some detail. 
However, a number of aspects require a little further discussion and clarification. This 
appendix expands upon and justifies several features of the thesis’ research strategy. 
Section B.1 discusses the thesis’ use of a large-N quantitative comparative approach. B.2 
outlines and adds detail to the techniques used to construct the thesis’ three composite 
family policy indices. B.3 clarifies how the thesis deals with missing data, while B.4 
discusses the various issues and complications involved with using regression techniques 
to analyse time-series cross-section data, and justifies the techniques used in the thesis to 
deal with these complications.  
 
B.1. Large-N quantitative comparative approach 
 
As touched on at the start of chapter 3, the general research strategy used in this thesis 
could be classified as ‘large-N’ quantitative comparative, in that the thesis looks to 
understand links between changes in policy and employment outcomes through the 
analysis of quantitative data drawn from a relatively large number of countries (20) and 
fairly large number of years (26). Comparative methods are, of course, popular in social 
policy research and indeed in social research more widely. Although to some degree all 
social research is comparative (Kennet, 2001: 41), explicit comparative designs look to use 
contextual, temporal or spatial variation as controlling factors and to employ the ‘logic of 
comparison’ in order to approximate some form of quasi-experiment (Lijphart, 1971), 
with the end goal of isolating empirical relationship that are disassociated from a given 
and specific situation (Pennings et al, 1999: 24; Hantrais, 2009: 6, 10). In this case, the 
thesis looks to draw on similarities and differences in the experience of a number of 
countries in order to identify some general influence of family policy on employment 
outcomes. Of course, it is by no means impossible to explore the effects of family policy 
within a given country140. However, at times single country studies struggle to isolate the 
direct effects of family policies from the many other context-specific determinants of 
gender differences in employment outcomes. Using and comparing the experiences of 
multiple countries allows for delineation of whether the two share an association away 
                                                        
140 Indeed, a number of extremely valuable studies explore the influence of policy and changes in 
policy within a single country (e.g. Baum, 1993; Joesch, 1997; Waldfogel, 1999; Waldfogel et al, 
1998; Bainbridge et al, 2003; Naz, 2003; Zveglich and van der Meulen Rodgers, 2003; Schönberg 
and Lusteck, 2007; Baker and Milligan, 2008; Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008; Lundin, Mörk and 
Ӧckert, 2008; Hanratty & Trzcinski, 2009; Havnes and Magstad, 2009) 
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from a given specific setting. 
 
There is, of course, no one particular comparative method. Generally, strategies in 
comparative social research tend to be separated into two main types – small-N case-
oriented studies, and large-N variable-oriented studies141 (Landman, 2000: 49). The 
former case-oriented approach takes countries themselves as the primary units of analysis 
and seeks to understand the complex causes of specific and diverse outcomes within the 
defined countries. To do so, case-oriented studies examine countries in depth and detail, 
often through qualitative methods that generate rich data and perhaps in combination 
with quantitative information. The focus of investigation typically leans towards a deep 
understanding of the similarities and differences between countries, which aids 
identification of shared – or not – characteristics that account for a given or a differential 
outcome (Landman, 2000: 27). However, the emphasis on a small number of countries 
also means that small-N studies are generally more susceptible to selection and omitted 
variable bias (King et al, 1994). 
 
In contrast, the large-N, variable-oriented approach focuses mostly on understanding 
associations between variables as they exist across countries. In other words, it pays less 
attention to the countries within which the variables are embedded, and instead looks to 
identify ‘law-like’ relationships that hold across a number of cases (Hantrais, 2009: 32). In 
order to establish robust ‘law-like’ relations, the variable-oriented approach requires a 
relatively large number of cases. As a result, this approach tends to be dominated by 
quantitative data and statistical methods that are capable of synthesising and analysing 
large quantities of information (Landman, 2000: 24).  
 
Large-N quantitative comparative research strategies carry a number of benefits. Not 
least, the use of statistical methods can, if applied correctly, reduce the dangers of omitted 
variable bias and spurious relations, and provides a greater level of statistical control. The 
ability to analyse a large number of cases, meanwhile, allows for more comprehensive 
inferences that suffer less from selection bias (Landman, 2000: 24, 49).  
 
That said, large-N comparative methods also carry several complications and drawbacks. 
An issue that is general to all comparative research but amplified in large-N studies, is that 
of establishing equivalence of concepts and measures across countries (Landman, 2000: 
                                                        
141 Single country case studies can also be considered as comparative if they operate within a 
comparative framework and are conscious of the specific context within which the case study is 
embedded (Hantrais, 2009: 32).  
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38). This point is particularly relevant here, since even similar types of family policies are 
often diverse in practice across countries – for example, eligibility criteria for similar leave 
policies differ between countries in numerous ways. Likewise the definitions used for 
measuring aspects of employment often differ cross-nationally. One method for 
overcoming the equivalence problem is to increase the level of abstraction in concepts and 
measures (Landman, 2000: 49). This thesis follows the literature in using more general 
and transferable measures of policy and employment than might be used in a single 
country or small-N study – for example, to overcome issues of comparability, leave policies 
are captured in this thesis through the transferable concepts of ‘weeks of entitlement’ and 
the ‘wage replacement rate across the leave’. However, the use of more general and 
comparable measures of policy also comes at a cost. It often means sacrificing many of the 
idiosyncratic features of country policy that may influence employment outcomes142, and 
at time reduces the real-world meaning of empirical results. As a result, any findings from 
this thesis and indeed most other large-N studies generally represent stylised pointers 
only, rather than specific recommendations on exact policy design.   
 
A second main drawback of large-N comparative research is that – in part due to the above 
– suitable quantitative data are often restricted in availability (Landman, 2000: 25). In 
order to minimise problems of equivalence it is necessary to use comparable data that 
have been designed or adjusted to be fully transferable across countries. However, for 
both employment and family policy such comparable data is relatively scarce, especially 
when also looking to extend relations across time. As discussed in detail in sections 3.2 
and 3.3, this places some restriction on the aspects of both family policy and employment 
that it is possible to examine within the thesis. 
 
Lastly, the methods of analysis typically associated with large-N comparative research – in 
particular, multiple regression – have been criticized for reducing complex comparative 
relations into single estimates of associations that ignore much of the valuable wider 
information on country cases (Shalev, 2007a). In other words, in the search for ‘law-like’ 
relations across cases, quantitative large-N studies often transform information-rich cases 
into simple observations that fit neatly into defined variables and precise relations, and as 
a result remove data from its real world context and sacrifice much of the value of 
comparative analysis. This particular criticism was discussed and addressed in depth 
earlier in section 3.4. 
                                                        
142 To use leave policies as the example once again, using only weeks of entitlement and wage 
replacement rates to capture the policy means the effects of eligibility conditions, for example, on 
incentives for mothers to engage in employment prior to motherhood, or on the proportion of new 
mothers who are able to take maternity leave, are ignored.  
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These drawbacks are not insubstantial, and of course limit the results produced by this 
thesis. However, the large-N quantitative comparative approach remains the most 
appropriate comparative strategy for answering the thesis’ three research questions. In 
particular, as the thesis explicitly looks to examine the impact of changes in policy, it is 
necessary to use methods that are able to handle large amounts of data and to control for 
alternative influences on developments in gender differences in employment. Accordingly, 
and following much of the existing comparative family policy literature, this thesis 
examines relations between changes in policy and outcomes using quantitative measures 
drawn from number of countries and time points and statistical techniques – primarily, 
multiple linear regression – that are capable of providing at least some level of statistical 
control.  
 
B.2. Construction of the three composite family policy indices 
 
As stated in chapter 3, the thesis uses its nine main measures of family policy both as 
individual indicators in their own right, and as components in one of three policy indices 
that reflect and summarise the general level of provision of dual earner-carer leave policy, 
dual earner childcare policy, and general family support policy, respectively. It is not 
uncommon for indices to be used to measure family policy – Gornick et al (1998), Mandel 
and Semyonov (2005), Mandel and Semyonov (2006), Tranby (2010), and Korpi et al 
(2013), amongst others, all use indices to capture family policies within their studies. 
However, producing policy indices can be fairly complicated, and construction requires a 
number of decisions and considerations. Aside from judgments around data and 
indicators, the various measures used need to be normalised in order to ensure 
comparability, weighted to reflect importance to the overall composite, and lastly 
‘aggregated’ or compiled into the final index (Nardo et al, 2005). This thesis’ approach to 
normalisation, weighting and aggregated was summarised briefly in 3.2, but all three 
warrant a little further elaboration. The following outlines various issues, discusses 
alternatives, and justifies the final decisions made during the construction of the three 
family policy indices.  
 
Normalisation 
 
As a first stage of index construction, the various indicators chosen to capture the three 
areas of family policy need to be normalised or transformed onto a common scale. This is 
necessary because the indicators often differ in their units of measurement, so aggregating 
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in raw form would lead to composites that are difficult if not impossible to interpret and 
that are dominated by those indicators measured on the largest scale. The normalisation 
process can also be used to minimise between-indicator differences in distributional 
characteristics, and in particular between-indicator differences in variances. Where 
variances differ between indicators, those with the larger variance are inadvertently 
weighted strongest in the overall composite while the influence of those with smaller 
variance is compressed (Plantenga et al, 2003: 55; Paroulo et al, 2013: 612). Thus, 
minimising differences between indicators is necessary in order to avoid or at least reduce 
any unwarranted weighting of indicators in the final index. 
 
There are a number of methods that can be used to normalise indicators (Nardo et al, 
2005: 17-19). These techniques range from the very simple – such as ranking, which is 
rejected here as it retains only ordinal information and leads to vast reductions in detail – 
to more complex methods such as categorical scales, which is considered unsuitable here 
because categorical scales are not well suited to showing change over time (Nardo et al, 
2005: 18). A particularly popular method is min-max re-scaling (Nardo et al, 2005: 18), 
which transforms variables on to a common scale that varies between 0 and 1 by 
subtracting the minimum possible value from the actual value, and then dividing by the 
possible range. This technique has been used by Gornick et al (1998), Tranby (2010) 
Mischke (2011), amongst others, in their family policy indices. However, it is rejected here 
because for at least some of the family policy indicators it is not clear where or at what 
values the range should be set, and also because in itself min-max re-scaling does nothing 
to reduce unequal variances between the indicators (Paruolo et al, 2013: 617). 
 
The method finally chosen here - Z-score standardisation - is an equally popular 
alternative. Z-score standardisation transforms indicators so that they hold a standard 
normal distribution, that is, so that all indicators are expressed on a common scale with a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (Jacobs et al, 2004: 37). Normalised 
indicator scores are thus expressed relative to the mean in units of standard deviations, 
and importantly hold identical (unit) variances. For a given indicator in a given year, this 
transformation can be expressed algebraically as: 
 
𝑁𝑋𝑗𝑖
𝑡 =  
𝑋𝑗𝑖
𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑋𝑖
𝑡)
𝜎(𝑋𝑖
𝑡)
 
 
Where 𝑁𝑋𝑗𝑖
𝑡  is the normalised value for country j on indicator i at time t, 𝑋𝑗𝑖
𝑡
 is the raw 
  
322
value for country j on indicator i at time t, and 𝐸(𝑋𝑖
𝑡) and 𝜎(𝑋𝑖
𝑡) are the mean and standard 
deviation of indicator i in year t. 
 
To ensure comparability across years it is necessary that the mean and standard deviation 
used in the calculation are held constant over each time point. Nardo et al (2005: 60) 
recommend using the mean and standard deviation from a base year – usually the first 
year in the series – so that if desired it is possible to integrate data from additional years 
without changing the inital normalised scores. However, the use of a base year can be 
problematic if the variance on a given indicator is exceptionally low or high in the base 
year relative to the rest of the series – as the standard deviation used to standardise scores 
across the remainder of the series will also be relatively small or large, subsequent 
variations in standardised scores on that indicator will be inflated or compressed, 
respectively. This distortion can cause the post-standardisation variance on a given 
indicator to differ substantially from the other standardised indicators over the remainder 
of the series, possibly to the extent that between-indicator differences in variances are 
greater after base year standardisation than before143. 
 
To avoid this problem, this thesis’ three policy indices use the mean and standard 
deviation for the entire series – that is, the mean and standard deviation of each indicator 
across all countries and all years in the sample – for standardisation . This ensures that 
each indicator has identical (unit) variances over the series as a whole. Under this 
transformation, normalised indicator values are relative to the overall mean indicator 
score and are expressed in units of the overall standard deviation, which can be 
represented by: 
 
𝑁𝑋𝑗𝑖
𝑡 =  
𝑋𝑗𝑖
𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑋𝑖)
𝜎(𝑋𝑖)
 
 
Where 𝐸(𝑋𝑖) and 𝜎(𝑋𝑖) are the mean and standard deviation of indicator i across all time 
periods. Scores can then be interpreted as differences in standard deviations from the 
overall mean for a given country in a given year on a given indicator. 
 
It is worth pointing out that Z-score standardisation does suffer from a couple of 
                                                        
143 In the current dataset this particularly problem occurs with Indicator 2 - Father-specific leave, in 
effective weeks. As paternity leaves and father-specific leaves were almost entirely absent in 1985 
(fourteen of the countries included offered no paid father-specific leave in 1985, and only two 
offered over one week) but developed to varying extents across countries over the series, the 
standard deviation for Ind.2 is exceptionally low in 1985 compared to much of the rest of the series.  
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limitations. The standardised values are relative to other observed scores in the sample 
rather than some substantive benchmark, so the final index values lose much of their ‘real-
world’ meaning. Use of the mean also implies that standardised values may be susceptible 
to distortions by extreme outliers (Jacobs et al, 2004: 37). However, these drawbacks are 
considered less severe than those suffered by alternative techniques. 
 
Weighting 
 
Following normalisation but prior to aggregation, it may be desirable to weight the 
individual indicators to reflect their importance to the overall policy area under 
consideration (Nardo et al, 2005:21). In existing family policy indices, theoretical 
weighting has been used by Korpi et al (2013) – who assign weights of 0.5 to their 
childcare leave and marriage subsidy indicators within their general family support index 
because they effect only some families – and Gornick et al (1998) – who weight various 
maternity leave indicators by 0.5 to reflect their limited length, and paternity leave 
indicators by 0.5 to reflect their indirect effect of female employment. Mandel and 
Semyonov (2005; 2006) also implicitly use weights, since their family policy indices are 
constructed using the factor loadings produced by factor analysis.  
 
Weights do, though, imply strong value judgments about the theoretical contribution of 
various indicators to the composite under consideration, and should only be used with 
strong justifications. In the current case, neither Korpi’s (2000) theoretical conception nor 
comparative family policy theory in general are considered detailed or developed enough 
to provide a strong basis for applying differential weights to the indicators. It is not clear, 
for example, whether mother-specific leave is a more or less important component of a 
country’s set of dual earner-carer leave than father-specific leave or earnings-related 
parental leave. Likewise, and unlike Korpi et al (2013), this author is not comfortable with 
the suggestion that flat-rate parental and childcare leaves are a less central or influential 
component of general family support policy than child benefits, for example. 
 
As a result, the three family policy indices used in this thesis do not apply weights to the 
individual indicators prior to aggregation. It is recognised, though, that an absence of 
weights implies equal weighting and, thus, that each of the indicators are considered as 
being of ‘equal’ importance to the underlying family policy type (Nardo et al, 2005: 21). 
This is, of course, a value judgment in itself, and it is acknowledged that there is also no 
strong reason to believe that all aspects of the three family policy types are of equal value. 
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However this is considered a more conservative and transparent approach than applying 
weights in an ad-hoc manner without strong justification. 
 
Aggregation  
 
Finally, following normalisation and weighting the various individual indicators need to be 
combined or aggregated into their respective composite family policy indices. Again, there 
are a number of methods that can be used for aggregation of indicators into their final 
composites (Nardo et al, 2005: 22). These include the surface measure of overall 
performance (SMOP) technique – which is attractive primarily because it produces 
intuitive and useful graphical visualisations of the data through the radar charts, but is 
rejected here because there is simply not enough space to present the charts – and the 
multi-criteria approach (MCA), which is considered unsuitable for reasons explained a 
little later on. The method finally chosen here for this thesis’ three policy indices is 
straightforward linear aggregation – that is, the simple arithmetic mean of each index’s 
normalised sub-indicators. The formula for this calculation can be given by:  
 
𝐶𝐼𝑗
𝑡 = (1/𝑛) ∑ 𝑁𝑋𝑗𝑖
𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
Where 𝐶𝐼𝑗
𝑡 is the composite indicator score for country j and time t, n is the number of 
indicators included in that composite indicator and 𝑁𝑋𝑗𝑖
𝑡  is the normalised value for 
country j at time t on indicator i. 
 
As ever, though, linear aggregation does carry drawbacks. In particular, linear aggregation 
implies complete compensability across indicators – in other words, a high score on one 
sub-indicator can entirely offset an equally low score on another sub-indicator, or vice 
versa (Nardo et al, 2005: 22). It is not clear from the theory whether compensability is 
appropriate for the three composite family policy indices. Should, for example, the 
presence of a long mother-specific leave be able to compensate for the absence of father-
specific leave? On the other hand, should not high public expenditure on childcare services 
be able to compensate for low public service provision, given that states may choose to 
assist parents through demand-side cost subsidisation rather than direct provision? 
 
Compensability can be avoided by using the Condercet multi-criteria approach (MCA) as 
touched on above. However, to do so the MCA transforms all indicators (or criteria) into 
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ordinal variables with countries ranked according to their relative performance across 
measures (Nardo et al, 2005: 22). Thus, the Condercet MCA is considered unsuitable for 
the composite family policy indices produced here due to the desire to retain detail in the 
data. Geometric aggregation – the nth root of the product of the indicators – can also be 
used to produce partial-compensability: since the geometric mean places greater weight 
on changes in low absolute values than in high absolute values, a given country would 
need an extremely high score on one indicator to compensate for a low score on another 
indicator (Nardo et al, 2005: 22). In other words, under geometric aggregation a country 
would need to provide an extremely generous set of mother-specific leave policies to 
compensate for the absence of any father-specific leave. However, since the geometric 
mean uses the nth root of the product of the indicators, it requires all indicators to be 
positive. Thus, the geometric mean is unsuitable for the three composite family policy 
indicators as the use of Z-scores produces negative as well as positive indicator scores.  
 
Given these issues, linear aggregation is considered the most suitable method for the 
thesis’ three policy indices. Uncertainty around the desirability of complete 
compensability remains – and should be kept in mind when interpreting results – but 
linear aggregation is considered an intuitive and transparent approach (Zhou et al, 2005: 
307) and the most appropriate for the three composite family policy indicators. 
 
B.3. Handling missing data in the indicators of family policy 
 
The thesis’ indicators of family policy were selected so as to minimise missing data, but 
unfortunately several continue to suffer from a certain number of missing cases. As 
touched on in chapter 3, missing cases can cause serious problems for analysis, 
particularly as through listwise deletion they lead to the loss of an entire case if even only 
one variable suffers from a single missing value. This problem is amplified further in the 
context of the use of indices, as a missing value on just one of the component indicators 
will compromise the validity of the entire index for the given country-year. Thus, it is 
important that any missing data in the indicators of family policy are handled 
appropriately.  
 
As stated in chapter 3, this thesis deals with missing data primarily through linear 
interpolation and, in cases at the beginning or end of the series, through ‘carry next value 
back’ and ‘carry last value forward’. There are though a number of alternative and, in 
many cases, more sophisticated techniques available for treating and filling missing cases. 
Nardo et al (2005: 10, 17), for example, outline several competing methods, most of which 
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can be separated into two main types.  
 
The first is single imputation, which is a broad family of techniques ranging from ad-hoc 
and deterministic imputation methods through to more refined regression- and model-
based techniques, all of which fill the missing observation with a single value (Nardo et al, 
2005: 52-53). These methods range in their complexity, and the techniques finally used in 
this thesis – linear interpolation and ‘carry next value back’/‘carry last value forward’ – 
both fall into this category. However, all single imputation techniques suffer from the 
problem that they may systematically underestimate variance in the imputed values 
because they do not fully capture the uncertainty around the unknown values (Honaker 
and King, 2010: 563; Nardo et al, 2005: 17). 
 
The second general method is multiple imputation. This is a model-based technique that 
looks to overcome the problem of underestimated variance by estimating several values 
for each piece of missing data. This allows the imputed data to reflect uncertainty in the 
missing observations and produces complete datasets that are superior to those filled 
using single imputation, from a statistical perspective at least (Honaker and King, 2010: 
563). 
 
Multiple imputation works well for data with independent observations (Honaker and 
King, 2010: 563). However, multiple imputation – and indeed all model-based methods – 
are not always well suited to data with non-independent, clustered or hierarchical 
structures, as is the case here where countries are repeatedly observed over time. In such 
situations the predictive models that lie behind multiple imputation methods can often 
return implausible imputed values that differ significantly from otherwise smooth or 
stable time trends, or that seem unlikely based on real-world knowledge (Honaker and 
King, 2010: 562). This is particularly problematic in the case of policy data, where 
indicator values tends to be relatively similar year-on-year. 
 
In an attempt to overcome this problem, Honaker and King (2010) have developed a 
multiple imputation algorithm that takes into account the dependent and correlated 
structure of time-series cross-section data, and is designed to generate imputed values 
that are smooth over time within countries. This technique has been successfully applied 
within a time-series cross-section setting (e.g. Castellaci and Natera, 2011). Unfortunately, 
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however, this author could not get Honaker and King’s method to predict consistently 
reasonable and plausible results for all the missing data within the current dataset144. 
 
Because of issues with inconsistent and implausible estimates, both multiple imputation 
and other model-based single imputation methods are considered unsuitable for use in 
this thesis. As stated in 3.2, it is recognized that both methods finally chosen – linear 
interpolation and ‘carry next value back’/‘carry last value forward’ – may, as single-
imputation methods, lead to a reduction of variance in the post-imputation indicators. 
However, as the missing data in question is policy data, it is considered more important 
for filled values to be plausible and consistent. As a result, linear interpolation and ‘carry 
next value back’/‘carry last value forward’ are considered the most suitable methods for 
dealing with missing data in this thesis’ nine main indicators of family policy.  
 
B.4. Estimations issues in time-series cross-section linear regression analysis 
 
As discussed in chapter 3.4, analysis in this thesis is conducted primarily through fixed 
effects multiple linear regression. Using multiple regression to examine the sort of data 
used here – time-series cross-section (TSCS) data – carries several advantages, not least 
that it is capable of synthesising large quantities of information and of providing at least 
some level of control between competing explanatory factors. However, it can also 
introduce a number of potential statistical issues that may complicate the estimation of 
relations. Many of these complications revolve around the fact that, because in TSCS data 
the same set of countries are observed repeatedly over time, cases are unlikely to be 
independent. If not handled properly, this lack of independence may lead to biased 
regression coefficients and incorrect standard errors and, consequently, false inferences 
(Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck, 2001; Wilson and Butler, 2007). 
 
The techniques and corrections used in this thesis’ regression models for any such 
statistical issues were summarised in chapter 3.4. However, in several cases these issues 
require further detail and discussion. The following outlines and tests for the various 
potential issues, discusses options for dealing with any complications, and justifies and 
clarifies the final decisions made.  
 
                                                        
144 To be clear, this is not a criticism of Honaker and King’s (2010) algorithm. Rather, it is possible 
that these implausible results are caused by a given set of policy variables being poor predictors of 
other specific policy variables.   
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Unit heterogeneity 
 
A primary concern in TSCS regression analysis is unit heterogeneity, that is, cross-country 
differences in the dependent variable caused by time-constant country-specific factors 
that are not included in the analysis, either because the appropriate variable is unknown 
or because it is not or cannot be observed (Wilson and Butler, 2007: 104). If not accounted 
for, the implicit assumption is that no unobserved country-specific heterogeneity exists 
(Wilson and Butler, 2007: 104). This may turn out to be correct, but in the presence of any 
unobserved heterogeneity estimates are open to omitted variable bias as the included 
independent variables are forced to explain variation caused by the omitted country-
specific variables (Dougherty, 2006: 417). Unobserved heterogeneity is a concern in any 
analysis – indeed, as discussed in chapter 2, it may be a core problem with the existing 
cross-sectional family policy literature – but any bias is likely to be inflated when using 
TSCS data due to repeated measurement of the same units.  
 
Testing for unit heterogeneity is difficult since, by their nature, the variables in question 
are unobserved145. In the current case, however, unobserved heterogeneity is sufficiently 
likely to be taken almost as given146.  
 
Several methods exist for dealing with the problem, the three most common of which are 
random effects (RE), fixed effects (FE) and first-differencing (FD) (Dougherty, 2006: 412). 
The first two deal with heterogeneity by allowing the intercept to vary between units. The 
RE model does this by estimating a random parameter with a zero mean and estimatable 
variance. It assumes, however, that the unit-specific effects are uncorrelated with the 
included independent variables, which is often unrealistic in many TSCS applications 
(Wilson and Butler, 2007: 104)147.  
                                                        
145 Wilson and Butler (2007: 104-105) suggest including country-specific dummies and running a 
joint F test on the dummies, with any significant result indicating unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, as Plümper et al (2005: 331) point out, country-specific dummies also capture between-
country differences in the levels of included independent variables and any pre-t1 effect of time-
varying independent variables. Thus, the presence of statistically significant country-specific 
dummies does not necessarily indicate the presence time-constant unit-specific heterogeneity.   
146 As an example, country-specific culture and tradition are likely to play a strong role in 
determining gendered labour market outcomes (Pfau-Effinger, 1998; Pfau-Effinger, 2004), are 
relatively constant – or at least slow-moving – over time, and despite the best efforts of researchers 
remain difficult to observe. As a result, if unaccounted for, country-specific differences in culture 
would likely bias results as other included factors are forced to pick up culture-driven variation in 
outcomes. 
147 This can be tested using a Hausmann test. Tests on the current dataset (not shown) reject the 
null that the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the included independent variables, 
suggesting that the RE model is unsuitable. In any case, the FE model is preferred for substantive 
reasons.  
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The FE model, meanwhile, provides each unit with its own specific intercept through the 
inclusion of unit-specific dummy variables (less one, to avoid multicollinerity). These unit-
specific dummies completely absorb all between-unit differences in the levels of all 
included variables, removing any unit-specific heterogeneity but also removing all other 
between-country variation (Beck, 2001: 285; Wilson and Butler, 2007: 120; Bartels, 2008: 
6). As a result, both the dependent and independent variables are effectively centred on 
their unit-specific mean148, leaving only within-unit variation and with the model 
transformed into one of within-unit change only (Plümper et al, 2005: 334). In many 
situations this is undesirable – between-unit variation is often of interest, and the 
centering of variables prevents the estimation of time-invariant or slowly changing 
variables due to collinearity (Beck, 2001; Wooldridge, 2010). In the current case, however 
– where the interest lies mostly in within-country relations between changes in policy and 
changes in equality outcomes – the fixed effects, within-unit change model is attractive.  
 
The third common approach is to use a first-difference model, which estimates relations 
based on the year-on-year change – that is, the value at t less the value at t-1, or the ‘first-
difference' – in all dependent and independent variables (Dougherty, 2006: 413). Taking 
year-on-year changes ‘differences-out’ any time-constant unit-specific heterogeneity, but 
also removes all other level variation from the included variables, leaving only variation 
that exists between t and t-1 (Kittel and Winner, 2005: 278-279). Thus, like the FE 
estimator, FD produces results that are based on within-unit change only. In this case, 
however, estimates reflect only the instantaneous effects of a change in the independent 
variables, with any medium- or long-run association completely ignored (Kittel and 
Winner, 2005: 279). This has several advantages with regard to trending variables (see 
later in this section), but also radically changes the meaning and interpretation of 
estimates. In the current case, relations estimated using first-differences would reflect 
only a one-time effect of changes in family policy on gendered labour market outcomes. 
 
As stated in chapter 3, the approach taken here to unit heterogeneity is to use the fixed 
effects model. This is justified largely on theoretical grounds – given that this thesis’ three 
research questions focus explicitly on relations between changes in policy and gender 
differences in employment outcomes, fixed effects models, with their focus on within-
country variation only, appear particularly appropriate. Unfortunately though, use of fixed 
                                                        
148 Indeed, an exactly equivalent model is the ‘within-estimator’, which centres all variables on their 
unit-specific means before estimation. This saves on degrees of freedom as it is no longer necessary 
to include the unit specific dummy variables (Dougherty, 2006: 412, 415).  
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effects does mean that this thesis cannot examine the effects of any time-constant or 
slowly changing factors on gender equality in employment.  
 
Non-spherical errors 
 
A standard OLS assumption is that regression errors are ‘spherical’, that is, they are 
identically and independently distributed with constant variance across observations 
(homoscedasticity) and no systematic dependence or correlation between observations 
(no autocorrelation) (Beck and Katz, 1995: 636; Beck, 2001: 274; Stock and Watson, 2007: 
182). However, TSCS data tend to violate these assumptions, as repeatedly observing the 
same countries over time often results in ‘clustered’ data with non-independent errors 
across units and time (Beck and Katz, 1995: 636; Plümper et al, 2005: 329; Bartels, 2008: 
2). More specifically, TSCS errors tend to be: panel heteroscedastic, with each unit having 
their own and different error variance; contemporaneously correlated, with errors for a 
given unit correlated with errors for other units at a given point in time: and serially 
correlated, with errors for a given unit in a given year correlated with earlier and later 
errors for that unit (Beck and Katz, 1995: 636; Plümper et al, 2005: 329). The result is that 
OLS standard errors are unlikely to be correct, leading to over- or under-confidence in the 
coefficients and incorrect inferences (Beck and Katz, 1995: 636; Beck, 2001: 274). 
 
Table B.1 presents results of tests for these three issues. In all cases, results are for the 
main models shown in chapters 5, 6 and 7 for each of the eight dependent indicators of 
gender equality in employment. These tests suggest that models for all dependent 
variables suffer from the first and third issues – panel heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. Interesting, though, none appear to suffer from contemporaneous 
correlation149. 
 
There are, again, several methods available for dealing with non-spherical errors150. 
Perhaps the most common approach is to use panel corrected standard errors (PSCEs), 
which adjust OLS standard errors according to the clustered properties of the data in  
 
                                                        
149 This is slightly surprising as, given the interdependence of OECD and particularly European 
economies, it might be expected that countries would experience common labour market shocks 
and, as result, cross-sectional correlation of errors. It is possible, however, that the use of gender 
gap indicators – rather than female outcome indicators - removes the effects of common shocks if, 
for example, the impact is felt equally (or almost equally) by men and women.   
150 An alternative and historically popular technique not discussed here is the ‘Parks method’, 
which transforms the data based on the correlated residuals before re-estimating the model 
through OLS. However, Beck and Katz (1995) show comprehensively that the Parks method 
severely underestimates standard errors.  
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order to take into account any panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
(Beck and Katz, 1995: 638; Beck, 2001: 278). PCSEs are generally considered a sound 
method for dealing with these two issues (Wilson and Butler, 2007: 104), and according to 
Beck come at ‘no cost’ (2001: 278). They do nothing, however, to correct for serial 
correlation. 
 
Here, Beck (2001: 279) and Beck and Katz (1995: 645) recommend adding a lagged 
dependent variable (LDV) to the model, which ‘in almost all cases’ (Plümper et al, 2005: 
329) removes serial correlation from the errors. The use of LDVs has, however, been 
criticised by several authors (Achen, 2001; Plümper et al, 2005). In particular, Achen 
(2001) shows that LDVs can capture an unjustifiably large proportion of variation in the 
dependent variable when at least some of the independent variables exhibit a trend, while 
several authors (Wooldridge, 2002: 270; Kittel and Winner, 2005: 278; Plümper et al, 
2005) argue that combining an LDV with unit fixed effects necessarily biases estimates. 
The result is that the lagged dependent variable can suppress the coefficients on the 
independent variables, and in certain circumstances even reverse the direction of 
relations (Achen, 2001; Plümper et al, 2005).  
 
An increasingly common alternative is to use cluster robust standard errors (CRSEs). 
Similar to PCSEs, CRSEs adjust standard errors to the clustered properties of the data, but 
importantly are consistent for panel heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation 
and/or serial correlation151 (Rogers, 1993; Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 312-313; Baum, 
2006: 138). Thus, CRSEs can correct for non-spherical errors without the need for an 
additional LDV to remove serial correlation. A concern with CRSEs, though, is that they 
require a ‘large’ number of units for proper estimation, with estimates of the standard 
error biased downwards when the number of units is small (Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 
319; Wooldridge, 2010: 311). It is not clear what constitutes a ‘large’ number of units 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 320). Rogers (1993) suggests that the bias will be small if no 
unit exceeds roughly 5% of the total sample – implying that around twenty countries is 
close to sufficient – while Wawro et al (2011) provide evidence to indicate CRSEs are 
consistent with n=16. In any case, most statistical software – including STATA, as is used 
here – are able to apply finite sample corrections to adjust for a small number of units 
(Baum, 2006: 139; Baum et al, 2010). As noted in the text in section 3.4, it is this latter 
approach – CRSEs – that is used across almost all models presented in this thesis. 
                                                        
151 Standard CRSEs correct standard errors only for one-way clustering, so that there is a choice 
between adjusting for contemporaneous and serial correlation. However, Baum et al (2010) have 
recently developed a two-way cluster robust estimator, which allows for dependence in errors both 
within and between units.  
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Trends, non-stationarity and unit roots 
 
An issue in any analysis with a time dimension is stationarity, that is, whether the 
distributional characteristics – primarily, the mean and variance – of the data series are 
constant over time (Wooldridge, 2009: 846). Estimating relations in OLS when more than 
one of the variables are non-stationary risks spurious results as two unrelated variables 
can appear to share an association only because the distributional characteristics – 
perhaps the mean – are changing concurrently over time152. Of perhaps greatest concern is 
non-stationarity caused by a unit root, that is, a highly persistent series where the current 
value of a variable for a given unit is equal to the previous year’s value plus some weakly 
dependent process (Wooldridge, 2009: 391-393). These highly persistent variables tend to 
lead to the violation of several central OLS assumptions, and often result in spurious 
estimates (see Wooldridge, 2009: 388-396, 636-637). 
 
Table B.2 (overleaf) presents the results of Im-Pesaran-Shin and Fisher-type tests (Im, 
Pesaran and Shin, 2003; Choi, 2001; see Baltagi, 2001: 236-239) for unit roots in six of the 
eight indicators of gender equality in employment used across the thesis as dependent 
variables. Unfortunately it is not possible to perform Im-Pesaran-Shin tests on both the 
gender gap in employment in ‘female-type’ occupations and the female share of managers, 
and either type of test on the gender gap in top quintile earnings, due to a shortage of 
observations in the time-series. In most cases the tests suggest that the various measures 
of gender equality in employment do not contain unit roots. However, there is some 
suggestion of a possible unit root in the female share of managers with low and possibly 
also moderate education, and perhaps also the gender gap in the overall labour force 
participation rate. That said, these tests should be treated with caution – as Kittel and 
Winner (2005: 278) note, formal tests for unit roots are known to under-reject the null 
that the series are non-stationary.  
 
Beck (2008) suggests an alternative test – first, run a model including a lagged dependant 
variable and examine whether the coefficient on the LDV is near one, and second do 
likewise with an autoregression on the residuals. In both cases, a coefficient near one 
indicates a possible unit root. Results from these ‘Beck-type’ tests are shown in the last 
two columns in table B.2. In all cases, tests for each of the eight dependent variables are 
again run on their respective main models (see chapters 5, 6 and 7). For all eight  
                                                        
152 Or, alternatively, if only one variable is non-stationary then a ‘true’ relation between two 
variables may be obscured (Wooldridge, 2009: 366).  
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dependent variables the 95% confidence interval on both the LDV and the lagged residuals 
do not overlap – and, indeed, are far from – one, suggesting the none of the dependent 
variables contain a unit root153.  
 
Nonetheless, almost all of the indicators used in this thesis – be they dependent or 
independent variables – do contain some form of time trend. As a result, there remains at 
least some risk of spurious regression across most if not all of the models produced.  
 
There are two main options available to deal with trending data. One is to estimate 
relations using the first difference (FD) estimator. As outlined earlier in this section, first 
difference models work by using year-on-year changes in variables only. As taking the 
year-on-year difference completely removes all level information, any trend in any of the 
included variables is cancelled out entirely through differencing (Kittel and Winner, 2005: 
278). However, as also noted earlier on, first differencing completely changes the 
interpretation of the model to one that estimates the immediate one-time effects of the 
independent variables only.  
 
A second option is to include country-specific time trends in the model154. These 
effectively de-trend the data – that is, in effect they subtract the value predicted by a linear 
trend from the observed value on a given indicator for a given country – so that all that 
remains is variation around the trend (Wooldridge, 2009: 365). This technique is fairly 
common – Ruhm (1998), Akgunduz and Plantenga (2012), Thévenon (2013) Thévenon 
and Solaz, (2013) all include country-specific time trends in their models – and is 
generally effective at reducing the risk of spurious regression as long as the variables do 
not contain unit roots. Unlike first differencing, it also has the advantage of being 
compatible with the inclusion of fixed effects. In part due to the latter, country-specific 
time trends are used in this thesis across all models to account for trending data. 
 
Heterogeneous slopes 
 
A central characteristic of most pooled TSCS regression analyses is that they generally 
                                                        
153 As a side note, it might be interesting to note here that Beck and Katz (2011) suggest that the 
type of variables used in this thesis may well be highly persistent but cannot, by definition, contain 
a unit root as they are bounded – typically, between 0 and 100 – and thus over a long enough period 
must hold a constant mean. 
154 Another alternative is to include a common time trend. This is, however, unlikely to resolve the 
spurious regression problem as the magnitude of trends differ across countries (see chapters 4, 5, 6 
and 7) - any country with an above (below) average trend on a given initial variable will, post-
common-detrend, have a series with a positive (negative) trend.  
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estimate a single common coefficient – otherwise known as a homogenous slope – for all 
units and periods included in the analysis (Beck and Katz, 2007). In other words, it is 
assumed that the relationship between the dependent variable and a given independent 
variable is identical across units and time periods, with this common relationship 
represented by a single estimate. In the current analysis, the use of a homogenous slope 
would mean that the relationship between within-country variation in given policy and 
labour market indicators is assumed identical across the twenty-countries and twenty-six 
years in the sample.   
 
The use of homogenous slopes across pooled units and time periods has been criticised as 
overly simplistic or unrealistic (e.g. Shalev, 2007a), and various techniques have been 
developed to allow slopes to vary across units or time. The simplest is to include an 
interaction effect between the independent variable and the unit, group of units or time 
period of interest. More sophisticated techniques include Pesaran and Smith’s (1995) 
mean group estimator – which estimates individual relations for each unit and/or time 
period, before taking the mean as the overall relation – and random coefficients models 
(RCMs) or multilevel models, which allow for country-specific variation around a common 
coefficient (Beck and Katz, 2007). 
 
It would of course be valuable to incorporate heterogeneous slopes into this thesis’ 
analyses of links between changes in policy and gender differences in employment 
outcomes. Indeed, examining whether a given relationship varies across contexts would 
represent a worthwhile task in itself, particular if combined with an exploration of why 
relations differ. However, doing so comes at a cost – estimating individual unit, group or 
time slopes takes a large number of parameters (Beck, 2001: 286) and, more practically, 
takes a large amount of space to present, especially where several models are estimated. 
In many instances this additional space is tricky to justify, particularly in cases such as this 
where it would represent a secondary question only.  
 
For the most part, estimation in this thesis uses only the simpler, common homogenous 
slopes – that is, regression models estimate within-country relations as they exist across 
all countries and time points included in the analysis only. However, as noted at several 
points across the thesis and in particular in chapter 8, it is worth bearing in mind that 
relations may vary for a given individual country or group of countries, and that the 
presence or absence of a significant relation means only that the given relation is apparent 
across the sample as a whole. 
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Reverse causality 
 
A final consideration is, as ever, endogeneity, and in particular endogeneity due to reverse 
causality or simultaneity between the dependent and independent variables. If 
unaccounted for, such endogeneity could lead to bias and inconsistency in the OLS 
estimates of not only the endogenous variable under consideration, but also all other 
variables included in a given model (Wooldridge, 2009: 552). 
 
A particular concern here is reverse causality between the measures of gender equality in 
employment and several of the family policy indicators. It is possible, for example, that 
increases in female labour market activity – and, perhaps, also attainment – could drive 
increases in the generosity of family policy provision through political pressures and 
labour market tensions (Winegarden and Bracy, 1995: 1024; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013: 
27). The indicators of childcare provision are perhaps at most risk, as the decision to make 
use of childcare is to some degree simultaneous with, typically, a mother’s decision to 
participate in the labour market (Thévenon, 2013: 23). That said, the emphasis here on 
public childcare – which is determined by policy decisions as well as demand – does limit 
the danger to some degree. Several of the control variables are also potentially 
endogenous. The size of the service and public sectors could increase with female 
employment if a shift away from female domestic labour creates increased demand for 
services and public services – for example, an increase in demand for domestic and care 
services – while fertility may clearly be influenced by female participation, although the 
variable used here – the crude birth rate – partially reduces the risk of endogeneity 
(Thévenon, 2013: 23).  
 
Winegarden and Bracy (1995) produce evidence to suggest that leave policies are unlikely 
to be endogenous (1995: 1024), but the other indicators remain a risk. The preferred 
solution in the presence of possible reverse causality is to instrument the endogenous 
variables – that is, to approximate the endogenous variable with one or more additional 
variables that correlate with the original variable but are not themselves endogenous – 
and to estimate the model using two-stage least squares (see Wooldridge, 2009: 546-566; 
Thévenon and Solaz, 2013: 27). Unfortunately, however, finding valid instruments for the 
endogenous variables is difficult. 
 
As a compromise, Jaumotte (2003), Thévenon (2013) and Thévenon and Solaz (2013: 27) 
use as instruments the one-year lag of any potentially endogenous variables, under the 
argument that current values of the dependent variable are less likely to influence past 
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values of the endogenous variables155. As an exploration, the main model used in chapters 
5, 6 and 7 are re-run using the same approach, that is, estimated in two-stage least 
squares with any potentially endogenous independent variables instrumented by the one-
year lag. Table B.3 shows the results of a Durbin-Wu-Hausmann tests (Baum, Schaffer and 
Stillman, 2003) run on these models, which tests the null that running the same model in 
OLS produces consistent estimates or, in other words, that any (potentially) endogenous 
variables have no effect on results.  
 
For all eight models the test fails to reject the null at p<0.05, suggesting results from the 
two-stage least squares models are not different to an equivalent model estimated using 
OLS. In other words, either the models do not suffer from endogeneity caused by reverse 
causality, or using the one-year lag of any potentially endogenous variables as instruments 
is ineffective at dealing with effects of any endogeneity. Given these results, and because 
the two-stage least squares estimator is less efficient than OLS (Wooldridge, 2009: 527), 
instrumental variables are not used here. However, as a precaution – and in part for 
theoretical reasons – in several specifications any potentially endogenous variables are 
lagged at (‘proxied’ by) one year (see section 3.4). Estimation remains, however, in OLS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
155 Angrist and Krueger (2001) do, however, caution against using lagged values as instruments as 
it is possible that the lagged value will remain correlated with the error term, in which case two-
stage least squares may produce estimates with greater bias than OLS with the original variables 
(2001: 76).  
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Appendix C. First statistical appendix to chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7: full results 
for each indicator of family policy and gender equality in employment, 
by country and year 
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Appendix E. Third statistical appendix to chapters 5, 6 and 7: checks and 
tests for outliers and influential points 
 
An important step when using regression as the basis of any research is of course to verify 
whether models meet the many assumption of regression analysis (see Wooldridge, 2009) 
and to check whether relations and significance tests are biased by any of the various 
issues that can impact on regression estimates. There is unfortunately not space here – 
even in this appendix – to present results from all of the various tools and tests used to 
examine the validity and robustness of the models presented throughout the thesis. 
However, a particularly important concern when using comparative time-series cross-
section data – given its typically moderate sample size – in regression analysis is whether 
or not estimates are unduly influenced by one or more outlying or highly influential 
country cases, that is, by country observations that cause estimates to change by a 
unjustifiably large amount when included or excluded from the model (Wooldridge, 2009: 
325). It is then worthwhile outlining here the tools used to check for influential points and 
– more importantly – the results of these tests. 
 
Spotting influential points is not always straightforward. Certainly, any outliers in the 
traditional sense – cases that appear unusual in that they deviate sharply from 
expectations and other observed points on a given variable – have the potential to distort 
estimates (Wooldridge, 2009: 325). However, of additional concern are ‘multivariate 
outliers’, that is, cases that appear ‘normal’ when values on any given variable are 
examined in isolation but that contain an unusual or extreme combination of values or 
that come to dominate the regression once variations in all included variables are taken 
into account. 
 
This appendix summarises findings from one common technique for identifying 
multivariate outliers and influential points – Cook’s Distance, or Cook’s D for short. The 
next subsection provides a short overview of the technique and the general approach 
taken in the thesis to potentially influential points, while subsequent subsections present 
findings from Cook’s D for all models shown in chapters 5, 6 and 7, respectively. 
Unfortunately, there is not space here to present results in full, so these subsections 
provide a brief summary of findings only.  
 
Cook’s Distance and outliers and influential points 
 
Cook’s D is one of the most commonly used tools for spotting and examining influential 
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points in OLS regression. It provides a single value that measures the effect of omitting a 
given case from the analysis, or more specifically that measures the degree to which the 
regression coefficients change once a given case is excluded from the model (Stevens, 
1984: 34). Thus, comparison of Cook’s D across cases helps reveal the relative influence of 
each case and aids the identification of observations that may be ‘overly influential’.  
 
As ever, it is not always easy to isolate a threshold value for Cook’s D above which cases 
may be considered ‘overly influential’. Some authors suggest cases with values on Cook’s D 
above 4/n may warrant further investigation (Van der Meer et al, 2010; Nieuwenhuis, 
2014: 197). However, in many circumstances 4/n seems excessively strict. For example, 
for the models of the gender gap in the labour force participation rate shown earlier in 
table 5.3, a critical value of 4/n = 4/486 = 0.0082 would lead up to 75 cases being 
classified as potentially ‘highly influential’. Other authors, including Cook himself, suggest 
cases with a value of greater than 1 on Cook’s D may be considered highly influential 
(Cook and Weisberg, 1982; Stevens, 1984). The approach taken here is to use Cook’s 
guidelines of D > 1 as the primary criterion, but with any cases with a value of D that is less 
than 1 but considerably larger than the rest also flagged up as possible influential points. 
 
Of course, even if a case is identified as ‘highly influential’ by Cook’s D the decision to keep 
or drop the observation from the model remains difficult. On the one hand, such cases may 
damage the generalisability of results if they force the regression to fit their unusual or 
extreme set of values (Nieuwenhuis, 2014: 190). On the other, as Wooldridge (2009: 325) 
points out, multivariate outliers might strongly influence results not because they are 
erroneous, but rather because they are legitimately very different from the other cases 
included in the analysis. Often such exceptional cases are of primary interest – particularly 
in macro-comparative research with its associated limited sample size – and removing a 
legitimate case from the analysis simply because it changes results risks producing a 
biased sample and misleading results. This is particularly so where dropping a single case 
considerably increases the size of the coefficient on one or more variables or moves 
variables into significance, as the most likely inference in this situation is that the excluded 
case provides an important exception to the general relation and thus provides the model 
with valuable uncertainty. The case for excluding a given observation is generally stronger 
if removing the case leads to a substantial decrease in the size of coefficients or to one or 
more variables moving out of significance, as in these circumstances the most likely 
inference is that the single observation is driving the estimated relation.  
 
The approach taken here is generally conservative, in that cases are removed only in 
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exceptional circumstances. Certainly, any potentially influential cases that are flagged up 
by Cook’s D are examined and the relevant models are re-estimated with the offending 
observation excluded. In several instances this leads to interesting but not critical 
differences in results and inferences, a number of which are mentioned in footnotes 
throughout the thesis. However, only if there is a very strong case for omission – for 
example, the case appears to contain erroneous data, or if excluding the particular case 
radically changes the overall meaning and conclusions emerging from the model – is the 
case removed from the main models presented in the body of the thesis. 
 
Outliers and influential points in the models presented in chapter 5 
 
Table E.1 (overleaf) summarises findings from Cook’s D for all models shown in chapter 5 
for the gender gap in the labour force participation rate and the gender gap in usual 
weekly working hours. While it is not possible to plot or display values of Cook’s D 
themselves – due mostly to the number of models used – the table does show any cases 
with values of Cook’s D that are above the critical value of 1, and also any cases with 
values of Cook’s D that are ‘substantially larger’ than the rest. Where cases are found to be 
potentially influential, the relevant models are re-run with the given case removed. The 
second to last column in table E.1 summarises whether or not omitting the case under 
consideration leads to any major changes in results or inferences. To save on space, these 
alternative models – with the potentially influential case removed – are shown only when 
omitting the given case does change results.   
 
In all ten of the models presented in chapter 5, no cases hold values of Cook’s D that 
exceed the threshold value of 1 – in other words, none of the individual cases can be 
identified clearly as possibly overly influential. However, in the four models of the gender 
gap in the labour force participation rate for men and women aged 25-54 the observation 
‘Netherlands 1986’ holds a value on Cook’s D that is substantially larger than that on all 
other cases. For example, for model A in table 5.3, ‘Netherlands 1986’ has a Cook’s D value 
of 0.11 – the next largest is 0.05 for ‘Greece 1986’. Thus, while going by Cook’s criteria 
‘Netherlands 1986’ is not considered an ‘overly influential’ observation, it may still be 
worth examining the effect of omitting the case on estimated relations. 
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All four models of the gender gap in the labour force participation rate were re-estimated 
with ‘Netherlands 1986’ dropped. In all four cases, removing ‘Netherlands 1986’ made 
almost no difference to results. Coefficients remained largely the same, and importantly no 
variables moved into or out of statistical significance at the 5% level. Broadly, then, results 
from the four models of the gender gap in the labour force participation for men and 
women aged 25-54 – as well as those for all other measures of gender differences in 
labour market activity – appear robust to the omission of any potentially influential cases. 
 
Outliers and influential points in the models presented in chapter 6 
 
Table E.2 (overleaf) summarises findings from Cook’s D for all models shown in chapter 6 
for the gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations, the female 
share of managers, and the gender gap in top quintile earnings. Again, the table shows 
very few cases hold values of Cook’s D that exceed the critical value of 1. The only 
exception is the case ‘Canada 1990’ for all three models of the female share of managers, 
where values of Cook’s D range between 1.07 and 2.32. Notably, though, excluding this 
case makes no practical difference to results – when dropped, all coefficients and 
inferences are almost identical to those from the original models.  
 
However, a number of cases across dependent variables do continue to hold values of 
Cook’s D that are considerably larger than the pack. In many instances, omitting these 
cases from the relevant models does not change results or inferences, implying estimates 
are robust to the exclusion of the potentially influential case. In certain others, however, 
dropping the observation does have some impact on findings. This is the case, to some 
extent at least, for ‘Luxembourg 2010’ and ‘Denmark 1992’ in models of the gender gap in 
the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations and the female share of 
managers, respectively, and particularly for ‘Finland 2010’ in models of the gap in top 
quintile earnings.   
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Table E.3 (overleaf) shows results from models of the gender gap in the proportion of 
employees in ‘female-type’ occupations and the female share of managers when the cases 
‘Luxembourg 2010’ and ‘Denmark 1992’ are omitted, respectively. In each case the 
original model from chapter 6 is shown alongside the re-estimated model in order to aid 
comparison. As far as the gender gap in employment in ‘female-type’ occupations is 
concerned, dropping ‘Luxembourg 2010’ from model A in table 6.4 brings the relation on 
child benefit into statistical significance, although this does not lead to huge changes in 
inferences as child benefit was already significant in model A in table 6.3. Perhaps more 
importantly, dropping the same case from model D in table 6.4 leads to total maternity 
and parental leave available to mothers and its square becoming significant at the stricter 
5% level, suggesting that increases in the length of general leave may inflate gender job 
segregation if only once the observation for Luxembourg in 2010 is removed. That said, 
the coefficients here are very small – the estimated effect of a 26 week increase in general 
leave for mothers is an increase in the gender gap of just 0.79 points – so in substantive 
terms excluding ‘Luxembourg 2010’ makes little difference to inferences. 
 
With regard to the female share of managers, meanwhile, columns E-H in table E.4 show 
that when ‘Denmark 1992’ is removed from models B and C in table 6.6, the negative 
coefficient on the proportion of children aged three-to-six in public pre-primary education 
or schooling moves from significance only at the 10% level to significance at the extremely 
strict 1% level. Curiously, this suggests that expanding public childcare provision for older 
children may damage women’s ability to attain employment as managers, although the 
coefficient remains fairly small. All other estimates, however, remain the same or similar 
to those from the original models. 
 
In both cases then, dropping neither ‘Luxembourg 2010’ nor ‘Denmark 1992’ from models 
of the gender gap in ‘female-type’ employment or the female share of managers leads to 
substantially different results and inferences – while the differences in estimates are 
interesting, in neither case is the overall conclusion radically different from that emerging 
from the original model. It is a different story, however, when the case ‘Finland 2010’ is 
omitted from models of the gender gap in the proportion of employees with top quintile 
earnings.  
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Table E.4 (overleaf) shows results from models of the gender gap in top quintile earnings 
when they are run both with all cases (columns A and C) and with ‘Finland 2010’ removed 
(columns B and D). The models that use all available cases show very few statistically 
significant results – in columns A and C, the only clear associations are a large and 
negative relation with changes in the size of the public sector as an employer, and a 
curious negative relation on changes in childcare leave. In other words, when all possible 
observations are included, the broad inference is that changes in policy and indeed most 
controls are almost entirely unrelated to movements in the gender gap in top quintile 
earnings.  
 
Dropping ‘Finland 2010’ from either A or C causes substantial changes to inferences. In 
both columns B and D, the negative coefficient on father-specific leave moves into 
significance at the 5% level, while the negative coefficients on service sector size and the 
crude birth rate plus the positive coefficient on tax support for the family become 
significant at the more lenient 10% level. Perhaps more importantly, in both cases the 
coefficient on total maternity and parental leave available to mothers increases in size by 
up to 50% and moves into statistical significance at the 5% level. Thus, once ‘Finland 
2010’ is excluded, the major inference from the models shifts to become one that suggest 
changes in leave for mothers can constrain equality in top earnings, and moreover that 
changes in leaves for fathers can promote women’s relative access to high pay. Put 
differently, conclusions from models of the gender gap in top quintile earnings are 
considerably different once the single observation ‘Finland 2010’ is removed from the 
models.  
 
The decision of whether or not to include ‘Finland 2010’ in the main models presented in 
chapter 6 is not an easy one. On the one hand, the results shown in table E.4 indicate that – 
across all cases other than ‘Finland 2010’ – changes in leave policies may have a 
meaningful effect on women’s relative ability to reach high earnings. On the other, there is 
no real apparent reason to exclude ‘Finland 2010’ other than the fact that its omission 
substantially changes results – inspection of the case reveals no extreme or erroneous 
data, and no sharp changes in any of the relevant variables between the previous time 
point (2005-2009) and 2010, although in some sense this strengthens the case for 
exclusion as there is nothing particularly interesting about ‘Finland 2010’. The final 
decision taken here is that, on balance, the shifts in inferences associated with the 
exclusion of ‘Finland 2010’ are of such magnitude and importance for the theory as to 
justify its exclusion. Thus, all models for the gender gap in top quintile earnings presented 
in chapter 6 are run without ‘Finland 2010’.  
  
400
 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
va
ri
ab
le
:
M
o
d
el
:
Ex
cl
u
d
ed
 c
as
e(
s)
La
g
V
ar
ia
b
le
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
B
SE
t-
1
M
o
th
er
-s
p
ec
if
ic
 e
ar
n
in
gs
-r
el
at
ed
  l
ea
ve
t
Fa
th
er
-s
p
ec
if
ic
 le
av
e
-0
.2
6
2
(0
.1
5
1
)
^
-0
.3
1
6
(0
.1
4
5
)
*
-0
.2
7
0
(0
.1
5
3
)
^
-0
.3
3
4
(0
.1
4
4
)
*
t-
1
G
en
d
er
-n
eu
tr
al
 e
ar
n
in
gs
-r
el
at
ed
  p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
t-
1
C
h
ild
re
n
 u
n
d
er
 3
 in
 p
u
b
lic
 c
h
ild
ca
re
-0
.1
5
3
(0
.1
3
8
)
-0
.1
2
2
(0
.1
3
2
)
-0
.1
6
5
(0
.1
4
0
)
-0
.1
3
8
(0
.1
3
1
)
t-
1
C
h
ild
re
n
 3
-6
 in
 p
u
b
lic
 p
re
-p
ri
m
ar
y 
ca
re
 o
r 
p
ri
m
ar
y 
sc
h
o
o
l
-0
.0
5
1
(0
.0
4
1
)
-0
.0
5
4
(0
.0
3
9
)
-0
.0
5
2
(0
.0
4
2
)
-0
.0
5
7
(0
.0
3
9
)
t-
1
P
u
b
lic
 e
xp
en
d
it
u
re
 o
n
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 s
er
vi
ce
s
0
.2
2
5
(0
.5
5
2
)
0
.2
9
5
(0
.5
2
3
)
0
.2
8
7
(0
.5
6
2
)
0
.4
0
7
(0
.5
2
5
)
t
C
h
ild
 b
en
ef
it
 p
er
 m
o
n
th
 f
o
r 
tw
o
 c
h
lld
re
n
0
.1
6
8
(0
.1
4
6
)
0
.1
6
8
(0
.1
3
8
)
0
.1
7
2
(0
.1
4
7
)
0
.1
7
4
(0
.1
3
6
)
t
Ta
x 
su
p
p
o
rt
 f
o
r 
fa
m
ili
es
0
.1
5
4
(0
.1
5
4
)
0
.2
8
5
(0
.1
5
8
)
^
0
.1
5
9
(0
.1
5
5
)
0
.3
0
9
(0
.1
5
7
)
^
t-
1
Fl
at
-r
at
e 
p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
 a
n
d
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 le
av
e
t-
1
To
ta
l m
at
er
n
it
y 
an
d
 p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
 a
va
ila
b
le
 t
o
 m
o
th
er
s
0
.1
8
3
(0
.0
9
3
)
^
0
.2
4
0
(0
.0
9
2
)
*
0
.3
8
1
(0
.2
8
5
)
0
.5
7
8
(0
.2
7
7
)
*
t-
1
(T
o
ta
l m
at
er
n
it
y 
an
d
 p
ar
en
ta
l l
ea
ve
 a
va
ila
b
le
 t
o
 m
o
th
er
s)
2
-0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
0
4
)
-0
.0
0
5
(0
.0
0
4
)
t-
1
C
h
ild
ca
re
 le
av
e
-0
.1
9
5
(0
.0
8
0
)
*
-0
.1
6
1
(0
.0
7
7
)
*
-0
.1
8
7
(0
.0
8
1
)
*
-0
.1
4
4
(0
.0
7
7
)
^
t-
1
-0
.3
1
8
(0
.2
3
4
)
-0
.3
8
3
(0
.2
2
4
)
^
-0
.3
2
1
(0
.2
3
6
)
-0
.3
9
6
(0
.2
2
2
)
^
t-
1
-1
.4
7
1
(0
.5
4
0
)
*
-1
.5
7
6
(0
.5
1
2
)
**
-1
.5
3
8
(0
.5
5
1
)
**
-1
.7
0
0
(0
.5
1
6
)
**
t-
1
0
.5
1
4
(0
.4
5
0
)
0
.4
3
9
(0
.4
2
7
)
0
.5
5
5
(0
.4
5
7
)
0
.4
9
9
(0
.4
2
5
)
t-
5
-0
.5
0
7
(0
.2
5
7
)
^
-0
.4
8
4
(0
.2
4
3
)
^
-0
.4
5
8
(0
.2
6
8
)
^
-0
.3
9
9
(0
.2
5
0
)
t
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n
 in
d
ex
1
.3
8
6
(1
.6
1
3
)
2
.1
2
3
(1
.5
6
2
)
1
.7
3
6
(1
.6
9
2
)
2
.8
0
0
(1
.6
3
1
)
^
t
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 f
re
ed
o
m
 in
d
ex
-1
.5
0
7
(1
.6
1
5
)
-0
.9
7
4
(1
.5
4
6
)
-1
.1
4
5
(1
.6
9
8
)
-0
.3
0
4
(1
.6
1
5
)
2
.1
7
0
(2
, 1
3
)
4
.3
1
0
(2
, 3
0
)
*
n
8
6
8
5
8
6
8
5
0
.9
1
5
0
.9
2
6
0
.9
1
7
0
.9
3
0
P
u
b
lic
 S
ec
to
r 
Si
ze
C
ru
d
e 
b
ir
th
 r
at
e
Fe
m
al
e 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
te
rt
ia
ry
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 s
tu
d
en
ts
Ta
b
le
 E
.4
. A
lt
e
rn
at
iv
e
 t
w
o
-w
ay
 f
ix
e
d
 e
ff
e
ct
s 
re
gr
e
ss
io
n
 m
o
d
e
ls
 f
o
r 
th
e
 g
e
n
d
e
r 
ga
p
 in
 t
h
e
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
e
m
p
lo
ye
e
s 
w
it
h
 t
o
p
 q
u
in
ti
le
 a
n
n
u
al
 e
ar
n
in
gs
, w
it
h
 
p
o
ss
ib
le
 in
fl
u
e
n
ti
al
 c
as
e
s 
re
m
o
ve
d
R
ef
er
en
ce
 m
o
d
el
A
 G
en
d
er
 g
ap
 in
 t
o
p
 q
u
in
ti
le
 e
ar
n
in
gs
M
o
d
el
 A
 in
 t
ab
le
 6
.9
M
o
d
el
 D
 in
 t
ab
le
 6
.9
B
C
D
O
ri
gi
n
al
 m
o
d
el
 u
si
n
g 
al
l a
va
ila
b
le
 c
as
es
Fi
n
la
n
d
 2
0
1
0
O
ri
gi
n
al
 m
o
d
el
 u
si
n
g 
al
l a
va
ila
b
le
 c
as
es
Fi
n
la
n
d
 2
0
1
0
N
o
te
: *
 =
 p
<0
.0
5
 *
* 
= 
p
<0
.0
1
 *
**
 =
 p
<0
.0
0
1
. ^
 =
 p
<0
.1
. 
Sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
s:
A
-B
. S
ee
 m
o
d
el
 A
 in
 t
ab
le
 6
.9
C
-D
. S
ee
 m
o
d
el
 D
 in
 t
ab
le
 6
.9
D
u
al
 e
ar
n
er
 c
h
ild
ca
re
 p
o
lic
y
D
u
al
 e
ar
n
er
-c
ar
er
 le
av
e 
p
o
lic
y
G
en
er
al
 f
am
ily
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 p
o
lic
y
A
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
o
f 
le
av
e 
p
o
lic
y
Jo
in
t 
F-
te
st
 o
n
 t
o
ta
l l
ea
ve
 a
va
ila
b
le
 t
o
 m
o
th
er
s 
an
d
 it
s 
sq
u
ar
e 
(d
.f
)
r-
sq
u
ar
ed
 (
w
it
h
in
)
Se
rv
ic
e 
Se
ct
o
r 
Si
ze
  
401 
 
Outliers and influential points in the models presented in chapter 7 
 
Table E.5 (overleaf) summarises findings from Cook’s D for all models shown in chapter 7 
for the gender gap in the labour force participation (for those aged 25-49, 25-29 and 30-
34), the female share of managers, and the gender gap in top quintile earnings across 
levels of education. Once again, in most models no cases hold values of Cook’s D that 
exceed the threshold value of 1. The exceptions are the models of the gender gap in top 
quintile earnings for employees with low and high education, which are returned to a little 
later on. There are, though, a number of instances where cases have values of D that are 
far larger than those seen on most other observations. Once again, excluding or dropping 
most of these observations makes little difference to results. However, in certain cases 
dropping the observation under consideration does have at least some impact on 
estimates.   
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Table E.6 shows results from models of the gender gap in labour participation amongst 
individuals aged 25-49 with low education, the gap in participation amongst individuals 
between 25-49 with high education, and the female share of managers with low education 
when ‘Portugal 1992’, ‘Luxembourg 1994’ and ‘Denmark 1992’ are dropped, respectively. 
In all cases the original models are shown alongside the re-estimated models so as to help 
comparison.  
 
With regard to models of the gender gap in labour force participation for individuals aged 
25-49 with low education, dropping ‘Portugal 1992’ (columns A-D) shifts the negative 
relation on the proportion of children aged less than three in publicly funded childcare out 
of significance at the 5% level, and the negative coefficient on flat-rate childcare leave into 
significance at the 5% level. However, in both cases the relation was either previously or 
remains significant at the more lenient 10% level, and the coefficients remain of 
reasonably similar size. Moreover, in the case of the relation on childcare provision for 
children aged less than three, the coefficient remains far larger than the equivalent 
coefficients on the same variable for the gender gaps amongst men and women with 
moderate and high levels of education. Thus, inferences around the effects of policy on 
participation for men and women aged 25-49 remain largely the same whether or not 
‘Portugal 1992’ is included in the model for men and women with low education. 
 
It is a mostly similar story when ‘Luxembourg 1994’ is dropped from models of the gender 
gap in the labour force participation rate for men and women aged 25-49 with high 
education (columns E-H). Excluding ‘Luxembourg 1994’ reduces the size of the coefficient 
on father-specific leave but the relation remains significant, while the negative relation on 
proportion of three-to-six year olds in publicly funded pre-primary education or primary 
school drops out of significance at the 5% level. However, as noted in the text in chapter 7, 
only limited emphasis should be placed on this latter relation as the coefficient is in any 
case only very small. Thus, regardless of whether ‘Luxembourg 1994’ is included the 
inference remains that childcare provision for older children has only a limited impact on 
equality in participation amongst 25-49 year old men and women with high levels of 
education. 
 
Lastly, columns I-L show the impact of dropping ‘Denmark 1992’ from models of the 
female share of managers with low education. In this instance, dropping the potentially 
influential case does lead to a fairly sizeable change in estimates – removing ‘Denmark 
1992’ moves the negative relations on both childcare provision for older children and flat-
rate parental and childcare leave into significance at the 5% level. The latter is particularly  
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interesting as it provides more concrete evidence to suggest that changes in certain leave 
policies can damage women’s representation amongst managers with low levels of formal 
education.  
 
There may be some justification, then, for dropping ‘Denmark 1992’ from models of the 
female share of managers with low education. However, an additional concern here is that, 
ideally, the sample should be identical or as close to identical as possible across levels of 
education in order to aid the comparability of results. There is no strong case for removing 
‘Denmark 1992’ from models of the female share of managers with either moderate or 
high education, so excluding ‘Denmark 1992’ from models of the female share of managers 
with low education only would lead to unbalanced samples and comparisons across levels 
of education. For this reason, ‘Denmark 1992’ continues to be included in all models of the 
female share of managers. 
 
Returning to table E.5 (pg. 402-403), it is clear that the various models of the gender gap 
in top quintile earnings across levels of education may contain a number of potentially 
influential cases. In several instances, these cases hold values of D that are well above one. 
Excluding these observations does not always change results, but in some instances 
differences in estimates are fairly sizeable. A number of other cases also hold values of D 
that are fairly large in comparison to most others, particularly in models of the gender gap 
in top quintile earnings amongst employees with moderate education.  
 
Table E.7 re-estimates models of the gender gap amongst employees with low and 
medium education with ‘Sweden 90-94’ and ‘Ireland 2010’, ‘Austria 90-94’, ‘Austria 00-04’ 
and ‘Luxembourg 85-89’ removed, respectively. Dropping ‘Sweden 90-94’ from models of 
the gender gap amongst employees with low education (models A-B) leads to 
considerable changes in estimates. In particular, the coefficient on total maternity and 
parental leave available to mothers almost doubles and the relation becomes highly 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Similar to the discussion around the exclusion of 
‘Denmark 1992’ in the section above, this alternative model provides stronger evidence to 
suggest that any adverse effects attached to leave policies are concentrated on the relative 
attainment of women with low education. However, also like the discussion around 
‘Denmark 1992’, a couple of additional considerations mean that, on balance, it may be 
best to keep ‘Sweden 90-94’ in the model. 
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First, just as discussed above, it is important to maintain a sample that is as similar as 
possible across levels of education. There is no clear reason to exclude ‘Sweden 90-94’ 
from models of the gap at moderate or high levels of education, so dropping the case at 
low education only would lead to an unbalanced comparison. Second, examination of the 
case shows that it provides important evidence to counter any positive relation between 
general leave and the gender gap in top quintile earnings. More specifically, between the 
five-year periods ‘90-94’ and ‘95-99’ Sweden couples a sizeable decrease in effective 
weeks of total maternity and parental leave available to mothers with no real change in 
the gender gap in top quintile earnings (see tables C.10 and C.33 in appendix C). Thus, 
removing the case simply because it changes and solidifies inferences would be to remove 
an observation that adds important uncertainty to the estimated relation. For these 
reasons, it is considered best to include ‘Sweden 90-94’ in the models presented in chapter 
7. 
 
Elsewhere, removing the various other observations from models of the gap amongst 
employees with moderate education cause several relatively minor changes to findings. 
Columns C-F in table E.7 show that dropping either ‘Ireland 2010’, ‘Austria 90-94’ or 
‘Austria 00-04’ from model B in table 7.10 causes the negative relation between mother-
specific leave and the gap for employees with moderate education to become significant at 
the 5% level. This relation was, however, already significant at the more lenient 10% level. 
Removing ‘Luxembourg 85-89’ from model E in table 7.10, meanwhile, leads to the 
negative coefficient on father-specific leave becoming statistically significant. This case is 
important to include, however, because it couples a substantial drop in the gender gap 
with no change in father-specific leave (see tables C.2 and C.34 in appendix C) and 
therefore again adds important uncertainty to the model. 
 
Finally, table E.8 (pg. 410) illustrates the impact of removing ‘Spain 90-94’, ‘Denmark 85-
89’, Australia 85-89’ and ‘Denmark 00-04’ from models of the gender gap in top quintile 
earnings amongst employees with high education. In most cases, any changes to results 
produce only small differences in inferences. Dropping ‘Denmark 85-89’ from model C in 
table 7.10 moves the negative relation on childcare provision for children under three into 
significance at the 5% level, and also increases the level of significance on both child 
benefit and flat-rate parental and childcare leave. However, in all three cases changes to 
broader inferences are only mild – the negative relation on childcare for children under 
three is already significant in model F in table 7.10, while the negative and significant 
relation on flat-rate leave adds a little more weight to the very cautious suggestion in  
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chapter 7 that leave policies may improve the relative occupational attainment of highly 
educated women. Dropping either ‘Denmark 85-89’ or ‘Australia 85-89’ from model F in 
table 7.10 meanwhile, moves the negative coefficient on child benefit payments into 
significance at the 5% level but removing ‘Spain 90-94’ does the opposite, while excluding 
either ‘Spain 90-94’, ‘Denmark 85-89’ or ‘Denmark 00-04’ shifts the negative coefficient on 
childcare leave into significance. This latter relation is however tricky to explain 
theoretically – it is difficult to see how the introduction of or an extension to these long, 
unprotected leaves could boost the relative ability of highly educated women to reach top 
earnings – so it is considered best to rely here on the original full sample results. 
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Appendix F. Fourth statistical appendix to chapter 5, 6 and 7: checks and 
tests for the influence of missing data imputed using ‘last value carried 
forward’ or ‘next value carried back’ 
 
As touched on in both chapter 3 and appendix B.3, this thesis deals with missing data in 
the indicators of family policy using two techniques – primarily, through linear 
interpolation between the nearest two non-missing data points, but also through ‘last 
value carried forward’ or ‘next value carried back’ (LVCF/NVCB) where the missing data 
are at the beginning or end of a series and thus interpolation is not possible.  
 
Neither of these methods are without their faults. Most immediately, as single imputation 
techniques, both may systematically underestimate variance in the imputed values as 
neither fully capture uncertainty around the unknown missing data points (Honaker and 
King, 2010: 563; Nardo et al, 2005: 17; see appendix B.3). However, the use of LVCF/NVCB 
to impute data points at the beginning or end of a series may be particularly problematic. 
The missing data here reflect almost full ignorance, in as much as there is no information 
available on the given policy in the given year other than that which exists for the nearest 
available data point. Assuming that the given policy remained unchanged over the 
intervening period may well be unrealistic, particularly where the number of years 
missing at the beginning or end of the series are more than a few.  
 
This final appendix explores the effects on results of using LVCF/NVCB by dropping any 
cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB from the various regression models presented in the 
main text. In this respect, it examines the sensitivity of estimates to the use of LVCF/NVCB, 
at least relative to a situation where the cases in question are deleted entirely. It is 
unfortunately not possible to test the sensitivity of results against any generated using 
data imputed through other, potentially superior methods of imputation – such as 
regression-based methods and in particular multiple imputation – as the author could not 
get these methods to impute plausible values on the missing data points. 
 
It should be pointed out here that the removal or deletion of any observations imputed 
using LVCF/NVCB does carry its own risks, most of which revolve around the fact that, 
through listwise deletion, the removal of any one observation imputed using LVCF/NVCB 
leads to the loss of the entire case – including information on other, non-missing variables 
– for the given country in the given year. First and foremost, deleting entire cases in this 
manner may damage estimates on other variables that are themselves unaffected by 
missing data if the deleted cases contain information on the other variables that is 
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important (Little, 1992: 1230; King et al, 1998: 4). Put differently, using listwise deletion 
risks producing misleading results for other unaffected variables if deletion throws away 
important known and observed data that would otherwise have been valuable for the 
estimated relation. Second, omitting cases completely reduces sample size and as a result 
can – if enough cases are removed – reduce statistical power (Osborne, 2013: 118).  
 
In both cases, the damaging effects of deleting cases are likely to be small if only a few 
cases are affected. However, as noted by both Osborne (2013: 118) and Schafer and 
Graham (2002: 156), where models include many independent variables only a small 
proportion of cases need be missing on each individual variable for a large portion of cases 
to be deleted from the final model. In this instance, a total of 212156 observations are 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB spread across four family policy indicators – 101 on the 
proportion of children under three years of age in public or publicly supported childcare, 
69 on the proportion of children between three and six years of age in publicly run pre-
primary education or in primary school, 38 on public expenditure on childcare services 
per child aged under six, and 4 on tax subsidies for the family. The remaining five 
indicators of family policy are unaffected by missing data.  
 
To minimize the dangers associated with deleting whole cases – and in particular the 
possibility that estimates on a given variable may change due to deletion of cases imputed 
using LVCF/NVCB on a different variable – the following presents alternative models with 
any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed for each affected variable individually, plus 
an ‘overall’ model with all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB across all variables removed. 
In other words, it goes through each affected variable one-by-one, deleting cases imputed 
using LVCF/NVCB on the given affected variable only, before presenting a final model with 
all affected cases across all affected variables removed. Results across the various models 
are compared, with particular attention paid to any variables that move into or out of 
significance when any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed.  
 
By and large, results suggest that deleting cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB does not 
change substantive conclusions on the effects of those four variables with cases imputed 
using LVCF/NVCB. There are on occasion minor changes in estimated coefficients and 
significance test on the four affected variables, but these generally do not lead to changes 
in wider inferences. In most cases this is either because the same relation was already or 
                                                        
156 The number of observations actually removed from models when any cases with data imputed 
using LVCF/NVCB are deleted is usually far lower than this number. This is due to either missing 
data on the dependent variable, to the time-lags applied to the affected independent variables, or to 
cases having data imputed using LVCF/NVCB or more than one variable in a given country in a 
given year.  
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remains evident elsewhere, or because the estimated coefficient is only very small or only 
marginally statistically significant. Most important though, all of this thesis’ major findings 
related to the four affected variables remain intact – even once cases imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB are removed, results continue to suggest that increases in the provision of 
public childcare services for children aged 0-3 can promote equal labour participation, 
particularly amongst men and women with low levels of education; that changes in the 
provision of public services for older children and public childcare spending have little 
real impact on gender differences in employment outcomes; and that changes in tax 
support for the family do no harm to female participation.  
 
Removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB does at times though lead to changes in 
estimates on other family policy variables that are themselves unaffected by missing data. 
In almost all cases these changes can be explained by the loss – through listwise deletion – 
of specific observations that provide valuable information for the original models 
presented in the main text.   
 
F.1. Gender gap in labour force participation rates (25-54 year olds) 
 
Tables F.1 and F.2 show results for models of the gender gap in labour force participation 
rates among 25-54 year olds when any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed. In 
each case, the original model is shown alongside alternative models with any cases 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB on a given variable removed plus a final model with all cases 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed. For example, in table F.1, specifications 1-6 show 
results for model A presented earlier in table 5.3 – specification 1 is the original model, 2-
5 are models with any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB  on the four affected variables 
removed respectively, and specification 6 a model that removes all cases imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB  across all four affected variables. For ease of interpretation, the variable(s) 
with cases removed is highlighted in bold.  
 
Removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB from models of the gender gap in labour force 
participation rates among 25-54 year olds does lead to a couple of changes in results on 
the affected variables. Results for both the proportion of 0-2 year olds in public or 
publicly-funded childcare and tax support for the family are generally robust to the 
deletion of LVCF/NVCB, with both coefficients and significance tests of the coefficients 
largely unchanged (specifications 2, 5, 6, 8, 11 and 12 in tables F.1 and F.2). However, 
results do change slightly for the proportion of children aged 3-6 in public pre-primary or 
primary school, and more so for public expenditure on childcare. 
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Changes in results for the proportion of children aged 3-6 in public pre-primary or 
primary school are mixed and only small. Specifications 3 and 9 in table F.1 show that 
when any LVCF/NVCB cases are removed from models A and D in table 5.3, the small 
negative coefficient on the proportion of children aged 3-6 in public pre-primary or 
primary school moves into and out of significance at the more lenient 10% level, 
respectively. In all cases the estimated coefficients are tiny – the estimated effect of a 49 
percentage point increase in the proportion of 3-6 year olds in public pre-primary 
education or school, the largest observed over the series, is at most a decrease in the 
gender gap of just 0.9 percentage points, all else equal – and significance at only the 10% 
level suggests the relation is far from conclusive. As a result, this change is considered to 
make little difference to substantive conclusions.  
 
Changes in results for public expenditure on childcare are though a little more consistent 
and considerable in magnitude. Specification 10 in table F.1, for example, shows that 
when cases that use LVCF/NVCB to impute data on public expenditure on childcare are 
removed from model D shown in table 5.3, the positive coefficient on public expenditure 
on childcare moves into significance at the 5% level, while specifications 6 in table F.1 and 
6 and 12 in F.2 show something similar when all LVCF/NVCB cases are removed from 
their respective models. The consistency of this change is concerning for the results shown 
earlier in the main text, but the relation itself is curious – it suggests that, all else equal, an 
increase in public childcare spending can increase the gender gap in labour participation 
rates. It is difficult using the theory to explain how expanding childcare spending could 
have such a damaging effect on equal participation – in that it is not clear how an increase 
in childcare spending would actively discourage female headcount participation (see 
chapter 2) – but it is possible that the true relation may actually run in reverse, with an 
increase in childcare expenditure a response to little or no growth in female economic 
activity.  
 
Elsewhere, removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB from models of the gender gap in 
labour participation does lead to changes in estimates on several other variables that do 
not themselves suffer missing data. This is particularly the case with regard to the 
estimated associations on changes in weeks of flat rate parental and childcare leave and 
changes in total general leave available to mothers. Specifications 6 and 12 in table F.1, for 
example, show that deleting cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB leads to the negative 
coefficient on changes in flat rate parental and childcare becoming highly significant, while 
specifications 6 and 12 in F.2 show something similar for changes in both total general 
leave available to mothers and changes in childcare leave. These alternative results would, 
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if valid, provide stronger evidence to suggest that changes in leave policies can reduce 
gender gaps in labour force participation, although this would be unexpected in the case of 
childcare leave given that, theory-wise, these extended leaves should do little to promote 
female activity.  
 
In all cases, however, these changes can be explained by the removal through listwise 
deletion of cases that provide important information on these variables. The shift into 
significance of flat rate parental and childcare leave in specifications 6 and 12 in table F.1, 
for example, can be explained entirely157 by the loss of observations for Denmark and 
Sweden between 1985 and 1992 and Luxembourg in 1985. In doing so, these models miss 
the period before the introduction of the childcare leave in Denmark in 1992 – which 
coincides with an increase in the gender gap in labour participation –  and much of the 
period before the introduction of a similar leave in Luxembourg in 1987, which coincides 
with no immediate change in gender differences in labour participation. As a result, these 
alternative models – with any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed – lose valuable 
uncertainty around the estimated relations and risk producing misleading results. 
 
Similarly, the shift of total general leave available to mothers and its square into joint 
significance in specification 12 in table F.2 can be explained by the loss of observations for 
Portugal between 2005-10 and New Zealand between 1985-2003. Both countries changed 
provision of total general leave for mothers during the period in question, with in both 
cases little apparent immediate effect on the gender gap in labour force participation 
rates. Thus, the deletion of theses cases again has the effect of removing important 
uncertainty and counter-information from the model, and again risks producing 
misleading estimates and inferences.  
 
F.2. Gender gap in labour force participation rates (25-34 year olds) 
 
Table F.3 shows results for models of the gender gap in labour force participation rates 
among the younger 25-34 year old age group when any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB 
are removed. Specifications 1 and 7 are again the original models shown earlier in the 
main body, with 2-5 and 8-11 models with any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB on the 
four affected variables removed individually, and 6 and 12 models with all cases imputed 
using LVCF/NVCB removed. Again, for ease of interpretation, the variable(s) with cases 
removed is highlighted in bold. 
                                                        
157 Removing only these cases from the models produces the same results 
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Removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB from models of the gender gap in labour force 
participation rates amongst 25-34 year olds has little impact on results for those variables 
that suffer from missing data. Similar to the results shown above for the broader age 
group, specifications 3 and 9 show that removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB leads 
to the proportion of children aged 3-6 in public pre-primary or primary school moving 
into significance at the more lenient 10% level, although in this case the coefficient is 
positive – in other words, there is some admittedly still weak suggestion that increasing 
the proportion of children aged 3-6 in public pre-primary or primary school leads to a 
increase in the gender gap in labour participation. Again though, the coefficient is tiny – 
the estimated effect of a 49 week increase in the proportion of 3-6 year olds in public pre-
primary or primary school is at most a 1.3 percentage point increase in the gender gap. 
Otherwise, those variables that suffer missing data are generally robust to the removal of 
cases with data imputed using LVCF/NVCB.  
 
Like results for the gender gap in labour participation amongst 25-54 year olds shown 
above, removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB does lead to some change in estimates 
for variables that do not themselves suffer missing data. Specification 6, for example, 
shows that once all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed, the negative 
coefficients on mother-specific earnings related leave and gender-neutral earnings related 
leave move out of significance and that on flat rate parental and childcare leave again 
moves into significance at the 5% level. The former can be explained by the loss of 
observations for Denmark and Finland between 1985 and 1992 – so that the models miss 
much of the period before the subsequent decreases in mother-specific and gender-
neutral earnings-related leaves and the coinciding increases in gender differences in 
labour participation – while the latter can again be explained by the deletion of 
observations for Denmark and Sweden between 1985 and 1992.  
 
Specifications 12 and particularly 6 also show that the negative coefficient on father-
specific leave comes into significance once all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are 
dropped from their respective models. If valid, this would provide evidence to suggest that 
an expansion in paternity and other father-specific leaves can promote equal participation 
in general, in addition to the evidence that father-specific leaves may close gender gaps in 
participation among highly educated men and women (see chapter 7). Again though, the 
shift into significance can be explained by the loss of cases that provide important 
counter-information to the suggested association – in this case, the shift can be explained 
by the loss of data for Finland 1985-1992, the Netherlands 2004-10, and Portugal 2005-
  
420
10, all of which provide information to suggest that an increase in father-specific leave has, 
to varying extents, little impact on gender differences in labour participation among 25-34 
year olds.  
 
F.3. Gender gap in usual weekly working hours (25-54 year olds) 
 
Tables F.4 and F.5 show results for models of the gender gap in usual weekly working 
house rates when any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed. In both tables, 
specifications 1 and 7 are the original models shown earlier in the main body, with 2-5 
and 8-11 models with any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB on the four affected variables 
removed individually, and 6 and 12 models with all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB 
removed. Again, for ease of interpretation, the variable(s) with cases removed is 
highlighted in bold.  
 
Removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB from models of the gender gap in usual 
weekly working hours has very little impact on results for those variables that suffer from 
missing data. The only even slight change is in specification 12 in table F.4, where the 
positive coefficient on public expenditure on childcare services moves into significance at 
the 10% level once all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB across all variables are removed. 
This relation is not though evident in those models where only cases that use LVCF/NVCB 
to impute missing data for public expenditure in childcare specifically are removed 
(specifications 4 and 10 in tables F.4 and F.5) – suggesting that the change is driven 
mostly if not entirely by the deletion of observations with missing data on the other three 
affected variables – nor is it apparent in the other three models where all LVCF/NVCB 
cases are removed (specifications 6 in table F.4 and 6 and 12 in table F.5).  
 
Similarly, removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB makes no difference at all to results 
on those variables that do not suffer from missing data. Generally then, results for the 
gender gap in usual weekly working hours appear robust to the removal of any cases 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB.  
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F.4. Gender gap in the proportion of employees in ‘female-type’ occupations (all 
ages) 
 
Table F.6 shows results for models of the gender gap in employment in ‘female type’ 
occupations when any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are deleted. Specifications 1, 7 
and 13 are the original models shown earlier in the main body, with 2-5, 8-11 and 14-17 
models with any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB on the affected variables removed 
individually, and 6, 12 and 18 models with all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed. 
It is worth noting here that, because of missing data on the dependent variable, the 
original models use no cases where missing data for tax support for the family are 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB. As a result, models 5, 11 and 17 are left blank.   
 
Generally, results for the proportion of employees in ‘female type’ occupations are robust 
to the removal of any cases with data imputed using LVCF/NVCB. There are no changes in 
results for the three variables that are affected by missing data, regardless of whether only 
their own LVCF/NVCB cases or all LVCF/NVCB cases are removed from the model. 
Similarly, there are very few changes in results on those variables that are not themselves 
affected by missing data. The only exception is in specification 6, where the positive 
coefficient on child benefit payments shifts out of significance entirely. However, as 
covered in the main text, this relation was already known to be driven entirely by 
Australia, where in 2000 an increase in the generosity of child care benefit coincides with 
a jump in the proportion of women working in ‘female-type’ jobs (see chapter 6.4). 
Appropriately, the shift in significance here can be explained entirely by the loss of 
observations for Australia over the years 1985-2001 due to missing data on the 
proportion of 3-6 year olds in public pre-primary education or primary school.   
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F.5. Female share of managers (all ages) 
 
Table F.7 shows results for models of the female share of managers when any cases 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB are deleted. Specifications 1, 7 and 13 are the original models 
shown earlier in the main body, with 2-5, 8-11 and 14-17 models with any cases imputed 
using LVCF/NVCB on the affected variables removed individually, and 6, 12 and 18 
models with all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed. Again, it is worth noting that 
because of missing data on the dependent variable, the original models use no cases where 
missing data for tax support for the family are imputed using LVCF/NVCB so 5, 11 and 17 
are left blank.  
 
As far as the three variables affected by missing data are concerned, removing any cases 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB makes almost no difference at all to results. The only exception 
is in specification 18, where the negative coefficient on the proportion of 3-6 year olds in 
public pre-primary education or primary school shifts out of significance from the 10% 
level. However, it remains significant at the 10% level in models 3, 9 and 15 – where only 
cases that use LVCF/NVCB to impute missing data for the proportion of 3 to 6 year olds in 
public pre-primary education or primary school are removed – which suggests that the 
shift is caused mostly by the removal of LVCF/NVCB on the other affected variables.  
 
Removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB does though lead to a couple of changes in the 
estimated relations on variables that are not themselves affected by missing data. 
Specification 12, for example, shows that the coefficient on child benefit becomes positive 
and significant once all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed from model B in 
table 6.6. This change is driven entirely by the removal of observations for Australia 1985-
2001, Ireland 2004-10, and New Zealand, 1985-2003, but in any case the relation itself is 
curious – it is difficult using the theory to explain how an increase in child benefit could 
lead directly to an increase in female access to managerial positions. 
 
More importantly perhaps, specification 18 shows that the negative association between 
changes in total general leave available to mothers and the female share of managers falls 
out of significance completely once all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed from 
model C in table 6.6. If valid, this would damage the conclusion that increases in leave may 
lead to a reduction in female access to managerial employment. However, this change can 
again be explained by the loss of cases that contain important information – more 
specifically, the change in result is driven entirely by the loss of observations for Canada 
(all years) and New Zealand 1985-2003, where in both cases an increase in total general 
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leave available to mothers coincide with at least a slight drop in the female share of 
managerial employment.  
 
F.6. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top-quintile annual earnings 
(25-54) 
 
Table F.8 shows results for models of the gender gap in top quintile earnings when any 
cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed. Specifications 1, 7 and 13 are again the 
original models shown earlier in the main body, with 2-5, 8-11 and 14-17 models with 
any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB on the four affected variables removed individually, 
and 6, 12 and 18 models with all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed. Again, for 
ease of interpretation, the variable(s) with cases removed is highlighted in bold.  
 
By and large, removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB makes little difference to results 
on those variables that suffer from missing data. The only exception is in specification 4, 
where deleting cases with data on public expenditure on childcare services that are 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB leads to the negative coefficient on public expenditure on 
childcare becoming large and significant at the 10% level. This association would, if valid, 
provide at least some evidence to suggest that increasing childcare spending could 
promote women’s relative access to top earnings. However, it is not evident in either of 
the other two specifications where LVCF/NVCB cases for public expenditure on childcare 
are removed (specifications 8 and 16) or those where all LVCF/NVCB cases are removed 
(6, 12 and 18), and in any case is significant only at the more lenient 10% level.  
 
More widely though, removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB does impact on results 
for the other included variables in as much results collapse completely once all  
LVCF/NVCB cases are removed. More specifically, in specifications 6, 12 and 18 estimated 
relations on all included variables move out of significance and, moreover, the coefficients 
on many variables shift in size and in some cases change sign. Put a different way, 
removing all LVCF/NVCB cases radically changes estimates to the point where results are 
unrecognizable from those in the original models. 
 
The most likely explanation here is that removing all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB 
leads to the loss of many valuable cases and, perhaps more importantly, reduces the 
sample size to the point where there is little power left in the model. Due to measurement 
at five-year intervals, the sample size for models of the gender gap in top earnings was 
already small at 85 observations. After removing any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB, 
this falls by almost a third to 58. Given that these models include at least 16 independent 
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variables plus country-specific time trends and year fixed-effects, reducing the sample size 
to 58 observations is likely to drain the models of all statistical power, with the result few 
clear estimates and results that are entirely inconsistent with those from the original 
model. In other words, any changes in results here may be due less to the removal of the 
influence of any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB and more to an insufficient number of 
observations. 
 
F.7. Gender gap in labour force participation rates across levels of education (25-49 
year olds) 
 
Tables F.9 and F.10 show results for models of the gender gap in labour force 
participation rates (25-49 year olds) across men and women with low, medium and high 
education when any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed. In both tables, 
specifications 1, 7 and 13 are the original models shown earlier in the main body, with 2-
5, 8-11 and 14-17 models with any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB on the affected 
variables removed individually, and 6, 12 and 18 models with all cases imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB removed. It should be noted here that because of missing data on the 
dependent variable, the original models use no cases where missing data for both public 
expenditure on childcare services and tax support for the family are imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB. As a result, models 4, 5, 10, 11, 16 and 17 are left blank.   
 
Once again, removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB makes only very minor differences 
to results on the two variables that have cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB. Specification 
15 in table F.9 shows that the negative coefficient on the proportion of children aged 
between 3-6 in public pre-primary or primary school shifts from significance at the 10% 
level to significance at the 5% level once any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are 
removed. However, a similar relation was already evident in model F in table 7.4 (see 
specification 13 in table F.10), so this change does not radically alter broader inferences. 
Similarly, specification 2 in table F.10 shows that when LVCF/NVCB cases are removed 
from model D in table 7.4, the negative coefficient on changes in the proportion of 0-3 
year olds in public or publicly funded childcare also shifts from significance at the 10% 
level to significance at the 5% level. Again though, a similar relation was already shown in 
model A in table 7.4 (see specification 1 in table F.9). 
 
Elsewhere, removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB does produce a couple of changes 
in the estimates on variables that do not themselves suffer from missing data. In 
specifications 6 and 12 in table F.9, for example, the deletion of cases imputed using 
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 LVCF/NVCB leads to the negative coefficients on flat-rate parental and childcare leave 
becoming highly statistically significant, while specification 12 in table F.10 shows 
something similar for changes in weeks of childcare leave. The latter association in 
particular is curious since these extended childcare leaves are – theoretically speaking – 
particularly unlikely to promote female labour participation. In all cases however the 
shifts into significance can again be explained by the loss of the observation for Denmark 
1992, which forms an important case as it precedes reductions in the Danish childcare 
leave and coinciding increases in the gender gaps in participation at low and medium 
levels of education over the mid-1990s.  
 
F.8. Gender gap in labour force participation rates across levels of education (25-29 
year olds) 
 
Tables F.11 and F.12 show results for models of the gender gap in labour force 
participation rates (25-29 year olds) across men and women with low, medium and high 
education when any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed. In both tables, 
specifications 1, 7 and 13 are the original models shown earlier in the main body, with 2-
5, 8-11 and 14-17 models with any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB on the affected 
variables removed individually, and 6, 12 and 18 models with all cases imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB removed. Again, it should be noted here that because of missing data on the 
dependent variable, the original models use no cases where missing data for both public 
expenditure on childcare services and tax support for the family are imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB. As a result, models 4, 5, 10, 11, 16 and 17 are left blank.   
 
Once more, removing any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB makes almost no difference to 
results on the two variables with cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB. The only exception is 
in specification 2 in table F.12, where removing any cases that use LVCF/NVCB to impute 
data on the proportion of children under three in public childcare leads to the coefficient 
on the proportion of children under three moving out of significance completely. The same 
variable does though remain significant in specification 2 in table F.11, while the 
estimated coefficients across models in table F.12 continue to suggest that any beneficial 
effects of public childcare for very young children are likely to be most substantial for less 
educated women.  
 
Elsewhere, removing LVCF/NVCB cases does again impact on estimates for those variables 
that do not suffer missing data. Specification 18 in table F.12, for example, shows that 
removing all LVCF/NVCB cases from model F in table 7.5 shifts to the negative coefficient 
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on father-specific from significance at the 10% level to significance at the 5% level, 
although again this relation was already significant in model C in table 7.5 (see 
specification 13 in table F.11). More importantly perhaps, removing cases imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB from model A in table 7.5 leads to the negative association between changes 
in mother-specific earnings-related leave and the gender gap for men and women with 
low education moving out of significance at the 5% level, although it remains significant at 
the 10% level (specification 6 in table F.11).  
 
The latter result would, if valid, weaken evidence in favour of the suggestion that these 
dual earner-type leaves are particularly effective at promoting equal participation among 
less educated men and women. It can again though be explained mostly by the loss of 
Denmark 1992, which means that the model loses an important observation that precedes 
a decrease in the effective length of mother-specific earnings-related leave and an increase 
the gender gap in labour force participation for 25-29 year olds with low education. 
Moreover, estimated coefficients on mother-specific earnings-related leave continue to 
decline and turn positive as education increases (see specification 6, 12 and 18 in table 
F.11), which implies that any beneficial effects of mother-specific earnings-related leave 
remain likely strongest for less education women. As a result, this change does not lead to 
a major revision in broad inferences regarding the effects of changes in leave on gender 
differences in participation across levels of education.  
 
F.9. Gender gap in labour force participation rates across levels of education (30-34 
year olds) 
 
Tables F.13 and F.14 show results for models of the gender gap in labour force 
participation rates (30-34 year olds) across men and women with low, medium and high 
education when any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed. In both tables, 
specifications 1, 7 and 13 are the original models shown earlier in the main body, with 2-
5, 8-11 and 14-17 models with any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB on the affected 
variables removed individually, and 6, 12 and 18 models with all cases imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB removed. Once more, it should be noted here that because of missing data on 
the dependent variable, the original models use no cases where missing data for both 
public expenditure on childcare services and tax support for the family are imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB. As a result, models 4, 5, 10, 11, 16 and 17 are left blank.   
 
Removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB from models of the gender gap for 30-34 year 
olds across levels of education makes absolutely no difference to results on the two
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variables that have cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB. Across all specifications in tables 
F.13 and F.14, neither of the two variables (the proportion of 0-2 year olds in public 
childcare and the proportion of 3-6 year olds in public pre-primary or primary school) 
move into or out of significance when LVCF/NVCB cases are removed, suggesting that 
results for both are robust to the omission of LVCF/NVCB cases.  
 
Again though, there are a couple of changes in results for the remaining family policy 
indicators that do not themselves contain any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB. Several of 
these changes revolve around estimates of the effects of changes in child benefit payments. 
In specification 12 in both table F.13 and table F.14, for example, removing all 
LVCF/NVCB cases leads to the negative association between child benefit and the gender 
gap for men and women with moderate education moving out of significance, while 
conversely in specification 18 in both table F.13 and table F.14 removing LVCF/NVCB 
cases leads to the negative association between child benefit and the gender gap for men 
and women with high education moving into of significance at the 5% level. The former 
two can both be explained mostly by the loss of observations for France between 2003 and 
2010 – where decreases in the generosity of childcare payments coincide to some degree 
with increases in the gender gap in labour participation among 30-34 year olds with 
moderate education – while the latter two can be explained by deletion of observations for 
Italy in 2009 and 2010. In all cases though a negative relation between changes in child 
benefit payments and the gender gap in labour force participation is a little hard to explain 
theoretically, particularly for highly educated men and women who are less likely to suffer 
from a liquidity constraint on a second earner’s labour supply decision (see chapter 7.3). 
 
Lastly, similar to several other models of the gender gap in labour force participation (for 
example, the models for 25-54 year olds by levels of education shown in tables F.9 and 
F.10), removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB from models of the gender gap among 
30-34 year olds again leads to the negative coefficients on flat-rate parental and childcare 
leave (specification 12 in table F.13) and childcare leave (specification 12 in table F.14) 
moving into significance.  As discussed earlier, the latter association in particular is 
curious given that childcare leaves are theoretically unlikely to close gender gaps in labour 
participation. Again though, both can be mostly explained by the loss of the observation 
for Denmark in 1992, which precedes decreases in Danish childcare leave and increases in 
the gender gap in participation at moderate levels of education.  
 
F.10. Female share of managers by level of education (all ages) 
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Tables F.15 and F.16 show results for models of the female share of managers among 
managers with low, medium and high education when any cases imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB are removed. In both tables, specifications 1, 7 and 13 are the original models 
shown earlier in the main body, with 2-5, 8-11 and 14-17 models with any cases imputed 
using LVCF/NVCB on the affected variables removed individually, and 6, 12 and 18 
models with all cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB removed. Once more, it should be noted 
here that because of missing data on the dependent variable, the original models use no 
cases where data for tax support for the family are imputed using LVCF/NVCB. As a result, 
models 5, 11 and 17 are left blank.   
 
Removing cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB makes little real difference to results for those 
variables that use data imputed using LVCF/NVCB. Specification 9 in table F.16, for 
example, shows that removing any cases that use LVCF/NVCB to impute data for the 
proportion of children aged 3-6 in public pre-primary or primary school shifts to the 
negative association between the variable and the female share of moderately educated 
managers from significance at the 10% level to significance at the 5% level. Conversely, 
specification 15 in table F.16 shows that removing the same LVCF/NVCB cases has the 
opposite effect on the positive association between the proportion of 3-6 year olds in 
public pre-primary or primary school and the female share of highly educated managers, 
with the coefficient shifting from significant at the 5% level to significant at the 10% level. 
However, in both cases the same relations were already and remain significant in 
specifications 9 and 15 in table F.15, and in any case the estimated coefficients remain 
only fairly small – the largest estimated effect of a 49 percentage point change in the 
proportion of 3-6 year olds in public pre-primary education is a 2.7 percentage point 
decrease in the female share of managers with moderate education (specification 9 in 
table F.16). Thus, any change in results here does not lead to major differences in broader 
inferences regarding the influence of public care for older children on the female share of 
managers.  
 
Elsewhere, deleting cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB has some impact on associations for 
those variables that do not themselves used any data imputed through LVCF/NVCB. 
Removing all such cases from model A in table 7.8, for instance, shifts the negative 
coefficient on flat-rate parental and childcare leave into significance at the 5% level 
(specification 6 in table F.15). This would, if valid, provide stronger evidence to suggest 
that changes in leave policies are particularly (and only) harmful to the careers of less 
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educated women. It is, however, driven entirely by the deletion of observations for 
Portugal between 2005-2010, where a substantial decrease in the female share of less 
educated managers coincides with no change in flat-rate parental and childcare leave. 
Thus, removing these cases also removes important uncertainty and counter-information 
from the model.  
 
Specification 18 in table F.16, meanwhile, shows that the positive association between 
changes in total general leave available to mothers and the female share of highly 
educated managers moves into significance once any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are 
removed from model F in table 7.8. This would if correct provide stronger evidence to 
suggest that increasing leave actually promotes, not constrains, the career attainment of 
highly educated women. It can though be explained mostly by the loss of cases for Ireland 
between 2004 and 2010 and Portugal between 2005 and 2010, where in both cases the 
female share of managers with high education increases without help from major changes 
in the total length of general leave available to mothers. 
 
Lastly, several specifications across tables F.15 and F.16 show that removing any cases 
imputed using LVCF/NVCB leads to changes in associations on father-specific leave. More 
specifically, specification 12 in both table F.15 and table F.16 show that when LVCF/NVCB 
cases are removed from models of the female share of moderately educated managers, the 
positive coefficient on father-specific leave moves into significance, while specification 18 
in both table F.15 and table F.16 suggests the opposite is true for the female share of 
highly educated managers – when LVCF/NVCB cases are removed from these models, the 
negative coefficient on father-specific leave moves into significance. The latter relation 
make little theoretical sense – it is difficult to see how an increase in paternity and other 
father-specific leaves could damage highly educated women’s relative access to 
managerial positions. In all cases though, the changes can again be explained entirely by 
the deletion of observations for Ireland between 2004 and 2010 – where increases in the 
female share of managers with both moderate and high education coincides with no 
change in father-specific leave – and for Portugal between 2005 and 2010, where an 
increase in father-specific leave coincides with fluctuations in the female share of 
moderately educated managers and importantly increases in the female share of highly 
education managers. Thus, again, deleting these cases risks removing important 
uncertainty and producing misleading results.  
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F.11. Gender gap in the proportion of employees with top-quintile annual earnings 
by level of education (25-54) 
 
Lastly, table F.17 and F.18 shows results for models of the gender gap in top quintile 
earnings by levels of education when any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB are removed. 
Specifications 1, 7 and 13 are again the original models shown earlier in the main body, 
with 2-5, 8-11 and 14-17 models with any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB on the four 
affected variables removed individually, and 6, 12 and 18 models with all cases imputed 
using LVCF/NVCB removed. Again, for ease of interpretation, the variable(s) with cases 
removed is highlighted in bold.  
 
Removing cases imputed through LVCF/NVCB from models of the gender gap in top 
quintile earnings leads to a couple of changes in results for those variables that contain 
data imputed using LVCF/NVCB. More specifically, in specifications 2 and 14 in table F.17, 
removing any cases imputed using LVCF/NVCB for the proportion of 0-2 year olds in 
public or public-funded childcare leads to the negative coefficients on the variable 
dropping out of significance at the 10% level, while specification 14 in table F.18 shows 
something similar, albeit with the coefficient in question moving out of significance from 
the stronger 5% level. In all three cases, these alternative results weaken the suggestion 
put forward in the main body that increasing public childcare for very young children may 
help promote female career attainment. Importantly though, this suggestion was only 
cautious, and was made in conjunction with similar and stronger associations from models 
of the female share of managers across levels of education. Notably, results shown earlier 
in tables F.15 and F.16 suggest that changes in the proportion of 0-2 year olds in public 
childcare continue to share a significant positive association with changes in the female 
share of managers with low and high education even after cases imputed using 
LVCF/NVCB are removed from the analysis. Thus, although the changes shown in tables 
F.17 and F.18 are slightly concerning, there remains substantial evidence to suggest that 
increasing public childcare for very young children may help promote female career 
attainment.  
 
Finally, similar to the models for the overall gender gap in top quintile earnings shown 
earlier in table F.8, removing all LVCF/NVCB cases from models of gender gaps in top 
earnings across levels of education does impact on results for those variables that do not 
suffer from missing data in as much as it again causes the model to collapse almost 
completely (specifications 6, 12 and 18 in both table F.17 and F.18). Almost all significant  
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variables move out of significance even at the 10% level, and many coefficients change 
radically in size and even switch sign. As discussed earlier in section F.6, the most likely 
explanation here is that the deletion of all cases imputed using  LVCF/NVCB reduces the 
sample size to a point where there is little statistical power left in the model, in addition to 
deleting valuable cases. In any case, it is clear that removing these cases radically changes 
estimates to the extent that the final models in specifications in specifications 6, 12 and 18 
in both table F.17 and F.18 are unrecognizable from those presented in the main text.  
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